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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis, I use the metaphysics of the incarnation as a lens for 
investigating how a Christian God relates to time. Parts (i)-(iii) deal in turn with 
a specific aspect, or element, of the incarnation. Each part examines whether 
and how a timeless (atemporal) and a temporal God, respectively, can account 
for that specific incarnational element. These elements are the Son of God 
‘becoming’ incarnate; the incarnate Son being fully divine, fully human and a 
single person; and the Son’s glorification. I argue that a temporal God is 
compatible with all three of these important aspects of the incarnation. 
Comparably, if God is atemporal, I argue that although we can potentially 
make sense of the Son ‘becoming’ incarnate, we cannot account for the other 
two elements of the incarnation. Part (iv) takes a step back from these 
incarnational commitments, and considers debates about the nature of time 
itself: the relationism vs. substantivalism debate, and the tensed vs. tenseless 
time debate. I argue that in previous debates, substantival time has been 
assumed almost exclusively, and that construing time as relational instead looks 
promising for furthering the debate, because it provides us with a new and 
coherent sense of divine temporality. Regarding the tensed vs. tenseless time 
debate, I argue that atemporalists tend to assume that time itself is tenseless; 
and temporalists that it is tensed. I consider how God’s relation to time might 
look if we swap these traditional pairings around. I argue that a timeless God 
existing outside of tensed time is wholly untenable, but that a temporal God 
existing within tenseless time is perfectly coherent. This strengthens my 
argument in Parts (i)-(iii), because it provides the temporalist alone with the 
freedom to choose between tensed and tenseless time, whereas atemporalists 
have only tenseless time to work with. 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
B: The incarnate Son’s human body 
B+S: The incarnate Son’s human body and soul/mind (I’m using ‘soul’ and 
‘mind’ interchangeably) 
DDA: Derivative Divine Atemporality  
DDT: Derivative Divine Temporality 
EMR: Ersatz Modal Realism 
GMR: Genuine Modal Realism 
GS: God the Son 
GS+B+S: The composite Jesus Christ (as three-parter compositionalists would 
allege) 
GTR: General Theory of Relativity  
MST: Moving Spotlight Theory 
NDA: Non-derivative Divine Atemporality 
RR-Relationism: Radically Reductionist Relationism  
S: The incarnate Son’s human soul (used interchangeably with ‘mind’) 
STR: Special Theory of Relativity
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Still, even as a boy watching the hands creep around the clock, or the digital 
hundredths of a second blurring on the stopwatch, I was in awe that 
something was slipping away forever, being replaced by something that had 
never been before. 
 
I wondered what time would look like to God (DeWeese 2004: ix). 
 
(1) MOTIVATIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
If God exists, what is His (or Her, or Its) relation to time? 1 God is 
frequently hailed as ‘eternal’, but it’s unclear what’s meant by this. Our 
understanding of God’s eternity has the potential to be very different, 
depending not only upon how God relates to time, but also upon how we’re 
understanding the nature of time itself. What is clear, however, is the 
significance of asking this question, for it bears importantly on whether and 
how God exists. Nelson Pike recognises that ‘a good deal rests on how one 
interprets [the predicate ‘eternal’] when attempting to construct, comprehend 
or evaluate a theological system’ (1970: x). Here, Pike states the importance of 
considering God’s relation to time, hinting at how tightly our answer to this 
question is interwoven with the answers that we would (and could) give to 
other questions about the nature of God, and the possibility of God’s 
existence. It’s from this latter angle that I’ve come to be so interested in God’s 
relation to time. I’m agnostic about God’s existence, but ‘actively’ so: for a long 
time, I’ve been interested in philosophical arguments both for and against it. In 
                                                             
1 Henceforth, I’ll refer to God using the male pronoun, for ease of consistency with the 
many quotations that I’ll draw upon in this thesis. However, I (of course) want to remain 
neutral regarding God’s gender, or lack thereof.  
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particular, I’m interested in metaphysical arguments for and against God’s 
existence. Braiding this together with an independent interest in the 
metaphysics of time, I was led to the wealth of literature on God’s relation to 
time, and in turn to contemplate the topic of this thesis.  
 The question of how God relates to time is an age-old one that can be 
traced back to Augustine (c.397-400 CE) [1912]) and Boethius (c. 524 CE 
[1969]).  Moreover, it’s still being hotly contested to this day, with the likes of 
Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann (1981), together with Brian Leftow 
(2007) and Ryan Mullins (2016), to name but a few, making important waves in 
the debate. This thesis approaches this ancient question from a fresh angle: it 
focuses specifically on how a Christian God relates to time, and uses the 
doctrine of the incarnation of the Son of God as a lens for carrying out this 
investigation. That is, I privilege incarnational commitments as central and 
non-negotiable, and examine how these affect the debate over God’s relation 
to time. The reason for this privileging of the incarnation is due to its centrality 
to the Christian faith. The Son’s becoming human is what made possible the 
Atonement: the reconciling of humankind with God, repairing the broken 
relationship that existed beforehand.2  
But what of the relationship between the incarnation and divine 
eternity? The incarnation is in fact bound up in important ways with temporal 
considerations, and with the ‘eternity’ of God Himself. After all, according to 
the Christian tradition, Christ incarnate was a walking, talking, temporal being: 
He was born, He was later baptised, and He lived for 33 years. Millard J. 
Erickson remarks that the Son incarnate ‘ate, paid taxes, and did all the normal 
day-to-day activities that humans do’ (1991: 21), thus drawing attention to the 
temporality of the Son’s incarnate life. Knowing that I’d need to narrow my 
focus to just one religion, it’s for this reason that I chose to explore the 
Christian religion specifically in this thesis. The incarnation has particular and 
blatant links to temporal issues in that Jesus Christ, God incarnate, was 
evidently a temporal being.  
                                                             
2 I’m going to be using the terms ‘The Son’, ‘the Word’ and ‘GS’ (God the Son) 
interchangeably. They all pick out the second person of the Trinity. Importantly, ‘Jesus 
Christ’ also (allegedly) picks out this same person, but in human form – although we’ll see 
that different accounts of the incarnation tell different stories about how this can be the 
case.  
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In spite of this, I’m confident that this thesis still bears upon debate 
that reaches beyond the parameters of the philosophy of Christianity. This is 
for several reasons. Firstly, incarnation is by no means unique to Christianity, 
and I think that my general methodology (prioritising incarnational 
commitments to investigate divine eternity) could equally be utilised in the 
philosophy of other religions, with the potential to yield further interesting 
results. Secondly, it will become clear that my final two chapters take 
something of a step back from the Christian faith. They consider more 
generally how debates in the metaphysics of time can bear upon the picture of 
God’s relation to time – where ‘God’ can be understood as (I think) a God of 
theism in general.  
Returning to the Christian incarnation, the topic of this thesis is how 
this act affects our understanding of divine eternity. My central research 
question is therefore:  
 
Assuming an orthodox understanding of the doctrine of the incarnation, what does this tell us 
about God’s relation to time? 
 
This question requires me to specify in more detail what I mean by an 
‘orthodox’ understanding of the incarnation, which I’ll do shortly. I’ll also 
specify the two traditional (and opposed) accounts of God’s relation to time. 
Furthermore, later in the thesis I’ll consider different ways that we might 
understand the nature of time itself – and how these differing understandings 
can be brought to bear upon this central research question. 
  Taking this research question in its entirety, I’ll privilege the doctrine of 
the incarnation as non-negotiable, and then consider how, in light of this 
indispensable commitment, God can be said to relate to time. In so doing, I 
hope to shed fresh light onto our understanding of the Christian concept of an 
‘eternal’ God. A number of other authors hint at the importance of prioritising 
the incarnation. Richard A. Holland, for instance, urges that ‘the Christian 
doctrine of the Incarnation should function as the centrepiece in the debate 
and the lens through which the topic [of God’s relation to time] ought to be 
examined’ (2012: 58). Similarly, Stephen T. Davis remarks that ‘the doctrine 
that “God became man in Jesus Christ” is universally recognised by Christians 
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as being at the heart of their faith. The theological stakes could not be higher’ 
(1983: 119). More recently, Mullins has remarked that ‘since the incarnation is 
part of the hardcore of every Christian research program, it is a non-negotiable 
doctrine’ (2016: 157). Moreover, it’s worth noting that how God relates to time 
is an issue that’s (as exemplified by this thesis) very much up for debate, 
whereas the incarnation, and the elements of it that I’m privileging in this 
thesis, isn’t disputed by Christians. 3  This further justifies my use of the 
incarnation as a constraint in my consideration of how a Christian God relates 
to time. I’ll now outline the two traditional ways of understanding divine 
eternity. Both views have plenty of supporters, and the debate between the two 
positions is very much alive.  
 The first account of God’s relation to time is that He’s timeless, 
or atemporal: that He exists ‘outside’ of time and views all events in time as if in 
one ‘simultaneous present’. 4 There are no temporal stages in an atemporal 
God’s life. Recently, Mullins has provided a clear and comprehensive definition 
of atemporality: ‘God is timeless if and only if God exists (i) without 
beginning, (ii) without end, and (iii) without succession. To say that God exists 
without succession means that God does not do one thing, and then another’ 
(2016: xvi). God’s atemporality is perhaps most famously expressed by 
Boethius as ‘the complete, simultaneous and perfect possession of everlasting 
life’ (1969: 163). An analogy, also tracing back to Boethius (ibid.: 165), is often 
drawn to standing on a hilltop and surveying the view below all at once: God 
(although Himself not in time as our hilltop observer would be) perceives the 
temporal spread all at once, despite us temporal creatures in the valley below 
experiencing each moment as we come to it. A similar analogy is helpfully 
drawn to a circle, whose circumference is equally present to the centre point 
                                                             
3 What is disputed, of course, is the way that the specifics of the incarnation can be 
metaphysically cashed out. This debate will be extremely important in this thesis, but 
doesn’t detract from my above assertion that the incarnation itself isn’t questioned by 
Christians.  
4 The word ‘simultaneous’ (or some variant of it) is often used when describing an 
atemporal God’s perspective on the world. It’s used, for instance, in Boethius’ famous 
expression of God’s atemporality, which is outlined in the main text below. Similarly, 
Mullins says that ‘a timeless God does not experience one moment of time after another. 
Instead, a timeless God experiences His life all at once’ (2016: xvi: my italics). However, it’s 
important to note that simultaneity is itself a temporal relation, and so not one that can 
apply to a timeless God. The use of this word in discussion of a timeless God is, then, 
merely an attempt at describing what time would look like for atemporal God. I’ll follow 
others in using it, but I do so for want of a better word.  
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(or God), but for any given point on the circumference, some points are much 
closer to it than others. Katherin Rogers says that this analogy is ‘especially apt 
because the centre point is seen not only as present to the circumference, but 
as its source’ (1994: 5), which is also the case for God, who created humankind. 
I’ll henceforth refer to proponents of this view of God’s relation to time as 
‘atemporalists’.  
The rival view is that God is temporal, that He exists ‘within’ time as we 
do, experiencing each moment as it passes. A God existing in this relation to 
time is sometimes described as ‘sempiternal’. Unlike us humans, a temporal 
God would be backwardly and forwardly everlasting, but, as with us, moments 
of His life can be said to have passed, with other moments still to come. To 
help us compare God’s temporality with His atemporality, Mullins provides the 
following conditions which he deems to be a necessary and sufficient 
guarantee of temporality: ‘God is temporal if and only if God exists (i) without 
beginning, (ii) without end, and (iii) with succession. The life of a temporal 
God is characterised by a succession of moments’ (2016: xvi). It’s important to 
note that only the final attribute has changed here from Mullins’ definition of a 
timeless God: whether or not God’s life comprises a succession of moments is 
what distinguishes a temporal God from a timeless one. Henceforth, I’ll refer 
to proponents of God’s temporality as ‘temporalists’.  
Typically, philosophers working within the Christian tradition have 
argued for one or other of these views and then later, if at all, suggested how 
their chosen account can be squared with the doctrine of the incarnation of the 
Son of God. However, due to the centrality of this doctrine to the Christian 
faith, I maintain that we should prioritise the incarnation, and use it as the 
initial lens for examining the coherence of different accounts of God’s relation 
to time. More specifically, I’ll prioritise what I consider to be the three most 
important and indispensable elements of the incarnation, and examine how, or 
whether, these can cohere with the accounts of God’s eternity. These three 
elements will be explained in more detail in my thesis outline, but briefly, for 
now, they’re: i) the Son of God ‘becoming’ incarnate, ii) the incarnate Son 
being fully divine, fully human and a single person, and iii) the Son’s 
glorification. I’ll now outline some important constraints that an account of the 
incarnation must meet. 
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(2) SOME CONSTRAINTS FROM ORTHODOXY 
Before detailing my thesis outline, it’s important to qualify some 
boundaries: any account of the incarnation must be faithful to orthodoxy (and, 
as such, mustn’t stray into heresy). This imposition of orthodox boundaries is 
by no means an outrageous one: it indeed structures the vast bulk of the 
Christian tradition within which I’m working. In fact, in the literature of the 
metaphysics of the incarnation, the charging of one’s opponent(s) with straying 
into unorthodoxy is a common occurrence.  
In particular, it’s the Chalcedonian ‘definition’ of the incarnation that I 
want to remain faithful to. Again, this is a decision that I made because it’s in 
keeping with the philosophical literature on the incarnation, which takes 
Chalcedon to be orthodox. Sarah Coakley explains this use of Chalcedon as a 
‘guide’ in one’s theorising about the incarnation. She says: 
 
What category or genre of text, then, is the Chalcedonian ‘Definition’? If 
my interpretation is right, it is clearly regulatory and binding as a 
‘pattern’ endorsed by an ecumenical council: reflections on Christ’s 
person must henceforth pass through this ‘grid’, as I put it (2002: 161-
2). 
 
I’ll be taking a similar approach in this thesis: using the Chalcedonian 
‘definition’ as a regulatory guide that a satisfactory account of the incarnation 
must satisfy. Importantly, though, Coakley views Chalcedon simply a linguistic 
guide to orthodoxy: one that shapes how we’re to talk about the incarnation 
(ibid.: 144). I, however, will use Chalcedon as a ‘grid’ to consider and shape our 
ontological claims about the incarnation. I want my metaphysics of the incarnation 
to be orthodox, because it’s this that I’m employing to examine God’s relation 
to time.  
The Chalcedonian Creed (AD 451) holds, among other things, the 
following commitments: 
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i) Before time began he was begotten of the Father, in respect of his deity, and now 
in these ‘last days,’…this selfsame one was born of Mary the virgin…in respect 
of his human-ness (John H. Leith (ed.) 1963: 36) 
ii) The distinctiveness of each nature is not nullified by the union…they are not 
divided or cut into two, but are together the one and only and only-begotten 
Logos of God, the Lord Jesus Christ (ibid.) 
iii) [Jesus Christ] ascended to heaven, where He sits at the Father’s right hand 
(ibid.: 24) 
 
It’s these three commitments that I’m privileging in this thesis. What I take 
from (i) is that the Son of God was wholly divine ‘before’ the incarnation, but 
He then ‘became’ incarnate (being born of Mary) as a human being.5 This is of 
course important because of, firstly, the sacrifice that the Son made in 
becoming incarnate – He was once wholly divine, but He (freely) chose to take 
on human form in addition to this. Clause (ii) details the important 
commitment that the incarnate Son possessed a fully human and a fully divine 
nature – and these belonged to Him (a single person). It’s important that the 
divine Son took on a genuine human nature here, so that His later ascension into 
Heaven can make it possible for other humans to achieve salvation. It’s also 
important that He remains divine, otherwise it won’t after all have been the 
Son of God who became human. Finally, (iii) details the fact that the Son of 
God rose into Heaven, where He exists (be this atemporally or temporally) to 
this day. As mentioned, this ‘glorification’ is important because it’s part of the 
process that created the possibility for the rest of humanity to achieve salvation 
themselves, thus completing the restoration of the relationship between God 
and humankind.  
 There is, however, an important tension that lies between my central 
research question and the Chalcedonian ‘definition’ of the incarnation. This is, 
as Leftow puts it, that ‘it is a simple historical fact that those who defined 
                                                             
5 This notion of the Son being unincarnate ‘before’ the incarnation doesn’t have to be read 
in a temporal sense. For instance, when Paul Helm discusses the Son being begotten of 
the Father ‘before’ all time, this is to be read in a non-temporal sense. He provides the 
examples of duty being before pleasure and the Queen before the Prime Minister to 
illustrate this; here we read ‘before’ as denoting a relation of superiority; a sort of non-
temporal precedence. Similarly, the Son could exist in an unincarnate state ‘before’ the 
incarnation ‘in the nature of his being’, because He doesn’t depend upon time and creation 
for his existence (1994: 323). 
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orthodox Christian belief about the incarnation universally held that God is 
non‐temporal’ (2002: 273). If the Church Fathers who set out the 
Chalcedonian definition of the incarnation all agreed that God was timeless, 
how can I then use the Chalcedonian creed as a guide in a debate that involves 
calling into question this very divine timelessness? My answer is that 
Chalcedon is about the incarnation, and it’s these (orthodox) incarnational 
specifics that I’m holding fixed. This doesn’t mean that I can’t interpret these 
specifics in different ways – which includes considering interpretations that the 
church Fathers perhaps wouldn’t have been happy with. The restriction I’m 
imposing is only that my account of the incarnation must be orthodox, and in 
line with Chalcedon itself.  
 In order to remain orthodox in this way, it’s important that I steer clear 
of common heresies regarding the incarnation. There are three that will be of 
greatest relevance to this thesis, and I’ll outline them here. The first of these is 
Nestorian heresy, and it involves claiming that there are in fact two persons in 
Christ – one of which is human, and the other, divine (Hill 2011: 2). To 
endorse this view would be to depart from the orthodoxy of Chalcedon, which 
we’ve seen emphasises the unity of Christ’s divine and human natures into one 
single person. The second heresy that will be relevant to this thesis is 
Apollinarianism. This is the heresy that, upon incarnation, the Son of God 
displaces Christ’s human soul (or mind) (ibid.: 9-10). This would therefore 
mean that the incarnate Son isn’t sufficiently human, as is required by the 
Chalcedonian creed. There’s another heresy which seems to me to be a broader 
species of Apollinarianism: Eutycheanism, according to which ‘Christ’s divinity 
swamps His humanity’ (ibid.: 2). This would again be unacceptable according 
to the Chalcedonian definition of the incarnation, which states that ‘the 
distinctiveness of each nature is not nullified by the union’. More specifically, 
Anna Marmodoro and Jonathan Hill cite Eutyches as reportedly claiming that: 
‘I acknowledge that our Lord came into being from two natures before the 
union, but after the union I acknowledge one nature’ (2008: 108). This single 
nature is interpreted as meaning a divine nature, such that the incarnate Christ 
doesn’t possess a human nature (ibid.).  
 These three heresies will come to be important when I discuss various 
metaphysical accounts of the incarnation over the course of this thesis. Having 
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outlined these heresies, and explained how they diverge from the orthodox 
Chalcedonian creed that I’m privileging in this thesis, I’ll now proceed to 
outline the structure of the thesis. In so doing, I’ll also illustrate in more detail 
the three specific incarnational commitments (derived from Chalcedon) that 
I’m privileging as sacrosanct in my examination of God’s relation to time.  
  
(3) OUTLINE 
My thesis comprises four parts, with two chapters in each. The first 
three parts each take a specific, indispensable aspect of the incarnation 
(outlined in the previous section), and devote a two-chapter treatment to it. 
They examine whether God’s atemporality and temporality, respectively, can 
make sense of the aspect of the incarnation in question.  
By the Son’s ‘becoming’ incarnate, I mean His taking on of human 
flesh, and living among us as the human Jesus. I’m upholding this incarnational 
commitment in line with orthodoxy: the Son wasn’t always human, since there 
was a time ‘before’ the incarnation where He existed unincarnate. 6 This 
incarnational commitment is important because the Son’s prerogative was to 
remain unincarnate: He needn’t have become a human, but He did so in order to 
atone for the sins of humankind. The Son’s giving up of His state of exclusive 
divinity was therefore a sacrifice that He freely made, and any account of the 
incarnation must honour this important commitment. The first two chapters 
of the thesis therefore consider what account atemporalists, and temporalists, 
respectively, can give of the Son’s becoming incarnate.  
Chapter 1 considers what story the atemporalist can tell about this 
‘change’ that the Son undergoes when He becomes a human. I consider three 
types of change in turn, which I take to be exhaustive. I argue firstly that 
intrinsic change isn’t something that a timeless God can undergo, because it 
requires God Himself to be one way (unincarnate) at one time, and another 
way (incarnate) at a later time, which thus introduces sequence into His life. 
Such sequence isn’t possible for a timeless being, I argue. I then consider two 
other ways that the atemporalist might be able to claim that the Son changed 
                                                             
6 I explained above that ‘before’ here can be read in a non-temporal sense, so this use of it 
doesn’t beg the question against the atemporalist. 
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when He became incarnate. The first of these stems from a brief remark by 
Leftow, who says that the Son can take on flesh in virtue of exhibiting modal 
variation (2002: 299). I attempt to unpack this remark, treating it as amounting 
to the claim that there’s a type of timeless change made up of variation across 
possible worlds: in some possible worlds, the Son becomes incarnate, and in 
others, He doesn’t. Exhibiting such modal variation doesn’t require one to be 
subject to the passage of time, I suggest, because of all modal facts being fixed 
in either their truth or their falsity. However, after unpacking this account of 
modal variation as it might be understood by genuine modal realists, and 
ersatzists, respectively, I argue that Leftow’s modal claim can’t in fact give us 
the cross-worldly variation that is desired. Furthermore, I argue that Leftow’s 
claim undermines the sense in which the incarnation was a free act of grace on 
God’s part, insofar as we wish to be libertarians about divine freedom. 
Therefore, Leftow’s ‘modal variation’ claim can’t be appealed to as a means of 
explaining how the Son of God ‘changed’ upon becoming incarnate.  
In considering a final type of change, I return to the idea of change 
requiring time, but consider the possibility of intrinsic change happening to 
something else, such that the Son becomes incarnate in virtue of a change 
merely extrinsic to Himself. I argue that extrinsic change gives us a provisionally 
viable means of explaining how a timeless God becomes incarnate: the Son 
Himself changes in virtue of a human body, together with perhaps a human 
mind or soul, coming into existence and becoming related to Him (despite that 
He himself undergoes no intrinsic change).7 This is comparable to my changing 
to become a sister: I changed from ‘not being a sister’ to ‘being a sister’ when 
my sister was born, but in order for this to happen I needn’t have changed 
intrinsically at all. Moreover, to be subject to an extrinsic change means that 
one needn’t be subject to the passage of time, I argue. I explain that this 
requires one to subscribe to a specific model of the incarnation – a 
compositionalist account, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 2 and 
3. According to such accounts, the Son of God (GS) is a part of a divine 
composite, which has as its other parts a human body (B) – as well as, perhaps 
– a human soul (S). With (what I think are) all the options for ways that a 
                                                             
7 Henceforth, I use the terms ‘soul’ and ‘mind’ interchangeably, as is common in this 
debate. I also want to remain neutral regarding what (if anything, in the case of a soul), 
they refer to. 
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timeless God can become incarnate on the table and scrutinised, I conclude 
that atemporalists can, thanks only to an appeal to extrinsic change, make sense 
of the Son becoming incarnate.  
In Chapter 2, I consider how the temporalist can uphold the important 
incarnational commitment that the Son ‘became’ incarnate. I note firstly that 
temporalists, unlike their atemporalist rivals, can claim that the Son ‘took on’ 
flesh by undergoing an intrinsic change – because temporalists are, by 
definition, perfectly happy with God being subject to the passage of time. I 
consider two different ways that temporalists might model the Son’s becoming 
incarnate. Firstly, they might argue that the Word takes on flesh by becoming 
united with a human body (and perhaps a human soul as well) to form a divine 
composite that is Jesus Christ. This is a type of ‘compositionalist’ account, 
which I introduced above. Alternatively, temporalists could adopt a 
‘transformationalist’ account, whereby ‘to become human means to be 
transformed into a human’ (Hill 2011: 8).8 Hill defines ‘transformed’ here as 
‘roughly…a process in which a single subject loses some properties…and 
acquires new properties’ (ibid.). Importantly, atemporalists don’t have the 
resources to appeal to transformationalist accounts, because there’s no doubt 
that these require intrinsic change. I deal briefly with temporalist 
compositionalist accounts, arguing that they’re as least as viable as their 
atemporalist counterparts discussed in Chapter 1, and probably more so. The 
bulk of the chapter is then devoted to examining transformationalist accounts, 
which I argue are preferable for temporalists.  
I consider a challenge to transformationalist accounts, which comes 
from kind-essentialism, the thesis that: ‘if something is a member of a [natural] 
kind, then it is essentially a member of that [natural] kind’ (Sharpe 2017: 119). 
If ‘human’ is a natural kind, and kind-essentialism is true, then it seems 
impossible for the Son to become human, because it’s impossible for something 
human to exist without being human. There’s also another commitment which 
Kevin Sharpe argues is a species of kind-essentialism: ‘For any kind K, there is 
a set of modal properties, M, such that necessarily, for any x, x is a member of 
kind K if and only if x has the members of M’ (ibid.). This commitment also 
                                                             
8 Whatever a human may be. I want to remain neutral between rival accounts of what it is 
to be a human being. 
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has the potential to cause problems for the transformationalist if there are 
modal properties belonging to the kinds ‘divine’ and ‘human’ that are in 
conflict with one another. 9  This would make it such that nothing can 
simultaneously be a member of the kinds ‘divine’ and ‘human’, which would of 
course be highly problematic for the possibility of the incarnation. 
I proceed to outline and examine various responses that are available to 
transformationalists in the face of these objections. I firstly suggest an 
argument, due to Thomas Morris, that one can draw a distinction between 
being ‘fully’ and ‘merely’ human (1986: 65). This is fleshed out by Sharpe’s 
suggestion that, if we revise our traditional understanding of kind-essentialism, 
we are able to account for the divine becoming human. However, I next argue 
that Sharpe’s revised kind-essentialism leaves any sense of the Son’s being ‘fully 
human’ looking rather impoverished. I therefore seek to patch this up. I 
distinguish between the taking on of an ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ human nature, 
due to Alvin Plantinga (1999: 183). Thanks to this distinction, I argue that we 
can explain how the Son is ‘truly human’ if we postulate what concrete thing 
He transforms into in order that He count as a human. As a case study, I 
discuss physicalism about human persons – in particular, Trenton Merricks’s 
version of physicalism (2007), which claims that the Son is fully human 
because He is identical with – and so, transforms into – a human body. 
Having examined what atemporalists and temporalists can say about 
the Son ‘becoming’ human, Part two of my thesis considers the Son’s attributes 
when He is incarnate. According to orthodoxy, the incarnate Son of God is 
fully divine and fully human, and yet is one single person. Mullins comments 
that ‘in the one person Jesus Christ, humanity and divinity are perfectly united. 
Not only is it possible for divinity and humanity to be united, they are in fact 
united and the incarnation is a demonstration of that fact’ (2016: 178). It’s been 
notoriously difficult to formulate a coherent account of how it is that Christ’s 
divine and human natures (with their vastly different characteristics) can 
belong to one person in a way that doesn’t entail a contradiction. This has been 
called the problem of ‘incoherence’ (Hill 2011: 2) – henceforth, the 
‘incoherence problem’. For instance, how can the person that is Christ 
                                                             
9 I also discuss whether or not ‘divine’ can reasonably be thought of as a ‘kind’. 
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incarnate be both omnipotent and limited in power? I discuss various 
attempted solutions to this problem in light of God’s relation to time.   
Chapter 3 argues that atemporalists can’t provide a satisfactory response 
to the incoherence problem. I discuss the compositionalist models of the 
incarnation that Leftow (2002: 273-299) and Stump (2002: 197-218) have 
employed to answer this challenge. I examine their different uses of 
reduplication of parts of a composite Christ to resolve contradiction. They 
propose that we ascribe the opposing properties to two different parts (or 
natures) of Jesus (divine and human), rather than to the person simpliciter. For 
instance, Christ would be omnipotent qua divine nature, and limited in power 
qua human nature.  
I examine Leftow and Stump’s ‘reduplication’ arguments as applied to 
what I consider to be the strongest model of atemporalist compositionalism – 
the ‘hierarchy of natures’ account, which is due to Marmodoro and Hill (2010: 
469). I draw out the problems with the proposed solution of reduplication, 
arguing that it leads to a dilemma for the atemporalist. On the one hand, it 
steers one dangerously towards Nestorian heresy (where there are unacceptably 
two persons in Christ). For example, atemporalists must maintain that GS is a 
person, and that He’s timelessly incarnate. But we also have B and S, and in the 
case of the rest of us humans, these elements would compose a person on their 
own. On top of this, the composite itself (GS+B+S) seems to be another 
reasonable candidate for personhood – in which case we’d have three persons in 
Christ. I outline and anticipate atemporalist responses to this charge, arguing 
that to the extent that they succeed in defending the status of Christ incarnate 
as a single person, they unacceptably end up denying Him a human mind. This 
is the other horn of the dilemma, and is also Apollinarian heresy, which 
therefore leads the atemporalist into unorthodoxy. Furthermore, denying 
Christ a human mind looks problematic for preserving His human nature, 
which is of course a crucial element of this part of my thesis. I therefore 
conclude that atemporalists can’t satisfactorily respond to the incoherence 
problem. 
I’ve mentioned that temporalists have more ways of modelling the 
incarnation at their disposal: they (unlike atemporalists) can appeal to 
transformationalist models, whereby the Son undergoes an intrinsic change 
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when He becomes incarnate. In Chapter 4, I argue that temporalists do have 
the resources to combat the incoherence problem. I firstly consider a strategy, 
due to Morris (1986: 103) and Richard Swinburne (1994: 202), called the ‘two 
minds’ (or ‘divided mind’) model. According to this model, when the Son 
becomes incarnate the divine mind either voluntarily splits (divided mind), or is 
joined by a human mind (two minds). We then have a human mind (or stream 
of consciousness) in Christ, in addition to the divine one. It’s this that enables 
the Son to be fully human (as well as fully divine), according to two minds 
theorists. Furthermore, different properties can be attributed to the different 
minds, such that – allegedly – these properties aren’t in conflict. For example, 
the divine mind continues to be omniscient and omnipotent, as well as to 
possess all of the other requisites for divinity. The human mind is fallible and 
limited in power, and unaware that it’s at all divine.  I consider two different 
ways of interpreting the two minds view. I argue that there are problems with 
both of these interpretations, such that they’re unable to respond to the 
incoherence problem.  
I next consider an alternative temporalist model: kenoticism – which is 
a form of transformationalism. According to kenoticism, the Son freely chose 
to divest Himself of the divine properties of omniscience and omnipotence 
when He became incarnate, because of His love for humankind and His desire 
to truly know our condition. The kenoticist argues that the incarnate Son is 
fully human thanks to His divestiture of omniscience and omnipotence, as well 
as His possession of a limited human body. Kenoticists allegedly face problems 
accounting for the Son’s divinity, because He has given up His omniscience 
and omnipotence, which are commonly thought to be essential divine 
properties. Furthermore, kenoticists must be able to explain how Christ 
incarnate counts as one single person. This latter duty remains challenging 
because there are still other divine properties (omnibenevolence, and necessary 
existence, for example), which look difficult to reconcile with the Son’s 
humanity. I argue that kenoticists can respond to these worries, and that they 
can therefore successfully avoid the incoherence problem. At the close of this 
part of the thesis, the temporalist is therefore in a stronger position than the 
atemporalist.  
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Part three turns to consider the final element of the incarnation that 
I’m privileging in this thesis: the glorification of the Son of God. After Jesus 
died on the cross, and was resurrected, He rose into Heaven and was exalted. 
He remains in this state today, according to the temporalist. Alternatively, for 
atemporalists, it’s alleged to be timelessly true that the Son is glorified. The Son’s 
glorification is important because Jesus’ ascension into Heaven is believed to 
have paved the way for the rest of humanity to achieve salvation for 
themselves. Chapters 5 and 6 consider how atemporalists and temporalists, 
respectively, can account for this glorification. Hill (2012) has recently outlined 
two specific ‘glorification requirements’, and I follow Him in prioritising these 
as necessary benchmarks that any credible account of the incarnation must be 
able to meet. These are i) ‘after his death, Jesus both was raised from the dead 
and subsequently ascended into heaven. After these events, he is exalted—i.e., 
he enjoys the full divine life and properties, including omniscience and 
omnipotence’ (2012: 3), and ii) ‘after his exaltation, Jesus remains fully human’ 
(ibid.: 4).  
Chapter 5 firstly explains that atemporalists must understand the above 
requirements in different language that doesn’t attribute sequence to the life of 
Jesus. Hill offers just such an ‘atemporalist friendly’ interpretation of the 
requirements, which I outline. I next argue that atemporalists can successfully 
meet the requirement that the exalted Son is omniscient and omnipotent. 
However, I proceed to argue that they’re unable to satisfy the requirement that 
the Son remains ‘fully human’ when He’s exalted. This is the case even when 
the commitment is phrased in atemporalist-friendly language, such that ‘it’s 
true now’ (at this time) that the Son (who exists atemporally) is fully human.10 I 
explain that atemporalists must understand this claim as meaning that it’s 
timelessly true that the Son is human, and argue that atemporalists are unable to 
provide a satisfactory guarantee of what grounds this timeless truth, without 
resorting to unacceptably temporal concepts. 
  Chapter 6 argues that, although two minds accounts of the 
incarnation aren’t able to meet Hill’s two glorification requirements, kenotic 
models can do so. I explain that the second requirement seems prima facie to 
                                                             
10 As opposed to it being true that the Son is human at this time, which is not something 
that atemporalists can endorse. See Hill 2012: 25 (footnote).  
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present a challenge to kenoticism. This is that, if (as is thought by kenoticists) 
the Son must necessarily give up His omniscience and omnipotence in order to 
become human, then it seems that once He regains these divine attributes, it 
ought to be impossible for Him to be human. However, Hill’s second 
requirement states that the exalted Son is ‘fully human’. I suggest three 
responses available to the kenoticist, endorsing one which qualifies what 
exactly we mean by ‘human’ in such a way that the exalted Son can be human 
and omniscient and omnipotent.  
In light of the discussion in Parts 1, 2 and 3 of my thesis, privileging 
incarnational commitments means that temporalism emerges as by far the 
stronger position than its atemporal rival. Chapter 1 argues that atemporalists 
can provisionally account for the Son becoming incarnate, but only by being 
compositionalists and appealing to extrinsic change on the part of the Son. 
However, Chapters 3 and 5 proceed to argue that atemporal compositionalist 
models can neither avoid the incoherence problem nor account for the Son’s 
glorification. If God is temporal, on the other hand, there’s a way to uphold 
each of these incarnational commitments, but only through adopting a kenotic 
(and so, transformationalist) model of the incarnation.  
When we say that God exists ‘inside’ of ‘time’, though, there are 
different ways in which we might understand this claim. I mentioned above 
that when researching God’s relation to time, it’s important to be clear about 
how one is understanding the nature of time itself. In Part four, the final part 
of my thesis, I therefore take something of a ‘step back’ from these 
incarnational commitments, and consider debates in the metaphysics of time. 
Up until this point I’ve been considering whether God is ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ of 
time, so it’s important to detail what the nature of time itself might be. This part 
of my thesis demonstrates that, depending upon how we do understand the 
nature of time, the way that God might relate to it can vary quite considerably. 
I devote Chapter 7 to the debate between substantivalism and 
relationism, which considers whether time is an entity in itself that God can 
exist ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ of (substantivalism), or whether it’s nothing over and 
above the relations between events and states of affairs (relationism). To say 
that God exists ‘inside’ time therefore has a different meaning, depending on 
which of these theories one endorses.  I argue that substantivalism has been 
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assumed in almost all discussions about God’s relation to time, and that if we 
instead consider time as relational, a whole different picture of God’s relation 
to time emerges. I discuss a recent account in this area from Robin Le 
Poidevin. He argues that if time is relational, then there emerge three distinct 
ways in which God relates to time – two of which are forms of atemporality, 
and one of which is a form of temporality. Explicating Le Poidevin’s account, I 
suggest that his single commitment to God’s temporality is novel and coherent. 
Nevertheless, Le Poidevin’s two ‘atemporal’ commitments, when held together, 
are incoherent, I argue – as well as being subject to independent problems. In 
spite of these criticisms, I reflect again upon the coherence and novelty of Le 
Poidevin’s single commitment to divine temporality, arguing that it provides 
independent support for my more specific claim that incarnational 
commitments reveal a temporal God. More specifically, subscribing to a 
temporal God doesn’t commit one to either substantivalism or relationism about 
time, which is a bonus for temporalism. Atemporalism, on the other hand, 
looks problematic when construed along Le Poidevin’s relationist lines. 
In the final chapter, I outline the debate between tensed and tenseless 
theories of time. I argue that in the foregoing debate over God’s relation to 
time, atemporalists have assumed that time is tenseless, and temporalists that 
it’s tensed. I consider what happens when we shake up these traditional 
pairings. I firstly respond to Leftow’s argument that a timeless God can exist 
outside of (presentist) tensed time, explaining why such a picture is incoherent. 
For good measure, I apply Leftow’s argument to the idea of a timeless God 
existing outside of Growing Block time and Moving Spotlight time, 
respectively, and argue against both of these pictures. This enables me to argue 
that a timeless God existing outside of any form of tensed time is incoherent. 
However, I then elucidate a new (and, I argue, coherent) account of God’s 
relation to time: one where God is temporal, but time is tenseless. I detail the 
features of this position, and suggest how it can reliably account for each of the 
three aspects of the incarnation that I privileged in the previous parts of my 
thesis, understood kenotically. In light of my arguments, I conclude that 
temporalists, unlike their atemporalist rivals, have the luxury of choosing 
between being tensed or tenseless theorists of time.  
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(4) OMISSIONS 
Unfortunately, as much as I want my investigation to be a thorough 
one, there are a number of important issues which I touch upon in this thesis 
that I don’t have the space to discuss in detail. Of greatest note are, I think, 
issues relating to the metaphysics of the Trinity. This is a growing and 
fascinating research area. According to orthodoxy, the Trinity is made up of 
the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, all of which are persons. Importantly, 
they share a single divine essence (Tuggy 2016). There have been two main 
ways of modelling these commitments: Social Trinitarianism and ‘Latin’ or 
‘one-self’ Trinitarianism. 11  I’ll touch upon Trinitarian theories when, for 
instance, I introduce the theory of Social Trinitarianism in Chapter 4 (as well as 
briefly in Chapters 7 and 8). I’ll stipulate that it’s necessary to be a Social 
Trinitarian if one wants to be a kenoticist (but not vice versa). To the extent 
that one accepts this, together with my argument that kenoticism is required to 
model the incarnation, then I venture that one must be committed to Social 
Trinitarianism, too. This is an important consequence of my thesis, but 
unfortunately I don’t have the space to explore this separate debate. I think it’s 
to be expected that debates in the metaphysics of the incarnation are closely 
braided together with debates in the metaphysics of the Trinity, which I hope 
renders my reliance on Social Trinitarianism more palatable. In fact, I hope 
that my drawing out where my discussion connects with the metaphysics of the 
Trinity can be considered interesting in its own right. Ultimately, however, in 
order to give my full attention to the metaphysics of the incarnation, this 
signalling of where my arguments bear upon debates about the metaphysics of 
the Trinity is the best that I can do.  
Relatedly, I’m also unable to discuss in detail the relations between the 
members of the Trinity, and the properties that they share. I’m debating the 
nature of divine eternity, but notably only the Son’s eternity, since I’m 
examining divine eternity using the Son’s incarnation. The question remains, 
then, whether the (a)temporal mode of the Son’s existence can be 
straightforwardly applied to the other two members of the Trinity. Thomas 
Senor argues that if one member of the Godhead possesses a particular 
                                                             
11 For a defence of Social Trinitarianism, see Swinburne (forthcoming). For a defence of 
Latin Trinitarianism, see Leftow (2004). 
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relation to time, all members of the Godhead exist in that same relation (1990: 
159-61). Mullins also suggests that it’s part of Arian heresy to attribute 
timelessness to the Father and temporality to the Son. He says that Arians ‘had 
no qualms denying divine timelessness…[to] the Son. On their understanding, 
only the Father enjoys these particular divine attributes because only the Father 
is the one true God, whereas the Son is a lesser divine being’ (2016: 162). 
I’m certainly inclined to agree with Senor and Mullins, for I feel that if 
different members of the Trinity exist in different relations to time, this is 
driving too much of a wedge between their respective existences. It also seems 
to threaten their shared essence, which we can see above is required by 
orthodoxy. I don’t have the space to argue for this conclusion in my thesis, 
however. I’ll simply venture that all members of the Trinity exist in the same 
relation to time, and hope that this point is relatively uncontentious. At the 
very least, denying it would leave one facing many charges of unorthodox 
Trinitarianism.  
Furthermore, whilst I devote a part of this thesis (Part four) to 
considering debates about the nature of time itself, which have often been 
neglected in considerations of God’s relation to time, I don’t include an in-
depth discussion about the nature of time in light of the Special and General 
theories of Relativity (STR and GTR). I’ll only touch upon these theories in 
Chapter 8 when I mention the independent support for the tenseless theory of 
time, due to STR and GTR being at the forefront of our current ‘best science’. 
I think that a thorough investigation into the nature of God’s eternity in light 
of these theories would be fascinating, but I unfortunately don’t have the space 
to do it here.   
 
(5) OUTCOMES 
My research findings will be significant for a number of reasons. The 
metaphysics of the incarnation is an area that has recently begun to grow, 
particularly with recent contributions from Holland (2012) and Mullins (2016). 
This is therefore an excellent time for me to conduct a full and unique 
examination into how the doctrine of the incarnation affects God’s temporal 
situation. I anticipate that my thesis will be an important contribution to the 
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metaphysics of theism. This is because it’s the first detailed consideration of 
the temporal metaphysics of the incarnation that considers in depth debates in 
the metaphysics of time itself. I argue that these debates have been all-too-
often neglected in discussions of God’s relation to time, with one particular 
conception of time commonly being assumed without being stated. I highlight 
the important bearing that one’s metaphysics of time has on debates about 
divine eternity and the incarnation. It’s therefore particularly thanks to this 
discussion that my thesis is of interest to metaphysicians of time (as well as to 
philosophers of religion). They would, I think, be interested to hear details of 
an argument that Christian commitments can be understood in different ways 
depending on, for instance, whether time is a substantivalist or a relationist, or 
an A-theorist or a B-theorist. 
Furthermore, my research will be of interest to Christian philosophers 
who believe in an eternal, incarnate God. I also speculated above that my 
general methodology is one which could be applied further beyond the 
Christian religion – there are, after all, divine incarnations in many other 
religions, believed in together with divine eternity. The results of my thesis 
ought also to be taken seriously by philosophically-minded atheists. After all, 
these atheists need to be able to justify their beliefs, and discussing God’s 
relation to time is one plausible way to do so. If it can be argued that a 
Christian God can’t consistently exist in any relation to time (be this outside of 
time, inside of time, or in some other relationship to it), then surely there’s no 
mode of existence for this God! This, the atheist could claim, is an important 
stepping stone to the denial of God, given that Christianity is the world’s 
biggest religion. If there are some coherent models of a Christian God’s 
relation to time, however, then atheists would need to justify their (dis)belief 
on other grounds, or else find a way to respond to these arguments.  
Although my main audience is an academic one, the topic of my 
research is of widespread significance. Millions of people around the world 
believe in the doctrine of the incarnation, as well as an eternal God, so it’s 
important to examine whether and how these two claims can be reconciled. 
That the Son of God took on human form as a response to sin is an essential 
Christian belief in itself. Moreover, it has further implications for the faith that 
Christians have that they’ll achieve salvation themselves. The Son of God 
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became human so that the rest of humanity can one day come to share in the 
divine glory. Moreover, this thought bears upon our more general musings, no 
matter what religious beliefs we hold: it’s likely that numerous people, whether 
avowedly religious or not, have hoped (even if considered in vain) to meet 
loved ones again after their death, and we’ve all pondered what an afterlife 
could be like.  
Now that my thesis has been outlined, together with my methodology, 
and now that interests have been (hopefully) sparked from a variety of 
different philosophical camps, we’re ready to begin this investigation into the 
nature of divine eternity.  
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PART I) BECOMING 
INCARNATE 
Because of us men and because of our salvation [The Son] came down and 
became incarnate, becoming man’(Kelly (ed.) 1960: 216, my italics). 
   
A central part of the doctrine of the incarnation is the notion of the 
Son ‘becoming’ incarnate: God choosing to become human. I take A. D. Smith 
to be presenting a challenge to atemporalist and temporalist alike when he says 
that it can’t be that ‘one single individual have a beginning in time and also 
have no such beginning in time’ (1977: 267). I think it’s uncontroversial that 
both atemporalists and temporalists would want to claim that the Son has a 
beginning in time in the sense that Christ has a beginning in time. I also think 
that both would claim that there’s another sense in which the Son has no 
beginning in time: atemporalists because He’s timeless, and temporalists because 
He’s backwardly everlasting, with there being no moment at which He hasn’t 
existed. In fact, it could be added in support of this that it’s Arian heresy to 
affirm that the Son hasn’t always existed (be this in a timeless or a backwardly 
everlasting sense), and so our understanding of the Son’s ‘becoming’ human 
must examine how this pre-existing, ‘unincarnate’ deity ‘became flesh and dwelt 
among us’ (John 1:14).  
Charles Gore says that ‘Jesus Christ, then, in His pre-existent state, was 
living in the permanent characteristics of the life of God. In such a life it was 
His right to remain. It belonged to Him’ (1992: 157). Here, Gore is 
emphasising the supererogatory nature of the act of incarnation. The Son’s 
prerogative was to remain exclusively divine, and yet He chose to become 
human.  Holland says that the Word’s becoming flesh ‘lies at the root of the 
Christian understanding of the Incarnation’ (2012: 59-60). The Son’s becoming 
human has important soteriological aspects because His sacrifice paved the 
way for the rest of humanity to achieve salvation themselves. By living as a 
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human, spreading the word about God’s existence, and suffering and dying on 
the cross as a human, the Son restored humankind’s relationship with God.  
Importantly, this could only be achieved if the Son truly became man: if 
divinity and humanity genuinely united in one single person. It can’t be that the 
Son merely appeared to become the human Jesus, whilst remaining purely 
divine, lest His sacrifice be diminished and our salvation be impossible. Mullins 
says ‘if the incarnation is to be meaningful we must know that God Himself 
has become incarnate’ (2016: 178).  
It’s thus an investigation of the Son ‘becoming’ incarnate that is the 
subject of this part of my thesis. In the first chapter, I examine whether it can 
be upheld in conjunction with divine timelessness. I consider three different 
ways that the atemporalist can account for the Son ‘becoming’ incarnate. I 
argue that two fail, and that one remains on the table as provisionally viable. In 
the second chapter, I consider whether the divine temporalist can account for 
the Son of God ‘becoming’ human – in particular, in the face of worries posed 
by kind-essentialism. I argue that temporalists have the resources to respond to 
these worries, and that as such they can explain this important aspect of the 
incarnation. 
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CHAPTER 1  
CAN A TIMELESS GOD 
‘BECOME’ INCARNATE? 
It’s surely not contestable that Christians regard Jesus Christ as a 
walking, talking temporal being. He lived a life of temporal sequence, being 
born of the Virgin Mary, and later being baptised, before partaking in the last 
supper with His disciples, and finally being tried and crucified. He existed at all 
of these times throughout His earthly life, engaging with and responding to 
those He met. This leaves the atemporalist with a challenge: she must be able 
to account for how the timeless Son of God became this temporal being.1  
When we think about something ‘becoming’ something else, we most 
intuitively imagine some sort of change in that thing. This change also seems to 
be something that a timeless God can’t undergo. Mullins certainly shares this 
intuition. He comments that: 
 
All one needs is a change, any kind of change, in order to have time. 
Any kind of change that a being undergoes will be sufficient for that 
being to be temporal as it will create a before and after in the life of 
that being (2016: 157). 
 
However, the notion of ‘change’ is equivocal. We might understand it 
as either intrinsic or extrinsic. An intrinsic change does indeed require a 
transformation of some sort in the thing that changes. For instance, if I 
                                                             
1 This chapter is an investigation of whether a timeless God can become human – and, 
hence, we’ll see that more broadly it could be considered an examination of whether there 
can be change without time. In light of this, therefore, it can be seen as carrying out a 
converse investigation to Sydney Shoemaker’s – who looks at whether there can be time 
without change (1969: 363-381). Shoemaker uses a thought experiment to argue that there 
are conceivable circumstances in which we’d have good reason to infer that a changeless 
interval has taken place. Conversely, I’ll argue in the ‘extrinsic change’ section of this 
chapter that we have a provisionally viable means of modelling change without time. This 
chapter will therefore provide further support for the thought that the concepts of change 
and time, although very closely related, can indeed come apart.  
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become good at ballroom dancing, I change in being able to perform the heel 
leads and rise and fall that I wasn’t capable of before. This transition therefore 
also requires time in order to take place – there’s a time at which I’m quite good 
at ballroom dancing, and a time when I was comparably worse. Applying this 
to the Son becoming incarnate, then, He Himself would undergo a 
transformation of some sort in order to become incarnate. In this chapter I 
firstly discuss intrinsic change, explaining that it isn’t something that a timeless 
Son could undergo, because intrinsic change requires being one way at one 
time, and a different way at some later time.  
I then consider other options available to the atemporalist. There’s 
another way that things can vary, and that’s across possible worlds. Section 2 
will thus be an examination of a modal understanding of the Word becoming 
flesh, based on an argument from Leftow. This doesn’t require the passage of 
time, because the ‘change’ is instead constituted by variation across possible 
worlds. However, I argue that this account ends up endorsing incarnations in 
all possible worlds, and thus undermining any sense of cross-worldly variation. 
In turn, this will also undermine the sense in which the incarnation was a free 
act of grace on God’s part, insofar as we wish to be libertarians about divine 
freedom. Finally, I return to the idea of change requiring time, but I consider 
the option of intrinsic change happening to something else, so that the Son 
Himself becomes incarnate in virtue of undergoing a merely extrinsic change. 
Under this head, I explain that if one adopts a compositionalist account of the 
incarnation, we have a provisionally viable means of explaining how a timeless 
Son becomes incarnate. The Son can ‘become’ incarnate by a human body and 
soul becoming related to Him, I’ll suggest. On this account, the intrinsic change 
takes place in the created order, and not in the Son Himself. With (what I think 
are) all the options on the table and scrutinised, I conclude that atemporalists 
can, thanks only to appeal to extrinsic change, make sense of the Son becoming 
incarnate.  
 
(1) INTRINSIC CHANGE? 
At first glance, when we think about something ‘becoming’ something 
else, or somebody ‘becoming’ intrinsically different, this appears to be a 
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temporal notion because it seems to require duration, such as my 
aforementioned example of becoming good at ballroom dancing. This is 
particularly evident when we envisage something changing from natural kind 
to natural kind – for example, Professor McGonagall transfiguring into a cat.2 
There’s no doubt that this involves intrinsic change: it isn’t that the change 
happens to something else and McGonagall changes extrinsically as a result. 
Rather, she herself changes in her intrinsic properties such as mass, having no 
tail and having two legs. These properties don’t depend on anything else, 
they’re ‘entirely about that thing’ (Lewis 1983a: 197). In contrast, examples of 
McGonagall’s extrinsic properties which ‘may depend, wholly or partly, on 
something else’ (ibid.) are ‘being admired by Hermione,’ and ‘being feared by 
Neville’.  
It might be objected that intrinsic change doesn’t necessarily require 
temporal duration, due to counter-example cases of instantaneous intrinsic 
change. For instance, the winning of a race takes place at an instant, and at that 
very instant the runner changes from competitor to victor. I personally think 
that such cases still require the passage of time, lest the runner would possess 
incompatible properties (winner and not winner) at the same instant. 
Furthermore, I’m concerned with the subject of the change (the Son of God), 
rather than the event of the change itself. Regardless of whether the event of a 
race being won is an instantaneous change, the thing undergoing the change 
must still be temporal. There must be a moment before the runner won the 
race, and a moment where the winning happens, regardless of whether the 
change itself is instantaneous. If McGonagall becomes a cat, she herself must 
be subject to the passage of time, because the change is happening to her. 
There’s a time at which she’s human, and a later time at which she’s a cat. 
Similarly, there must be a moment at which the Son exists unincarnate, and a 
moment at which He undergoes intrinsic change and ‘becomes’ incarnate. If 
there wasn’t this moment ‘before’ the change where the Son was unincarnate, 
we can make little sense of the idea that He really changed intrinsically at all.  
                                                             
2 Nothing hinges on the possibility of such a change for the purposes of this argument. I’ll 
examine its viability, however, in the next chapter, when I examine how temporalists can 
account for the Son becoming incarnate.  
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Based on this, I contend that if the Son of God changes intrinsically 
upon becoming incarnate, He’s temporal. To illustrate this, Senor outlines the 
following argument:  
 
(P1) God the Son eternally (and essentially) has His Divine nature.  
(P2) The human (accidental) nature of God the Son is assumed (or ‘taken 
on’).  
(P3) X’s assuming (or ‘taking on’) a nature involves a change in X’s 
intrinsic properties.  
(C1) …The assumption of the human nature brings about a change in the 
intrinsic (though non-essential) properties of God the Son.  
(C2) So, the Son is mutable.  
(P4) Mutability entails temporal duration.  
(C3) So the Son is not timeless (1990: 157).  
 
By ‘mutability’ in (P4), Senor means the capacity to change in one’s intrinsic 
properties (ibid.: 164, footnote). Senor’s argument is further supported by 
Hill’s consideration of models of the incarnation whereby the Son becomes 
incarnate due to being ‘literally transformed’ (2012: 24) into a human body. Hill 
would certainly agree that these ‘transformationalist’ models involve intrinsic 
change in the Son. He says: 
 
But an atemporal entity cannot be transformed into anything, since to 
be transformed is to undergo change; it requires that the entity in 
question have one property or set of properties at time t1, and have a 
different property or set of properties at time t2 (ibid.: 24-5). 
 
It’s for these reasons that I close off the first option in this chapter: 
atemporalists can’t account for the Son becoming incarnate by appealing to 
intrinsic change in the Son. To undergo intrinsic change requires sequence in 
one’s life. In fact, I take this to be uncontroversial.  
What options remain for the atemporalist? After all, if Senor’s 
argument is sound, then this is detrimental for atemporalists. They’re clearly 
committed to (P1), reading eternally as ‘timelessly.’ Senor volunteers the 
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potentially weak premises: (P2) and (P3). He notes that (P2) might be denied 
by atemporalists. They might argue that the Son doesn’t ‘take on’ a human 
nature because He possesses it timelessly. I’ll discuss this response in section 3, 
because it’s commonly held in conjunction with an account of the Son 
changing merely extrinsically when He becomes incarnate. This argument 
additionally responds to (P3), as we’ll see. Firstly, however, I’ll discuss an 
alternative response to (P3), which takes the form of a modal argument from 
Leftow.  
 
(2) MODAL VARIATION? 
Variation across possible worlds needn’t require the passage of time. In 
this world, I just have two cats, but there are other possible worlds in which 
I’m also the proud owner of a puppy. To use my earlier example of Professor 
McGonagall, she’s head of Gryffindor house and opposed to Voldemort in 
this world, but there are other possible worlds in which she doesn’t work at 
Hogwarts, and is a Death Eater. Professor McGonagall and I therefore vary 
across worlds, and there’s no need to invoke the passage of time in order to 
explain this. In fact, it’s often been argued that because possible worlds are 
necessarily static, all modal facts are either true or false, and they don’t change 
in a temporal sense. Robert Adams reminds us that ‘each possible world, if 
temporally ordered at all, is a complete world history and not a momentary stage 
of one’ (1974: 211, my italics). Therefore, if there’s variation across worlds, 
there will always (timelessly) be this variation, and it’s this that constitutes modal 
variation. 
The incarnation is something that we want to say varies across worlds. 
This is because of it being a contingent, supererogatory act on behalf of the 
Son. In the actual world, the Word takes on flesh for the purposes of our 
salvation, but His prerogative was to remain unincarnate. Therefore, to 
represent this there must be some possible worlds in which the incarnation 
doesn’t take place. It’s this, I think, which leads Leftow to make a (very brief) 
argument for a modal construal of the Word becoming flesh. I’ll call it 
Leftow’s ‘modal claim,’ and it’s as follows:  
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The import of the ‘taking on’ [flesh] claim on God's side is modal, not 
temporal. That God took on flesh does not entail that he changed. It 
entails only that he could have been God without being incarnate, and 
that if he could have refrained from becoming incarnate, he could have 
not had a body. Here I simply bat the ball back onto the temporalist’s 
side of the net: why isn’t this enough to make orthodox sense of the 
claim that God the Son took on flesh? (2002: 299)  
 
Arguably, atemporalists could adopt Leftow’s claim as a way of 
explaining how the Son became incarnate without being subject to the passage 
of time. If we read ‘became’ in a modal sense, the Word becomes flesh because 
in this world He takes on human form, but in other possible worlds He doesn’t. 
This can presumably be contrasted with necessary facts – we’d never say, for 
instance, that 2+2 ‘takes on’ the property of equalling 4. Understanding 
Leftow’s claim in terms of possible worlds tells us that there are possible 
worlds that are exactly the same as ours, except that they lack a divine 
incarnation, meaning that they also presumably lack atonement for any sin that 
takes place there.3 According to Leftow, we therefore have variation across 
logical space regarding the incarnation. This is an independently important 
claim to uphold, for it helps to emphasise the sacrifice that the Son made for 
us, together with its voluntary, supererogatory, nature. The difference is that 
Leftow needs this variation for his modal claim: he seems to think that instead 
of intrinsic change, this cross-worldly variation regarding the incarnation is 
sufficient to make sense of a timeless Son ‘becoming’ incarnate. I was tempted 
to title this section modal ‘change’, but in the above quotation Leftow explicitly 
denies that the Word changed in taking on flesh. Rather, he suggests that the 
Word ‘varied’ across possible worlds.4   
This section will give Leftow’s modal claim the scrutiny that it 
deserves. I’ll consider different ways of cashing it out, arguing that it doesn’t in 
fact leave us with Leftow’s desired modal variation, and so it can’t be appealed 
                                                             
3 Unless there are other ways to achieve atonement besides incarnation. This will be 
discussed in section 2.3. 
4 Although, Leftow could simply be denying that the Son changed intrinsically. In fact, we’ll 
see in section 3 that he’s perfectly happy with the Son changing extrinsically upon 
becoming incarnate. Still, it’s unclear whether he’d be happy for his modal account to be 
called a change in this sense – so I won’t do so.  
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to as a means of explaining a timeless God becoming incarnate. A further 
unwelcome consequence falls out of this result: divine libertarian freedom is 
impinged upon. In section 2.1, I present an argument that Leftow’s claim 
doesn’t give us modal variation, and respond (2.2-3) to potential objections to 
the weakest premises. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 consider the problematic 
implications of Leftow’s argument for ersatzism and genuine modal realism 
about possible worlds, respectively, with sections 2.6-8 considering problems 
specific to the genuine modal realist.  In section 2.9, I outline and respond to a 
final objection that can be levelled against ersatzists and genuine modal realists 
alike. I conclude that, in light of these arguments, atemporalists can’t appeal to 
modal variation as a way that the Son becomes incarnate, without taking on 
board serious dialectical tensions. 
Before we venture into these specifics, though, it’s tempting to object 
that Leftow’s modal claim is a non-starter, because it’s simply too weak to do 
the work that we need. Surely, even if we can make sense of the Son not taking 
on a body in other possible worlds, this claim isn’t substantial enough for us to 
be able to say that He ‘became’ incarnate? The incarnation takes place in the 
actual world – the Word becomes flesh. Surely, then, there must be a sense in 
which the Son takes on flesh relative only to the history of this world, 
regardless of what happens at other worlds? Not wanting to beg the question 
against Leftow’s modal account, I’ll grant for the sake of argument that we can 
make sense of something ‘becoming’ something else due solely to modal 
variation. My objection to Leftow will instead lie in revealing the unwelcome 
tensions and consequences that follow once we apply his claim to particular 
understandings of modality.  
It’s important to emphasise the sense of the Son’s libertarian freedom 
that’s implicit in Leftow’s claim. Libertarian freedom rests on a form of 
incompatibilism: the view that our freedom is incompatible with our actions 
being causally determined. It’s also commonly thought to require alternative 
possibilities for action. So, I’m free to do x iff at the time of performing x, it’s 
possible that I refrain from doing so. For instance, I’m free to get a puppy iff, at 
the time of doing so, it’s possible that I refrain.5 There must be alternative 
possibilities available to me, such as changing my mind and going home empty-
                                                             
5 See, e.g. Diekemper (2013: 47-8).  
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handed, or getting a hamster instead. Leftow seems to require that the Son be 
free in this libertarian sense, because he stresses in the passage above that God 
‘could have refrained’ from being incarnate. It must be possible that He refrain 
from taking on a body.6 Leftow also endorses libertarian divine freedom and 
the principle of alternative possibilities elsewhere. He says in a recent paper 
that ‘God acts freely, in a robust sense which implies He could have acted 
otherwise’ (2016: 47). He reads this possibility of refraining in a libertarian 
sense (forthcoming). This is evidently an important reason why, for Leftow, 
there must be variation across possible worlds regarding incarnations. I’ll now 
present an argument that Leftow’s claim, when cashed out, doesn’t give us his 
desired variation across possible worlds.  
 
(2.1) LEFTOW’S CLAIM DOES NOT GIVE US MODAL VARIATION 
(P1) The Son takes on a body in the actual world to redeem us from sin, and 
because of His omnibenevolence.7 
(P2) There are other possible worlds that contain as much/more sin than ours. 
(P3) If the Son takes on a body in no other possible worlds, then there are 
possible worlds that contain as much, or more, sin than ours, in which there 
are no incarnations. 
(P4) There are no ways, besides incarnation, that salvation can be achieved.  
(P5) If God becomes incarnate at a world, but not at other worlds with as much 
or more sin than our own, then He isn’t omnibenevolent.  
                                                             
6 Some compatibilists might object here that there’s nothing preventing them from 
accepting this appeal to alternative possibilities. David Lewis, for example, stresses that 
even in the face of a causally determined universe, it would be the case that I’m able to act 
otherwise than the way in which I in fact act. He argues that I’m able to do otherwise in 
the sense that if I do something which it was determined that I’d not do, then some law of 
nature would have been broken (1981: 122-29). However, even if the universe is causally 
determined, this isn’t something that God’s freedom would have to be rendered compatible 
with, given that He created the universe ex nihilo (more on this anon). Moreover, I’m 
assuming here that God is atemporal, which makes it still easier to see how He’s removed 
from the (determined) causal unfoldings of the universe. I therefore contend that, whilst 
compatibilists might be able to help themselves to the principle of alternative possibilities 
regarding human freedom, this isn’t something that makes sense in the case of divine 
freedom. It would be a mistake to allege that the determined unfolding of events in the 
universe – that God created and is causally and temporally isolated from – is something 
that His freedom needs to be made compatible with. However, a different version of a 
compatibilist divine freedom will be discussed in section 2.4. 
7 Henceforth, I’ll be assuming that ‘sin’ is equivalent to ‘evil,’ so long as evil is understood 
as being actively caused by humankind, or by the inhabitants of the particular world in 
question.  
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(C1) (From P1, P3, P4 & P5) If the Son does not take on a body in all the 
possible worlds with as much/more sin than ours, then He isn’t 
omnibenevolent.  
(P6) God is omnibenevolent.  
(C2) (From C1 & P6 via modus tollens) The Son takes on a body in all the 
possible worlds with as much/more sin than ours.  
(C3) (From C2) Quantifying over all worlds with as much or more sin than 
ours, the Son necessarily takes on a body.   
 
(P1) states God’s omnibenevolence, and the purpose of the incarnation 
being atonement. (P2) follows from the contingency of sin, together with the 
belief that humans have been given free will. We can suppose that for every 
logically possible human, and every logically possible action they might carry 
out, there’s a possible world to represent this. Many of these worlds will be 
ones containing more sin than this one. For instance, there’s a possible world 
where I kick puppies instead of studying philosophy. This world (assuming it’s 
otherwise the same as ours) seems – quite uncontentiously – to be a more 
sinful world than ours.  (P3) follows if we accept (P2). As I’ve mentioned, the 
only way that atonement could have been achieved was for the Son to truly 
become one of us in order to restore humankind’s relationship with God, and 
this is represented here by (P4).  The basis for (P5) is God’s omnibenevolence 
being such that He wouldn’t permit worlds with the same amount, or more, sin 
than our own to not be atoned, whilst nevertheless becoming incarnate in our 
world. If He did permit this, it would make His decision to be incarnate in our 
world an arbitrary one, so not one that, I submit, we’d wish to attribute to a 
perfectly loving and rational God. In fact, it would be possible for a more loving 
being to exist, who is incarnate in these other worlds, and makes reasoned, fair 
decisions to boot. (P6) is a requirement of classical theism. We derive (C2) 
from (C1) and (P6) via modus tollens. (C3) then follows from (C2) because at 
all of the worlds with as much or more sin than ours, the Son takes on a body, 
which on a reductive account of modality  is just what it means to say that 
taking on a body is (quantifying over these worlds) necessary. The contingency 
requirement of Leftow’s premise is therefore not met. If this argument is 
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sound, Leftow’s modal claim can’t explain how a timeless God ‘becomes’ 
incarnate. I’ll now consider, and respond to, some potential objections.  
 
(2.2) CONCERNING ‘RELEVANTLY SIMILAR’ WORLDS 
An initial objection raises its head, regarding my quantifying only over 
the worlds with as much, or more, sin that our own. (C2) claims that all of the 
worlds ‘with as much or more sin than ours’ contain the Son taking on a body. 
It might be objected that Leftow’s desired modal variation is in fact achieved, 
because the scope of (C2) is too narrow. After all, it doesn’t mention the 
worlds containing less sin than our own, where no incarnations are required. 
It’s these (incarnation free) worlds that would generate modal variation, the 
argument would go. In response to this, I maintain that we must restrict our 
scope to closer, relevantly similar worlds to our own if we wish to generate a 
sufficiently substantial sense in which the Son ‘could have refrained’ from 
being incarnate. I contend that the worlds relevant to Leftow’s argument must 
be relevantly similar in (at least) the following way: they must contain the same 
amount, or more, sin than our own.8  
This qualification isn’t an ad hoc addendum, but has independent 
motivation due to the aforementioned emphasis that Leftow places upon the 
libertarian freedom of the Son. Importantly, when scrutinising our libertarian 
freedom, we look to the closest possible worlds to examine whether it’s possible 
for us to refrain from acting in a certain way. For instance, if I want to know 
whether it’s possible for me to refrain from getting a puppy, I look to the 
closest possible worlds where, for instance, my history up until now, my living 
situation, financial situation and love of animals are all the same as at this 
world – and see whether or not these worlds contain my obtaining a puppy. I’m 
not concerned with the distant worlds in which, say, I actively despise dogs, or 
dogs don’t even exist. Likewise, if we want to account (as Leftow evidently 
does) for a genuine sense of the Son’s libertarian freedom to take on flesh, we 
must look to the relevantly similar worlds, and see whether He’s incarnate there. 
Although only one incarnation-free world is needed for Leftow’s claim to go 
                                                             
8 Perhaps in order to count as ‘relevantly similar,’ the worlds in question also ought to 
contain inhabitants who are free in the same way that we are. This is in light of discussion 
that will follow in section 2.4. 
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through, this world must be one that contains the same amount, or more, sin 
than ours, because of the emphasis being placed on the Son’s free decision to 
respond to sin. Insofar as the incarnation is a response to sin, then, our 
attention ought not to be occupied by distant worlds with less sin than our 
own. We should restrict it only to the worlds with as much, or more sin than 
ours. At all of these, I’ve argued, the Son is incarnate. 
    
(2.3) POTENTIAL RESPONSES 
Perhaps the most contentious premise is (P4). Leftow might object to 
it for several different reasons. Firstly, he could argue that the Son didn’t need 
to respond to sin specifically by taking on a body. That is, there could be other 
ways in which Atonement could be achieved, such that God can remain 
perfectly good and loving even if He doesn’t respond to sin by becoming 
incarnate. A species of this objection might be the case of a possible world 
whose inhabitants aren’t embodied.9 If this were the case, the argument would 
go, then (P4) is false, because the Son wouldn’t need to take on a body in order 
to atone for the sins of that world’s inhabitants. More broadly, even in cases 
where our counterparts are embodied, there could simply be other ways (ways 
that we can’t begin to comprehend) in which the Son could atone for our sins, 
besides taking on flesh.  
I think it would still be possible to retain the spirit of my argument if, 
in response to this objection, I broadened my claims so that instead of 
referring to physical incarnations, or the taking on of a body, I appealed 
instead to any wider soteriological gesture on behalf of the Son. If I plugged 
something like this into my argument, then its wider scope would generate the 
(still, for Leftow, unwelcome) result that at all worlds with as much, or more, 
sin that ours, the Son engages in some sort of soteriological action. A similar 
conclusion to (C3) would be generated, and would be something like: 
‘quantifying over all worlds with as much or more sin than ours, the Son 
necessarily acts to redeem us from sin’. However, any divine action to save us 
                                                             
9 Supposing, of course, that these disembodied beings could be our counterparts. They 
would need to be such in order for this possible world to count as sufficiently close to our 
own, to generate the desired sense in which the Son ‘could have refrained’ from being 
incarnate. After all, the more distant the possible worlds that we use to support this claim, 
the less we’re able to account for the Son’s free decision to take on flesh.  
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from sin, I’d argue, ought to be freely chosen and supererogatory – and 
therefore contingent. In this broader context, it would then also need to exhibit 
modal variation. I therefore contend that my argument can be widened in such 
a way that it creates a problem for Leftow’s modal claim even when we factor 
in possible worlds containing incorporeal inhabitants or alternative forms of 
Atonement. This would additionally help to respond to Leftow’s recent 
suggestion that: 
 
Christians believe that their salvation is an act of free grace: that God 
need not have sent Christ to die for them. Even those who think that 
God’s love guaranteed His doing something to save us may think that He 
need not have done so by sending Christ (2017: 152). 
 
Again, it could be responded here that even if it wasn’t specifically incarnation 
that was necessary to redeem us from our sins, God (being omnibenevolent), 
would still have responded to sin with some sort of soteriological gesture. This 
would be the case in every world with as much, or more, sin than our own, it 
could be argued, otherwise we can imagine a more loving (and less arbitrary 
being) who would treat all worlds the same. I’ll henceforth leave (P4) as it is, 
referring specifically to incarnation as a response to sin, but if one prefers, one 
can imagine my argument widened in the way suggested above. 
Changing tack slightly, Leftow might object to (P5) by claiming that the 
Son can remain omnibenevolent in spite of not becoming incarnate (or, in line 
with the above, wider argument: in spite of not engaging in any soteriological 
gesture) at the worlds with as much, or more, sin than ours. It seems strange, 
after all, to insist that there’s a precise level of sin, at which point God must 
personally intervene by taking on human form. Leftow could appeal to divine 
mystery, and reject the assumption that God’s omnibenevolence necessitates 
an incarnation whenever there’s a world as sinful as our own. At any rate, 
perhaps there’s far more to be considered in what makes for the ‘best’ world 
besides the level, or quantity, of sin, and God considers this when surveying 
worlds and their need for atonement. We, on the other hand, have no real 
insight into God’s reasons. On this account, Leftow could argue that it merely 
seems arbitrary and reasonless to us if there are two worlds with equal levels of 
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sin, but God is only incarnate at one: in fact, our omniscient God has 
(timelessly) surveyed both worlds, and taken everything into account, and 
made a fully-informed decision about what’s best for each of these worlds.   
In response to this, I grant that it’s possible that God is taking far more 
into account than levels of sin when considering whether or not to be 
incarnate in various worlds. However, the incarnation is of course a response to 
sin, and I’m therefore confident that sin must at least be an important factor in 
world rankings. I venture that the burden of proof is on theists in Leftow’s 
camp to demonstrate what else exactly could be considered in making for the 
best possible world. Might it be the number of people (or other inhabitants) 
that exist in a world, for instance? Or, might it be to do with the ubiquity of sin 
within any world in question? Arguments along these lines would need 
additional support. Alternatively, if Leftow were to explain God’s decision to 
be incarnate by appeal to divine mystery, then this is less satisfying given that 
this thesis is attempting to elucidate metaphysical issues – namely, how a timeless 
God can become incarnate.  
There’s a related objection to (P5) in the vicinity, which I consider 
more troubling. Leftow might object that it’s crude to assume that sin can in 
fact be measured in the way that I’m suggesting. If this were the case my 
argument wouldn’t stand, because one wouldn’t be able to compare levels of 
sin across worlds. After all, it seems very difficult to imagine that there’s some 
sort of ‘unit’ by which we could compare, say, the sin involved in a mass 
murder with the sin involved in mass torture. If this were the case, (P2) as well 
as (C1) could potentially be denied, and my overall conclusion would no longer 
follow. Nonetheless, given that God did respond to sin in the actual world by 
taking on human form, there must have been something that made Him think 
that this response was required, lest the response be arbitrary. Furthermore, 
implicit in Leftow’s modal claim is the assumption that God responded to sin 
in at least one world, but not in others. It’s difficult to see how these responses 
(or non-responses) can be motivated without some consideration of levels of sin 
at the worlds in question. I therefore contend that the burden of proof is again 
on Leftow to demonstrate why this consideration of sin can’t be applied to 
other worlds, and compared across worlds. 
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Having considered these potential objections, I maintain that, at the 
very least, there are serious tensions embedded in Leftow’s modal claim. We’re 
unable to generate Leftow’s desired conception of ‘becoming’ incarnate, 
because we find that the Son takes on a body in all of the relevantly similar 
worlds to our own (‘relevantly similar’ regarding their amounts of sin). This is 
problematic for two reasons. Firstly, we can’t make sense of modal variation 
regarding the incarnation, which limits the lines of argument at the 
atemporalist’s disposal for explaining the Son ‘becoming’ incarnate. Secondly, 
the modal claim impinges upon the Son’s libertarian freedom, because no 
relevantly similar possible worlds contain His refraining from being incarnate. 
Divine libertarian freedom is evidently something that Leftow would want to 
preserve, and we’ve seen evidence of this above. In fact, I don’t think it would 
be presumptuous to say that most theists would want to preserve this.  They’d 
want to maintain that God is the freest of all beings, whose freedom doesn’t 
need to be rendered compatible with, for instance, His causally determined 
actions, in order to count as freedom. Moreover, if the Son isn’t free to do 
anything other than take on flesh, then it also presumably makes little sense for 
us to praise or thank Him for doing so – since it emerges that it wasn’t a choice 
that He was responsible for making. There are some differences in the 
implications (and potential responses to) this argument, depending upon how 
we understand these possible worlds – so I’ll now further develop and defend 
my argument under the heads of ersatzism and genuine modal realism about 
possible worlds, respectively. 
 
(2.4) ERSATZ MODAL REALISM (EMR) 
 The possible worlds that Leftow invokes in his modal claim could be 
understood in an ersatzist sense, whereby they’re ‘surrogates’ for the actual 
world, but don’t concretely exist. Rather, they’re more like maximally 
consistent states of affairs that form total ‘conditions’ that a concrete world 
could be in.10 Ersatzists are usually actualists: they’re committed to the view that 
everything that exists actually exists. The contents of all possible worlds actually 
                                                             
10 I don’t think it matters for my account whether I sketch the ersatzist view with regards 
to possible worlds being states of affairs, or anything else, such as propositions or sets of 
propositions: one can simply substitute in one’s favoured interpretation.  
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(but non-concretely) exist, because they’re constructed from things that 
themselves actually exist. Ersatzists are therefore still modal realists, of a 
certain stripe. The actual world is the only world that happens to obtain, on 
EMR. It therefore has a special status: it’s actualised, because it’s the way that 
things in fact are. I’ll defend the view that if we understand Leftow’s modal 
claim as an ersatzist would, we can’t achieve the desired variation across 
worlds. 
Ersatzists would read (P1) in the above argument as the Son taking on 
a body in the actual world – which is the only world that in fact obtains. Relatedly, 
Michael Almeida suggests that, because with EMR (and unlike with genuine 
modal realism) it’s impossible to actualise more than one world, ‘theists in the 
Leibnizian tradition are committed to the unlikely proposition that the actual 
world, with all of its evil, is as good as any other actualisable world’ (2011: 1). 
Given divine omnibenevolence (P6), I venture that He’d desire to actualise the 
world containing the least amount of sin possible. Ersatzists ought therefore to 
assume that God has actualised, or created, the best of all possible worlds: so all 
of the others will contain more (or the same amount of) sin than our own.11  
The ersatzist will thus interpret (P2) as being potentially even stronger 
than it first appeared, because all possible worlds will contain as much, or 
more, sin than our own. Any worlds containing less sin than our own are 
                                                             
11 Robert Adams (1972: 317-332) disputes the assumption that God created the best 
possible world. He says that God isn’t blameworthy if He creates a world that’s less than 
the best, with the caveat that there be no creature in it so miserable that it’d be better had 
it not existed. Adams says that God hasn’t wronged anybody in creating this world, 
because the creatures in the other worlds don’t exist, and merely possible beings don’t have 
rights. An important part of Adams’s argument is that God’s grace (defined as the 
disposition to love independently of the merits of persons (ibid.: 324)), means that He has 
no reason to love the inhabitants of one world more than any other. If this were true, then 
the actual world might not be the best of all possible worlds, and there could indeed be 
others that contain less sin and so need no divine incarnations. However, I follow William 
Rowe (2004) in objecting that Adams has merely shown that God isn’t morally obliged to 
create the best world that He can. Rowe argues that this can be true and it still be the case 
that God’s perfect goodness renders it necessary that He create the best possible world. 
Rowe argues that if God didn’t create the best world that He could, then He wouldn’t be 
perfectly good, because it would be possible for a more perfect being to exist. Even though 
creating the best was a supererogatory act (and hence, not one that God was obliged to 
carry out), some other morally better being could possibly create the best world, and God 
would no longer be the most perfect being as a matter of necessity. Rowe adds that if God 
has a reason for picking a world to actualise, it wouldn’t have anything to do with grace as 
defined by Adams, because God wouldn’t be able to select any worlds at all if He were 
only judging based on loving independently of merit. Even if one is convinced by Adams, 
however, I argued in section 2.2 that other worlds with less sin and no incarnations aren’t 
sufficient to generate Leftow’s modal variation, because they’re not close enough to be 
relevant to our considerations.  
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impossible, for otherwise they would have been actualised. This is perhaps 
because less sin would generate a contradiction in all of the ‘maximal 
consistent sentences’ (or similar) that are ersatzist possible worlds. For the 
ersatzist, (C3) therefore wouldn’t merely mean that all of the worlds with as 
much, or more, sin than our own contain divine incarnations – but that all 
other possible worlds contain divine incarnations.12 If this is so, we wouldn’t 
even need the justification given in section 2.2 for appealing only to ‘relevantly 
similar’ worlds. This is because all worlds would be relevantly similar in the 
required sense – they’d all contain as much, or more, sin than our own. There 
would then be no sense in which we can derive Leftow’s desired modal 
variation. This is also problematic for the Son’s freedom, because there are 
absolutely no worlds where He’s not incarnate, and so no sense in which He 
could have refrained from being so. Because the best (and so, actualised), 
possible world contains so much sin that the Son is incarnate in it, all other 
(less good) worlds must contain incarnations too, in response to the amounts of 
sin that exist there. The Son’s being incarnate in the world He actualised 
therefore necessitates His being incarnate at all other worlds.  
One line of response here might be to maintain that the best world 
isn’t simply the world containing the least amount of sin. Rather, it’s the world 
with the least amount of sin, together with a sufficient level of human free will.13 If this 
can be granted, then it’s not so clear that all other worlds must contain more sin 
than this one – nor, therefore, is it clear that they must contain a divine 
incarnation. I’m inclined to agree that a sufficient sense of human free will is 
an important requirement of the best possible world. However, I maintain that 
this has no bearing on the fact that this world (the best world) has been 
actualised. All other worlds will contain either more sin (together with human 
                                                             
12 It might be objected that not all worlds contain divine incarnations, because there are 
some possible worlds with no created life in them at all. I’d respond that equally, these 
worlds contain no sin either, and (in light of discussion in section 2.2), simply aren’t close 
enough to ours to count as ‘relevantly similar.’ Leftow would surely want the sense in 
which God ‘could have refrained’ from being incarnate to be more robust than this. That 
is, we want to be able to say that God ‘could have refrained’ from being incarnate because 
some inhabited worlds with free creatures don’t contain divine incarnations. This is the 
only way that we could generate the contingent nature of the Son’s sacrifice. It doesn’t 
seem very substantial to say that the Son needn’t have taken on flesh because He’s not 
incarnate at some uninhabited worlds where the question of salvation is irrelevant.  
13 This response is a species of the objection discussed in section 2.3. The objection was 
that there’s more to be considered in what makes for the ‘best’ possible world besides the 
amount of sin that exists there.  
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free will) or less sin (without a sufficient sense of human free will). The former 
worlds will contain divine incarnations as a response to sin and so won’t help 
Leftow with his desired modal variation. The latter worlds, because they lack a 
sufficient sense of human free will, are far too distant to be relevant to this 
argument, because to say that the Son refrained from being incarnate in worlds 
where humans aren’t even free to sin in the first place isn’t to say very much at 
all. We don’t generate a substantial sense in which the Son ‘could have 
refrained’ from being incarnate if we need to appeal to worlds which contain 
similar levels of sin, but unfree inhabitants whose every action is fatalistically 
determined. Rather, when evaluating whether it’s possible that God could have 
refrained from being incarnate, we must look to the relevantly similar worlds. 
Although what’s meant by ‘relevantly similar’ is arguably not crystal clear, I 
think it’s safe to say that worlds containing unfree inhabitants are definitely not 
ones that should factor into our calculations. 
An alternative response might come from the compatibilist about 
divine freedom. It could be maintained that in spite of there being no possible 
worlds that lack divine incarnations, we can still consider the Son to be free. 
Moreover, the compatibilist might argue that we can still make sense of the 
fact that the Son ‘could have refrained’ from being incarnate. This could be 
cashed out in terms of the Son (being omnipotent) having the power to refrain 
from being incarnate at every possible world, even if He doesn’t in fact refrain 
from this at any. Helen Beebee discusses a version of this compatibilist 
response to the principle of alternative possibilities, which is to provide a 
‘conditional analysis’ of claims about our freedom. For instance: ‘to say that I 
was able to do X, even though I did not in fact do so, is just to say that, had I 
chosen, or decided, or wanted to do X, I would have done it’ (2003: 259). This 
is a variant of the Lewisian response discussed at the start of this section (2). In 
the case of an omnipotent God, therefore, it could hardly be denied that, had 
He chosen or decided not to be incarnate in any world, He’d of course have so 
refrained. As was mentioned above, this wouldn’t be compatibilism in the 
sense that we’re used to with ordinary humans, where free will is taken to be 
compatible with a causally determined universe. This is because in the divine 
case the determined universe would itself be (freely) created ex nihilo by God. 
Therefore, to be a compatibilist about divine freedom would be to say 
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(something like) God is free to do x ‘provided nothing outside of him 
determines him to [do x]’ (Rowe & Howard-Snyder, 2008). This is spelled out 
a little more by Thomas Talbott, who says: 
 
Even when God acts from an inner necessity, he remains the agent 
cause of his actions in just this sense: Each of them reflects his own 
perfectly rational judgement concerning the best course of action; none 
of them is the product of sufficient causes external to himself; and 
none of them is even partially a matter of random chance (2009: 378). 
 
The common thread here appears to be that God is free because nothing 
external to Himself determines His action. This account could therefore be said 
to be compatibilist because God’s freedom is deemed compatible with His 
nature. For instance, God may have no option to refrain from being incarnate 
when we factor in His omnibenevolent nature, but He’s still free with respect 
to this action – because nothing external to Himself causes the incarnation to 
be brought about. The compatibilist could therefore appeal to this 
understanding of divine freedom and maintain that God ‘could have refrained’ 
from becoming incarnate because He possesses the ability to refrain, and 
nothing external to His nature causes Him to be incarnate. His nature might 
ensure that He desires to sacrifice His divine prerogative and be incarnate, but 
had He not wanted to do so, He of course wouldn’t have. It seems that this 
sort of compatibilism is maintaining that divine freedom is compatible with 
something like ‘rational’ determinism – ‘the determination of what the agent 
does by the best reasons’ (Steward, 2015: 68). Helen Steward observes that this 
is altogether different from compatibilism in the ordinary case, where human 
freedom is reckoned compatible with causal determinism (ibid.: 69).  
I nevertheless can’t make sense of the compatibilist’s claim about 
ability without relying on a modal understanding of what it means. As I see it, if 
the compatibilist claim is to go through, there must be a possible world in which 
God decides not to be incarnate, and so isn’t incarnate. For instance, the Son 
was able to refrain from being incarnate iff there’s a possible world in which He 
decides against taking on flesh. Possible worlds, after all, represent the entirety 
of logical space, so if there’s no possible world in which God refrains from 
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being incarnate, we can’t say (as Leftow desires) that God ‘could have 
refrained’ from being incarnate. However, whether there are any possible 
worlds that don’t contain incarnations is of course exactly what’s up for grabs in 
this discussion. Therefore, whether or not the compatibilist’s argument has any 
traction depends on how much you’re convinced by the argument that follows 
in this chapter. There is, however, a great deal more debate to be had in this 
area.  
Notwithstanding my previous worry, I think that most theists would 
wish to avoid compatibilist accounts of God’s freedom: they wouldn’t be 
happy to accept that God’s freedom needs to be rendered compatible with, for 
instance, His causally determined actions or His nature, given that He ought to 
be the freest possible being. This would also be an unwelcome result for 
Leftow himself: we’ve seen that he’s argued elsewhere for incompatibilism 
regarding divine freedom. As long as Leftow is committed to his modal claim, 
however, a compatibilist understanding of divine freedom looks to me like His 
only option.  
An alternative response from Leftow might be that there are in fact 
worlds that lack incarnations, and this is why these particular worlds aren’t 
actualised, because – all things being equal – worlds with an opportunity for 
atonement are preferable to worlds without this opportunity. If this were the 
case, Leftow’s modal claim would go through, together with libertarian divine 
freedom. However, this option isn’t available given the indispensable 
assumption that God is necessarily omnibenevolent. To grant that some 
worlds with as much, or more, sin than our own don’t contain divine 
incarnations is in effect suggesting that the Son’s decision to be incarnate in 
our world is an arbitrary, reasonless one. It also suggests the possibility of a 
more loving being existing, who is incarnate at these worlds. Furthermore, it’s 
important to note that these other worlds might have been actualised, and if 
they had obtained, the Son (being omnibenevolent), would be incarnate in them 
– which is just what it means to say that the Son is incarnate at these other 
worlds.14  
                                                             
14 Unless, of course, the atemporalist maintains that all other worlds are impossible, given 
God’s omnibenevolence ensuring that He’ll only ever create the best possible world. This 
would be to endorse modal collapse: there’s only one world that God could have created, 
given His omnibenevolence, and thus the actual world is the only possible world. If Leftow 
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I therefore conclude that if we interpret Leftow’s argument as an 
ersatzist would, we’re unable to achieve Leftow’s desired variation across 
worlds. In fact, it emerges that there are no worlds in which the Son isn’t 
incarnate. I’ll now consider whether modal realists have an ontology that’s any 
better for upholding Leftow’s modal claim. 
 
(2.5) GENUINE MODAL REALISM (GMR) 
GMR, like EMR, is a reductive theory of possibility and necessity, so, 
for instance, something is necessary if it exists in every possible world. David 
Lewis calls our world the ‘actual’ world, but only because it’s the world where 
we happen to find ourselves, not because it’s any more real than the other 
possible worlds (1986a: 92). In fact, the other possible worlds are no different 
in kind from the actual world, and all worlds concretely exist. For Lewis, 
‘actual’ functions as an indexical term, just like ‘here’ or ‘there.’ Inhabitants of 
other possible worlds will likewise correctly call their own world ‘actual,’ so 
everybody in logical space can say ‘the actual world is the world in which I’m 
located,’ and be speaking the truth. According to GMR, for every way that a 
world could be, there’s a world that is that way (ibid.: 2), and these worlds are 
concrete, maximal sums of spatio-temporally related individuals (ibid.: 74). 
There are no spatio-temporal connections between worlds, so nothing that exists 
at this world can also exist at another world – lest the worlds in question not 
be distinct after all. Instead, we (and other members of worlds) have counterparts 
at other possible worlds, and our counterparts resemble us in important ways 
‘in content and context’ (1968: 114). We might say, for instance, that it’s 
contingent that yellow is my favourite colour in virtue of my having a 
counterpart at another world, whose favourite colour is blue. This counterpart 
resembles me in other ways that are sufficient for her being my counterpart – 
she might, for instance, have the same genetic make-up, the same parents (or at 
least, counterparts of my parents), and the same life story as I have in this 
world.15  
                                                                                                                                                           
were to take this line, however, he’d be throwing the baby out with the bath water, 
because if all other worlds were impossible his modal claim wouldn’t even get off the 
ground.  
15 These suggested traits are just examples – I’m not arguing that their possession is 
essential for qualifying as one’s counterpart. I think that our intuitions regarding what can 
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So, how would someone who’s both a theist and a genuine modal 
realist make sense of my argument responding to Leftow? Some noteworthy 
specifics are that she’d read (P2) particularly strongly, because for her these 
other worlds containing as much, or more, sin than our own, are real, concretely 
existing worlds. I venture that (P5) remains strong: if there are concretely 
existing worlds containing as much, or more, sin than our own, then the Son 
ought to care about them just as much as He cares about ours. Otherwise, we’d 
not be able to put the ‘omni’ in ‘omnibenevolent’ when describing God. These 
other worlds are equally as real as ours, and the Son exists at them in the same 
way that He exists at ours. Almeida endorses this when he says, whilst 
discussing theistic GMR, ‘the suffering of other concrete universes is no less 
genuine than the suffering in our universe. We perhaps have special obligations 
to our worldmates. But certainly God’s concern is with the multiverse as a 
whole’ (2011: 10). (P6) is, once again, an indispensable requirement of theism, 
and so the conclusion is again generated that the Son takes on a body in all of 
the worlds with as much, or more, sin than ours. Before considering more 
specific consequences of this argument for genuine modal realists, I’ll examine 
the possibility that their claim doesn’t even get off the ground, because we 
can’t make sense of timeless existence ‘at’ any world at all. 
 
(2.6) TIMELESS EXISTENCE ‘AT’ EVERY WORLD? 
Paul Sheehy has argued that if God is atemporal, He can’t exist at any 
genuine modal realist worlds. This is because to exist at any one world is to 
exist within the confines of space and time. Indeed, the spatio-temporal 
separation of worlds is a crucial part of Lewis’s account. This leads Sheehy to 
suggest that, for GMR, ‘there can be no God at the actual world or 
counterparts at each of the other worlds’ (2006: 318). The worry would mean 
that a timeless God can’t be necessary, because necessary existence just is 
existence at every possible world. Importantly, ersatzists don’t face this worry, 
because their possible worlds are non-concrete entities that don’t postulate 
                                                                                                                                                           
count as our counterparts are mostly in agreement. For instance, we’d all (I hope) agree 
that I can’t have a counterpart that is, say, a desk. Lewis comments on a similarly absurd 
candidate for counterparthood: ‘I suppose I might want to be a poached egg. (An ordinary 
poached egg – not an eggy creature that walks and talks). Would I then want to inhabit 
one of the worlds where I am a poached egg? That’s not it. I take it that there are no such 
worlds. No poached egg is a counterpart of mine!’ (1979: 530).  
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numerous spatio-temporally isolated worlds, all of which God must exist at. 
Rather, ersatz possible worlds are maximally consistent sets of propositions or 
simply ways that the world could be: we can therefore safely say that God’s 
existence (given that His existence is necessary) is included in all of these sets. 
Sheehy proposes a way out for the genuine modal realist, which is that each 
world consists of a maximal set of spatio-temporally related objects and ‘the 
domain of abstracta’ (ibid.: 319), which is atemporal and aspatial. If God exists 
as part of this domain, He could thus be timeless and necessary. However, 
Sheehy warns of the unparsimonious move of adding this extra domain into 
our ontology, whereas if God could straightforwardly exist ‘at’ a world we 
require just the one fundamental ontological category.  
Nevertheless, Ross Cameron responds to Sheehy by arguing (as he 
claims Lewis would) that an atemporal God could exist ‘at each world’ in the 
sense that He exists from the standpoint of each world. Cameron uses Lewis’s 
argument that pure sets such as numbers exist from the standpoint of every 
world, to argue that ‘the theist should grant God the same status as pure sets 
have in this regard’ (2009: 97), and this is sufficient to claim that God exists 
necessarily. Cameron cites Lewis’s definition of existing from the standpoint of 
a world: it ‘belongs to the least restricted domain that is normally…appropriate in 
evaluating the truth at that world of quantifications’ (Lewis, 1983b: 40). 
Cameron says that Lewis doesn’t even claim that GMR gets rid of any 
commitment to abstracta anyway (Cameron, 2009: 97), so it could be by 
belonging to this domain that God exists at every world. In fact, assigning 
God’s existence to this alternative domain could even be argued for 
independently, on the basis that His existence ought to be entirely other than that 
of His creation. It’s therefore quite fitting that God exists in a different way 
from all else. Importantly, though, God needs to be the only member of this 
domain, lest He be considered in the same ontological category as something 
else – say, numbers. If numbers exist from the standpoint of every possible 
world, it must be in a less fundamental way than God, because everything depends 
upon Him for its existence, and He’s the source of all.16  
                                                             
16 Alternatively, one might not consider the necessity of abstracta such as numbers to be a 
threat to God’s creative power. Scott Shalkowski argues that ‘if there are abstract objects 
and if they are the necessary existents that ground necessities, then it not only makes no 
sense to suggest that God somehow explains them, it is also unnecessary to think that any 
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Cameron has thus given the atemporalist the resources to explain 
God’s necessity in terms of existence ‘at’ all modal realist worlds, by appealing 
to the standpoint relation. Presumably, people in other possible worlds can 
also be world-mates with this very same (timeless) God in this manner, without 
needing to exhibit spatio-temporal relations to Him.17 Assuming GMR, we can 
contend that the God who exists from the standpoint of each world is one and 
the same God across all worlds. Cameron says that ‘counterpart theory is 
unmotivated for objects that have their intrinsic properties essentially’ (2009: 
99). God can’t be God without possessing all of the intrinsic properties that He 
does, and so there arises no potential conflict between His different intrinsic 
properties at different worlds. I therefore maintain that atemporalists have the 
resources to respond to Sheehy’s worry. They can consistently be modal realists 
and maintain that a timeless God is necessary. He (the very same God) exists at 
every possible world, because He exists from the standpoint of every possible 
world.  
 
(2.7) WORLDS APART: WHICH ONES DO WE CONSIDER? 
Returning, then, to Leftow’s claim, it could be argued that genuine 
modal realists are in a better position to uphold it than ersatzists. Genuine 
modal realists think that every possible way that the world can consistently be 
concretely exists, and could thus maintain that many worlds with far less sin than 
our own are indeed actual. They could claim, in line with Leftow, that we do get 
modal variation if we stop restricting our attention to possible worlds with as 
much, or more sin than ours. After all, just one possible world where the Son 
isn’t incarnate would be sufficient to yield modal variation and make true the 
claim that the timeless Son becomes incarnate. It could be argued that there are 
worlds with far less sin than ours (from the standpoint of which the Son still 
                                                                                                                                                           
‘limits’ they impose upon God threaten divine supremacy and majesty’ (2014: 153). This is 
because these just are necessary: there’s nothing beyond them that God can’t do, for the 
only things that lie beyond them are those that are impossible. It might not even be such a 
problem, therefore, if we posit the existence of numbers as strictly necessary in such a way 
that they don’t rely on God for their existence. We can argue that they remain no threat to 
God’s majesty and power.  
17 There’s a further motivation for these relations that we exhibit to God not being 
spatiotemporal: if everyone in the multiverse bears any sort of spatiotemporal relation to 
the very same God, we’re in danger of all worlds collapsing into one, simply in virtue of 
these connecting relations.  
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exists), and at these worlds He doesn’t even need to consider incarnating. This 
is because humanity is already in a fulfilled and loving relationship with God, 
and there’s very little (if any) sin. If we were to consider these (concretely 
existing) worlds, then Leftow’s modal claim goes through and we can make 
sense of ‘becoming’ incarnate in terms of modal variation. However, it seems 
that in this situation Leftow’s modal claim is too weak. This is because we’re no 
longer restricting our attention to the relevantly similar possible worlds that are 
sufficient to generate a substantial sense in which the Son ‘could have 
refrained’ from being incarnate. I explained this in section 2.2, and it’s for this 
reason that the genuine modal realist, to the extent that she widens her scope 
to the worlds with very little sin, is diminishing the strength of Leftow’s modal 
claim. On top of this, there’s a further worry that lies waiting in the wings if we 
adopt GMR. I’ll now illustrate it, strengthening my argument against Leftow. 
 
(2.8) A FURTHER WORRY FOR MODAL REALISTS 
The incarnation, according to Christianity, is unique in that it had never 
happened before and will never happen again: the Son’s becoming flesh was 
enough to atone for the sins of all humanity for the rest of time. Let’s call this 
the ‘uniqueness requirement.’ It’s evidently central to Christianity, and a claim 
that must be upheld in line with orthodoxy. If one interprets Leftow’s modal 
argument as a genuine modal realist would, then one faces the additional worry 
that the uniqueness requirement is flouted.  
Given that all possible worlds concretely exist on GMR, just one such 
other-worldly incarnation is all that we need to be in violation of the 
uniqueness requirement. Put differently, the contingency that we desire from 
Leftow’s modal claim is that there’s no other world at which the Word takes on 
flesh. Ersatzists, importantly, don’t face such worries, because they hold that 
only one world in fact obtains, so only one incarnation concretely exists.18 If 
we’re genuine modal realists, assuming that God is omnibenevolent and that 
there exist worlds as sinful as our own, it emerges that we can’t help but breach 
the uniqueness requirement. This is really no surprise, given that violating it is 
surely easier to do than it is to endorse incarnations in all relevantly similar 
                                                             
18 Unless, of course, there are multiple incarnations within a world, but this isn’t 
something that I’m examining here.  
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possible worlds. This unwelcome outcome is an additional reason why GMR 
isn’t congruous with Leftow’s modal claim.  
One potential line of response here is that the incarnation is unique 
according to GMR, because the Son’s incarnation in our world was enough to 
atone everybody in every other possible world. Timothy O’Connor and Phillip 
Woodward suggest a view in this vicinity: 
 
Human persons vary considerably, yet God’s incarnation as the 
particular first-century Palestinian man Jesus of Nazareth is thought to 
serve God’s restorative and identifying purposes for all of us. Why not 
for all [divine image-bearing] creatures human and non-human alike? 
(2015: 231) 
 
Here, the authors are suggesting that God’s incarnation as Jesus in our world 
could be powerful enough to atone every species made in God’s image, for the 
rest of time. In fact, it could be added that it’s down-playing the significance of 
the incarnation to assume that the Son’s sacrifice couldn’t accomplish such a 
task. If this were the case, the argument could be applied across logical space as 
a whole to argue that we don’t require incarnations in worlds with as much or 
more sin than our own, and so we can make sense of cross-worldly variation 
regarding the incarnation. However, there are several reasons to find this 
problematic, which O’Connor and Woodward are themselves aware of. Firstly, 
it seems presumptuous to suppose that we humans have ‘won an incarnational 
lottery’ (ibid.), because there seems to be no reason why God would choose to 
be incarnate as one of us over being a human in a different world, or a member 
of a different species in any world. Moreover, the authors question how 
creatures in other (spatio-temporally discrete) worlds could know that their sins 
have been redeemed (ibid.: 231-2). This leads to the related worry that these 
other-worldly creatures won’t feel the comfort and hope that we in our world 
feel in our awareness of this knowledge. 
Nevertheless, one might respond that the incarnation is still a unique 
event even if it happens at other worlds, because it only happens elsewhere in 
the sense that its counterparts happen. Each of these counterpart incarnations is 
brought about by the Son, who we’ve seen exists from the standpoint of every 
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possible world. Furthermore, the other worlds where incarnations take place 
are all and only those in a similar state to our own regarding amounts of sin, 
and where the person who is incarnate is sufficiently similar to Jesus to be His 
counterpart, at a sufficiently similar period of history.  
The problem here is that to the extent that we embrace GMR, we must 
also embrace an increase in number in these incarnations, given that the other-
worldly incarnations are all real. More forcefully, given the spatio-temporal 
separation of worlds, Christ incarnate must differ at each one.19 This is supported 
by Cameron. We’ve seen he says that, just as unchanging objects don’t face the 
problem of temporary intrinsics, ‘counterpart theory is unmotivated for objects 
that have their intrinsic properties essentially’ (2009: 99). For entities belonging 
to the latter category, such as the Son, we have: 
 
…no problem in holding that [they] strictly and literally [exist] at more 
than one world. There will never arise a potential conflict with 
Leibniz’s law, since there will never be one world at which [the object] 
is intrinsically F and another at which [it] is intrinsically not-F (ibid.: 99-
100).  
 
In contrast, when we consider the incarnate Son, we evidently want to say that 
His actions (although all perfectly good) vary across worlds in response to the 
different events and circumstances there. The uniqueness requirement thus 
remains flouted, because different divine incarnations concretely exist in 
different possible worlds. Christ incarnate is a temporal, mutable being, and so 
He’ll possess different intrinsic properties at different times. Moreover, it’s also 
important to hold that Christ incarnate differs across worlds simply because of 
the spatio-temporal separation of worlds. If the very same temporal, mutable 
being was able to exist within different spatio-temporally separated worlds, 
then these worlds would not in fact be spatio-temporally separated. Rather, 
they’d be parts of the very same world. It is, after all, part of the definition of 
genuine modal realist worlds that they’re unified by their parts being spatio-
temporally related, and by their spatio-temporal separation from other worlds 
                                                             
19 With the exception of potential qualitatively identical worlds. 
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and their parts. These are important reasons as to why Christ incarnate can’t 
enjoy trans-world identity.20  
Cashing out the claim that the timeless Son of God ‘becomes’ incarnate 
due to variation across genuine modal realist worlds therefore leads to us being 
unable to make sense of any cross-worldly variation regarding the incarnation. 
This is because at all of the relevantly similar worlds to our own, the Son is 
incarnate, so we end up endorsing multiple incarnations. A further problematic 
consequence of a genuine modal realist’s interpretation of Leftow’s claim is 
that we violate the all-important uniqueness requirement that’s central to a 
Christian understanding of the incarnation. After making his modal claim, 
Leftow argues that the ball is in his opponent’s court, and that they must provide 
an account of why modal variation isn’t a sufficient explanation of the Son 
becoming incarnate. I’ve engaged in debate in response to Leftow’s challenge, 
arguing that Leftow’s modal claim doesn’t achieve cross-worldly variation 
regarding incarnations, and that his account results in further problems besides. 
However, I can think of one final response which could be levelled against my 
argument by ersatzists and genuine modal realists alike. I’ll now consider it, 
arguing that it’s not one that atemporalists can help themselves to.  
 
(2.9) LEFTOW’S BEST SHOT 
The remaining retort is that I’ve been setting up the debate in a way 
that ensures the incarnation becomes necessary. It might be argued that by 
starting off with the assumption that the incarnation happened in the actual 
world (P1), I’ve selectively delineated that all other possible worlds contain 
incarnations. Ted Sider discusses something like this when talking about time 
travel cases in which failure is included within the antecedent of a 
counterfactual: for example, when we ask what would happen in the 
                                                             
20 A further issue suggests itself here: how can Christ incarnate be identical with the Son 
of God, as must be the case according to orthodoxy? If many different counterparts of 
Christ are all identical with the very same Son who possess trans-world identity, then does 
this mean that all worlds collapse into one? Alternatively, how does one and the same 
being (the Son, and the various counterparts of Christ) exist both from the standpoint of 
every possible world, and in just one possible world? This seems to be a rather elaborate 
species of the incoherence problem, which will be discussed in Chapter 3.  
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paradoxical case of a backward time traveller attempting to kill her baby self.21 
Sider says that ‘the antecedents of these counterfactuals concerning time travel 
in a sense “have their difficulty built-in”’ (2002: 124), in such a way that we’re 
doomed to fail at these specific time travel missions. He compares this with a 
non-time travel situation where failure is also loaded into the antecedent of a 
counterfactual: ‘If I were to try to throw the stone at the window but the 
window did not subsequently break, then I would slip on a banana peel or hit a 
passing bird or…’ (ibid.: 123). Here, my failure to break the window is 
guaranteed, because it’s built into the antecedent. It might be argued that by 
building into my assumptions the fact that the incarnation has happened in this 
world, I (misleadingly) necessitate its happening in all of the relevantly similar 
worlds. It could be maintained that Leftow has in mind something other than 
I’ve been assuming with his modal claim: the contingency of the Son 
incarnating ‘before’ He actually did so. Here, ‘before’ would be understood in 
something like a causal, or a logical sense of the word, such that in this sense 
there are no incarnations before God decides to become incarnate.  
Along these lines, one could argue that God’s timeless decision to be 
incarnate at the world(s) He did was itself a free one. God is atemporal, and so 
it’s not the case that He became incarnate at our world and then thought ‘oh 
no – now this means all similar worlds need to contain incarnations, too!’ This 
would be to endorse temporal sequence in His life; not to mention threaten 
His omniscience and our trust in divine providence. Rather, God timelessly 
and freely chose to be incarnate at all and only the world(s) He did. So long as 
His decision to be incarnate was a free one, this is all that’s needed for the 
modal variation argument to go through. God may timelessly be incarnate at 
the world(s) that He is, but He could have refrained from being so at all of these, 
because He exists logically prior to them. It’s this that gives Leftow his desired 
contingency, one might argue. In fact, it would surely be begging the question 
against divine timelessness as a whole to assume that God’s timeless decisions 
can’t be free, given that divine freedom is indispensable to theism.  
However, in my opinion Leftow’s claim has now become too weak to 
make sense of modal variation. If we’re able to make sense of a timeless Son 
                                                             
21 For an influential discussion of alleged contradictions that arise from imagined 
backward travels in time, see David Lewis (1976). 
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existing ‘before’ any incarnation(s) (perhaps in a causal, or logical, sense), there 
would then be no worlds at which He’s incarnate, and thus the incarnation 
would be impossible. It appears that if God is atemporal, we’ve no choice but 
to start with the claim that He timelessly possesses an incarnate nature at the 
worlds in which He does – so our only option is to build this into our 
antecedents. In fact, that the Son became incarnate (at this world) is the very 
feat this chapter is attempting to account for, so it’s of course important to 
start out with it as an antecedent assumption. And, more’s the pity for Leftow, 
as soon as we do return to the claim that our world contains a divine 
incarnation, this means that (P1) is back on the table, and either worries of 
arbitrariness get going again, or we endorse incarnations at all possible worlds.  
I’ve argued in this section that there’s no clear sense in which the Word 
taking on flesh varies across worlds, so atemporalists can’t appeal to modal 
variation as a way that the Son becomes incarnate. Furthermore, Leftow’s 
claim undermines the libertarian freedom of the Son, which is a result that 
Leftow himself would clearly be unhappy with. I explained that it’s possible to 
adopt a compatibilist account of God’s freedom here, in order to maintain that 
the Son is still free, but I anticipated that most Christians (including Leftow 
himself) wouldn’t find this option desirable. I also illustrated a further 
unwelcome result of adopting GMR: we end up violating the all-important 
uniqueness requirement of the incarnation. Finally, I considered the objection 
that I’ve (misleadingly) selectively delineated that the incarnation is necessary, 
by starting with the assumption that the incarnation happened in the actual 
world and then arguing that, to avoid arbitrariness, it must happen in all 
relevantly similar worlds. Against this objection, I argued that if God is 
atemporal, He’s timelessly incarnate at any worlds in which He takes on flesh, 
and there’s thus no sense in which we can compare across worlds before (in any 
sense of the word) the timeless Son is incarnate. I therefore conclude that if 
God is atemporal, there are great tensions with understanding the Son 
‘becoming’ incarnate in terms of mere modal variation. The modal account 
only seems workable if we dispense with (or possibly re-work our 
understanding of) God’s libertarian freedom. For now, though, I bat the ball 
back to Leftow’s side of the net: the atemporalist needs a better account of how 
the Word became flesh.  
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In light of this, I’ll consider what I think is the only remaining option 
for atemporalists, and the most preferable of the three discussed here: that a 
timeless God becomes incarnate by changing extrinsically. 
 
(3) EXTRINSIC CHANGE? 
As I argued above, if something is the subject of intrinsic change, it 
must itself be subject to the passage of time, because it can’t be intrinsically 
one way and then intrinsically another way without persisting through a period 
of temporal duration. However, if something changes extrinsically, it’s not clear 
that it needs to be temporal. This is because it’s only changing in virtue of 
something else changing intrinsically. For example, if McGonagall changes 
extrinsically in virtue of Neville no longer fearing her, she needn’t be in time. 
In fact, it’s perfectly consistent (for this argument) that she possesses a device 
to stop her own personal time, which she activates, and Neville change his 
mind about her whilst she herself is temporally frozen. In this situation, she 
would have changed extrinsically, despite not being subject to the passage of 
time. In this section I’ll consider a final option for the atemporalist: she might 
argue that Senor’s argument given at the start of this chapter is unsound by 
objecting to (P3) in an altogether different way from the modal argument 
discussed above. Once more, (P3) was that ‘X’s assuming (or ‘taking on’) a 
nature involves a change in X’s intrinsic properties’. Specifically, the 
atemporalist might maintain instead that the Word takes on flesh by virtue of 
changing extrinsically. I’ll argue that if the atemporalist adopts a compositionalist 
model of the incarnation, she possesses a provisionally viable account of the 
Son becoming incarnate, because she has the resources to appeal to such 
extrinsic change. 
 
(3.1) EXTRINSIC CHANGE AND COMPOSITIONALIST ACCOUNTS 
Richard Cross says that ‘the idea is that a proposition such as “God 
became man” is true not in virtue of any change in God, but merely in virtue 
of a change in the created order – a new sort of relation of a creature to God’ 
(2002: 206). Similarly, Oliver Crisp suggests that the Son’s ‘becoming’ incarnate 
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could involve such a change: ‘It is not… that the Incarnation involves a change 
in the nature of God…what is involved is a relational change between the 
Word and the human nature he contingently assumes’ (2007: 129). The 
thought here is as follows: if at a certain time I’m taller than my sister and at a 
later time I remain the same height but she’s grown to be taller than me, I’ve 
changed from being taller than her to no longer being taller than her – in spite 
of undergoing no intrinsic change myself. Rather, it’s my sister who has changed 
intrinsically, which changes the relations between us because I no longer stand 
in the ‘taller than’ relation to her. Similarly, the Son (despite not changing 
intrinsically) has changed from not being related to a human body and soul, to 
existing in such relations.  
As we’ve seen in the previous section, Leftow certainly shares the 
atemporalist view that the Son became incarnate without undergoing any 
intrinsic change. When he suggests that ‘the word became flesh by having flesh 
grafted on’ (2011b: 23), he seems (in addition to his separate modal argument) 
to be suggesting that the Son became incarnate by undergoing extrinsic change. 
If this is to be the case, something else must change intrinsically – just as in the 
case of my sister and me, it is she who changes intrinsically by growing. I’ll 
discuss the plausible candidates for undergoing such intrinsic change shortly.  
In order to adopt an account of extrinsic change, the Son and His 
human body (and possibly His human soul, if such there be) must be 
understood as proper parts of a composite - just as, for instance, we might 
understand bristles and a head to comprise proper parts of a composite that is 
a toothbrush. This is known as a ‘compositionalist account’ of the incarnation, 
and can be further sub-divided into two and three-parter models. Two-parter 
compositionalists argue that the Son becomes incarnate because His divine 
mind takes the place of an ordinary human mind: forming a composite with a 
human body. Three-parters add that a human mind, or soul, is also present in 
the composite Christ, which they maintain helps us to account for His genuine 
humanity, in addition to divinity. Henceforth, I’ll refer to the human parts of 
the composite as Christ’s body and soul. If one prefers, however, one can 
substitute in one’s favoured account of what constitutes a person and assume 
that I simply mean Christ’s body, or His body and mind, for example. Nothing 
hinges upon which interpretation one takes for the purposes of this argument.  
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Understandably, hackles might be raised at this point in relation to the 
coherence of compositionalist accounts. For example, how can there 
consistently be just one person in this composite of the Son and a human body 
and soul? I’ll examine worries such as these in Chapter 3, when I turn to look 
at the incoherence problem that faces the incarnation. For the moment, 
however, my goal is to argue that compositionalist models can at least get off 
the ground, because they can be used to demonstrate how a timeless God 
might ‘become’ incarnate.   
Importantly, compositionalist accounts of the incarnation are what Hill 
calls a type of ‘relational’ (2011: 10) model, meaning that the Son is made 
human by coming to be related to something that makes Him human (such as a 
human body and soul). This is as opposed to ‘transformationalist’ models, 
which require the Son Himself to change into something else in order to 
become human – and, so, to undergo intrinsic change. If one is a 
compositionalist, therefore, one can argue that the Son Himself needn’t change 
intrinsically upon becoming related to a human body and soul. Rather, the Son 
is a distinct part of the composite Christ, and it could be argued that it is 
something else that changes intrinsically upon the formation of the composite. In 
virtue of this, the Son Himself changes only extrinsically when He becomes 
incarnate, just as I change extrinsically when my sister grows taller than me. 
Importantly, compositionalists must be able to point to what undergoes the 
intrinsic change by virtue of which the Son changes extrinsically. Prima facie, it 
seems that the ideal candidates for this would be the other parts of the 
composite: the Son’s human body and soul. I’ll now elucidate the problems 
with such a view, and then outline a preferred account that nevertheless still 
requires one to be a compositionalist.  
 
(3.2) WHAT CHANGES INTRINSICALLY, IF NOT THE SON? 
The problem with the human parts of the composite undergoing 
intrinsic change in joining with the Son is that the human parts don’t themselves exist 
prior to the incarnation. Rather, their coming into existence is bound up in the 
very formation of the composite Christ. In fact, it would be unorthodox to 
argue that Christ’s human body and soul existed prior to the incarnation, 
because we’d then have two persons in Christ and so Nestorian heresy. 
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Alternatively, Leftow recognises that if this pre-existing person is destroyed 
when the composite forms, then the incarnation becomes ‘a bizarre form of 
human sacrifice’ (2002: 280). Neither of these options is remotely desirable, 
which is why we must say that the human part(s) of the composite don’t exist 
prior to the incarnation. However, for something to change intrinsically, it 
must exist both before and after the change, lest there’s nothing that the change 
happens to. For instance, when my sister grows, there has to be a time before 
the growth at which she was shorter. If the Son’s human body and soul only 
come into existence upon the formation of the composite, then, we can’t say 
that they changed – they didn’t even exist before! They simply are related 
compositionally to the Son. Leftow himself recognises this very worry: 
 
In a genuine change, one single thing exists both when the change 
begins and when it is over. Turning from green to brown is a change in 
a leaf only because the same thing, a leaf, is first green, then brown 
(ibid.: 298). 
 
It seems that we have the following problem if we are compositionalist 
atemporalists who appeal to extrinsic change in the Son. Something must 
undergo intrinsic change in order that the Son change extrinsically by virtue of 
it. As we saw in section 1, it can’t be the Son Himself lest He be temporal. If 
it’s the Son’s human body and soul, then they must have existed prior to the 
incarnation. If this is the case, however, then this initial person is either part of 
the new composite, which is unorthodox, or the person is destroyed when the 
composite forms, which turns the Son of God into a body snatcher of sorts 
(ibid.: 278).  
Thankfully, I think that there’s a way out for the compositionalist. The 
intrinsic change will have to be in nature itself: in the total constitution of the 
world, which changes because of the ‘coming into existence’ of a composite 
which didn’t previously exist. This is hinted at by Cross, who we have seen 
comments that: ‘A proposition such as “God became man” is true not in virtue 
of any change in God, but merely in virtue of a change in the created order – a 
new sort of relation of a creature to God’ (2002: 206).  I think that Cross 
misses the mark when he talks of this new relation of a creature to God, because 
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this suggests that the human parts of the composite already comprised some 
sort of entity. However, I think that Cross gets right the assertion that a change 
takes place in the created order when the Son becomes incarnate. This change is 
caused (timelessly, of course) by God Himself, in the creation of the human 
parts of the composite, which begin to have relations to the Son as soon as 
they come into existence. The intrinsic change doesn’t happen to a human body 
and soul, but to nature itself, because a human body and soul come into 
existence as part of a divine composite. It’s in virtue of this change in the 
formation of a composite and the associated relations within it that the 
timeless Son of God changes extrinsically. A better (although still not perfect) 
analogy might therefore be me undergoing extrinsic change in virtue of my 
sister being born. I don’t change intrinsically, but nature itself does, because 
something new is added to it – and this change brings me into the relation of 
‘sister’. 
   
(3.3) OTHER RESPONSES CONSIDERED 
Holland advances what could be an altogether different response to my 
account of extrinsic change in the incarnation. He says:  
 
The incarnation was an event, serving as the dividing line between two 
consecutive states of affairs in the life of God: before the Incarnation 
and after the Incarnation. God the Son existed pre-incarnate, and the 
event of the Incarnation was an event in his life, after which he existed 
incarnate in Jesus Christ (2012: 82).  
 
Here, Holland is claiming that the incarnation is a stage in the life of the Son, 
and thus that His life exhibits a ‘consecutive’ timely structure. This is part of 
Holland’s overall argument that the incarnation teaches us that God can’t be 
timeless. However, I think that Holland is begging the question against divine 
timelessness by assuming that the incarnation is an ‘event,’ and that it comes 
‘before’ another part of the Son’s life. The idea that there are temporal stages 
in the Son of God’s life is something that atemporalists explicitly argue should 
be rejected, and Holland can’t therefore help himself to it as part of his case 
against such accounts.  
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Relatedly, atemporalists claim that there’s no ‘before’ or ‘after’ the 
incarnation in the Son’s life, because He’s timelessly incarnate. It indeed seems 
to follow from the fact that He changes merely extrinsically upon becoming 
incarnate. What is more, it seems like this is what the atemporalist must say. 
Stump and Kretzmann offer such an argument when they say ‘the divine 
nature of the second person of the Trinity…cannot become temporal, nor 
could the second person at some time acquire a human nature He does not 
eternally have’ (1981: 453). Relatedly, Leftow himself comments on the 
relations that the Son has to His human soul and body: ‘If God is timelessly 
incarnate, he always had these [relations], timelessly, even at times before [the 
human soul and body] appeared’ (2002: 299). To us time-bound creatures 
before 1 AD it might have looked like the Son wasn’t yet incarnate, but this is 
simply due to our limited temporal perspective. In fact, the Son exists incarnate 
eternally (timelessly), in virtue of the fact that at some point in time the created 
order undergoes intrinsic change when the Son’s human body and soul come 
into existence and unite with Him to form a human being. Proponents of 
extrinsic change could therefore be objecting to (P2) of Senor’s above 
argument: that the human nature of the Son is ‘assumed’ or ‘taken on’, in 
addition to objecting to (P3): that taking on human nature involves a change in 
one’s intrinsic properties. Atemporalists could reject (P2) and maintain that the 
Son doesn’t need to take on a human nature, because He possesses it timelessly, 
in virtue of the fact that the human elements of the composite do join with 
Him at a particular moment in the history of the world. 
For the purposes of adequately explaining the Son ‘becoming’ 
incarnate, I’ll take this argument (that the Son is timelessly incarnate in virtue 
of undergoing a merely extrinsic change to become incarnate) to be sufficient. 
I’ll put more pressure on it under different heads in Chapters 3 and 5, 
however. In Chapter 3, I’ll discuss the unity (or lack of it) in the composite 
Christ in more detail. In Chapter 5, I’ll discuss the line of argument that the 
Son is ‘timelessly’ incarnate in more detail, considering what makes this 
assertion true. For now, I think that extrinsic change, aided by a 
compositionalist model of the incarnation, is provisionally able to explain what 
it’s been asked to in this chapter: the Son ‘becoming’ incarnate in spite of 
undergoing no intrinsic change. 
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(4) CONCLUSION 
Stump and Norman Kretzmann comment on the particular difficulty 
inherent in the incarnation: it’s often alleged that there are problems with the 
idea of a timeless God causing temporal events, but this is more pronounced 
here because ‘according to the doctrine of the incarnation an eternal entity 
itself entered time’ (1981: 451).22 I’ve considered three ways that atemporalists 
might maintain that the Son is timeless in spite of ‘becoming’ a temporal being, 
and the fact that this process itself seems to invoke change and so time. I ruled 
out the Son’s undergoing intrinsic change, arguing that this necessarily requires 
the thing undergoing intrinsic change to be temporal. I next considered modal 
variation, which doesn’t require the passage of time. I argued that whether we 
cash out modal variation as genuine modal realists or ersatzists, there’s no clear 
sense in which we get the cross-worldly variation that is required for modal 
variation. This is due to the many tensions embedded in Leftow’s modal claim.  
Finally, I considered the argument that the Son becomes incarnate by 
virtue of undergoing extrinsic change. This means adopting a compositionalist 
model of the incarnation, so that the Son is a distinct part of the composite 
Christ. The Son’s human body and soul are also distinct parts of the 
composite, and they come into existence, thus forming the composite Christ. 
The Son changes extrinsically as a result, but doesn’t need to be subject to the 
passage of time for this to happen. I therefore conclude that atemporalists 
have just one option: they can consistently make sense of the Word becoming 
flesh just in case they are compositionalists, and appeal to extrinsic change in 
the Son. In terms of explaining how the Son becomes incarnate, this option is 
provisionally viable. In the next chapter, I’ll consider whether and how 
temporalists can account for God becoming man.  
                                                             
22 It’s evident that Stump and Kretzmann mean ‘atemporal’ by their use of the word 
‘eternal’ here.  
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CHAPTER 2 
INCARNATION, TEMPORALITY, 
AND NATURAL KINDS 
A natural kind may have abnormal members. A green lemon is still a lemon – even if, 
owing to some abnormality, it never turns yellow.  A three-legged tiger is still a tiger. 
Gold in the gaseous state is still gold. It is only normal lemons that are yellow, tart, 
etc,: only normal tigers that are four-legged, only gold under normal conditions that is 
hard, white or yellow, etc. (Putnam 1975:  140). 
  
This chapter is an investigation of whether and how a temporal God can 
become incarnate. A credible metaphysical account of this is crucial because, as 
stated at the outset of this part of the thesis, the Nicean Creed states that 
‘because of us men and because of our salvation [The Son] came down and 
became incarnate, becoming man’ (Kelly 1960: 216). Any account of the 
incarnation worth its salt must be able to account for God genuinely becoming 
human. Not least, this is because of the important soteriological aspects that 
depend upon the Son becoming a human being. If He merely appeared to take 
on human form, it’s thought, the Son’s sacrifice on the cross wouldn’t have 
paved the way for the rest of humanity to achieve salvation. Furthermore, we 
wouldn’t be accounting for the greatness of the initial sacrifice that the Son 
made in relinquishing His prerogative to remain purely divine. The previous 
chapter examined how an atemporal God might become incarnate, considering 
three possible options – which were considered to be exhaustive. I concluded 
that extrinsic change in the Son of God is the only (provisionally) viable 
option.  
Temporalists are committed to the view that the Son is backwardly 
everlasting with respect to His divinity, and that at a specific moment of time 
He became human – so He ‘took on’ humanity, or transformed into a human 
at a particular time. This suggests two ways in which temporalists can 
understand the Son’s becoming incarnate. Firstly, the incarnation could be 
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modelled in a ‘compositionalist’ sense, where the Word takes on flesh by 
becoming united with a human body (and possibly a human soul as well) to 
form a divine composite: Jesus Christ. Alternatively, temporalists could adopt a 
‘transformationalist’ account, whereby ‘to become human means to be 
transformed into a human’ (Hill 2011: 8). Importantly, atemporalists don’t 
have the resources to appeal to transformationalist accounts, because there’s 
no doubt that these require intrinsic change. I argued this in the previous 
chapter, contending that the subject of an intrinsic change must itself be 
subject to the passage of time.  Atemporalists therefore only have 
compositional accounts available to them. According to transformationalist 
accounts, the Son Himself changes from being intrinsically one way (divine) at 
one time, to intrinsically a different way (divine and human) at a different, later 
time.  
This chapter examines both of the options available to the temporalist. 
I first briefly discuss temporalist compositionalist accounts, which I argue are 
at least as viable as their atemporalist counterparts, and probably more so. In 
spite of this, they’re dealt with briefly, because of the preferable accounts at the 
temporalist’s disposal. These are transformationalist accounts, which section 2 
is devoted to discussing. This involves positing ‘human’ and ‘divine’ as natural 
kind terms, and questioning whether it’s possible to ‘take on’ another kind 
essence in spite of typical arguments that one is a member of one’s natural kind 
essentially: ‘kind-essentialism’.1 I examine various responses that are available to 
transformationalists in the face of this objection, and in the face of other 
objections in the vicinity. I firstly present and examine Morris’s argument, 
which distinguishes between being ‘fully’ and ‘merely’ human, as well as 
scrutinising and re-considering the properties that are truly essential for 
humanity.2 This is fleshed out by Kevin Sharpe’s suggestion that, if we revise 
our traditional understanding of kind-essentialism, we are able to account for 
                                                             
1 Hackles might be raised at this point, regarding whether ‘divine’ can legitimately be said 
to count as a ‘natural’ kind – or, indeed, whether it ought to count as a ‘kind’ at all. Related 
discussion is forthcoming, so I ask readers to suspend judgement on this until then. 
2 There’s an interesting symmetry to be found between this chapter and the next one that 
discusses divine temporality (Chapter 4). This chapter largely relies on scrutinising and 
rethinking what properties are required for belonging to the natural kind ‘human.’ Chapter 
4 examines how temporalists might respond to the ‘incoherence problem’ that’s generated 
once the Son has become incarnate. Conversely, then, it re-examines and re-thinks the 
essential properties required for being ‘divine,’ or ‘God’ - in its discussion of kenotic 
models.  
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divinity becoming humanity. I consider the response that Sharpe’s revised 
kind-essentialism leaves any sense of the Son’s being ‘fully human’ looking 
rather impoverished. I next seek to patch this up. I distinguish between the 
taking on of an ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ human nature, with a view to showing 
that we can explain how the Son is ‘truly human’ if we postulate what concrete 
thing He transforms into in order that He count as a human. As a case study, I 
discuss physicalism about human persons – in particular, Merricks’s version of 
physicalism.3 This claims that the Son is fully human because He’s identical with 
– and so, transforms into – a human body. 
 
(1) COMPOSITIONALIST ACCOUNTS 
Compositionalist models of the incarnation are those according to 
which Jesus Christ is composed of various parts; ‘a compound of qualitatively 
and numerically different constituents: a divine mind, a human body, and, on 
some models, a human mind as well’ (Marmodoro & Hill 2010: 469). The Son 
becomes incarnate by becoming part of a ‘larger’ composite of which the 
human Jesus is another part (Hill 2011: 12-13).4 The human Jesus may be 
                                                             
3 Henceforth, whenever I refer to physicalism, I mean physicalism about human persons. 
The global thesis that everything that exists is physical is of course straightforwardly 
incompatible with theism. This is of course because ‘any classical theist, let alone any 
Christian theologian, will want to affirm the existence of at least one essentially immaterial 
entity: God’ (Crisp 2009:137).  
4 According to Hill, the main alternative compositionalist model claims that the Son 
acquires a human body (and potentially a human mind as well) as ‘parts of Himself’ (Hill 
2011:13). Hill compares this model to putting on weight: I enjoy numerous delicious 
meals, and I acquire extra matter, but I’m nevertheless the very same person that existed 
before this indulgent spell. In the same way, compositionalists of this stripe can argue that, 
on becoming incarnate, the Son acquires extra parts as part of Himself, rather than becoming 
one part of a greater whole (ibid).  Interestingly, it’s not evident that this account is solely 
compositionalist. It could additionally be construed as transformationalist, because the 
Son Himself must ‘transform’ in at least some sense in order to encompass or acquire 
these additional human parts. After all, it’s for exactly this reason that atemporalists can 
only help themselves to the compositionalist model whereby the Son unites with a human 
body and soul. This latter model, as was argued in the previous chapter, can be construed 
in such a way that the Son need only change extrinsically upon the formation of the 
composite. I therefore contend that the model whereby the Son acquires extra parts as 
parts of Himself is best viewed as a ‘middle ground’ account between compositionalist and 
transformationalist models. It involves a compound of distinct parts, but it also involves 
an intrinsic change on the part of the Son – and for this latter reason it can be appealed to 
by temporalists alone. For the purposes of this discussion, the transformationalist 
umbrella could be taken to additionally shelter these ‘middle-ground’ accounts. Likewise, 
however, the criticism of compositionalist accounts in Chapter 4 applies to these middle-
ground accounts, so championing them here would only mean falling at the next hurdle. 
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further divided into a human body and human soul – in which case we have a 
‘three parter’ model of the incarnation. Alternatively, the human Jesus may be 
composed of a body, united with and animated by God the Son – which would 
be a ‘two parter’ model.5  
Compositionalist accounts aren’t explicitly discussed, as far as I know, 
in relation to a temporal God – when discussed in connection with God’s 
relation to time, they’re appealed to by atemporalists.6 Presumably, temporalist 
compositionalist accounts of this first sort would be at least as viable as their 
atemporalist counterparts. If anything, they’d allow for a greater degree of unity 
between the parts of the composite, because they can endorse certain causal 
connections between the Son and the human parts that can’t take place if the 
Son is timeless and immutable. Nevertheless, in Chapter 4 I contend that 
temporalist compositionalist accounts tread an untenable path between 
Nestorian and Apollinarian heresy. It’s further argued (again in Chapter 4), that 
the temporalist has better accounts at her disposal. Indeed, it’s a particular 
variant of transformationalist accounts, kenoticism, which is suggested as 
having the advantage, both explanatorily and because it avoids heresy. It’s for 
this reason that I’ll discuss compositionalist accounts no further. The 
temporalist has better accounts to work with, and it’s these transformationalist 
accounts that will be the focus of this chapter.  
 
(2) KIND ESSENTIALISM AND BECOMING INCARNATE 
Transformationalist accounts, as mentioned, involve the Son changing: 
a divine being becoming a human being in virtue of an intrinsic change. This 
could be construed, for instance, as: the Son becoming a body (which will be 
my case study in section 4); the Son becoming a combination of a human body 
and soul; or even, as suggested above, the Son transforming to acquire a 
                                                                                                                                                           
For this reason, this chapter won’t discuss these any further – the temporalist has better 
options available. 
5 For more discussion on two and three parter models see, for instance, Leftow (2002:278-
280) and Plantinga (1999:182-193). 
6 Unless, of course, Swinburne’s divided mind model and Morris’s two minds model are 
variants of compositionalism. I consider this in Chapter 4. For defences of atemporalist 
compositionalist accounts see, for instance, Leftow (2002), and Hill (2012).  
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human body and soul as parts of Himself.7 It would, however, be unorthodox 
to argue that the Son’s divinity is divested upon this transformation, because 
Christ is (on pain of heresy) fully human and fully divine. Transformationalist 
accounts of the Son becoming incarnate thus face an important obstacle: kind-
essentialism. This is the doctrine that: 
 
(KE) If something is a member of a [natural] kind, then it is essentially a member 
of that [natural] kind (Sharpe 2017: 119). 
 
If K is a natural kind and x is a member of it, then x is essentially a member of 
it: it’s impossible for x to exist and not be a member of K. Sharpe mentions 
(2017: 130, footnote) that he’s indeed prepared to accept that (KE) holds with 
respect to artefactual kinds as well as natural kinds, but for our purposes we 
need simply read it as pertaining to natural kinds. 
If ‘divine’ and ‘human’ are themselves natural kinds, it appears that one 
can’t ‘become’ human. Rather, if we’re human, we’re essentially so, and can’t 
exist without being a member of this natural kind. It therefore appears that 
humanity isn’t something that can be taken on by anything. 8 For instance, a cat 
can’t become human, insofar as we’re talking about genuinely ‘becoming’ 
another natural kind.9 This is a different issue from the more plausible feat of 
appearing to have become another natural kind (such as Professor McGonagall 
appearing to become a tabby cat). Swinburne captures this difference well:  
 
                                                             
7 A further way to analyse the Son becoming human could be, in line with animalism, His 
simply becoming numerically identical with an animal (see, for instance, Olson 1997). It’s 
worth noting that Sharpe considers his view (to be introduced shortly) to be a version of 
animalism: he calls it ‘pyschologically serious animalism.’ Sharpe’s account will be spelled 
out more later on. I see no reason why the animalist can’t also appeal to 
transformationalism traditionally construed. Olson also argues that animalism is clearly 
compatible with physicalism: ‘anyone who claims to be a materialist but at the same time 
insists that you and I are not animals, or holds a theory of personal identity inconsistent 
with our being animals, has got some explaining to do’ (ibid.: 95-6). My case study will be 
specifically Merricks’s version of physicalism, because I think its demand that the Son 
must transform into a human body in order to count as human is the most tricky to defend. 
Olson seems to think that physicalism construed as a person’s being identical with a body 
is also compatible with animalism (see 1997: 101). I therefore think that there are various 
options available for the animalist who believes in the incarnation, but I won’t discuss this 
any further here.  
8 I’ll be using the phrases ‘becoming’ and ‘taking on’ interchangeably, because for these 
purposes they seem to be two sides of the same coin. 
9 Assuming that ‘cat’ and ‘human’ are natural kinds. 
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Can the animate being which John is come subsequently to have the 
experiences and do the actions of an alligator? Now no doubt John’s 
body could grow scales, his arms could grow short, he could lose his 
voice, etc. so that there existed an individual with an alligator-body. But 
if the sort of things the resulting individual thought and the sort of 
actions which the resulting individual did were those of a person, then 
he would be a person, although unfortunately cursed with an alligator-
body. What I am asking is whether that being could have the 
experiences and do the actions of an individual who really was an 
alligator – had alligator-like feelings about things and did actions typical 
of alligators (1977: 246). 
 
I’m interested only in preserving Swinburne’s latter sense of ‘becoming’ an 
alligator. This is because, as mentioned above, if the Son merely appeared to 
become a human being, we’d not be able to account for the sacrifice that He 
made in relinquishing His purely divine prerogative. Furthermore, if the Son 
only appeared to be human, then his death on the cross would in turn be 
merely apparent, and this wouldn’t be sufficient to enable the rest of humanity 
to achieve salvation themselves.  
Sharpe explains the problem of taking on another natural kind, in 
reference to the potential natural kind ‘human animal.’ 
 
If [all animals are essentially animals] then it is impossible for 
something to become an animal, where the relevant notion of becoming 
involves an object’s acquiring a property that it previously lacked, since 
it is impossible for something to acquire an essential property. After all, 
if o is essentially K, then it is impossible for o to exist and not be a K 
and hence there’s no time at which o exists and is not a K (2017: 120). 
 
Relatedly, it seems that Smith is commenting on a broader problem when he 
says:  
We must not be blind to the crucial logical difference between ‘x ceases 
to exist’ and ‘x turns green’. Coming into being and going out of 
existence are not changes that an object undergoes since before and 
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after, respectively, the event in question there just is no object about 
which one can say that it is about to change or just has changed (1977: 
267).[10] 
 
The problem here is that we want to affirm that the divine Son became human, 
and was identical to the human He became, but this is difficult given the 
apparent impossibility of ‘taking on’ another natural kind (assuming that 
‘divine’ and ‘human’ are natural kinds). In other words, we must affirm that the 
Son became human, but given kind-essentialism we have to say that something 
new came into existence. As Smith says, ‘coming into existence’ isn’t a process 
that anything can undergo, because nothing exists before it comes into 
existence.  
The problem that kind-essentialism poses for the incarnation is 
particularly pernicious because of the contradictory modal properties that 
allegedly need to be possessed of necessity in order for one to belong to a 
particular natural kind.11 Morris comments that:  
 
According to one standard account of natural kinds, every such kind 
has an essence, a set of properties or underlying traits individually 
necessary and jointly sufficient for membership in the kind. We can 
understand both human nature and divine nature, or divinity and 
humanity in parallel fashion. Human nature comprises all those 
properties individually necessary and jointly sufficient for being 
human...and likewise for divinity (1986: 22-3).[12] 
 
Similarly, Sharpe suggests the following commitment of kind-essentialism: 
 
                                                             
10 Incidentally, this also speaks to my argument in Chapter 1 that it’s not the Son’s human 
body and soul that change by coming into existence, because this suggests that the Son’s 
human body and soul existed prior to coming into existence – which would be absurd.  
11 The problems that these contradictory properties pose for both atemporalists and 
temporalists will be given detailed treatment in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively, in the form 
of ‘the Incoherence Problem.’ This chapter examines the alleged contradiction only in 
relation to kind-essentialism, with the broader aim of examining whether something divine 
‘becoming’ human is a concept that can get off the ground in the first place. 
12 This is clear evidence of Morris construing ‘divine nature,’ or even ‘divinity’ as a natural 
kind, which one might consider objectionable. More on this below.  
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(KINDS) For any kind K, there is a set of modal properties, M, such that 
necessarily, for any x, x is a member of kind K if and only if x has the members of 
M (2017:119). 
 
Sharpe proposes that some modal properties associated with being a member 
of the kind animal might be ‘being essentially organic’ and ‘being essentially 
physical’ (ibid.: 121). The problem arises when we dictate that certain modal 
properties need to be possessed in order to be a member of the kind ‘divine.’ 
It’s plausible to think that ‘being essentially non-physical,’ or at least, 
‘necessarily not being essentially physical’ are among these properties, and 
therefore there appears to be an incompatibility between the properties 
required for being human, and those required for being divine.  
An important and credible response at this juncture might be that 
‘divine’ isn’t a natural kind at all, and therefore doesn’t carry with it any 
requisite ‘set’ of modal properties that need to be possessed. If this were the 
case, perhaps there would be no divine properties for the modal properties 
required for being ‘human’ to be in conflict with. I’ll now consider this 
response, and explain why – even if this is so -the kind-essentialist still faces at 
least one problem.  
 
(2.1) IS ‘DIVINE’ A NATURAL KIND? 
When introducing the problem for the incarnation caused by 
(KINDS), I was assuming that ‘divine’ is a natural kind, but this is a 
contentious issue. We might be inclined to think that ‘divine’ is neither ‘natural’ 
nor a ‘kind’. With regards to the former, Senor suggests instead that ‘divine’ is a 
‘supernatural’ kind (1991: 353-70). If we’re buying into the idea of ‘divine’ as a 
kind, I think that positing it as a supernatural kind is the more fitting way to 
describe it. After all, God created nature, so potential problems could arise from 
the thought that He Himself is a part of it. Making this distinction could also 
help with the forthcoming argument that there’s no contradiction in being 
both divine and human – because they’re different types of kind. Relatedly, 
Morris notes an important difference between the various properties required 
for membership of the kind ‘divine,’ compared to those required for 
membership of the kind ‘human.’ The former, he says, are more commonly 
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known a priori, whereas the latter – the essential properties required for being 
human – are known a posteriori (1986: 23). This further justifies the need to 
distinguish between natural and supernatural kinds. 13  Saul Kripke concurs 
when he says of properties assigned a posteriori that: 
 
Later empirical investigation may establish that some of the properties 
did not belong to the original sample, or that they were peculiarities of 
the original sample, not to be generalised to the kind as a whole. (Thus 
the yellowness of gold may be an optical illusion; or, more plausibly, 
though the gold originally observed was indeed yellow, it could turn 
out that some gold is white) (1972: 137). 
 
Something ‘divine’ may well be supernatural, then, but is it a ‘kind’ at 
all? In other words, is ‘divine’ a class, or category that can have various 
members? I think that divine is best not considered as a kind. I agree with Brian 
Davies that: 
 
To call something an individual is usually to imply that there could be 
another thing distinct from it though just like it. In this sense, different 
people are individuals. But in this sense, says the classical theist, God is 
not an individual. He belongs to no kind or sort. (1982: 9). 
 
The idea is that God can’t belong to any kinds (such as ‘divine’), because this 
would be to propose that there are possibly other things that are also members 
of this kind. Suggesting that there can potentially be other divine entities or 
Gods would of course be unorthodox in the Christian tradition within which 
I’m working. I follow Davies in resisting the idea that ‘divine’ is a natural, or 
indeed, supernatural, kind. Even if this is so, however, there’s still a residual 
problem for the theist given (KE) and the incarnation: how can we allow that 
the Son ‘became’ a member of the kind ‘human,’ – a kind which He isn’t a 
member of essentially? Potential solutions to this problem will be the subject 
                                                             
13This could also be a reason why alleged requisite properties for ‘human’ lend themselves 
to revision, as Morris suggests – more on this below. We can imagine (empirically) finding out 
that certain properties aren’t in fact essential for membership of the kind ‘human,’ but that 
they’re instead only common properties amongst humans. 
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of the rest of this section. Furthermore, I will at many junctures assume that 
‘divine’ is a (super)natural kind, simply because Sharpe and Morris do, and I 
want to engage fully with them. Sharpe in fact says that the Son is essentially a 
member of the kind ‘divine person’ (2017:125). Furthermore, including this 
assumption will present a greater challenge to transformationalist accounts – a 
challenge which, if it can be sidestepped, will deem transformationalist 
accounts all the more credible. If, however, one has reservations about such 
categorisation (reservations which I ultimately concur with), one can ignore 
this problem posed by (KINDS) and view the problem at stake as a simple 
matter of explaining how the Son can ‘become’ human in light of (KE).  
I’ll now illustrate and consider responses to the problem that kind-
essentialism poses for the doctrine of the incarnation. The first, from Morris, 
simply rejects (KE). Nevertheless, Morris accepts (KINDS) but allegedly 
circumvents the problems it causes for the incarnation. It distinguishes 
between being ‘fully’ and ‘merely’ human, and also re-considers the properties 
that are generally considered essential for membership of the kind ‘human.’ The 
second, which can embellish and bolster the first, is due to Sharpe, and modifies 
kind-essentialism such that it’s possible to become a member of a natural kind 
that one wasn’t previously a member of. This involves altering the traditional 
understanding of the way in which we can belong to a particular natural kind.  
One is, of course, free to reject kind-essentialism altogether, and in my 
view this removes the greatest obstacle to our positing the Son of God 
transforming into a human being. One might, alternatively, reject (KE) and the 
idea that we’re essentially members of all kinds that we’re members of, but 
continue to endorse (KINDS). For instance, many people argue that an 
embryo isn’t simply human from the moment of conception, but becomes 
human at a later point in its development. This still buys into the idea that 
there are certain properties necessary and sufficient to our being ‘human,’ but 
suggests that these can be taken on at a later point in time. Alternatively, 
perhaps we can conceive of a cluster of cells in a test tube that has the 
potential to transform into a human – but isn’t human at present. Similarly, 
Bird and Tobin suggest the example of a nucleus gaining a proton, resulting in 
it becoming the nucleus of a different element, but are inclined to say that the 
very same nucleus persists through the transformation into a new element. This 
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would also be to deny (KE) – presuming that each element is a natural kind – 
but would be to accept (KINDS), because we’d still be endorsing the essential 
modal properties (such as possessing x number of protons) required for being 
a particular element. 14  The rest of this chapter will nevertheless be a 
consideration of transformationalist accounts of the incarnation in light of kind-
essentialism as a whole, with a view to mounting the strongest possible defence 
of transformationalism.   
 
(2.2) EMBRACING KIND-ESSENTIALISM: COMMON VS. ESSENTIAL 
PROPERTIES (MORRIS) 
Morris’s solution to the problem raised by kind-essentialism is to 
distinguish between certain properties being genuinely essential for being a 
member of a particular natural kind on the one hand, and their merely being 
common (or indeed, their happening to be universal) to members of a particular 
natural kind, on the other hand. Regarding merely common properties for 
being human, he suggests ‘living at some time on the surface of the earth.’ 
Morris says:  
 
I think it is safe to assume it is now a universal property for humans. 
But it is not an element of human nature. It is not essential for being 
human. It is clearly possible that at some time in the future human 
beings be born, live, and die on a space station or on another planet 
colonized by earth, without ever setting foot on the earth itself (1986: 
63). 
 
The same could therefore be said to be the case for ‘being essentially physical’ 
– this could perhaps only be a common property of the natural kind ‘human,’ and 
therefore the Son of God doesn’t have to possess this property in order to be 
deemed a member of this natural kind.15 There’s then no problem, according 
                                                             
14 See Bird & Tobin (2016) http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/natural-
kinds/ for this example. 
15 Some dualists might maintain that ‘being essentially physical’ isn’t a property of humans 
at all, and argue that they don’t need to trouble themselves with a story of how this 
property is taken on. I think it’s safe to say that physicalism (at least, the understanding of 
physicalism that I’m working with in section 4), faces the greatest difficulties in light of 
(KE) and (KINDS). Incidentally, this is why this physicalist account of the incarnation has 
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to Morris, with Jesus Christ being both divine and human: the essential modal 
properties for belonging to the kinds ‘divine’ and ‘human’ aren’t in conflict 
with one another.  
Morris expands upon his argument by distinguishing between being 
‘merely’ a member of a particular natural kind, and being ‘fully’ a member of a 
natural kind. He says that we’re all merely human, in addition to being fully 
human. This is because we don’t exemplify any other kind-natures – only that 
of ‘human’. Jesus Christ, on the other hand, is fully human – in addition to 
being fully divine: 
 
In order to be fully human, it is not necessary to be merely human. An 
individual is merely human just in case it has all the properties requisite 
for being fully human (the component properties of human nature) and 
also some limitation properties as well, properties such as [coming into 
existence] (1986: 65).[16] 
 
Jesus Christ, being fully human, doesn’t need to possess these 
limitation properties –they’re only essential for being merely a member of the 
natural kind ‘human’. Because He doesn’t possess any of these properties, and 
it was these properties that were incompatible with some essential divine 
properties, there’s no contradiction in Jesus being primarily a member of 
another, ontologically higher, (super)natural kind – that of ‘divine’. He’s ‘fully’ 
divine, and because of this, Morris seems to be suggesting that there’s no 
contradiction in His becoming human, because He needn’t acquire any modal 
properties that conflict with His divinity. It therefore seems that Morris’s 
account has the resources to uphold (KINDS), in conjunction with 
transformationalist accounts of the incarnation. It can maintain that the 
requisite properties for membership of the kinds ‘divine’ and ‘human’ aren’t in 
conflict with one another – thanks to the different ways in which we can 
belong to the kind ‘human.’ I’ll now consider some responses to Morris.  
                                                                                                                                                           
been selected for examination. We’ll see below, however, that dualism still faces 
difficulties as a result of (KE). 
16 Morris hasn’t provided the best example of a ‘limitation property’ here: we’ve seen that 
nothing can have the property of ‘coming into existence,’ because nothing is there to come 
into existence in the first place – lest it already be in existence. A better example might be 
‘having a beginning in time,’ or ‘existing contingently.’  
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(2.3) POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH MORRIS’S ACCOUNT 
Firstly, it might be argued that Morris’s account makes our being 
physical into a contingent matter. This is allegedly the result of dismissing 
‘being essentially physical’ as an essential property for membership of the kind 
‘human’. Granted, there might be some dualists who would have no qualms 
about this result, but it would be an unwelcome result of Morris’s account if it 
precluded most other positions as a rule.17 In particular, this is because my 
setup of the problem caused by (KINDS) – the assumption that humans are 
essentially physical, or essentially possess physical properties – seemed to more 
obviously invoke other positions, such as physicalism. There are of course 
many different versions of physicalism, but my case study in section 4 is a 
version of physicalism whose central commitment is that we are essentially 
physical – and that we’re identical with a body, no less. I therefore want my 
solution to be one that these physicalists would be happy with, and so one that 
can allow for our essential possession of our bodies. Relatedly, Sharpe (who 
considers himself a physicalist) says:  
 
While I’m perfectly willing to accept that the Son is contingently 
physical, and hence contingently organically constituted, I am willing to 
accept this on the grounds that, as the pre-existent Divine Son of God, 
the Son is no mere organism. Yet no such considerations hold for 
persons like you and me. We appear not only to be animals, but 
essentially so….I would prefer a response to the objections that didn’t 
overthrow such deep-seated theoretical commitments (2017: 123). 
 
In response to this, Morris can argue that we, unlike the Son, are ‘essentially 
physical’ (or, perhaps, ‘essentially have physical properties’), because of our 
individual natures. Morris distinguishes these from kind natures: 
 
The many properties of metaphysical limitation and dependence that 
characterise you and me do so…not because they are essential 
elements in our common human nature. They may characterise you 
                                                             
17 It’s important to note that dualists who deny our being essentially physical still aren’t 
home and dry: they face problems in light of (KE), which will be discussed shortly.   
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and me necessarily. Presumably, they do. But it is not in virtue of our 
being human; rather, it is in virtue of the humans we are (1989: 117). 
 
It could perhaps be maintained along these lines that we are necessarily 
physical, and this is because of our individual essence – the particular people that 
we are. It’s not possible that we be these individual people and not be 
physically constituted, it might be argued. Furthermore, Morris could 
alternatively respond that if we’re merely human, we do possess properties such 
as ‘being essentially physical’. Morris says that in virtue of being merely human: 
 
We have certain limitation properties in virtue of being God’s 
creatures. God the Son, through whom all things are created, need not 
have taken on any of those limitation properties distinctive of our 
creatureliness in order to take on a human nature (ibid.). 
 
We, on the other hand, belonging to the kind ‘human’ in this ‘mere’ sense, are 
of necessity essentially physical, and essentially organic. The Son doesn’t 
belong to the kind ‘human’ in this sense: He’s ‘fully’ human, but not merely 
human, because He also belongs to a ‘higher’ (super)natural kind – that of 
‘divine’. He needn’t possess the ‘limitation’ properties that we mere humans 
do. I think that these responses are successful – if one wishes our possession of 
our physicality to be essential, the resources are available to maintain this in 
conjunction with Morris’s argument, using either of the responses I’ve 
suggested.  
This leaves me to discuss what are to me the biggest problems facing 
Morris’s account. The first is that, whilst he seems to have the resources to 
sidestep (KINDS), this is but one commitment of the overall thesis (KE): If 
something is a member of a natural kind, then it’s essentially a member of that 
kind. I find nothing in Morris’s arguments to circumvent this – he seems to be 
arguing that as long as none of the requisite properties of ‘divine’ and ‘human’ 
are in conflict, then there’s no barrier to the Son ‘becoming’ human. Granted, 
this is because Morris rejects (KE) (1986: 42), which is why he doesn’t attempt 
to consider responses to it. I’m assuming (KE), however, meaning that it 
would be impossible to become a member of a natural kind that one isn’t 
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essentially a member of – even granting that we’ve found a way around (KINDS). 
This seems to be a problem for dualists and physicalists alike, because 
whatever one’s account of human persons is, (KE) tells us that such a status is 
possessed essentially. Upholding (KE) means that it’s impossible to ‘take on’ a 
natural kind, given that if one is a member of a natural kind, one is essentially so 
– nothing can start out life lacking an essential property, and then acquire this 
property at a later time.  
  The second residual problem with Morris’s account is one which he 
himself voices: 
 
Merely to claim of all human properties incompatible with some kind-
essential divine attribute that they are not part of the kind essence of 
humanity…can appear to yield by implication a fantastic figure of 
Christ. And in so doing, it can appear implausible to the point of 
being…a desperate strategy (ibid.: 70). 
 
The worry here is that Morris’s solution to kind-essentialism is unsatisfyingly 
ad hoc, because as soon as we find an alleged property of humanity that 
conflicts with divinity, we just declare it inessential for being fully human, 
simply with a view to avoiding the very contradiction at issue. There are several 
responses available here. In an earlier paper, Morris says he thinks it’s 
‘mandatory’ for the Christian philosopher ‘to develop his idea of human 
nature, his conception of what the essential human properties are, with certain 
propositions or controls derived from...his belief in the reality of the 
Incarnation’ (1983: 457). This certainly seems appealing, particularly given the 
logical and explanatory priority that’s being given to Christology in my thesis. 
Along these lines, then, it could be maintained that Morris’s solution isn’t ad 
hoc – it stems from an independent motivation to prioritise the incarnation as 
sacrosanct, and to allow our other commitments to be shaped around this.  
The temporalist can also strengthen this defence metaphysically, thanks 
to a recent argument from Sharpe. Temporalists could maintain that it’s not ad 
hoc to deny that certain allegedly essential properties for being human are 
essential. They could claim that the account of kind-essentialism that we’ve so 
far been working with isn’t exactly right. If we work with Sharpe’s adapted 
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account, we have the resources to better explain how the Son can become fully 
human (whilst remaining divine), in spite of not possessing properties such as 
‘being essentially organic’ and ‘being essentially physical’. This involves a 
modification of (KINDS). 
 Importantly, Sharpe’s account also involves a rejection of (KE) in its 
traditional form, which gives one the resources to explain (where Morris’s 
can’t) how something can ‘become’ a member of another natural kind. This 
revision of (KE) thus avoids the worry that divinity can’t become humanity – 
the worry that if one is a member of a particular natural kind, one is essentially a 
member. Sharpe’s account will be the subject of the subsequent section.   
 
(2.4) MODIFYING KIND-ESSENTIALISM: DOMINANT KINDS 
(SHARPE) 
Sharpe argues that it’s possible for an individual to belong to multiple 
natural kinds, and yet to only possess the modal properties of one, which is its 
dominant kind. He says that an object’s dominant kind is a matter of what that 
object is ‘most fundamentally’:  
Every object belongs to exactly one kind dominantly and for any kind 
K, there is a set of modal properties, M, such that necessarily, for any 
x, x has the members of M if and only if x belongs to K dominantly 
(2017: 124).  
 
This is therefore a modification of (KINDS), because x can be a member of a 
kind (non-dominantly) without possessing the modal properties required for 
membership of that kind. How do we decide whether we belong to K 
dominantly? Sharpe follows Michael Rea, who suggests that: 
 
(DOMINANT KINDS) For any x, K is x’s dominant kind just in case 
(i) x is essentially a K, and (ii) for any kind K’ such that x is essentially a 
K’, x’s being a K entails x’s being a K’ (2000: 187). 
 
We might say, for instance, that ‘dog’ is my future pet’s dominant kind, 
because that pet is essentially a dog. She’s also essentially (for example) an 
animal and a mammal, and her being a dog entails her being an animal and a 
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mammal. Rea doesn’t discuss the incarnation when proposing (DOMINANT 
KINDS), but his paper helps us to see what Sharpe has in mind. Sharpe adds 
that ‘an object’s dominant kind provides metaphysically the best answer to the 
question “what is it?”’ (2017: 124). Helpfully, this chimes with Morris’s 
suggestion that for us, ‘humanity crowns our ontological status as the greatest 
foothold we have in the grand scheme of things’ (1989: 117). It therefore 
seems that Morris would concur with Sharpe that our dominant kind is ‘human 
person’, or at least ‘human,’ because we’re most fundamentally human persons, 
and we possess the essential modal properties for membership of this kind.18 
This, following Rea’s condition, entails that we’re animals, and persons, given 
that we’re also essentially animals and persons. We’re not dominantly animals or 
persons, though, because ‘human person dominates both person and animal’ 
(Sharpe 2017: 125). In the case of Jesus Christ, He’s a human person, but only 
non-dominantly, says Sharpe. Furthermore: 
It’s reasonable to believe that the Son’s dominant kind is something 
like divine person (of which there are two, and only two, other members). 
Since individuals have their modal properties in virtue of their 
dominant kind, the incarnate Son does not have the modal properties 
associated with either animal or human person even though he’s both. 
Thus, there’s no essentialist ground for objecting to the immaterial 
divine Son’s becoming a living human organism (ibid.).[19] 
 
Sharpe’s account could reasonably be adopted to enhance Morris’s 
distinction between being ‘merely’ and ‘fully’ human. The Son is fully human, 
                                                             
18 ‘Human person’ is Sharpe’s term. It stems from his own position, which he calls 
‘psychologically serious animalism.’ He notes that it differs from traditional animalism 
because his position also says that (in addition to our being essentially animals), we’re 
essentially human persons. Sharpe argues that this is compatible with our being essentially 
psychological beings (2015: 53-72). He thinks that ‘human person’ is our dominant kind, 
and that we’re non-dominantly ‘humans,’ ‘persons’ and ‘animals’ (2017:126).  I don’t have 
the space to analyse the animalist aspect of Sharpe’s argument here, and so I’ll not place 
any argumentative weight on his preferred dominant kind – I’ll assume that we’re 
dominantly ‘human,’ rather than adhering to Sharpe’s more specific preference. When 
citing Sharpe using the term ‘human person,’ I simply mean ‘human.’ If one does prefer 
that we’re dominantly ‘human persons’, however, I think that the same problems stand for 
the incarnation anyway, if we continue to assume (KE), (KINDS), and ‘divine’ as a 
supernatural kind.  
19 Sharpe is evidently suggesting that the Father and Holy Spirit are also members of the 
kind ‘divine person’, or ‘divine’, a claim which some might be sceptical about. I don’t 
think that anything hinges upon the need to postulate this in my thesis.  
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and He’s also a member of the ontologically higher ‘dominant’ kind that is 
‘divine,’ or ‘divine person’. The Son can therefore become incarnate by 
becoming a member of the natural kind ‘human person’, but still remain 
dominantly a member of the natural kind ‘divine person’. In virtue of 
belonging to these natural kinds, Jesus Christ is both fully divine and fully 
human, it could be argued. Sharpe doesn’t mention Morris’s argument at all in 
his paper, but drawing this parallel between their accounts only strengthens 
them, I think. It helps to account not merely for the Son’s transformation into 
a member of another natural kind, but also the retention of His initial 
(super)natural kind membership: that of ‘divine’.  
Furthermore, Sharpe’s account has the resources to respond to the 
worry that the Son’s contingent physicality makes all humans only contingently 
physical. It’s one’s dominant kind that determines whether or not one is 
essentially physical, Sharpe maintains (2017: 128), and therefore we humans are 
essentially physical, whereas the Son (being dominantly divine) is only 
contingently physical, because He needn’t have become human.  
So, the Son became a member of the natural kind ‘human’ as a matter 
of contingent fact. This still involves Him becoming a member of a natural 
kind, though, so how does one avoid the worries caused by (KE)? If we’re 
essentially a member of all (super)natural kinds we’re a member of, then how 
can Sharpe explain our becoming a member of another (super)natural kind at a 
later time? We’ve seen how Sharpe can modify (KINDS) so as not to be 
problematic for transformationalist accounts of the incarnation, but this is only 
half of the story.  
The second condition of (DOMINANT KINDS) was as follows:  
 
…for any kind K’ such that x is essentially a K’, x’s being a K entails 
x’s being a K’ (Rea 2000: 187).  
 
So, if the Son is essentially a human, then His being a divine person entails His 
being a human. But this is unorthodox: the Son’s being divine doesn’t entail His 
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being human – the incarnation is a supererogatory, contingent event – the Son 
chose to take on flesh; this can’t simply fall out of the fact that He’s divine.20  
Sharpe is aware of this. He says that ‘the Son is not essentially a human 
person since he was not human prior to the incarnation’ (2017: 125). 
According to Sharpe, we can also be members of a natural kind without being 
essentially so – we can be accidental members, whereby it’s possible for us to 
exist without being a member of that natural kind. Incidentally, Morris seems 
to be hinting at something like dominant kind-membership when he discusses 
being ‘typical’ members of kinds. He says:  
 
A typical member of a kind has its individual identity tied to that kind 
essentially. In this sense of the word ‘typical,’ Jesus Christ was not a 
typical human being, although he exemplified the fullness of human 
nature. He was and is a typical member of the higher kind-nature of 
divinity’ (1986: 42). 
 
I think that Morris would therefore concur with Sharpe that Jesus Christ is an 
accidental (not a typical) member of the kind ‘human’, whereas He’s typically 
(dominantly) a member of the kind ‘divine’. 
To illustrate what he means by accidental kind-membership, Sharpe 
refers to Rea’s example of a case of ‘found art’: an eroded rock face that’s 
dominantly a ‘lump of rock,’ but accidentally and non-dominantly happens to 
be a ‘statue of Elvis’ (Sharpe 2017: 131 (footnote) & Rea 2000: 188-9). One 
might plausibly object to the idea of lump of rock being (as opposed to ‘looking 
like’) a statue of Elvis. Alternatively, one might not consider ‘statue of Elvis’ to 
be a kind at all. Luckily, an alternative option is available for such objectors. 
This is to stress that there are no credible examples of accidental kind 
membership aside from the incarnation. One could say that this is exactly as it 
should be, given the metaphysical uniqueness of the incarnation. It could be 
maintained that nothing that’s a part of the created order can ‘accidentally’ 
belong to a natural kind: it can only belong essentially – whether this is 
                                                             
20 Indeed, in the previous chapter, I emphasised the importance of our account of the 
incarnation being able to maintain the contingency of the Son’s decision to take on flesh.  
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dominantly or non-dominantly. The Son, however, not being a part of 
creation, is free to take on accidental kind membership.  
The take home message of Sharpe’s account is that we can essentially be 
members of a kind, and this is necessary, but not sufficient, for that being our 
dominant kind (just as in the case of my future pet being essentially mammal, 
but dominantly a dog). In order for a kind to be a dominant kind, that kind 
membership also needs to entail membership of all the other kinds that we 
happen to be essential, non-dominant members of. Alternatively, we can be 
non-dominant accidental members of a kind. This suggests a modification of 
(KE). Recall that according to (KE), if something is a member of a kind, then 
it’s essentially a member of that kind.  
It might be objected that tampering with (KE) throws the baby out 
with the bath water – what have we left of kind-essentialism at all, if we’re 
allowing that we can belong to some natural kinds accidentally? My response 
here is that in order to allow that something belongs to a kind accidentally, it 
must still belong to at least one other kind, its dominant kind, essentially. So 
perhaps Sharpe would revise (KE) thus: 
 
(KE 2) If something is a member of a kind, then it’s either accidentally or 
essentially a member of that kind. Something can be accidentally a member of a 
kind iff it’s dominantly a member of another kind.  
 
I think that (KE 2) still preserves kind-essentialism, of a sort. It still preserves 
the requirement of our belonging to certain kinds (our most fundamental kinds, 
no less) essentially, after all.  
In light of these clarifications, however, the Son’s being a member of 
the kind ‘human’ is now starting to look rather tenuous. He can’t be essentially a 
human, because then His being dominantly divine would need to entail His 
being human, which is far too strong – as well as unorthodox. Instead, the Son 
should be said to be human ‘accidentally’. He’s a member of the natural kind 
human, but not essentially, meaning that He can exist (as He does), without 
being human. Sharpe says that his account ‘allows for non-dominant 
contingent kind membership’. Moreover, the Son doesn’t possess all of the set 
of modal properties required for being human essentially. Sharpe endorses this 
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when he says: ‘Since individuals have their modal properties in virtue of their 
dominant kind, the incarnate Son does not have the modal properties 
associated with either human animal or human person even though he’s both’ 
(2017: 125).  
In virtue of what, then, is the Son ‘fully human’? The appeal of 
Sharpe’s account is that it suggests a way for something to ‘take on’ 
membership of a natural kind, contrary to traditional kind-essentialist worries 
that such a feat is impossible. Sharpe needs to say more, however, about how 
the Son counts as ‘fully human’, rather than merely ‘accidentally’ human – no 
more a human than a weathered rock face happens to resemble a statue of 
Elvis. The Son must be wholly human if our account is to be orthodox, and if 
we’re to preserve a robust sense in which He sacrificed His ‘purely’ divine 
prerogative and chose to ‘become’ human. After all, the incarnation was by no 
means an accident.  
In order to help us to understand this, the next section discusses two 
different senses in which we might be said to possess human nature: abstract 
and concrete. We’ll see that the chapter has so far considered only abstract 
senses of ‘taking on’ human nature, and that it’s possible to bolster these with 
concrete accounts of the Word becoming flesh, which will lend a much fuller 
sense to the humanity of Christ.  
 
(3) INTERLUDE: ABSTRACT AND CONCRETE NATURE 
INCARNATIONS 
Section 2 examined how the Son might transform into a human 
through arguing for the coherence of His assuming the property of human 
nature – ‘whatever property it is that is necessary and sufficient for being 
human’ (Plantinga 1999: 183). I assumed that ‘the term ‘human nature’ denotes 
a property (or, if you like, group of properties): the property P which is such that 
necessarily, every human being has P, and necessarily whatever has P is a 
human being’ (ibid.: 184). Plantinga dubs this the ‘abstract nature’ (ibid.) view 
of the incarnation, and it’s important to see that the previous section assumed 
this view when considering the viability of the Son ‘becoming’ human. The 
alternative (although not opposing) account is the ‘concrete nature’ view, 
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whereby ‘the thing denoted by ‘human nature’ and that gets assumed [by the 
Son] is a human being, a concrete object, not an abstract object like a property’ 
(ibid.). When I discussed the Son ‘becoming’ human in spite of worries posed 
by (KE) and (KINDS), I simply stated this, as though it’s some abstract 
property that is acquired. More specifically, I didn’t specify any concrete thing 
in virtue of which the Son is accidentally human. 
Leftow amends Plantinga’s description of the concrete nature view, 
noting that if the Son were to ‘assume’ a particular human being, we’d have 
Nestorian heresy. The Son would ‘team up’ with a pre-existing person, or ‘take 
over’ that person in a possessive sense – both of which Leftow dismisses as 
unorthodox (2002: 278). Instead, he proposes the following construal of the 
concrete nature view: 
 
On the concrete nature view, the ‘human nature’ the Son assumes is a 
full natural endowment of a human being, that is, a human body and (if 
such there be) soul, ‘carrying’ a human mind and will. On the concrete 
nature view, then, to take on human nature is to acquire such an 
endowment; what the Son assumed is not a human being, but the 
natural endowment of one (ibid.). 
 
Importantly, the concrete nature view doesn’t necessarily entail a 
commitment to either dualism or physicalism – one can simply plug in one’s 
preferred view of what a human being is, and say that the Son acquires, or 
transforms into, that. Relatedly, the concrete nature view can (I think) be 
appealed to by both transformationalists and compositionalists. The former 
can say that the Son transforms into a concrete human endowment. The latter 
can (and do) say that the Son acquires such an endowment.21 Leftow himself is a 
                                                             
21 Hill comments that it’s often abstract nature views that go hand in hand with 
transformationalist accounts, and concrete nature views with compositionalist (he calls 
these a species of ‘relational’ models of the incarnation) accounts (2011: 11-12). However, 
I think that this needn’t be the case. This is firstly because of Leftow’s argument (outlined 
shortly) that the abstract and concrete nature views are in fact intimately related, and that 
the latter is in fact necessary for the former. Secondly, I think that one could quite 
consistently be a transformationalist and think that the Son transformed into something, a 
concrete particular such as a human body or a human body and mind, in virtue of which 
He’s human. There will be more discussion on this shortly. Comparably, one could be a 
compositionalist who claims that the Son acquires certain ‘human-making’ properties when 
He becomes incarnate, in addition to concrete ‘parts’. Here I also appeal to Thomas Flint, 
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compositionalist, so perhaps this explains his choice of the word ‘acquires’ in 
his above definition.22  
 I mentioned that the abstract and concrete nature views aren’t in 
conflict. Instead, they’re intimately related. Indeed, Leftow suggests that where 
we find one, we find the other: we acquire the (abstract) property of human 
nature only if we acquire a (concrete) human endowment. Likewise, we acquire 
this (concrete) human endowment only if by doing so we come to exemplify 
the (abstract) property of human nature (ibid.: 278-9). However, Leftow 
proposes that: 
 
The symmetry ends there. One does not usually interact directly with 
properties, ‘assuming’ or ‘exemplifying’ them. Concrete things act, and 
in virtue of their activities, they come to exemplify properties. 
Abstract‐nature incarnation can take place only by concrete‐nature 
incarnation. In this sense, the concrete nature view of the incarnation 
has to be basic (ibid.: 279). 
 
Armed as we now are with this important distinction, and desiring an 
account of the Son becoming incarnate complete with a robust sense of the 
Son’s humanity, I’ll examine concrete nature views of the Son becoming 
incarnate. Given that these views are the more fundamental, they’ll help us 
understand how the Son becomes ‘fully human’ in the abstract sense that has 
been discussed thus far. I’ll consider as a case study the view that I believe (and 
have hinted above) is the hardest to reconcile with kind-essentialism. This is 
physicalism: the view that a human just is a physical substance. Whilst there are 
many different versions of physicalism, I’ll be focusing on a version which I 
believe to be the hardest of all to reconcile with transformationalist accounts of 
                                                                                                                                                           
who argues (2011) that it’s a ‘misconception’ (ibid.: 86) to exclusively pair the ‘concrete 
nature’ view with a compositionalist (he calls it ‘mereological’) model of the incarnation. 
He says ‘the arguments in favour of concretism are independent of the mereological 
models, and their soundness doesn’t depend on these models’ (ibid.).  
22 The other verb that Leftow uses in the above passage to demonstrate the taking on of a 
concrete human nature is the more worrying ‘assume’. Perhaps he’s borrowing it from 
Plantinga, and in any case Leftow is keen to emphasise that a human endowment is not 
assumed by the Son in the sense that a human is possessed, or taken over, by the Son. 
This is not least because we’d then risk charges of Nestorianism. There will be more 
discussion on this, and on how Leftow claims that his account avoids Nestorianism, in 
Chapter 3.  
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the incarnation. This is the view that humans just are physical bodies, and to be 
embodied is to be identical with one’s body. Merricks champions this view, 
construed as a transformationalist account of the incarnation (2007: 281-300). 
In order for the Son to become incarnate, Merricks says that this omniscient, 
omnipotent being was literally transformed into a human body (ibid.: 294). As 
I hinted above, these sorts of physicalist commitments arguably produce the 
biggest conflict between the modal properties required for kind-membership 
of both ‘divine’ and ‘human’ (such as ‘being essentially non-physical’ vs. ‘being 
essentially physical’). Henceforth, when I refer to ‘physicalism’, unless stated 
otherwise I mean specifically the view that humans are identical to their bodies. 
I’ll argue that a physicalist incarnation is provisionally viable, and suggest that 
this in turn can’t be anything other than promising for those who hold 
alternative accounts of human persons.  
 
(4) CASE STUDY: PHYSICALISM AND THE INCARNATION 
 Given that the Son of God is an immaterial being, physicalism is 
perhaps the trickiest position to uphold in conjunction with 
transformationalism, because one must assert that when the Son becomes 
incarnate, something incorporeal is literally transformed into something 
physical. This is potentially problematic for a number of reasons, not least 
because an essential property of divinity might be something like ‘not 
possessing any physical properties’. Plantinga expresses related worries: 
 
If…as materialists assert, to be a human being is to be a material 
object, then the second person of the Trinity must have become a 
material object…but then an immaterial being became a material 
object; and this seems to me to be impossible. It is clearly impossible, 
I’d say, that the number seven or the proposition that 7+5 = 
12…should become, turn into, material objects. It is less clearly 
impossible, but still impossible…that the second person of the Trinity 
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– that personal being with will and intellect and affection – should tum 
into a material object (1999: 186). [23] 
 
For good measure, Leftow is equally opposed to physicalist accounts of the 
incarnation: 
 
To me, materialist Christologies are non-starters. My intuitions say that 
[the Son being identical to a body] is flatly impossible. How could an 
immaterial thing become material? How could something relevantly 
like a soul become something relevantly like a stone? The answer seems 
to me, ‘it couldn’t’ (2011b: 21). 
 
Plantinga and Leftow are evidently highly sceptical of whether the Son can 
become human if concretely taking on a human nature is to become a material 
object – i.e. a body. Merricks, however, would beg to differ. He argues that it is 
plausible for the Son to become a human body – indeed, that this is preferable 
to dualist accounts. He says that those opposed to the Son becoming a body 
presuppose that there’s:  
 
…a ‘bigger difference’ between the divine and (alleged) physical 
humans than there is between the divine and (alleged) non-physical 
humans. But, in reply, the difference between God the Son and each of 
us is staggering. The difference between a non-physical human person 
and a physical person is comparatively trivial. If we believe that God 
the Son became a human being, we have swallowed the camel. To 
insist that God the Son could not possibly become a physical human is 
to strain out a gnat (2007: 297). 
 
Although my argument here definitely requires more than gnat-
straining, I certainly agree that there’s a far greater difference between divinity 
and humanity than there would be between a physical and a non-physical 
person. It would surely be down-playing God’s greatness to suggest anything 
                                                             
23 I see no reason why ‘materialism’ here can’t be used interchangeably with ‘physicalism’. 
Moreover, Plantinga seems to be referring to the specific version of physicalism that’s the 
subject of this section. 
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to the contrary. I therefore follow Merricks in not considering Plantinga and 
Leftow’s views to be detrimental to the possibility of physicalist incarnation.  
What other worries might one have with the Son becoming a human 
body? Merricks dismisses the response that a material Son won’t be able to 
possess mental properties. He says that we obviously do possess mental 
properties, but notes that this is compatible with physicalism. He says ‘while 
the physicalist says that a human person has physical properties, she does not 
insist that a human person has only physical properties. Persons also have 
mental properties’ (ibid.: 295). This additionally helps the physicalist to 
respond to claims that her account is heretical in denying the Son a ‘rational 
soul’ (Swinburne 2011: 157). According to the Chalcedonian Creed, Jesus 
Christ was animated by this rational, human soul, and it’s considered 
Apollinarian heresy to deny Him this.24 It could be maintained here, as before, 
that Christ incarnate does possess a rational ‘soul’, or indeed ‘mind’, in virtue of 
the mental properties that He possesses in the same way that other humans do, 
and all of this is perfectly consistent with being a physicalist. 
Crisp offers a related and more detailed account of how physicalists 
can avoid Apollinarian heresy and grant Christ a ‘rational soul’: adopt property 
dualism. He says that ‘Christian materialists who are property dualists can claim 
that human persons are essentially material beings that have certain irreducibly 
mental properties including having the right sort of mental life necessary for 
being human, the capacity for consciousness and experience’ (2009: 148). Crisp 
says that ‘property dualism concerns properties that are distinct, and that refer 
to either the mental or physical life of a substance. Also, property dualists hold 
that the content of mental properties refers to something irreducibly mental, or 
immaterial, whereas the content of physical properties refers to something 
irreducibly physical’ (ibid.: 147). Merricks himself agrees that his version of 
                                                             
24 For similar reasons, two parter models (compositionalist models containing God the 
Son and a human body) of the incarnation are sometimes alleged to be heretical, because 
they fail to attribute a human mind to Christ (see e.g. Hill 2011:14). The physicalist 
transformationalist models that we’re considering ought perhaps to be considered ‘one 
parter’ if we’re pressed: the Son transforms into a single thing; a human body. He’s 
identical with this human body, which makes Him fully human, and yet He’s also fully 
divine. I think it would be begging the question against such transformationalist accounts 
to say that they’re unorthodox simply because they’re one parter. I see no prima facie reason 
why a single whole can’t be both divine and human. Besides, it’s only really 
compositionalists who are in the business of assigning various ‘parts’ to a ‘composite’ 
Christ (see section 1), and transformationalists shouldn’t be criticised simply for failing to 
choose such a way of modelling their account.  
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physicalism is consistent with irreducible mental properties. He says: 
‘physicalism, as I understand it, is consistent with a physical person’s mental 
properties’ being sui generis, being irreducible to physical properties’ (2007: 295).  
It might be objected, however, that there’s a deeper worry here 
regarding the nature of the divine mental properties. God is omnipotent and 
omniscient, and how can these attributes be squared with our being essentially 
physical? Hill worries that ‘a human body could not directly exercise 
omnipotent power. And a human brain could not have the capacity to store 
the infinite amount of knowledge required for omniscience’ (2012:11). 
Omnipotence and omniscience seem to be properties which require one to be 
essentially not entirely physical. I’ll postpone a response to this particular worry 
until Chapter 4, as it’s better placed in relation to the incoherence problem. I’ll 
grant until then that there’s no problem with an essentially physical incarnate 
Christ possessing (typical) mental properties, and move to discussing the links 
between Merricks’s position and the earlier worries posed by kind-essentialism. 
 
(4.1) REJECTING KIND-ESSENTIALISM? (MERRICKS) 
Interestingly, Merricks thinks that his account is incompatible with 
kind-essentialism, for the reasons listed at the outset of this chapter. He says 
that ‘given kind-essentialism, physical objects are essentially physical objects. 
Nothing can start out lacking an essential property and then later acquire 
it…kind-essentialism implies that something that starts out as a non-physical 
object cannot possibly become a physical object’ (2007: 296). On this basis, 
Merricks rejects kind-essentialism, and seems to think that once he’s done so 
there are no remaining obstacles to his view that the non-physical Son 
becomes a physical human being (2007: 296). Importantly, Merricks’s 
argument demarcates natural kinds that are different to those I’ve been 
working with thus far. For instance, he uses the more coarsely–grained 
‘physical object’ as a natural kind, and says that ‘human soul’ is also a natural 
kind if one is a dualist. This classification means that, he argues, all believers in 
the incarnation (whether dualist or physicalist) must reject kind-essentialism 
(ibid.), since either way the Son is (per impossible) taking on something essential. 
This would of course be problematic, since I’m arguing that the Son can 
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transform into a human being (including an essentially physical one) even if 
kind-essentialism holds true.  
Luke Van Horn, however, suggests that the main worry facing 
physicalists isn’t in fact kind-essentialism. He says that the intuition that the 
immaterial can’t become material rests ‘rather on the idea that immateriality 
entails properties which are plausibly thought to be essentially had by 
everything that has them and are inconsistent with properties entailed by 
materiality’ (2010: 339). I fail to see how Van Horn’s alternative suggestion 
here is anything other than a kind-essentialist commitment. It’s a variation of 
(KINDS) – in order for something to count as ‘immaterial,’ it must possess all 
of a certain set of modal properties, and likewise for being material. 
Furthermore, I agree with Merricks that traditional kind-essentialism is 
incompatible with physicalist transformationalist accounts of the incarnation, 
for reasons outlined earlier in the chapter – I just part ways with him because 
in my view the natural kind that can’t be taken on is that of ‘human’ – not 
‘physical object’. Van Horn also says that if kind-essentialism is true, then 
physicalists alone (and not their dualist rivals) face difficulties.25 He says that 
Merricks is mistaken in arguing that ‘human soul’ is a natural kind and to then 
deem that dualists, too, face worries regarding a divine being ‘becoming’ a 
human soul. He asks: 
 
Why think that human soul is a natural kind? Merricks does not claim 
that the corresponding physical kind is human body. Rather, it is the very 
general physical object. What prevents the dualist from constructing the 
relevant natural kind as immaterial object or, perhaps better, immaterial 
substance? In any case, the dualist…will deny that human soul is a natural 
kind. A human soul is just a soul embodied in a human body. Since that 
soul could be embodied in non-human bodies as well, there is no more 
a human soul natural kind than there is a Chinese soul or philosophy professor 
soul natural kind. Perhaps rational soul is a natural kind, but since the 
second person of  the Trinity is already a member of  this kind, there is 
                                                             
25 I think that Van Horn shouldn’t be so quick here, because I explained in section 2.3 that 
dualists still face the challenge of (KE). They must be able to account for how we might 
‘become’ a member of another natural kind, given that if kind-essentialism is true our kind 
membership ought to be essential. I offered a response to this worry in section 2.4.  
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no barrier to his becoming a human soul, as Merricks claims. Dualism 
therefore has no problem with kind-essentialism, while physicalism 
obviously does (2010: 338). 
 
In section 2, however, I argued that the dualist can be home and dry even 
without Van Horn’s qualification here – even if  she’s sympathetic to the idea 
that ‘human soul’ is a natural kind, she can argue that it’s possible to belong to 
this kind accidentally, and without possession of  any of  the modal properties 
normally required for being a human soul. Unfortunately for Van Horn, the 
physicalist can make similar use of  Sharpe’s argument here. She can endorse 
kind-essentialism when qualified to mean that the Son essentially possesses all of  
the properties required for membership of  the (super)natural kind ‘divine,’ and 
maintain that He can also accidentally belong to the kind ‘human’ – or, in line 
with Merricks, ‘physical object’. That is, she can revise (KE) into (KE 2), and 
opt for (DOMINANT KINDS) instead of  (KINDS). The Son (non-
dominantly and accidentally) belongs to the natural kind ‘human’ or ‘physical 
object’ in virtue of  the concrete nature that He assumes when (freely and 
contingently) transforming into a human body. In being this human body, the 
Son just is fully human, and can also take on the requisite properties for being 
human – and as such, possesses the abstract property of  human nature. 
Whether this human can possess any requisite divine properties (notable 
examples being omnipotence and omniscience) is, I’ve mentioned, a worry that 
I’ll respond to in Chapter 4.  
 
(5) CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined various responses to the problems that 
kind-essentialism poses to temporalist accounts of the incarnation – 
specifically, to transformationalist accounts. Morris rejects (KE), so thinks that 
there’s no contradiction in the Son becoming human. He embraces (KINDS), 
but sidesteps it by arguing that many properties that appear essential for 
membership of the kind ‘human’ aren’t in fact so. Sharpe adapts both (KE) 
and (KINDS) into (DOMINANT KINDS). Merricks rejects (KE), and 
proposes a physicalist account of the incarnation whereby the Son assumes a 
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specific, concrete human nature by transforming into a body. He maintains 
that the jump from a dualist to a physicalist incarnation is a miniscule step – 
and that the real commitment lies in accepting that the divine became human 
at all. I’ve argued that braiding together the strengths and insights of these 
various accounts enables us to have a clear understanding of how a temporal 
God might transform into a human – how the Word might ‘become’ flesh.  
As a caveat, I’m not maintaining that the combination of these various 
elements is strictly necessary and sufficient for our understanding a temporal 
God becoming incarnate. My aim was more modest – suggesting a provisional 
way (which I believe to be promising), for a temporal God to ‘become’ human. 
I’m confident that if one is hostile to, for instance, Sharpe’s revision of kind-
essentialism, one could drop this commitment and would still be able to 
produce another viable account of the Son transforming into a human. I also 
mentioned that one is free to reject kind-essentialism altogether – and then one 
won’t even face the problems that I’ve dealt with here. I wanted to assume 
what I view as the biggest obstacles to transformationalist accounts (kind-
essentialism and physicalism) in order to produce the strongest case possible, 
and to be maximally charitable to opponents of temporalism. I’ve argued that 
temporalists do have the resources to uphold kind-essentialism – and, if they so 
wish, physicalism about human beings.  
The residual issue for temporalists is explaining how the divine ‘mental’ 
(or at least, non-physical) properties – such as omnipotence and omniscience – 
can be possessed by the human Jesus. More broadly, temporalists must be able 
to explain how Jesus is ‘fully divine’. This will be addressed in Chapter 4, where 
I’ll argue that omniscience and omnipotence can’t be possessed by a human. 
This isn’t detrimental for temporalists, however, because they have available 
kenoticist models of the incarnation, according to which the Son (whilst 
incarnate) isn’t omniscient or omnipotent. Prior to this, though, I turn back to 
divine timelessness, and to an examination of how atemporalists can deal with 
the alleged incoherence between divine and human properties. 
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PART II) FULLY DIVINE, 
FULLY HUMAN, ONE 
PERSON 
The character of each nature is preserved and comes together in one person 
and one hypostasis, not divided or torn into two persons but one and the 
same Son and only-begotten God…Lord Jesus Christ (Norris (ed.) 1980: 
159). 
 
‘Will it not follow that Jesus was omniscient, omnipotent, necessarily existent…as well 
as being an itinerant Jewish preacher? And is this not outlandish to the greatest 
possible degree? Did the bouncing baby boy of Mary and Joseph direct the workings 
of the cosmos from his crib? Was this admittedly remarkable man as he sat by a well 
or under a fig tree, actually omnipresent in all of creation? Did this carpenter’s son 
exist necessarily?’ (Hick 1989: 70). 
 
According to the Chalcedonian ‘definition’ of the incarnation, Christ 
incarnate must possess two natures, one divine and one human; yet these 
natures must be sufficiently united such that He qualifies as one single person. 
Christ’s divine nature is important because He really was the Son of God. The 
Son humbled himself by taking on human form – and so His genuine human 
nature must also be preserved in this union. We’ve seen that Christ’s humanity 
is important for the belief that the rest of humankind can achieve salvation. 
Christ’s humbling sacrifice on the cross and ascension into Heaven was what 
made this possible for everybody else. Due to the supposed vast gulf between 
divine properties and human properties, however, it’s proved extremely 
difficult to produce coherent metaphysical accounts that unite these two starkly 
opposing natures into just one individual. How can the same individual be 
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both omniscient, and, at the same time, limited in knowledge? How can an 
omnipotent creator take the form of a vulnerable infant? 
This apparent incompatibility of the divine and human natures is often 
called the ‘incoherence problem’ (Hill 2011: 3), and appears to be in danger of 
violating the law of non-contradiction. It’s often referred to as ‘paradoxical’ 
(Evans 2002: 272), as well as ‘utterly staggering’ (Torrance 1969: 52), because 
of the difficulty of providing a metaphysical account of how these two natures 
can count as belonging to just one person in a way that doesn’t entail a 
contradiction. David Werther remarks that if the two natures (divine and 
human) really are incompatible, ‘then Jesus could no more have fulfilled the 
conditions of the Chalcedonian account than he could have been a spherical 
cube’ (http://www.iep.utm.edu/incarnat/). 
Senor asks ‘why should we think that the infinite divine nature would 
be compatible in a single individual with the puny, metaphysically wispy nature 
of humanity?’ (2011: 88). The word ‘infinite’ here can be read as either 
referring to an atemporal, timeless God, or to a temporal, everlasting God. This 
part of my thesis investigates whether and how atemporalists and temporalists, 
respectively, can respond to this incoherence problem. In Chapter 3, I examine 
the strongest account that atemporalists have available, but argue that it’s 
unsuccessful because there’s no orthodox path available for it to carve out 
between two heresies. Ultimately, the atemporalist account therefore ends up 
falling prey to unorthodoxy. I conclude that atemporalists can’t provide a 
satisfactory response to the incoherence problem. In Chapter 4, I argue that 
temporalism is able to successfully avoid the incoherence problem, but only if 
temporalists adopt a kenotic account of the incarnation. I consider, and respond 
to, potential replies to this argument. 
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CHAPTER 3 
INCOHERENCE PROBLEM: 
ATEMPORALIST ‘SOLUTIONS’  
At first glance, the incoherence problem seems to be particularly 
problematic for atemporalists, because they seem to face an added problem: 
they must account for how a God with a timeless divine nature lived a temporal 
life in the form of Jesus Christ. That is, on top of the alleged incoherence 
between the Son’s divine and human natures (such as being omniscient versus 
being limited in knowledge), atemporalists must also maintain that Christ’s 
divine nature is timeless, yet His human nature (which must be wholly 
preserved) is temporal, experiencing sequence and enduring various events 
with the passage of time. Temporalists don’t initially appear to face this extra 
problem, because for them the Son’s divine and human natures are both 
temporal. C. S. Lewis nevertheless endorses the view that God can be both 
timelessly eternal, and, in the form of Christ, live a temporally sequenced life. 
He says: 
 
You cannot fit Christ’s earthly life in Palestine into any time-relations 
with His life as God beyond all space and time. It is really, I suggest, a 
timeless truth about God that human nature, and the human 
experience of weakness and sleep and ignorance, are somehow 
included in His whole divine life (1952: 169). 
 
This chapter examines how the atemporalist can account for the 
presence of these earthly and heavenly natures in the person of Christ. 1  I 
argued in Chapter 1 that if God is atemporal, models of the incarnation that 
                                                             
1 A discussion about the timeless truth that the Son is human, specifically, will also 
resurface in Chapter 5, when I consider on what grounds the timeless exalted Son can be 
said to be ‘fully human’ in spite of no longer being related to the human part(s) of the 
composite.  
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postulate the Son changing into either a human mind, a human body, or a 
combination of the two, simply can’t get off the ground. These are 
transformationalist models, and I argued that they’re non-starters if God is 
timeless, because if He were to undergo (intrinsic) change from being a divine, 
incorporeal entity into being a corporeal human body (or human mind or 
combination of the two), this would evidently take place at a time, and so 
would mean that His life is sequenced. Having thus discounted 
transformationalist options for the atemporalist, the remainder of this chapter 
will focus on the alternative: compositionalist models.  
I argued that compositionalist models remain on the table for the 
atemporalist because they allow her to appeal to extrinsic change in the Son 
when He became incarnate. In this chapter, I examine specifically the 
‘hierarchy of natures’ model (Marmodoro & Hill 2010: 469), which I claim is 
the best option that atemporalists have available. I outline how atemporalists 
have used reduplicative strategies to attempt to dispel the incoherence 
problem, in conjunction with a hierarchy of natures model. In this process, I 
concede that atemporalists don’t face an additional incoherence in light of the 
Son’s divine nature being timeless, and His human nature being temporal. I 
proceed to criticise the atemporalist model on the grounds that it can’t dispel 
any of the other incoherences generated by the presence of these two natures 
in one single person – such as the one person that is Christ being omniscient 
and limited in knowledge. I firstly explain how atemporalist responses to the 
incoherence problem unacceptably inflate their position into Nestorian heresy, 
whereby there are two persons in Christ. I argue that attempts from 
atemporalists to avoid this, however, collapse their position into Apollinarian 
heresey, which is where Christ is denied a human mind. I conclude that 
atemporalists are unable to avoid the charge of incoherence.  
  In broad strokes, compositionalist models of the incarnation are those 
according to which ‘Christ is a compound of qualitatively and numerically 
different constituents: a divine mind, a human body, and, on some models, a 
human mind as well’ (Marmodoro & Hill 2010: 469). My concern here is only 
with those models that do feature a human mind, otherwise called ‘three parter’ 
compositionalist models. There are several different versions of this model, but 
I’ll be discussing the one that preserves the closest unity between the 
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components of Christ (and so the most likely to avoid Nestorianism), and the 
one that atemporalists most commonly defend (because it allows that the Son 
doesn’t undergo change in the incarnation). In focusing on this model, I’m 
confident that I’m being maximally charitable to the atemporalist. The model 
in question has been called the ‘hierarchy of natures’ model (ibid.: 479), where 
on the incarnation the divine mind is related to the compound of a human 
mind and body. The human mind is related to the body in the ordinary way, 
and these are jointly related to the divine mind of God the Son.2 We therefore 
have three ‘parts’ in the incarnate Christ: the timeless God the Son (GS), a 
human mind or soul (S), and a human body (B). 3 It’s important to note that 
the human body and soul don’t become a part of the Son, for this would 
require Him to change. Rather, the Son is timelessly part of a partly temporal 
whole (Leftow 2002: 293) in a way that requires no intrinsic change. Instead, I 
argued in Chapter 1 that intrinsic change takes place in reality itself, when B+S 
come into existence. By virtue of this, the Son Himself undergoes an extrinsic 
change, which can be argued to constitute His becoming incarnate. I’ll now 
discuss how the hierarchy of natures model is alleged to avoid the incoherence 
problem. The attempted solution utilises reduplication of the parts of the 
composite Christ, a move which I’ll now explain and analyse.  
 
(1) REDUPLICATIVE STRATEGIES AND THE ‘EXTRA’ 
PROBLEM OF ATEMPORALITY 
Both Leftow (ibid: 273-299) and Stump (2002: 197-218) have argued 
for the hierarchy of natures model. They argue that the incoherence problem 
only appears to be an issue because we predicate the contradictory properties 
of Christ in the same respect (ibid.: 218). However, Christ incarnate has two 
natures, and so he can possess some properties with respect to one nature and 
others with respect to the other nature. Leftow and Stump’s strategies 
                                                             
2 By ‘ordinary way’ here, I mean that the Son’s human mind relates to His body in the 
same way that our minds relate to our bodies. I want to leave it an open question exactly 
what this relation is, so that one can plug in one’s preferred account of persons. I think 
that the physicalist could, if they so wished, claim to endorse this third part of the 
composite (the mind), but accept that the mental in some way supervenes on the physical.   
3 For the sake of my argument, nothing hinges upon my using of the terms ‘soul’ and 
‘mind’ interchangeably.  
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therefore appeal to reduplication of the parts of Christ. Leftow draws an 
analogy with apples; they ‘are red because their skins are – that is, because their 
parts include red skins. Nothing else about an apple makes it red; peel off the 
skin, and what is left is no longer red’ (2002: 288). We thus say that apples are 
red, and there’s no contradiction with their being white inside, because we 
know that whiteness and redness are true of the apple in different respects. Making 
a similar move, we can say that ‘Christ died qua human, but not qua divine’ 
(ibid.), to use Leftow’s initial example. This allows us to block the problematic 
inference that Christ both did and didn’t die; these properties are ascribed in 
different respects by being predicated of different parts of the composite, and 
their conflicting ascriptions to the whole composite is allegedly blocked. 
Likewise, atemporalists could claim that Christ incarnate is omnipotent qua 
divine nature, and limited in power qua human nature. Importantly for our 
purposes, it could be argued that Christ is timeless qua GS, but temporal qua 
B+S, and contradiction is (supposedly) avoided.  
 Bearing this strategy in mind, I’ll firstly examine whether the 
incoherence problem does indeed present an added difficulty (on top of the 
other incoherences) for atemporalists in that they must reconcile the Son’s 
timelessness with B+S’s temporality, which temporalists wouldn’t need to 
account for. Douglas Blount argues that this isn’t the case, because if (as we’ll 
see) there are various attempts to affirm that Christ can possess both a property 
and its negation without entailing a contradiction, the very same move can be 
made regarding the properties of temporality and timelessness. Blount says ‘if 
Christian temporalists can reasonably affirm God’s omnipotence, omniscience, 
and spacelessness despite such arguments, I see no reason for thinking that 
Christian atemporalists cannot reasonably affirm the doctrine of divine 
timelessness’ (2002: 242). By ‘such arguments’ here, Blount is talking about 
those that derive an unwelcome conclusion about the Son by inference from 
aspects of Christ’s life. Here’s his example in the case of spacelessness: 
 
(1) Jesus Christ is in Nazareth and not in Jerusalem. 
(2) So, local predicates apply to Jesus Christ. 
(3) Jesus Christ = God the Son. 
(4) So, local predicates apply to God the Son. 
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(5) Local predicates don’t apply to spaceless beings 
Conclusion: So, God the Son isn’t spaceless (ibid.: 241). 
  
Similarly, then, here’s how a parallel argument might run in the case of 
atemporality: 
 
(1) Jesus Christ was a carpenter before He began His ministry  
(2) So, temporal predicates apply to Jesus Christ 
(3) Jesus Christ = God the Son. 
(4) So, temporal predicates apply to God the Son. 
(5) Temporal predicates don’t apply to atemporal beings 
Conclusion: God the Son isn’t atemporal.  
 
There have been various responses (as we’ll see) to arguments such as 
these: for example, by denying (3) and maintaining that Jesus and God the Son 
aren’t numerically identical.4 One can also (as demonstrated above) appeal to 
reduplication of parts of the divine composite, and argue that the Son is 
spaceless and timeless qua divine nature, but spatially and temporally located 
qua incarnate human nature. This would be to deny (4), because no local or 
temporal predicates would apply to the Son Himself – only to His human 
nature. Blount therefore argues that this apparent contradiction between the 
Son being both spaceless and not spacelesss, or omniscient and lacking in 
knowledge, is resolvable in the same way in the case of God’s timelessness. 
This would mean that atemporalists can maintain that GS is timeless, and any 
apparent contradiction with Christ being temporal wouldn’t be an issue.  
Of course, there remains the objection that atemporalists now have 
one more contradiction to resolve than temporalists, because the latter don’t 
have to respond to the apparent incoherence between GS being outside of 
time and Christ being temporal. However, I think that temporalists would face 
a similar contradiction in relation to God’s temporality, caused by Mullins’ first 
two conditions of temporality that I outlined in the introduction. This is that a 
temporal God (just like an atemporal one) exists ‘without beginning’ and 
                                                             
4 This move is made in particular by compositionalists, because the composite Christ 
includes the additional part B+S.  
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‘without end’ (2016: xvi). For a temporal God, existing without beginning or 
end is understood as being backwardly and forwardly everlasting through time. 
Such a contradiction, I submit, also generates an argument parallel to the ones 
discussed above. For instance: 
 
(1) Jesus Christ was born in 4 BC. 
(2) So, there was a time when Jesus Christ didn’t exist. 
(3) Jesus Christ = God the Son 
(4) So, there was a time when God the Son didn’t exist. 
(5) Temporally everlasting beings have always existed 
Conclusion: God the Son isn’t temporally everlasting. 
 
The atemporalist could therefore argue that the incarnation doesn’t 
pose an added problem for advocates of divine timelessness, because 
temporalists must respond to equally many apparent contradictions in Christ’s 
attributes. Presumably, all of these problematic conclusions (that GS isn’t 
spaceless, or (for atemporalists) timeless, or (for temporalists) temporally 
everlasting) are on equal footing because they can all be resolved using 
reduplication of parts.  
However, Senor argues that atemporalists can’t get around the 
particular problem of God’s timelessness in the way that we can with 
spacelessness, due to an important asymmetry between timelessness and 
spacelessness. He says: 
 
A being that exists at a particular time will always be such that it existed 
at a time and so temporal predicates will apply to it. Thus, if Christ was 
ever temporal, temporal he remains… spacelessness doesn’t share this 
rigidity…there is nothing even apparently incoherent in the idea of an 
aspatial being’s becoming spatial and then returning to spacelessness 
(1990: 155). 5 
 
                                                             
5 Senor is perhaps being too quick in making this very strong claim. If an aspatial being 
were to become spatial, we’d certainly need a convincing account (perhaps a causal one) 
arguing that this was indeed the same entity. Nevertheless, for our purposes his criticism 
(that it looks extremely difficult to demonstrate how an atemporal being might become 
temporal and then return to genuine atemporality) still stands.  
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 If God is ever temporal, therefore, He can’t return to atemporality in the way 
that a spatial being can arguably become aspatial. However, to the extent that 
Senor’s distinction between timelessness and spacelessness works, it can also 
be drawn between temporality and spacelessness. That is, if God ever has a 
beginning in time, then He cannot return to being backwardly everlasting. 
Furthermore, while Senor’s response might work for transformationalist 
accounts of the incarnation where GS changes intrinsically in order to become 
human, I don’t think it can be alleged against atemporalist compositionalists of 
Leftow and Stump’s sort, because on these accounts the Son doesn’t transform 
into anything when He becomes temporal or spatial; He merely acquires 
temporal and spatial parts. 6  As Leftow says, he becomes part of a ‘partly 
temporal whole’ (2002: 299). He’s temporal qua human part, but remains (i.e. 
simply is) timeless qua divine part.  
Granting, therefore, that the incoherence problem doesn’t pose any 
particular problem for (compositionalist) atemporalists, we must still examine in 
more detail the atemporalist account of how incoherence is avoided. I’ve 
outlined the reduplicative strategy adopted by Stump and Leftow, which 
prevents us from ascribing a property and its contradiction to the composite as 
a whole. However, sometimes we may want to argue that one of the pair of 
contradictory properties does transfer to the whole. For instance, apples are red: 
‘it would be pointless pedantry to say, “the apple itself isn’t red, only the skin 
is, the flesh within is quite a different colour”’ (Le Poidevin 2009a: 173). Le 
Poidevin queries whether some properties ‘trump’ others in their being 
ascribed to the whole, and gives the example that ‘Hermione is intelligent by 
virtue of her brain, but not by virtue of her nose’ (ibid.). Here, we don’t say 
that Hermione is intelligent qua her brain and not intelligent qua her nose; we 
say that she’s intelligent, period. However, the qua move can’t help us to decide 
which (if any) property transfers to the composite whole. Leftow is aware of this 
difficulty: he submits that ‘Christologists and students of apples must work 
things out case by case’ (2002: 290).  
 Given this admission, how do we know whether certain properties 
‘trump’ others in the case of Christ incarnate? It’s here that rivals of 
                                                             
6 The word ‘acquires’ ought of course to be read in a non-temporal sense here. 
 108 
 
compositionalist accounts have applied pressure. For instance, Senor argues 
that: 
 
To say that these property pairs will have to be worked out one at a 
time is to say that the qua move does not, in fact, give us any general 
help in resolving the logical difficulties of the incarnation…Whether 
[the composite Christ] borrows the particular divine property or the 
particular human property will not be resolved by the use of 
reduplicative sentences. Yet this is precisely where we need help and 
precisely where the qua move was supposed to be useful (2007a: 66). 
 
We might want to argue that apples are red simpliciter, but the qua move is of no 
use here. It’s only from experience that we know to call the whole apple red. 
Similarly, we may want to know whether the composite Christ is temporal or 
timeless, or (say) omnipotent or limited in power, but again the ‘qua move’ only 
informs us that Christ is temporal and limited in power qua human nature, and 
timeless and omnipotent qua divine nature. Senor’s argument is therefore that 
the reduplication of parts move doesn’t tell us which (if any) of the 
contradictory properties applies to the whole. 
This is supported by Hill, who says that reduplication only works at a 
linguistic level, but doesn’t extend to reality: ‘it does not tell us how or why Christ 
avoids having inconsistent properties’ (2011: 6). Of course, given that the 
incarnation is a unique event, it would be a rather tall order to cite examples of 
other entities which are both temporal and atemporal, depending upon which 
of their parts we’re speaking about. Nevertheless, with regards to providing a 
metaphysical account of how an atemporal God can be incarnate within time, a 
compositional account doesn’t look so appealing, because the reduplicative 
strategy fails to resolve the incoherence problem at any satisfactory explanatory 
level.  
Leftow responds to Senor’s allegation by arguing that the qua move 
isn’t supposed to give us any help in deciding which properties apply to the 
whole simpliciter. Rather, it’s only supposed to resolve the contradiction that 
results from predicating a property and its negation of the very same subject. 
Leftow argues that, because the qua move succeeds in ‘[blocking] the move 
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from ‘S qua N is P’ to ‘S is P [simpliciter]’’ (2011a: 316), this is all that’s needed 
to stop us from positing the contradiction that something is both P and not P. 
The compositionalist could therefore argue that the qua move achieves its 
purpose of avoiding incoherence by blocking our ascriptions of contradictory 
properties to the whole simpliciter. For instance, the composite Christ isn’t 
omniscient but is omniscient qua divine, and limited in knowledge qua human, 
because these properties are manifested in Christ’s divine and human parts, not 
in Christ simpliciter. However, whilst we might grant that the qua move does 
save the atemporalist from having to say that a whole is both P and not P, I 
agree with Senor that we’re still left to consider what the whole itself might be. 
There’s the possibility that one of these properties might apply simpliciter to the 
whole, and the qua move won’t be of any help in working out which this is. 
Nevertheless, perhaps the atemporalist compositionalist can in fact say 
more. Stump offers an account of property borrowing to explain how properties 
of parts can indeed transfer to the whole, whilst allegedly avoiding incoherence. 
She writes that the composite Christ borrows the property of being limited in 
power from His human nature, and the property of omnipotence from His 
divine nature, and ‘because the incompatible properties are borrowed 
properties, Christ doesn’t have them in the same respect’ (2002: 214). Stump 
therefore argues that we can avoid contradiction if we ‘segregate the 
incompatible properties into different constituents of the whole and to 
attribute them to the whole derivatively’ (ibid.: 217, my italics). This move can be 
further supported with an argument by Don Cupitt, who argues that if there 
wasn’t some degree of separation between Christ’s divine and human natures 
‘then Christianity would slide into a soggy pantheism merging God into the 
world and the world into God’ (1979: 17), since we’d no longer be able to 
distinguish the divine from the created aspects of the universe. Stump could 
therefore argue that it’s necessary to insulate Christ’s natures to some degree, 
and the result would be the whole composite borrowing properties from its 
distinct parts, given that they’re separated.  
I think that Stump is attempting to have her cake and eat it here. I 
grant, in line with Cupitt, that there must be some degree of separation 
between the two natures, but when it comes to applying particular properties 
to the whole, they either would or wouldn’t apply, period. By keeping the 
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properties sufficiently insulated from the composite as a whole by predicating 
them only in a derivative way, Stump hopes to avoid the incoherence problem. 
This strategy could perhaps be seen as a ‘second level’ reduplicative move, 
because it doesn’t say that Christ is omniscient qua divine nature and limited in 
knowledge qua human nature, but rather that He’s derivatively omniscient qua 
divine nature, and derivatively limited in knowledge qua human nature. However, 
as Senor recognises,  
 
I have parts that are microscopic. But I’m not microscopic. I have parts 
that are transparent, boneless, and amoeba-shaped, but I’m none of 
these things in any sense at all. Adopting the view that all properties 
had by parts are had ‘in some respect’ by the whole is therefore a road 
best not taken (2007a: 64). 
 
Senor is here arguing that Stump attempts to insulate the contradictory 
properties in a way that prevents the incoherence problem. However, when it 
comes to deciding on the properties had by the whole, either the properties 
must be had to a degree ‘so small as to be insignificant’ (ibid.) – or indeed, not 
possessed at all, such as my being transparent – or otherwise the property is 
indeed had by the whole simpliciter. For example, if I cut my leg, I’m not 
bleeding ‘only derivatively’, I’m bleeding; period. 7  This links back to Le 
Poidevin’s earlier argument that it would be ‘pointless pedantry’ for one to 
insist something like ‘this apple is only red derivatively, because of its skin; you 
mustn’t forget that nothing beneath it is red!’  
Moreover, if we do dispense with Stump’s problematic property 
insulation and attribute the properties of both parts to the whole simpliciter, the 
incoherence problem rears its head once again and we’re back to where we 
started. We appear to be violating the law of non-contradiction once more. It’s 
                                                             
7 Senor is arguably employing a far too narrow sense of parthood by speaking only about 
material parts of an organism, and indeed examining non-material ‘parthood’ might help us to 
understand what Stump has in mind.  For instance, there’s a sense in which I might say that 
‘music is a significant part of who I am’, but this doesn’t mean that music is everything that I 
am, or that music is insignificantly part of me. However, I think that this more metaphorical 
utterance is most sensibly understood as my saying something like ‘I love music, period’. The 
disanalogy remains, therefore, because it can’t be argued that Jesus Christ is omnipotent, period, 
nor that His omnipotence is had in such a small sense that it’s insignificant.  
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for reasons such as this that Morris argues that ‘the reduplicative form of 
predication accomplishes nothing except for muddying the waters, since in the 
end the contradiction stands of x being characterised as both N and not N’ 
(1986: 48-9). If we don’t sufficiently insulate the properties, or predicate them 
of the whole derivatively, ‘in virtue of’ their being properties of parts, it seems 
that we’re still (unacceptably) ascribing them both to the whole. However, if 
we do insulate them into ‘watertight compartments’ (Werther: 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/incarnat/), we have an altogether different problem 
on our hands. We’re now in danger of fracturing the unity of Christ and 
proposing two distinct entities in the composite, which makes us stray 
dangerously close to committing Nestorian heresy. This will be the topic of my 
next section. 
 
(2) INFLATING INTO NESTORIANISM 
Atemporalist compositionalists maintain that GS is a person, and that 
He’s timelessly incarnate. The option isn’t open to them to adopt the sort of 
compositionalist account where He acquires a human body and soul as parts of 
Himself, because this would involve fundamental change and so bring Him into 
time. Rather, atemporalists must maintain that GS and S+B are parts of a larger 
whole; and that this composite is Christ incarnate. If we attempt to ‘insulate’ 
the divine and human natures so as to avoid the incoherence problem (or 
simply to fully preserve them in line with Chalcedon), it seems that we’re now 
in danger of predicating two people as Christ. After all, B+S would normally be 
sufficient to compose a human being, and we must maintain that GS is a 
person. Therefore, it’s starting to seem as though atemporalist 
compositionalists are guilty of Nestorian heresy, because both GS and B+S are 
candidates for personhood. Crisp says that: 
 
By insisting on a metaphysical cleavage between God the Son and the 
human nature of Christ (i.e. denying God the Son is identical to Christ 
or identical to His human nature), [the hierarchy of natures] model 
implies that there are two entities present in the incarnation: one 
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divine, the other human. Yet this appears to be straightforwardly 
Nestorian (2011: 50).  
 
Importantly, Crisp hints at another candidate for personhood when he mentions 
denying that God the Son ‘is identical to Christ or identical to His human 
nature’. The composite Christ is itself another candidate for personhood. This is 
linked to what Marmodoro and Hill dub ‘the homunculus problem’ (2010: 
483); ‘if Christ is a composite, containing (in addition to the divine mind) a 
human mind and body, which co-operate with the divine mind, then the 
human mind-body composite itself seems to be a person a ‘smaller person’ or 
homunculus within Christ’ (ibid.). The homunculus problem refers specifically 
to the conflict of personhood between the ‘larger’ GS+B+S and the ‘smaller’ 
B+S.  
In light of these confusions, it emerges that we have three candidates for 
who exactly the person of Christ is. We have GS, we have the composite 
Christ (GS+B+S), and we have human parts B+S. This would certainly be 
Nestorianism if all three were the case, so the atemporalist must be able to 
respond to this allegation. I’ll consider some responses to these allegations, but 
show that ultimately they don’t let atemporalists off the hook.  
Leftow’s response (2002: 281-2) to the homunculus problem uses an 
example borrowed from Peter Geach: that of Tibbles the cat, who is seated on 
a mat. If he were to lose a hair, he’d still be a cat. If he were to lose a different 
hair, again he’d still be a cat who enjoys sitting on mats. If he were (sadly) to 
lose an ear, he’d still be a cat. All of these proper parts of Tibbles minus one 
hair or ear must already be cats, because we don’t want to suppose that 
plucking a hair would generate a new cat. So, it seems that ‘everybody wants to 
be a cat’, and we now have many cats all sitting on the mat at once, which is of 
course an unwelcome inference.  Leftow concludes from this that ‘given a set 
of parts composing at time t a member of a natural kind (e.g. cat), no subset of 
that set composes at t a member of the same natural kind’ (ibid.: 282). This 
links to the view that nothing can be identical to a proper part of itself, which 
also makes Leftow’s argument consistent with Leibniz’s Law, whereby if two 
objects are to be identical (and hence only one object), they must have all of 
their properties in common. GS+B+S can’t be identical with any of its parts, 
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because the composite possesses different properties (such as more parts) than 
any one of the parts alone. Moreover, if GS+B+S composes a member of a 
natural kind (a person), then no subset of this set does so, so no parts of the 
composite can be any person. Leftow would argue that even if Tibbles minus 
an ear would on his own be a cat, he’s not when he’s a member of the larger 
Tibbles. Similarly, though S+B would ordinarily compose a person, it’s instead 
part of the ‘larger’ person; the composite Christ.  
I’m not convinced by Leftow’s argument, on the grounds that it 
doesn’t explain why persons can’t have persons as parts. Mullins comments 
that: 
 
I find this strategy to be lacking. It does not explain how a human soul 
and body that thinks, feels and acts is not a person. It just asserts that 
this is not a person in the case of the incarnation (2016: 168, footnote).  
 
That is, Leftow is leaning on the Tibbles analogy to simply state that persons 
can’t have persons as parts, but in fact we require an independent story as to 
why this is. 
It could be responded that the wills of Christ’s divine and human parts 
are united in performing the actions of the single person that is the composite, 
and it’s this that guarantees there is only one person. Marmodoro and Hill 
consider that what unites the human and divine natures into one person in the 
way that, say, a master and slave aren’t one person, might be that ‘they jointly 
perform a single action’ (2010: 481). Following John of Damascus, they suggest 
that in ordinary human action two operations are involved (from the body and 
mind), yet it’s one action that is performed. Similarly, in the case of Christ, 
distinct operations are performed by the divine mind and the human B +S, but 
‘every action he performs is a single action’ (ibid.: 482). The atemporalist could 
therefore maintain that this is what unites GS and B+S, which together form 
the actions of the ‘larger’ (and so, according to the Tibbles argument, only) 
person that’s GS+B+S.  
The combined strength of these replies is the most charitable counter-
argument that I can suggest from atemporalist compositionalists, but 
nonetheless I don’t think that it succeeds. Cross expresses a worry about the 
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divine and human minds both causing the same action to be performed. He says 
that if GS performs a particular human action of Christ, then the human mind 
can’t also perform this same action, or we’d have causal over-determination, 
because the action ‘appears to be sufficiently causally explained by the presence 
of merely one causal origin’ (2002: 218). Whilst this worry may not be fatal for 
the atemporalist, she must still either deny this over-determination, or 
demonstrate why it’s not problematic.  
The atemporalist must also deal with the trickier issue of who exactly 
the person of Christ is. If, as Leftow says, no subset of the composite can be 
of the same natural kind as the composite, then it seems that the composite 
Christ itself must compose the person (thus blocking the ‘homunculus’ B+S). 
However, even granting Leftow (and Tibbles) that B+S doesn’t compose a 
distinct person, we evidently do want to maintain that GS is a person in line 
with orthodoxy, and also that He’s not identical to the composite Christ with 
its temporal additions. Senor writes that: 
 
Since a whole can never have itself as a proper part, GS can’t be 
identical to [the composite]. This, together with the orthodox 
assumption that we cannot deny the personhood of GS, entails that 
either Christ Incarnate is a person distinct from GS, or else Christ 
Incarnate is an impersonal conglomerate (2007a: 56).  
 
We’re Nestorians if we argue that the incarnate Christ is a distinct person from 
God the Son, or, if we deny this (and maintain that it’s GS that is the only 
person in the incarnation), the composite itself looks worryingly impersonal.  
The former horn of this dilemma must be avoided on pain of heresy, and I’ll 
now argue that the latter horn brings with it problems of its own.  
 Crisp calls the latter the ‘no person objection’ and asks who the person 
is that, for example, weeps at Lazarus’ grave (2011: 51). He determines that it 
can’t be GS, because (due to being timeless) He must be sufficiently insulated 
from the changes that His human nature undergoes, and is also impassible, so 
can’t undergo suffering (ibid.). Hill expresses a related worry when he claims 
that GS is too insulated from the acting and reacting human part of Christ to 
be the person who is incarnate. He says that: 
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It appears to follow…that the person who walked and talked in Galilee 
was not the divine Son at all. He was…a part of the composite Christ, 
which also has the Son as another part, in which case Jesus wasn’t the 
Son at all (2011: 18-19). 
 
It seems that Hill would endorse the view that B+S is the subject of the 
weeping when he says that the person who walked in Galilee was ‘part of the 
composite Christ, which also has the Son as another part’. However, I think 
that B+S can’t be the person who weeps, because then (along with GS) we have 
two persons in Christ. Crisp would also argue that the composite Christ equally 
can’t be the person who weeps at Lazarus’ grave. He says: 
 
Christ is just the mereological sum of God the Son and his human 
nature. And it certainly cannot be that Christ’s human nature is a 
person on pain of Nestorianism…but then it appears that no person is 
the subject of the weeping. And this is surely theologically intolerable 
(2011: 51). 
 
It therefore seems that GS is (on pain of unorthodoxy) the only candidate for 
personhood – but we’ve seen that a timeless GS looks unable to perform the 
actions that we attribute to the person of Christ. It seems that atemporalist 
compositionalists can’t account for (a timeless) GS being the person that is 
Christ incarnate, because He’s too insulated from performing the actions that 
are attributed to Christ. However, we equally can’t deny that GS is a person, 
because this would be unorthodox, so we have a tension here. It initially seems 
that Leftow wants to ascribe personhood to the composite GS+B+S, because 
this would be in line with his Tibbles analogy where a ‘larger’ member of a 
natural kind can’t have a member of the same natural kind as a part. However, 
this would be to deny personhood to the ‘part’ GS, which I’ve just explained is 
unorthodox. As Crisp recognises, it also can’t be that B+S is the person of 
Christ, because this would be Nestorian as we’d also need to maintain that 
there’s a divine person in the composite, too.  
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We’re therefore left very confused as to who and what Jesus Christ is, 
and I think this has a lot to do with our account being a compositional one, 
since we have different ‘parts’ of the composite, as well as the composite itself, 
that are all candidates for personhood. This difficulty wouldn’t arise were our 
account to be transformationalist and the Son to simply ‘change into’ the 
person Jesus, rather than having extra parts ‘tacked on’ by virtue of an extrinsic 
change. 
However, I’ve already explained why atemporalists can’t help 
themselves to transformationalist accounts. Davis argues that ‘the orthodox 
doctrine claims that God became man, not that…God and man somehow 
combined’ (1983: 124). This problematic ‘combining’ is exactly what does 
happen on an atemporalist compositionalist account, though, and we can see 
how it creates difficulties for who exactly the person of Christ is. Hill adds that 
‘a caterpillar that sits on the back of a butterfly does not thereby become a 
butterfly itself – in order to become a butterfly it must be transformed into 
one’ (2011: 15). In attempting to avoid the frying pan of Nestorianism, we’ve 
now landed in the fire of the ‘no person’ objection.  
Leftow might respond by maintaining that GS is the only person in the 
incarnation, yet reject the idea that this makes the composite impersonal. He 
says in his earlier paper that the person who is (the composite) Jesus Christ is 
God the Son, but not in the sense that the two are numerically identical (2002: 
294), thus denying that the composite is identical with a person. Rather, he says 
that GS ‘is’ Jesus Christ in the sense of being His ‘psychological core, the 
ultimate determiner of his attitudes and actions’ (ibid.). This response would 
enable Leftow to maintain that the Son is timeless, because He’s not identical 
with something that has a temporal part. Rather, He ‘has atemporally the 
attribute of being part of a partly temporal whole’ (ibid.). Leftow also affirms 
this in a later paper, where he replies to Senor’s above allegation: ‘though I 
have argued that GS+B+S is personal, there is no person with which it is 
identical’ (2011a: 321). He even admits that he ought not to have named the 
composite (GS+B+S) ‘Jesus Christ’, because this (mistakenly) leads us to think 
that it’s a person, when in fact we should reserve the name ‘Jesus Christ’ only 
for GS. 
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  However, if GS is the only person in the composite, then it seems that 
Christ’s human mind (S) is redundant, which is verging on Apollinarianism. 
Nevertheless, Leftow does seem to be maintaining that it’s GS that is the only 
person in the incarnation. Secondly, therefore, it now seems that the ‘Tibbles’ 
analogy in his earlier paper is misdirected, because he doesn’t need to evade the 
homunculus problem if the ‘larger’ composite isn’t in fact a person at all. He’d 
need another argument, however, to prove that B+S is not a distinct person; he 
can’t appeal to Tibbles because he’s of course denying that the composite is 
itself a member of the natural kind ‘person’.8 He also can’t appeal to Tibbles 
because on the hierarchy of natures model that we’re working with, B+S 
doesn’t become a part, or ‘homunculus’ of GS – it simply joins with GS.  
I think that Leftow has such an argument available. In a different 
paper, he says that ‘S’ is specifically GS’s human soul; so there is no other 
individual that B+S could possibly form except for the composite Christ. He 
says that ‘S could not exist unless GS were incarnate in a composite including 
it’ (2011b: 30), meaning that S could only have existed as the human soul or 
mind of one person; the individual Jesus Christ whose psychological core is 
God the Son.  
Assuming that Leftow successfully avoids Nestorianism and the ‘no 
person’ objection, we’re now left wondering what work B+S actually does in the 
incarnation, if the Son, being Christ’s ‘psychological core’ and the ‘ultimate 
determiner’ of his actions, is the person who is Christ.9 The human mind of the 
composite is now starting to look problematically redundant, which is verging 
dangerously on the heresy of Apollinarianism. I’ll next examine whether and 
how atemporalist compositionalists can respond to this charge. 
 
(3) COLLAPSING INTO APOLLINARIANISM 
Le Poidevin remarks that the difficulty with maintaining that the Son is 
identical with Christ is that ‘the human part of the composite is entirely 
extraneous to the person of Christ’ (2011: 213). I think this argument has force 
                                                             
8 Leftow is assuming, of course, that ‘person’ is a natural kind. 
9 Leftow’s success at avoiding these aforementioned objections is questionable, but I’m 
going to grant it for the purposes of the next section in order to be maximally charitable to 
the atemporalist.  
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even if we grant Leftow that the relation between Christ and GS isn’t the 
stronger one of identity but rather GS being (more weakly) the core of Christ, 
because GS is still determining Christ’s actions and attitudes, which seems to 
leave no substantial role for the human mind (or, indeed, the human body).  
It might be responded by the atemporalist compositionalist that she’s 
not neglecting the Son’s human body or mind, because of the role that they 
play in enabling the timeless Son to manoeuvre in space and time. His human 
body enables Him to be visible and to move around the earth, and His human 
mind enables Him to experience thoughts that can’t be predicated of Him qua 
divine, such as feeling tempted. Leftow draws an analogy with scuba gear to 
illustrate this. He writes: 
 
Scuba gear is intimately connected to the diver’s body. Yet it keeps the 
diver disconnected from the water it touches: scuba gear lets one swim 
without getting one’s feet wet. B+S is the Son’s environment suit, 
letting him manoeuvre in time and yet stay dry (2002: 292).  
 
So, just as scuba gear keeps the diver dry and disconnected from water, so B+S 
is the Son’s ‘environment suit’ that lets him act in time, whilst remaining 
timeless Himself. The atemporalist could therefore adopt this argument to 
deny that B + S is redundant in the composite Christ. 
 I don’t think that the scuba gear analogy is very appealing, however, 
because surely S+B is more than a mere ‘environment suit’. Whilst it’s 
important for preserving God’s timelessness that, indeed, He be ‘disconnected’ 
from time, what’s important for the incarnation is that Jesus walked amongst 
us and talked with us, and events in his life are temporally extended as ours are. 
This is supported by Cupitt, who says that ‘the human Jesus is not supposed to 
be a glove-puppet with the hand of God inside it. He is supposed to be fully 
human, with human thoughts, feelings and volitions’ (1979: 8). There seems to 
be a tension here, and I think that we’d want to say more about the Son acting 
in time than that He ‘swam without getting wet’. Rather, we want to say that 
He wholly participated in temporally extended events, such as healing the sick 
and suffering on the cross. This latter event is particularly important, because 
in the incarnation the Son really (temporally) endured His crucifixion as a 
 119 
 
sacrifice for us and, I’d argue, to say that He merely experienced this in a 
disconnected way, all the way ‘staying dry’ from duration and temporal passage 
isn’t to fully respect and understand the extent of the suffering involved in 
God’s sacrifice.  
Nevertheless, it might be responded that it’s only Christ’s human body 
that’s used as a tool, and this is no different from how we use our own bodies. 
Christ’s human mind, however, has a far more important role to play.10 It’s 
more than a mere tool, because it experiences the important human emotions 
that we ascribe to Christ, such as feeling tempted (Matthew 4: 1-11). These 
emotions are integral to the sacrifice of the incarnation, and thus Christ’s 
human mind indeed plays a fundamental role.  
I grant that the above is a persuasive argument for evading Apollinarian 
heresy; except that we’ve now returned to the problem of our two isolated, 
‘watertight’ natures in a single person – so we’re now back on the unorthodox 
road to Nestorianism. This is because if Christ feels truly tempted, then He 
must be unaware of His divine, impassible nature, because there must be a 
genuine epistemic possibility of His yielding to temptation. In order to truly 
account for the sacrifice of the incarnation, and to avoid Apollinarianism by 
upholding the importance of Christ’s humanity, we must argue that Christ was 
prone to feeling, for instance, genuine temptation, suffering and desertion 
through his human mind. This then exemplifies the gulf between the (timeless, 
impassible) divine nature and the (temporal, susceptible-to-suffering) human 
nature, and suggests that there are indeed two persons in the composite; one 
who suffers and one who doesn’t.  
It could be responded, in line with Crisp, that the Son can’t be wholly 
unaffected by the changes that take place in B+S, meaning that GS isn’t as 
insulated as we might think. Crisp asks: 
 
Do we want to concede that God the Son does no action that Christ is 
reported as doing in the canonical Gospels? Do we want to concede 
that he has none of the properties that Christ has? That seems like 
rather too much for an orthodox christologist to swallow (2011: 50-1).  
                                                             
10 This claim could be made of Christ’s human’s mind whether or not that one thinks it’s 
ultimately reducible to, or supervenient on, His physical body, I submit. 
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If the Son merely timelessly knows everything that B+S does, but doesn’t 
participate in any of these actions, a further problem is also waiting in the 
wings; that of the Son having the same relationship with B+S as He does with 
every other human. David Brown says that if ‘God knows all human 
experience in any case through his omniscience, [then] the relationship viewed 
at least from the divine nature, would be no different in kind from its 
relationship with any other human nature’ (1985: 264). The atemporalist 
compositionalist therefore needs to concede, in line with Crisp, that the Son 
must be affected in some way by His union with the B+S, lest He be 
unacceptably insulated from the other parts of the composite in a way that 
threatens to make GS’s relation to the human part(s) of the composite the 
same as His relation with every human. This sameness of relations would be 
problematic because the incarnation would fail to be the unique and 
miraculous event that it’s widely considered to be.  
It could be responded that in order to see how the incarnation is 
different from God merely knowing the contents of every human mind, we 
can distinguish between propositional and experiential knowledge. God 
possesses perfect propositional knowledge, and so knows the truth value of every 
proposition. He knows that I like dogs and Harry Potter novels, and about my 
contemplation of His knowledge of this fact, for instance.11 He can therefore 
be deemed omniscient, for He knows every propositional truth. However, God 
has incomplete experiential knowledge in that He doesn’t know exactly what it’s 
like to be me, or to be a dog, for instance.12 However, due to the incarnation, 
He does know exactly what it’s like to be a human; Jesus – for He experiences 
the world as that very human. This has the added upshot that the incarnation 
brings God closer to His creation through His coming to know our human 
condition. An analogy might be drawn with Mary the colour scientist leaving 
her black and white room (Jackson 1982: 127-136): the Son possessed all 
propositional knowledge of His creation in the room, just as Mary did of 
                                                             
11 There’s no reason why this propositional knowledge can’t be tenseless, and possessed 
from a timeless standpoint. 
12 Even if one thinks that God does know what it’s like to be every one of His creatures, I’d 
still maintain that He doesn’t know exactly what it is to be any of them. I’d maintain in line 
with Linda Zagzebski that even if God has ‘perfect total empathy’ (2008: 242) of all our 
conscious states, He’s nevertheless aware that this is a ‘copy’ of the experiencer’s 
conscious state (ibid.).  
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colour. On becoming incarnate, though, the Son came to know exactly what 
it’s like to be human – by virtue of being a human – just as on leaving the 
room Mary knows what it’s like to see colour. It could therefore be argued that 
this experiential knowledge of being Jesus (but not literally being any of us) is 
what individuates the incarnation, and what prevents the Son from being 
incarnate in all of us. This endorsement of the Son acquiring experiential 
knowledge upon becoming incarnate will come to be important later on in this 
thesis – most notably, in Chapters 6 and 8.  
However, this response only works (or at least, only has force) if one 
abandons one’s belief in a timeless God. Only temporalists can account for 
God’s experiential knowledge changing with the incarnation in the way described 
above, because atemporalists must maintain that God timelessly possesses all 
knowledge, so it would be impossible to supplement this at a later time. It 
therefore seems that in this sense a temporalist can provide a better account of 
the point of the incarnation, because she alone can account for God adding to 
His perfect propositional knowledge the experiential knowledge of what it’s 
like to be human. I therefore close off this line of argument to the 
atemporalist, who must maintain that God’s knowledge doesn’t change.  
I think Leftow would answer the above challenge by arguing that it’s 
the causal relations between GS and B+S that make the incarnation of Christ 
distinct from GS’s relation with other humans. Leftow argues that a timeless 
God can still have causal relations with temporal entities, and provides the 
example of His creating and sustaining the universe (2002: 288). He notes, 
however, that ‘just what’ (ibid.: 299) the causal relations are between GS and 
B+S is too large a topic to broach. We’re therefore left wondering what exactly 
these timeless causal relations between GS and B+S are, and how they might 
be distinct from GS’s causal relations with other beings. They must be such 
that B+S is active as more than just an ‘environment suit’ on pain of 
Apollinarianism13, but they must keep GS from being a wholly isolated part of 
the composite lest we return to Nestorianism.  
Moreover, even granting Leftow that we can provide a credible account 
of these causal relations between the timeless divine and temporal human parts 
of the composite, the atemporalist still faces another problem. This is that if 
                                                             
13 And, indeed, Eutycheanism – the heresy whereby Christ’s possesses just a divine nature.  
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Christ’s divine and human consciousness are indeed parts of the same person, 
it must be possible that they be co-experienced. Swinburne says that in order 
for Christ to be one person, there must be at least a possibility for the person 
to co-experience the contents of His divine and His human consciousnesses 
(2011: 160, footnote). Swinburne acknowledges that the Son may have chosen to 
keep the two separate, but it must be at least possible for them both to be 
experienced together. ‘If it isn’t’, says Swinburne, ‘I’m lost as to what it means 
to say that both consciousnesses belong to one person’ (ibid.). Importantly, he 
then adds that if this co-experience is to take place, it must happen at a time.  
He says: 
 
Now consider some temporal experience of Christ at a moment t 
during his human life. Is [the Son] even able to co-experience that 
experience together with some experience of his divine consciousness? 
An answer ‘Yes’ is not possible, since t is not a moment simultaneous 
with any moment in the timeless divine consciousness’ (ibid.).  
 
Simultaneity is itself a temporal relation, and therefore not one that the 
consciousness of a timeless God the Son can exist in. Our attempt to avoid 
Apollinarianism has therefore returned us full circle to Nestorianism, because it 
seems very difficult to provide an adequate account of how the 
consciousnesses of a timeless GS and a temporal B+S can unite to form a 
single person. The two consciousnesses are unacceptably separate such that 
they seem to belong to two people. Indeed, Smith argues that there’s ‘no 
coherent via media between Apollinarianism and Nestorianism’ (1977: 267), 
because any attempt at finding a ‘middle ground’ ends up giving way to one of 
these heresies. I venture that this is certainly the case for atemporal 
compositionalism. 
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(4) CONCLUSION 
Hark, hark! The wise eternal Word 
Like a weak infant cries; 
In form of servant is the Lord, 
And God in cradle lies (Pestell 1914: 198). 
 
In this chapter, I’ve explored whether and how atemporalists can avoid 
the incoherence problem, by examining how they attempt to respond to the 
apparent paradox of the timeless Son, complete with the traditional divine 
attributes, entering into time as a meek and vulnerable baby. I granted that, if 
atemporalists adopt the ‘hierarchy of natures’ compositionalist account, they’re 
able to respond to the additional contradiction of God being both timeless and 
temporal. However, I then claimed that any attempts to avoid the incoherence 
problem in general only cause the atemporalist to be guilty of unorthodoxy in a 
different way.  
I argued that the atemporalist compositionalist ‘solution’ to the 
incoherence problem either inflates the model into Nestorianism, or collapses 
it into Apollinarianism, and there’s no coherent path between these 
problematic outcomes. Employing reduplication of parts of the composite 
Christ inflates His divine and human natures into distinct persons. Any 
attempts to deny this lead to worries regarding who exactly the person of Christ 
is. These seem best resolved by maintaining that GS is the only person in the 
composite, but this stance in turn deflates the atemporalist position into 
Apollinarian heresy. The problem with the atemporalist compositionalist 
response to Apollinarian heresy is that on the one hand, it keeps GS too ‘dry’ 
and isolated from the worldly temporal activities of Christ. We’ve already seen 
that this leads us back to Nestorianism, and so must be avoided. On the other 
hand, attempting to avoid Apollinarian heresy leads the compositionalist to a 
temporal GS, who directly participates in worldly activities. An investigation of 
the coherence of this account will be the topic of my next chapter: I’ll consider 
whether belief in a temporal God can provide a better response to the 
incoherence problem. 
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CHAPTER 4  
INCOHERENCE PROBLEM: 
TEMPORALIST SOLUTIONS 
 I argued in the previous chapter that temporalists face (equally) as 
many ‘contradictions’ as atemporalists in light of the incoherence problem. 
This is because where atemporalists must be able to account for God the Son 
being timeless in spite of Christ being a temporal being, so temporalists must 
reconcile the Son’s being backwardly everlasting with the conflicting property 
of Christ being born of the Virgin Mary, and thus having a beginning in time. 
In this chapter, I examine whether temporalists can provide a coherent account 
of how it is that Christ has two distinct natures that are united into just one 
person. Temporalists appear in a better position than their rivals, because they 
can argue that the Son did change in the incarnation, meaning that they have 
more options up their sleeve when responding to the charge of incoherence.  
 There are several different metaphysical models that have been 
adopted by temporalists. I first outline (section 1.1) Morris’s ‘two minds’ view, 
together with Swinburne’s ‘divided mind’ account. Section 1.2 outlines (and 
dispels) some prima facie worries that might be had regarding these accounts. 
One interpretation of Morris and Swinburne’s views seems to me to be as a 
temporalist compositionalist account (where the divine and human minds are 
‘parts’ of Christ). I examine such models in section 1.3, arguing that in spite of 
arguments to the contrary, these models don’t succeed in solving the 
incoherence problem. Section 1.4 turns to what I consider the alternative way 
to model these accounts: as transformationalist. More specifically, I consider 
‘inclusionist’ construals of Christ’s two minds, whereby one ‘contains’ the 
other. Such a model of the two minds view also fails, I argue – most notably 
because it leads to Apollinarian heresy. I finally turn to another species of 
transformationalism: a kenotic model of the incarnation. Section 2 argues that 
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kenoticism is (unlike all other models) successful at avoiding the incoherence 
problem.   
 
(1) TWO MINDS 
(1.1)THE ACCOUNTS 
Swinburne’s ‘divided mind’ and Morris’s ‘two minds’ accounts are 
remarkably similar, so they can usefully be scrutinised together. I’ll therefore 
assess them as two versions of the same view. At junctures where they do differ, 
I of course note this, and treat the accounts distinctly in order to be maximally 
charitable to each of them.  
Swinburne’s ‘divided mind’ account postulates the divine mind splitting 
at the moment of the incarnation, thus giving way to a human stream of 
consciousness, or ‘belief-system’, in addition to the divine stream of 
consciousness. The divine stream continues to be omniscient and omnipotent, 
as well as to possess all of the other requisites for divinity. The human stream 
is fallible and limited in power, and unaware that it’s at all divine. Swinburne 
stresses that, for the divine Son: 
 
The separation of the belief-systems would be a voluntary act, 
knowledge of which was part of the divine knowledge-system but not 
of the human knowledge-system. We thus get a picture of a divine 
consciousness and a human consciousness of God Incarnate, the 
former including the latter, but not conversely (1994: 202).  
 
Swinburne is here detailing an important accessing relation between the two 
belief systems; the divine one (being omniscient) knows all of the contents of 
the human belief-system, whereas this isn’t the case vice versa, given that the 
human belief-system is limited in knowledge and is unaware that it’s divine.  
To support his argument, Swinburne draws upon Freud’s findings that 
‘an agent can have two systems of belief to some extent independent of each 
other. In performing some actions, the agent is acting on one system of belief 
and not guided by beliefs in the other system; and conversely’ (ibid.: 201). 
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Swinburne suggests the example of a mother who denies that her son has died, 
yet in other respects her unconscious beliefs may guide her to behave as 
though he has died, such as by throwing away some of his belongings (ibid.). 
Similarly, in the incarnation, the Son’s human belief-system may behave as 
though a fallible mortal, stating ignorance of various things and experiencing 
bodily limitations such as thirst and hunger. The belief-system is wholly 
unconscious of the divine belief-system, yet sometimes it may unknowingly act 
through the latter. Swinburne acknowledges that the accessing relation between 
the belief-systems isn’t entirely one way: he grants that there are occasional 
times in which the human belief-system has access to the divine one. He says 
that ‘some penetration on Earth [is needed]…some access by Christ incarnate 
to divine knowledge and power in order that he should reveal it to us’ (1989: 
60-70). Examples of such a situation could be when Jesus performed miracles. 
It seems to me that Swinburne’s divided mind account can work 
exclusively for a temporal God, because the divine mind ‘voluntarily’ decides to 
split into two belief-systems. There must therefore be a time before, and a time 
after, this decision by the divine mind: it’s surely a process that needs to be 
broken down into temporal parts. In addition, there’s no doubt that the divine 
mind (and so, GS) undergoes fundamental change when it splits into two belief 
systems, because it develops a branch that’s a human stream of consciousness, 
which it didn’t possess before. Hill argues along these lines that Swinburne’s 
account can’t be appealed to by atemporalists, because of the transformation 
involved by the Son: ‘this could not happen if the Son does not change, which 
again presupposes that the Son is temporal’ (2012: 25). Understood in such a 
way, therefore, this divided mind account seems to be a transformationalist 
model of the incarnation, which will be discussed in section 1.4.1 
Conversely, Morris’s ‘two minds’ model doesn’t seem to be restricted 
exclusively to a temporal God. On this account, there are two distinct minds; 
the divine mind with its omniscient consciousness, and the earthly, fallible 
mind that is ‘thoroughly human, Jewish and first-century Palestinian in nature’ 
(1989: 121). Morris, presenting his view as an alternative preferable to 
kenoticism, speaks of an ‘asymmetric accessing relation between the two minds’ 
                                                             
1 I’ll shortly discuss (in this section) the fact that it’s somewhat confusing whether two 
minds accounts are to be classified as compositionalist, transformationalist, or something 
in between.  
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(1986: 103), meaning that the divine mind enjoys full and unlimited access to 
the contents of the human one, whereas (like Swinburne) the human mind has 
‘only such access [to the divine mind], on occasion, as the divine mind allowed 
it to have’ (ibid.). Morris stresses that his account has an advantage over 
kenoticism, because it can account for the Son humbling Himself through a 
taking on of properties, rather than a giving up. This ‘giving up’ of properties is 
central to kenoticism, as I’ll explain in the next section. Morris says that ‘[the 
Son’s] humbling consisted rather in his rendering himself vulnerable to the 
pains…and agonies which became his as a man but which, in his exclusively 
divine form of existence, could not have touched him’ (ibid.: 104). Therefore, 
Morris argues that his view can account for just as much of a sacrifice on the 
Son’s part as kenoticism, but without the (allegedly) problematic need to give 
up any essential aspects of divinity.  
Morris offers several analogies to illustrate his account, including one 
of lucid dreaming, where the dreamer is in a particular scenario with different 
characters. He says that:  
 
The dreamer himself is one of those characters, perceiving the internal 
environs of the dream and taking part in its action ‘from within’. But at 
the same time, the dreamer ‘as sleeper’ is somehow aware, in what 
could be called an overarching, lucid level of consciousness, that it is 
just a dream that is going on, in which he is playing a role as one of the 
characters (ibid.: 105). 
 
Similarly, the Son qua human mind is participating in an earthly life, interacting 
with other humans, whereas qua divine mind He’s aware of an ‘overarching’ 
level of His divine existence as the Son of God. Morris draws other analogies 
with multiple personality disorder, and brain hemisphere commisurotonmy, 
where there are two ‘distinct domains of experience’ (ibid.) operating, which 
are analogous to the two minds. 
I think Morris’s model could work with both a temporal and an 
atemporal God. It’s consistent with a timeless God since the divine mind 
needn’t change intrinsically upon the addition of the human mind because, 
contra Swinburne’s model, the divine mind doesn’t split or change: it’s rather 
 128 
 
joined by a human mind. Morris’s model also admits of a temporal God 
because the divine mind could, like the human one, experience sequential 
ordering, if one wished this for one’s account. It could also be maintained that 
the divine mind changes upon the incarnation and throughout it, because its 
knowledge changes to encompass the mutable experiences of the human mind, 
and it (freely) changes to occasionally allow the human mind access to it.  
There has been some confusion regarding whether Morris and 
Swinburne’s accounts are to be classified as transformationalist or 
compositionalist. Hill classifies Swinburne’s account as ‘partly 
transformationalist and partly relational’ (2011: 10).2  This is because the Son 
really does intrinsically change, or ‘transform’ into a human mind, but He also 
becomes related to a human body and soul. However, in the same paper, Hill 
characterises relational models as explaining the incarnation ‘wholly’ in terms 
of acquisition (of a human body and perhaps also a human mind) (ibid.). If this 
is the case, then Swinburne’s model seems prohibited from counting as 
compositionalist, given that it also involves a transformation. Indeed, in this 
very same paper, Hill describes Morris and Swinburne as non-
compositionalists (ibid.: 14). In a more recent paper, Hill calls Swinburne’s 
model a ‘Son-body’ account of the incarnation (2012: 15), categorising it as a 
third kind of model of the incarnation, in addition to transformationalism and 
compositionalism.  
I think that it’s possible to construe Morris and Swinburne’s models as 
either transformationalist or compositionalist. We can, on the one hand, 
imagine the minds as two distinct parts of the incarnate Christ: which would be 
a compositionalist model. This seems to be the case particularly because the 
tradition among compositionalists here is to use the term ‘part’ in a 
‘philosophically rather loose sense’ (Marmodoro & Hill 2010: 487, footnote). 
Likewise, Leftow classifies Morris and Swinburne’s accounts as ‘three parter’ 
models of the incarnation (2002: 287), suggesting that he views each of the two 
minds (together with a human body) as ‘parts’ of Christ. Especially because 
                                                             
2 ‘Relational’ is understood here as a model of the incarnation whereby the Son enters 
‘…into a kind of relationship…with something that would have been a human being had 
it not been in such a relationship’ (Hill 2011: 10). Compositionalist models are classified as 
one type of relational model of the incarnation.  
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we’re speaking loosely about parts here, I fail to see what these two minds can 
be if not parts, when we consider them in this ‘side by side’ sense.  
Alternatively, however, we can imagine one of the minds included 
within the other. Tim Bayne calls the latter ‘inclusion’ (2001: 125) models of the 
incarnation. I think that such inclusion models have to be transformationalist, 
because one mind must evidently change intrinsically in order to truly include 
the other. Inclusion models will be assessed in due course. I think that these 
really are our only options for conceiving of the two minds account: either one 
mind is included within (or part of) the other, or else the two minds are distinct. 
I think that the former are inclusionist (and so, transformationalist) and the 
latter are better viewed as compositionalist models of the incarnation. Hill 
seems to say something similar when he considers what might be the case if 
the human mind (or stream of consciousness) isn’t part of the divine one:  
 
Perhaps [the human mind] is ‘hosted’ by the human body…or perhaps 
it is distinct from both the divine mind and the human body…but in 
both of these cases…we are now envisaging that Christ consists of the 
Son plus a human body plus a human mind, and that is 
compositionalism (2012: 26).3  
 
I fail to see how atemporal two minds models are anything other than 
compositionalist models, because I don’t see how the minds can be anything 
other than distinct, ‘side by side’ parts. At the very least, I think that the burden 
of proof rests with the two minds theorist to tell us what else, besides ‘parts’ 
(in some sense) these two minds are, especially because I’ve explained that 
compositionalists tend to understand these parts in a quite loose sense of the 
term.4 I discussed the strongest atemporalist compositionalist model in Chapter 
3. I don’t think we can have inclusion in this case, because this would involve a 
change in the divine mind: it would have to change at a time in order to include 
                                                             
3 Hill thinks that to go compositionalist in this way is to depart from Swinburne’s account 
of the incarnation (ibid.). However, I would argue that construing the divine and human 
minds as ‘parts’ of Christ incarnate is just one way to model Swinburne’s account – the 
other being inclusion.  
4 Le Poidevin comments that the two minds account ‘looks like’ a version of 
compositionalism (2009b: 709), but then proceeds to say that the minds aren’t ‘parts’ of 
Christ. He doesn’t say why, however, and I think that the two minds theorist owes us such 
an explanation.  
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a human mind. Moreover, I find it hard to grasp the concept of something 
atemporal containing something temporal, because the atemporal ‘container’ 
would have to be mutable in order to accommodate the ever-changing 
contents of the human mind. Relatedly, Bayne says on the subject of an 
atemporal inclusionist model, ‘the prospects for such a marriage being a happy 
one seem dim’ (2001: 127). This is because of the problems we can imagine 
with a synchronic consciousness containing a diachronic consciousness (ibid.). I 
think that the burden of proof here rests with the two minds theorist if she 
wishes to deny this, because I can’t imagine what else these two distinct minds 
can be other than parts, for the atemporalist. I’ll therefore assume that the 
atemporalist two minds model has been dealt with in the above chapter, and so 
argued to be unfit for solving the incoherence problem. This section will 
discuss only temporalist variants of the two minds model (which incidentally do 
admit of inclusion).  
Morris and Swinburne’s accounts both admit of two distinct ‘belief-
systems’ in the incarnate Christ (whether minds or streams of consciousness), 
and they both maintain that Christ remains one person in spite of this. For ease 
of argument, I’ll henceforth refer to these belief-systems as ‘minds’, but my 
argument will encompass both accounts. However, where the argument may 
hinge upon the belief-systems being mere streams of consciousness as opposed 
to more ‘full-blooded’ minds (or vice versa), I’ll flag this up and treat the two 
accounts differently.5 A further similarity, then, is that both accounts argue that 
the divine mind has unrestricted access to the human mind, whereas the 
human mind has only occasional access to the divine one, when the divine 
mind permits it. They also both argue that the acquiring of the human mind 
(whether or not this takes place through a ‘splitting’ of sorts) is a voluntary act 
on the part of the Son.  
Morris and Swinburne argue that it’s in virtue of these two minds that 
Christ incarnate can be both truly divine and truly human, and yet remain one 
person. We can employ reduplication to make sense of the seemingly 
contradictory properties, saying, for example, that Jesus Christ is omniscient 
qua divine mind, but limited in knowledge qua His human mind. In Chapter 3, 
                                                             
5 Assuming, of course, that we can even draw such a distinction between a stream of 
consciousness and a mind.  
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I noted many of the problems that come with reduplication, such as that it 
gives way to Nestorian heresy, and that it doesn’t help us to decide which 
properties transfer to Christ as a whole. This aside, I’ll now explore the 
metaphysics of the two minds view in its own right, to ensure that I’m being as 
charitable as possible to this position. After outlining, and dismissing, some 
prima facie worries for the account, I’ll argue that once we start to tease out how 
the two minds are alleged to solve the incoherence problem, we find that a 
compositionalist two minds model renders the minds in danger of being so 
distinct that they’re more akin to people. This would be Nestorian heresy, 
however. Alternatively, if we maintain that (through the inclusion model) one 
mind can ‘contain’ the other in spite of their conflicting contents, we must be 
able to point to who exactly the person of Christ is, and what He knows. I’ll 
demonstrate that, of the three possible answers to this predicament, one 
restates the problem, one leads to Apollinarian heresy, and one (unacceptably) 
ascribes false beliefs and ignorance to Christ’s divine mind. 
 
(1.2) SOME PRIMA FACIE WORRIES 
A preliminary worry is that Morris isn’t clear about how the human 
mind is connected to the divine one, which suggests that his account struggles 
to get off the ground. On Swinburne’s account, the human belief-system is 
caused by the divine mind voluntarily deciding to split into two belief-systems, 
so the two systems belong to the same mind, which helps with linking the two 
causally.6 This is supported by Leftow: ‘one person’s having first one mind and 
then two, the second branching off from the first psychologically, is in fact a 
legitimate description of what goes on in cases of cerebral commissurotomy’ 
(2002: 286). For Morris, the human mind can’t be backwardly everlasting, 
because Jesus’s human stream of consciousness only began when He was born 
as a man. Perhaps, then, we can  argue that the Son, as part of His ‘taking on’ 
sacrifice, causes the human mind to come into existence, which takes place 
when the man Jesus is born in Bethlehem. However, the problem with this is 
that if the human mind is so distinct from the divine one, we imagine it just 
                                                             
6Even this splitting of belief-systems doesn’t get off the ground easily, though. If the 
divine mind decides to split, it must be in control of the splitting, and if it’s aware all the 
while of both belief-systems belonging to the same person, doubts are raised as to whether 
we really have two distinct belief-systems at all. This argument will be developed shortly. 
 132 
 
coming to exist in the way that the mind of any human baby does; with no 
connection to the divine one. It’s limited in knowledge and doesn’t know that 
it’s divine, and so there would be no psychological continuity between the 
minds.7 Granted, God may cause the human mind to exist, so there’s causal 
connection in this sense, but this is surely no different from the way that any 
human mind is caused to exist. This additionally seems to detract from the 
uniqueness of the incarnation, in that we’re all created by God and the contents 
of all our minds are fully accessible by God.  
Morris might respond by claiming that the incarnation is a unique 
event because ‘the earthly mind is contained in the divine mind in a distinctive 
way’ (1986: 161). By this, he means that the human mind was not ‘endowed 
with a set of personal cognitive and causal powers distinct from the cognitive 
and causal powers of God the Son’ (ibid.). Whilst the rest of us do possess 
these distinct wills and volitions, those of the Son’s human mind are no 
different from those of His divine mind, according to Morris.8 This unique 
relation of containment could also be what grants the human mind the 
occasional access to its divine counterpart – a further feat that sets the 
incarnation apart from generic cases of human minds being accessible to God. 
This alludes to an inclusion model of the two minds account, because the 
human mind can be ‘included’ within the divine mind in a way that our minds 
aren’t.  
However, this ‘containment’ of the human mind within the divine one 
is a troublesome concept to grasp. It can’t be a material sense of inclusion 
given that (I assume) at least one of the minds isn’t corporeal, and so can’t 
physically contain or be contained. If it’s merely ‘epistemological’ inclusion in 
the sense that the contents of the human mind are known by the divine mind, 
then this once again seems no different from the way that God knows the 
contents of all of our minds. Perhaps we can invoke a ‘non-physical’ sense of 
containment to do the trick – such as, for instance, the way we speak of a 
                                                             
7 There are numerous examples of people lacking psychological continuity (such as after 
suffering brain damage or being in a coma), and yet we don’t typically want to deny that 
they are the same person. Arguably, however, much of the appeal of these cases is that 
there remains bodily continuity, which we don’t have in the incarnation.  
8 This raises associated problems regarding the freedom of the human mind, which will be 
discussed below. 
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scene being contained within a play.9 Alternatively, perhaps we should simply 
state that one mind contains the other in a ‘metaphysical’ sense that one mind 
is a part of the other (Le Poidevin 2009a: 186, footnote). The confusion 
regarding these interpretations of ‘containment’ certainly suggests a lack of 
clarity, but perhaps we can additionally grant the two minds theorist this 
unique (albeit occasional) ‘accessing relation’ in the incarnation, whereby the 
human mind is granted access to the divine one.10 Whatever this ‘accessing 
relation’ might be, it’s something that the Son’s human mind has to the divine 
mind only on occasion, and which our human minds are never granted. It 
could thus be argued that it’s this occasional accessing relation that sets the 
incarnation apart as a unique relation between God the Son and His human 
mind.  
Having outlined these preliminary worries and granted that they’re not 
devastating, I’ll move to discussing whether and how two minds accounts can 
provide a coherent account of how the incarnate Christ remains one person. I’ll 
discuss compositionalist and transformationalist two minds strategies 
respectively. I’ll argue that both fail, and that we should thus abandon our 
attempts to model the incarnation using two minds accounts.   
 
(1.3) COMPOSITIONALIST TWO MINDS MODELS 
The temporal two minds view has the capacity to allow for more 
integration between the minds than its atemporal counterpart, given that on 
the former construal the divine mind can respond to the human mind in a more 
satisfying way. Moreover, the divine mind can adapt to the changes of the 
human mind. A temporal divine mind can itself change to know the ever-
changing contents of the mutable human mind. A temporal two minds model 
is therefore, I suggest, prima facie more appealing than Leftow’s atemporalist 
compositionalist account, where the divine mind is immutable and so can’t be 
well-integrated with the temporal human mind. Nevertheless, I’ll demonstrate 
                                                             
9 This interpretation has the bonus of implying that the Son’s human life is a temporal 
aspect of His overall divine life, which is therefore consistent with a temporal rendering of 
the incarnation.  
10 Morris’s choice of this phrase is difficult to grasp. What does it mean to say that the 
divine mind has ‘access’ to the human mind? Perhaps, in order to explain it, we must 
appeal again to the human mind’s inclusion within the divine one. This worryingly 
suggests that we can only explain the terms ‘inclusion’ and ‘accessing relation’ in terms of 
each other.  
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that a temporal construal of the two minds account ultimately still falls foul of 
Nestorian (and other) heresies.  
Compositionalist readings of the two minds model invite us to 
construe the minds existing as distinct, ‘side by side’ parts, particularly when 
contrasted with inclusion models where the human mind is (somehow) 
contained by the divine mind. The latter accounts would surely involve 
intrinsic change to the divine mind, and to this extent they belong to the 
transformationalist family, I venture. Swinburne’s account seems to have an 
initial advantage over Morris’s, given that one mind is divided. That is, it seems 
far easier to equate Morris’s two separate minds (compared with Swinburne’s 
two belief systems of the same mind) with persons, at least initially. Morris’s 
account thus seems more susceptible to Nestorianism. However, I think that 
even though Christ’s mind is ultimately one on Swinburne’s account, it’s 
extremely difficult to retain any sense of the unity between the two streams of 
consciousness. The main reason for this is that the human mind is (for the 
significant majority of the time) completely unaware that the divine mind even 
exists, let alone what it’s thinking. This degree of separation in my opinion 
makes the two belief-systems too distinct to be part of the same individual. 
Moreover, the belief systems in Swinburne’s model differ in character in the 
same way that Morris’s minds do: one is omniscient and the other fallible, for 
instance. I think that differences such as these are too stark for us to accept 
without question that the minds (or belief-systems) belong to the same 
individual.  
However, Morris would respond that we can avoid Nestorianism by 
distinguishing between being merely human, and being fully human.11 He says: 
 
It may be impossible for any merely human being to have more than 
one mind, or range of consciousness of the sort we are considering, at 
the same time...so among mere humans, the individuation of two 
minds at any one time will suffice for the identification of two persons. 
But this leaves open the possibility that outside that context, there is no 
such one-one correlation (1986: 157).  
 
                                                             
11 This distinction that Morris makes was outlined in detail in Chapter 2.  
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We don’t have any experience of what it’s like to be ‘fully’ (ibid.: 65) human in 
the sense that Jesus was, and so, Morris would argue, this is why we find it 
difficult to grasp how one person can possess two minds. We may think that 
possessing one, and only one, mind is essential for being human, but it could 
emerge that this is just a very common attribute, thus allowing for Jesus to 
possess two minds(or belief-systems) and still be one human individual.  
However, granting Morris and Swinburne that one individual can 
possess two minds, there’s no denying that the content of each is vastly 
different, which leaves us questioning who exactly the person of Christ is. Grace 
Jantzen, in her review of Morris’s book, asks: 
 
Who is the person? If the person is Jesus of Nazareth, in what sense can 
he appropriately be said to have a divine mind of which he is not 
conscious? If the person is God the Son, to what extent has he actually 
become incarnate if his omniscience…is preserved intact but kept 
inaccessible to Jesus of Nazareth? (1986: 245)   
 
This comment harks back to the ‘no person’ objection to compositionalism 
that I discussed in Chapter 3. Relatedly, Bayne questions who the referent of 
Christ’s ‘I’ thoughts is, and argues that it’s very difficult to see how all of the ‘I’ 
thoughts (from the different minds) can have the same referent, given the vastly 
different characters of the two minds (2001: 136). If there really is just one 
person in the incarnate Christ, we must surely be able to pick out the same 
overall referent of the ‘I’ thoughts at all times, because ‘consciousnesses don’t 
believe things, people do’ (ibid.: 137). This leaves us wondering what the one 
person of Christ can know. For instance, the divine mind might know the time 
of the parousia, whilst the human mind might be ignorant of this, but we 
remain unsure as to what the person of Christ believes. It seems that there are 
three possible answers here.  
Firstly, it could be maintained that the person of Christ both knows and 
doesn’t know the time of the parousia. The compositionalist could generate 
this result by reduplication of parts in the typical way: Christ knows the time 
qua divine mind, but doesn’t know the time qua human mind, so it can make 
sense to attribute both states of knowledge to Him, in different respects. 
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However, if Christ is one person, we ought to be able to give a more 
substantial answer than this, as I argued in Chapter 3. Senor voices this worry 
when he says:  
 
The two-minds view does not succeed in defeating the charge 
of…incoherence…since it will be true of Christ that he both knew and 
did not know the date of the Last Judgement. Since there is a single 
subject of predication, it does little good to claim that Christ was 
omniscient with respect to his divine nature and not omniscient with 
respect to his human nature (1991: 361).  
 
I therefore rule out this option, because it seems to be inflating the composite 
into two persons, and so into Nestorianism. Morris himself even admits that ‘if 
the question is pressed concerning what the person, God the Son, himself 
believed…evading the question by appealing to the duality of mind can appear 
to threaten the unity of person, and thus the coherence of the whole picture’ 
(1989: 125).12 A compositionalist construal of the two minds model therefore 
‘solves’ the incoherence problem for the price of Nestorianism, which of 
course we’re not willing to pay. We’re now left with two further options; that 
Christ doesn’t know the time of the parousia (because of His human mind not 
knowing), or that He knows the time of the parousia (because of His divine 
mind knowing this). Both of these answers lend themselves towards 
inclusionist construals of the two minds, because they suggest that one mind’s 
knowledge ‘trumps’ that of the other, which I think is best explained by 
inclusion in some sense.13 I’ll now move to discussing inclusionist models.   
 
(1.4) INCLUSIONIST TWO MINDS MODELS 
By way of reminder, inclusionist models postulate one of the minds 
(human or divine) ‘containing’ the other. I’ve explained that inclusionist 
models can’t be other than transformationalist, because to come to contain 
                                                             
12 We will see below that Morris has an alternative answer available: we should say that the 
Son’s divine mind knows all of the beliefs of the human mind, but does not have them as 
its beliefs.  
13 After all, if we don’t have inclusion but distinct, ‘side by side’ minds, we at least need 
another argument to explain how only one mind comes to be the subject of Christ’s 
knowledge of the parousia. 
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something else is to undergo intrinsic change.14 I also think that inclusion is the 
only alternative way to depict two minds accounts of the incarnation. Either the 
minds are distinct ‘parts’ of the composite, or there’s some relation of 
containment between them, I submit.  
I’ll firstly consider the option that Christ’s ‘I’ thoughts are those 
belonging to His human mind, because we must allow for His being ‘truly 
human’ throughout the incarnation. However, Christ’s human mind possesses 
only limited knowledge. This would then mean His divine mind (if it’s to be a 
part of this very same person) must ultimately know this, and only this, 
information. If ‘the entire contents of [Christ’s] human consciousness can be 
ascribed to God the Son’ (Bayne 2001: 137), then false beliefs, such as that it’s 
possible for Him to sin, or that He’s unaware of the time of the parousia, must 
be attributed to the divine mind (ibid.: 136-7). Le Poidevin has consequential 
worries regarding the divine mind, given that it’s supposed to be omniscient. 
He says ‘if the human mind is a subset of the divine mind, how is it possible 
for the human mind to entertain thoughts that the divine mind knows to be 
false?’ (2009a: 184). The idea is that, because Christ’s human mind is included 
within His divine mind, then we must attribute all of the human mind’s 
thoughts to the divine mind. This in turn means that the divine mind can be 
mistaken.  
Richard Sturch responds that this last answer is only a problem as long 
as we think in terms of an ‘inclusion’ model. He writes that the ‘I’ thoughts of 
the Word and Jesus refer to the same self, but neither is a subset of the other. If 
we avoid these thoughts of which mind is included within the other, then the 
Son ‘is…aware of Jesus’ feelings if he gets lost in the market, and is aware also 
that these are his own; but they are not themselves part of the divine 
consciousness in the way that these two awarenesses are’ (2003: 105). The idea 
is that if we imagine one mind being the overall referent of Christ’s ‘I’ thoughts, 
because it in some way ‘contains’ the other, we’ll be led into unnecessary 
problems, such as attributing false beliefs to the Son. What we ought to do, 
rather, is simply postulate the Son’s divine mind as being aware of what His 
                                                             
14 I do submit that one could draw their distinctions elsewhere (such as by postulating the 
two minds view as a ‘third’ category of incarnational model, as we’ve seen (above) that Hill 
does). However, given my investigation of God’s relation to time, I think it’s important to 
draw distinctions in the way that I’ve done here. That is, if a model of the incarnation 
involves intrinsic change, it counts as transformationalist. 
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human mind is thinking, knowing that these thoughts still refer to Himself, but 
also knowing that they’re not in any way part of its own consciousness. This is, 
in fact, supported by Morris himself, who says that: 
 
The divine mind would have perfect access to the contents of the 
human mind and thus would know [the human belief in question] to be 
contained in the human mind. It just would not thereby have this belief 
as one if its beliefs (1986: 160, my italics). 
 
However, I think that we’ve now returned to the unsatisfying answer generated 
by compositionalist models; that of Jesus both knowing and not knowing the 
same piece of information. Bayne insists that ‘something has to give’ (2003: 
109), because ‘if Jesus was God, and Jesus had false beliefs, then God had false 
beliefs’ (ibid.). Moreover, we can’t cherry-pick the beliefs that we wish to 
ascribe to God. Bayne says that ‘orthodoxy doesn’t claim that Jesus was God 
the Son only on certain occasions, or in certain respects’ (2001: 138). Rather, all 
of the beliefs of the Son’s human mind must be ascribed to a person (because 
people, not minds, have beliefs), and in line with orthodoxy this can only be the 
person that’s God incarnate. There has to ultimately be one subject of the 
thinking here, and if we prise the minds back into separate, distinct ‘parts’, 
we’re back to the Nestorian worries that face compositionalists. It therefore 
seems that we’re none the wiser as to who this person of Christ is, and what 
exactly He knows.  
We’re therefore left with a final option: that inclusion models can help 
us to keep Nestorianism at bay because the human mind is contained within 
the divine one, which helps us to imagine the human mind as included within 
the very same divine person of Christ incarnate. We might argue that the person 
of Christ knows the time of the parousia because His overarching (omniscient) 
divine mind knows this. Inclusionists could maintain that Christ’s divine mind is 
the subject of His knowledge. It has unlimited access to the human mind, (by 
virtue of containing it), and so can see what the fallible human mind is thinking, 
but also knows the overall truth: that He is the divine omniscient Son. 
However, this answer seems to be in danger of collapsing into the heresy of 
Apollinarianism, where Christ is denied a human mind. Christ is supposed to be 
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‘truly’ human after all, and if He knows all the while that He’s divine and 
omniscient, there’s no satisfactory sense in which we can argue that He did 
possess a human mind. It’s part of Christ’s sacrifice that He took on our 
limited form. This thought is summed up in a song by Sydney Carter. He says: 
 
And if they crucified me, 
I’d think that I was luckier  
Than those who hung beside me. 
I’d know that I should rise again 
And all things would be well; 
But when you are a son of man 
However can you tell? (1969: 15) 
 
For our purposes, the thought here is that if Christ’s divine mind is the referent 
of His ‘I’ thoughts, He’ll know all along that His crucifixion isn’t final, and 
won’t be in the despair that He would be in if He believed Himself to be truly 
human and unaware of His glorification. Brown says that this reduces the 
crucifixion to a ‘meaningless charade’ (1985: 253), because the divine nature 
(being impeccable and omniscient) doesn’t suffer on the cross, so there’s no 
sacrifice that takes place at all. This contention of Brown’s fits with the 
importance of the biblical picture of Jesus uttering the cry of dereliction whilst 
suffering on the cross (Mark 15:34). We’ll see later in this chapter that it also 
counts in favour of the kenotic view, which emphasises the importance of 
Christ’s genuine ignorance of His divinity if He’s to truly know our condition.  
  Moreover, if the subject of Christ’s ‘I’ thoughts is His divine mind, 
we’re also left pondering the freedom of the human mind. John Hick is 
particularly critical of the two minds view in this respect. He says that the 
account is ‘inadequately one-dimensional’ (1989: 421), because it only takes 
account of the noetic structures of each of the minds, but ignores their actual 
agency in the world (ibid.). Morris says that the volitional activity of Jesus is the 
volitional activity of the Son (1986: 161-2), but he’s referring only to mental 
activity. Hick says that this becomes more problematic when we consider the 
two minds and their will to act, because then it seems that ‘Jesus had no 
separate human will and the will operative in his life was the divine will of the 
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second person of the Trinity’ (2005: 56), which in turn means that He had no 
human agency. If Jesus’s will was nothing other than the will of the Son, then it 
appears that as a human He wasn’t free to act using the (limited) human 
faculties that he took on. Rather, He was all the while being controlled and 
monitored by the Son. This diminishes the sacrifice that Morris maintains is 
exemplified in the Son taking on a limited human nature: it’s hardly genuine if 
the Son never acts through His human mind. Furthermore, this detracts from 
the goodness and selflessness of the acts that the man Jesus performed, 
because it emerges that He didn’t perform these of His own human free will.  
 Morris has argued in response that, if we consider the human mind in 
itself, what’s important is that the human Jesus felt as though He was free to act 
on His human desires, and was unaware that the divine mind would intervene 
–  for instance, to prevent Him from sinning. Morris says that ‘Jesus could be 
tempted to sin just in case it was epistemologically possible for him that he sin’ 
(1986: 148), despite it being metaphysically impossible that He do so. By this, he 
means that Jesus could feel genuinely tempted to sin through His human mind, 
because He was unaware that His divine mind would always intervene to 
prevent this. Swinburne makes the same argument in relation to his model; he 
says that although ‘[Christ incarnate] cannot do wrong, he may however, 
through not allowing himself to be aware of his divine beliefs, be inclined to 
believe that he may succumb to temptation to do wrong and thus…he may feel 
as we do’ (1994: 205).  
Hick objects to these arguments, claiming that they present a ‘very 
strange kind of freedom’ (2005: 57) because they depend upon ignorance (1989: 
422). Morris is saying we’re free if we can do anything that we think we can, but 
actually can’t, do, which (I agree with Hick) isn’t an acceptable sense of 
freedom. For example, we can imagine that, no matter how hard I try, it’s 
impossible for me to eat a delicious-looking piece of chocolate cake. I might 
think that eating the cake is possible, though, and then force myself to resist 
this temptation. If I were to find out that it was impossible for me to eat the 
cake – perhaps because some evil demon would have prevented me – then 
there’s definitely a sense in which I’d feel that my choice wasn’t free. This is 
because eating the cake was never a real option anyway, so I never had a 
genuine choice between two real options. I think that this is certainly an 
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unwelcome picture, because it limits the freedom of the human Jesus and the 
extent to which He underwent a sacrifice by becoming human.15  
Morris anticipates this objection, and responds that although Christ’s 
divine mind would have stepped in had He tried to sin, it in fact didn’t need to 
do so, because ‘he freely, of his own accord, decided not to succumb to 
temptation’ (1986: 153), and so was fully responsible for His admirable and 
free actions. The divine mind never needed to step in, therefore, and so it can be 
argued that the freedom of the human mind was in no way impinged upon.  
One could add that if we’re positing (along Anselmian lines), the 
greatest God conceivable, then of course Jesus’s human mind didn’t require any 
intervention from the divine mind even in His impulses to act, because He was 
able to restrain Himself from giving into temptations. Ultimately, however, I’m 
still dissatisfied with this response because the above problem remains that 
there’s no genuine possibility for Christ to act in the way that He feels tempted 
to, so no real choice between actions. On Morris’s account, as Hick observes, 
those who talked with Jesus ‘were talking to a man whom God the Son was 
invisibly monitoring, ready to control him if he went astray’ (1989: 423).  
A related problem is that if the human mind is included within the 
divine mind to such an extent that the former is always limited by the latter, 
and can’t act contrary to the latter’s desires, then there’s no sense in which we 
actually have two distinct minds. This is further enforced by inclusion imagery, 
where we imagine the human mind as a ‘subset’ of the divine one. Senor 
observes in relation to this that there’s a ‘terrific irony’ (2011: 95) in the two 
minds account failing to succeed at positing two distinct minds. Bayne says 
that, by positing two minds but only one centre of causal power, the two minds 
account ‘teeters on the edge of outright inconsistency’ (2001: 134). Senor 
posits a dilemma here: 
 
Either there are two distinct sets of cognitive and causal powers, or 
there are not. If there are, then the unity of the incarnation is threated 
                                                             
15 This argument assumes that freedom should be libertarian, and require the principle of 
alternative possibilities. Compatibilists could respond (in line with my account in Chapter 
1) that Christ’s human mind isn’t constrained by anything external to Himself when acting, to 
the extent that it’s the same person as the divine Son. However, whether or not the divine 
Son is permitted to count as nothing external to His human mind is exactly what’s being 
debated in this section!  
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(and the heresy known as Nestorianism looms), and there is 
apparently…no unique relation between the human mind of Christ and 
the mind of God the Son. If there are not two distinct sets of powers, 
then it is hard to see that God incarnate had a genuine [human] mind 
(and the heresy known as Apollinarianism looms) (2007b: 563).  
 
I therefore conclude that the two minds view, when teased out 
metaphysically, can’t deal with the incoherence problem whether we adopt a 
compositionalist or transformationalist interpretation of it. We’re left 
wondering what Christ actually does know, or can do, and we ought to be able 
to answer this if He’s indeed one individual. I’ve already demonstrated the 
problems with attempts to blunt the first horn of Senor’s dilemma: they 
ultimately leave us questioning who exactly the (one) person of Christ is, given 
that the contents of each of the minds differs so greatly from that of the other. 
I’ve shown that all possible answers to this question seem to be problematic, 
because if we do posit one subject of these ‘I’ thoughts (via inclusion), we end 
up on the one hand impinging upon the freedom of the human mind, and 
impaling ourselves on the second prong of Senor’s dilemma. Alternatively, we 
impinge upon the impeccability of the divine mind, and end up ascribing 
problematic false beliefs to it, which is an equally unwelcome consequence.  
Fortunately for temporalists, however, there’s another model that 
comes under the umbrella of temporal ‘solutions’ to the incoherence problem. 
Kenoticism is another transformationalist model, and in the following section I’ll 
argue that it succeeds in avoiding the incoherence problem.  
 
(2) KENOTICISM 
On this model at the Incarnation his divine powers would shrink to those of a 
foetus, on the Cross he would literally die with no more surviving than is the 
case with any other human being, and then be raised again, finally to ascend 
to have his full powers of deity restored to him  
(Brown 1985: 267). 
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Kenoticism is the view that, when becoming incarnate, the Son freely 
divested Himself of many of His divine properties such as omnipotence and 
omniscience in order to become fully human. It’s illustrated powerfully above 
by Brown, who compares the Son’s powers at the outset of the incarnation to 
those of a mere foetus, suggesting that the Son truly became the human baby 
born of Mary. Charles Gore, one of the founders of kenoticism, says that ‘for 
love of us He abjured the prerogatives of equality with God. By an act of 
deliberate self-abnegation, He so emptied Himself as to assume the permanent 
characteristics of the human or servile life’ (1992: 157-8). Gore seems to be 
emphasising the supererogatory nature of kenoticism: the Son was under no 
obligation to surrender His divine prerogatives, but He chose to do so due to 
the extent of His love for us. Defenders of this view appeal to Philippians 2:5-
11, whereby the Son ‘emptied Himself, by taking the form of a servant, being 
born in the likeness of man’. Interestingly, this adds a sacrifice to the 
incarnation: in addition to dying for our sins on the cross, Christ also sacrificed 
His divine properties in order to coexist as ‘one of us’.  
 As I’ve hinted, I don’t think that the atemporalist can help herself to 
kenotic accounts, because they involve intrinsic change – from possessing 
certain divine attributes, to deciding to divest oneself of them, to lacking 
them.16 This is only possible if God is temporal. I take this point to be relatively 
uncontroversial, and haven’t come across any atemporal kenotic argument. 
Admittedly, Hill comes close when he suggests that some ‘functional’ kenotic 
views might be consistent with God being timeless (2012: 6). These are where 
Christ incarnate remains in possession of the divine attributes such as 
omniscience and omnipotence, but doesn’t exercise them, like Superman not 
exercising his powers when He’s in the guise of Clark Kent (Crisp 2007: 140). 
This is as opposed to ‘ontological’ kenoticism where the Son genuinely loses the 
divine attributes. However, I struggle to imagine how even functional 
kenoticism can admit of a timeless God, because this involves Him either 
choosing not to use His divine powers, or perhaps not realising that He has 
them. The latter view seems to conflict with His omniscience anyway, because 
an omniscient being can’t fail to realise anything. Moreover, the former view 
                                                             
16 Then, to re-gaining them upon glorification, but this aspect of kenoticism will be 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
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seems to involve a change. God has to have actively decided not to use His 
divine power and knowledge, which involves a prior time in which He had full 
use of these, a later time when He reconsidered this, and an even later period 
during which He ceased to use His divine properties. 
However, the atemporalist could argue (just as she does with other 
timeless responses) that an atemporal God can timelessly programme in failure to 
exercise omnipotence and omniscience. Just as a timeless God can ensure that 
on a certain date He responds to my prayer, He could also timelessly ensure 
that between the dates of the incarnation, He ceases to utilise omnipotence and 
omniscience. Paul Helm likens this to setting a thermostat (2001: 53): I 
programme (in one act) the temporally scattered actions of the radiator, just as 
God can timelessly arrange His failing to exercise omniscience, along with His 
creating the universe and all divine responses.  
Such an account of divine timeless ‘responses’ is of course not 
uncontentious, but even granting the functional kenoticist that her account can 
admit of an atemporal God, I’ll discuss this view no further.17 This is because I 
don’t regard functional kenoticism as a genuine ‘emptying’ of divinity. If the 
Son is simply choosing not to exercise certain divine properties, then He still, 
fundamentally, possesses them, which makes functional kenoticism seem 
somewhat of a ‘sham’, or ‘quasi’ (Forrest 2000: 127) kenotic view, as well as 
detracting from the Son’s ‘humbling’ sacrifice. It would be like a world-class 
chess player pretending to play badly for a game – she’d still be able to beat her 
opponent, because she doesn’t actually lack her expert chess knowledge and 
skill. This is supported by Evans, who remarks that God’s decision to share in 
the human condition is a ‘costly’ one, meaning that ‘Christ does not retain 
omnipotence and omniscience in reserve, so to speak, to be pulled out of the 
hip pocket in case of emergency’ (2006: 199). I’ll therefore consider atemporal 
kenotic accounts no further. I maintain instead that if kenotic accounts can 
deliver an orthodox reading of the incarnation, this is another string only to the 
temporalist’s bow. 
There’s also the added factor that, if kenosis is only functional, Jesus 
arguably won’t be sufficiently human, and so we’ll have departed from 
                                                             
17 For criticisms of divine timeless ‘responses’, see Wolterstorff (2001b:77) and Swinburne 
(1973: 232).  
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orthodoxy. After all, we’ve seen the conflict that’s generated between divine 
and human attributes, and I’ve just argued that this is ultimately detrimental for 
two minds accounts. In support of this, Davis asks ‘is a person who at any time 
has the ability to be omnipotent but voluntarily and temporarily decides not to 
call on that ability ‘truly human’?’ (2006: 132). Cupitt makes a similar argument, 
but regarding omniscience. He says: 
 
To become truly man, God the Son must take upon himself not just 
the outer but also the inner conditions of one particular time and 
culture. So there must be some kind of veil between the human Jesus 
and the omniscience of God the Son, or Jesus would not be truly 
human (1979: 12).[18]   
 
It’s for these reasons, therefore, that I’ll focus only on the ontological account 
of kenosis in which Christ truly lacked the divine properties in question as a 
result of kenosis, because I believe this to be the only candidate for a genuine 
self-emptying of divinity.  
 Having covered these preliminaries, I’ll now explain how the kenotic 
view is alleged to avoid the incoherence problem. Kenoticism is typically 
explained and debated in relation to the Son voluntarily giving up two divine 
attributes: omniscience and omnipotence. I’ll firstly assess the coherence of the 
kenotic account in relation to these two attributes. In a final section, I’ll 
examine a possible divestment of what have been called the ‘ungiveupable’ 
(Davis 2006: 119) divine attributes, such as ‘being uncreated’ and ‘existing of 
necessity’, in order to become human. 19  In both sections, I’ll argue that 
kenoticism can make sense of the incoherence problem, and I’ll defend it from 
allegations to the contrary.  
                                                             
18 In fact, Cupitt’s use of the word ‘veil’ could still allude to a form of functional 
kenoticism, suggesting that Christ still possesses omniscience, but that it’s merely 
‘screened off’ from Him, so He’s unable to access it. However, I take Cupitt’s view to be 
consistent with ontological kenoticism, and to mean that the human Jesus must be truly 
ignorant of His divinity and in genuine possession of limited knowledge, rather than just 
‘appearing’ to lack knowledge.  
19 By choosing this qualification, I don’t mean to assume that the attributes of 
omniscience and omnipotence are straightforwardly ‘give-upable’ by the Son. Indeed, this 
will be debated in the section.  Rather, I’m treating the sets of attributes differently 
because there’s no alleged outright contradiction or apparent impossibility in losing 
omniscience or omnipotence as there is with relinquishing, for instance, necessary 
existence.  
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(2.1) OMNISCIENCE AND OMNIPOTENCE 
As mentioned, kenoticists often cite Christ’s ‘self-emptying’ as 
described in Philippians, but there’s also other scriptural evidence that is 
appealed to. For instance, Gore appeals to Christ’s apparent lack of knowledge 
during His earthly life: ‘he expresses surprise at the…unbelief of men, and the 
barrenness of the fig-tree, and the slowness of His disciples’ faith. He 
expresses surprise on many occasions, and therefore, we must believe, really 
felt it’ (1992: 147). Gore also refers to Christ’s ignorance when He despaired in 
uttering the cry of dereliction: ‘nor is it possible that He could have cried with 
real meaning upon the cross, “My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?”’ 
(ibid.: 148) unless He had truly lacked knowledge of the future and of His 
divinity.20  
Defenders of kenoticism argue that the incoherence problem can be 
avoided because the Son (freely) divests Himself of those attributes that 
conflict with His true humanity and His genuine experience of our condition. 
On acquiring the properties essential to humanity, therefore, the Son loses 
some of those that are essential to divinity (Hill 2011: 17), all the while 
remaining wholly divine in a moral sense.21 Those divested divine properties 
most commonly discussed are omniscience and omnipotence, which it’s argued 
are given up in order that the Son experience limited knowledge and limited 
power, in line with the rest of humanity. Therefore, incoherence is avoided 
because there’s no contradiction whereby Jesus possesses a property and its 
negation. Moreover, Nestorian unorthodoxy is avoided because one person is the 
subject of the kenotic incarnation. In line with this, it’s maintained that a 
kenotically incarnate Christ could still perform miracles that we attribute to 
Him, just not in virtue of His omnipotence. Rather, He instead prayed for such 
                                                             
20 The Scriptures are internally contradictory on matters such as whether or not Jesus 
lacked awareness of His own divinity. I’m not, however, saying that my argument hinges 
upon the cry of dereliction – I’m merely using it to motivate my argument. 
21 The Chalcedonian Creed teaches that Christ incarnate was ‘like us in all things but sin’, 
suggesting that it was impossible for Him to commit any evil acts. We’ve seen in the 
previous discussion of the two minds view that this threatens the freedom of the human 
Jesus, because He’s only alleged to be omnibenevolent qua divine mind. This generates 
worries regarding the divine mind having to potentially ‘step in’ and prevent the human 
Jesus from succumbing to temptation. It also verges on Apollinarian heresy, threatening to 
collapse the two minds account into just one mind. On kenoticism, however, the human 
Jesus just is omnibenevolent: He’s not being controlled and potentially prevented from – 
for example – succumbing to temptation.  
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miracles (Forrest 2000: 128), and His prayers were answered with the Father’s 
divine intervention.22 
Over and above this, kenoticism has the added advantage that it 
depicts an incredibly selfless and loving God, and seems to attribute to Him 
the greatest sacrifice of all the models discussed, since He surrenders the 
attributes that were His divine prerogative in an act of supererogatory 
goodness.  
However, it’s commonly objected that kenoticism doesn’t account for 
the orthodox requirement of Christ possessing a divine nature, because the Son 
gives up those properties that are essential to His divinity, such as 
omnipotence and omniscience. It’s because of this that Marmodoro and Hill 
classify kenoticsm as a ‘partial set’ model of the incarnation: one in which 
Christ lacks some properties essential to either divinity or humanity (2008: 105) 
– in this case, divinity. They then criticise kenoticism on the grounds that: ‘if 
God must give up essential divine properties in order to be genuinely human, 
then it is impossible for any individual to be both genuinely divine and 
genuinely human’ (ibid.: 110). If the incarnate Son isn’t genuinely divine and 
genuinely human, however, we have strayed into unorthodoxy. Senor argues 
along related lines that: ‘the kenotic perspective faces an obvious, potentially 
devastating objection before it even leaves the proverbial gate’ (2011: 103), 
which is that, because some divine attributes are divested, kenoticism ‘runs the 
risk of denying the divinity of Christ’ (2011.:104). Moreover, Swinburne argues 
that, because omnipotence and omniscience are often ascribed to God 
essentially, ‘any being who was divine would have to have the same essential 
properties as such a creator – otherwise he would be less than the creator 
source of all, and there would be no incarnation of God’ (1994: 232, my  italics). 
Swinburne is arguing that omnipotence and omniscience are necessary to God, 
and so without them He’d no longer be the God of Christianity.23  
                                                             
22 Relatedly, when the Son is exalted and regains omniscience and omnipotence, these are 
restored to Him by the Father. The alternative is that the Son Himself retained the power 
to regain these attributes at any moment – but of course, this wouldn’t be to have truly 
divested Himself of omnipotence. Marmodoro and Hill comment that ‘if the Son can be 
omnipotent (but chooses not to be), then it is in his power to do all the things an 
omnipotent being can do. But that is the same thing as being omnipotent’ (2008: 110).  
23 This apparent commitment to a set of modal properties necessarily required for being 
‘divine’ seems to be a variant of (KINDS), which was discussed in Chapter 2.  
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A further consequence of this is that the kenotic view doesn’t feature a 
divine sacrifice on the cross, because it’s only a human nature that suffers in 
the form of Jesus, rather than the Son of God Himself. This is illustrated by 
Brian Hebblethwaite, who compares the case of God sacrificing Himself on 
the cross with the thought that God merely empathises with us – which would 
presumably be the case if Jesus wasn’t divine:  
 
Nor does the idea that God suffers with every sufferer…have the same 
moral force as the idea that God himself suffered on the Cross. 
Sympathy is an admirable quality but it is no substitute for accepting 
responsibility for the world’s ills by exposing oneself to them (1987: 
157).  
 
Critics therefore argue that if we want our metaphysical account of the 
incarnation to be of the incarnation of God, and a sacrifice on God’s part, the 
kenotic view won’t help us. This is because it’s extremely hard to demonstrate 
that the man Jesus was at all divine, if He lacked those properties considered 
essential to His (super)natural kind nature: that of divinity. 24  It seems that 
problems arise because on kenoticism, such important parts of the Son’s divine 
nature are relinquished that it becomes hard to tell that He has become 
incarnate, rather than just replaced by a human.  This is what Sturch seems to 
be arguing when he says ‘while it is possible to imagine becoming a crab in the 
sense of finding oneself in a crab’s body, to imagine a complete ‘kenotic’ 
transformation is really to imagine oneself ceasing to exist and being replaced by 
a crab’ (1991: 27). This is presumably because what’s fundamental to one’s 
nature no longer exists, in both the divine-human and human-crab kenotic 
incarnations. 
I firstly want to note that Senor, cited above as voicing this common 
objection to kenoticism, also appeals to the Philippians passage – which is 
typically used to support kenoticism – as being ‘the most explicit scriptural 
                                                             
24 Although in Chapter 2 I was sceptical of the idea of a ‘divine’ (super)natural kind, 
omnipotence and omniscience are nevertheless widely held to be essential to the Christian 
God that I’m discussing. These attributes are therefore essential to God’s individual divine 
nature. If one agrees with me that there’s no ‘divine’ supernatural kind, therefore, one still 
faces a problem in needing to account for how God can relinquish properties essential to 
His individual divine nature. These people can therefore plug in ‘individual divine nature’ 
in the place of ‘divine’ nature, if they so wish.  
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basis for the orthodox two-natures view of Christ’ (1990: 156, my italics). That is, 
he cites the well-known passage as requiring that Christ, ‘…though he was in the 
form of God…emptied himself, taking the form of a servant’ (ibid.: my italics). 
So, whilst the most common objection to kenoticism is its unorthodox neglect 
of the Son’s divine nature, the biblical passage most commonly appealed to to 
support kenoticism claims that Christ incarnate was ‘in the form of God’, which 
is enough to convince Senor that this passage indeed provides the most 
‘explicit’ support for the orthodox two-natures account of Christ. Whilst 
Senor’s use of this Philippians passage seems to count in favour of the 
orthodoxy of kenoticism, I won’t place any weight on this technicality, not 
least because there could be many interpretations of the phrase ‘in the form of’ 
God. I’ll instead outline and endorse other responses to the claim that 
kenoticism is unorthodox.   
The typical response here is to maintain that kenoticism doesn’t require 
us to say that the Son gave up His essential divine attributes, for we can rethink 
what these essential attributes are by using the incarnation to shape our 
understanding of God. Crisp, when discussing Davis’s view, says ‘we should 
allow the doctrine of the Incarnation to inform what properties are 
requirements for the divine nature, rather than stipulating that God must have 
certain properties and then trying to make this fit with…the Incarnation’ (2007: 
130). This strategy is particularly apt for my project, given that I’ve proposed 
the very same methodology: using the incarnation as a starting point for 
investigating God’s relation to time. 25  Armed with this strategy, it’s been 
suggested that we should revise the thought that the simpliciter form of 
omniscience and omnipotence is essential to divinity. This option was first 
considered by Morris, despite his ultimately not adhering to kenoticism.26 He 
suggests that ‘what would be claimed, though, is that it is not precisely 
omniscience which is a requisite of deity. It is rather a distinct property, the 
property of being omniscient-unless-freely-and-temporarily-choosing-to-be-
otherwise, which is a logically necessary condition of deity’ (1986: 99). On this 
revision, therefore, there’s no danger of the Son ceasing to be divine, because 
                                                             
25 Furthermore, this is similar to my approach in Chapter 2, where I discussed the 
possibility of rethinking the properties of having a human nature in light of the incarnation. 
Here, we’re rethinking the properties of the divine nature.  
26 We’ve seen above that Morris prefers his ‘two minds’ account. 
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He retains this (essential) property upon His ‘free and temporary’ decision to 
surrender His omniscience and omnipotence. With this tweak to omnipotence 
and omniscience, kenoticism can be permitted to count as what Marmodoro 
and Hill call a ‘complete set’ model of the incarnation: one in which Christ 
bears all of the essential divine and human properties (2008: 105). Davis 
adheres to this amendment of these divine attributes, adding that: 
 
If the claim that omnipotence simpliciter is an essential property of 
God is inconsistent with Jesus Christ being ‘truly human’, most 
Christians will be inclined to say: so much the worse for the doctrine 
that omnipotence simpliciter is an essential property of God (2011: 
127-8).[27]  
 
Davis is demonstrating his view that we should let the all-important doctrine 
of the incarnation shape our understanding of God’s nature, rather than first 
characterising His nature and then discovering that this hinders and confuses 
our impression of Christianity’s central teaching. As aforementioned, this is the 
approach that I’m taking in this thesis as a whole, so adopting it here is wholly 
consistent with my overall methodology. Similarly, Ronald J. Feenstra says 
when discussing kenoticism that ‘if Jesus Christ is the most direct revelation of 
God…then surely our understanding of what God is like seems likely to need 
revision in the light of what is revealed through his presence and teaching’ 
(2006: 162). 
Readjusting the requisites for divinity also enables the kenotic account 
to remain orthodox. It’s been argued by some that kenoticists are straying 
outside the guidelines of Chalcedon by postulating the Son emptying Himself 
of divinity, when He should rather be ‘taking on’ humanity and (all the while) 
not losing anything of His divine nature. For example, Swinburne says that:  
 
The intentions of kenotic theory are admirable – it is trying to capture 
the simple idea behind all vaguely orthodox theories of the Incarnation 
that in some way God humbled himself and lived a human life. Where 
                                                             
27 Of course, by saying ‘most Christians will be inclined to say’, Davis is referring only to 
his own intuition on this matter, and assuming that other Christians would agree with him.  
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it differs from Chalcedon is in supposing that that was and could be 
achieved by God the Son ceasing in some way to have the divine 
properties; the humility involved a giving up. Chalcedon, by contrast, 
affirms that the humility involves a taking on (1994: 233). 
 
However, if we readjust the requisites for divinity as above, so that the Son is 
divine if He’s ‘omnipotent unless freely and voluntarily choosing to be 
otherwise’, He’s still truly divine. Therefore, in spite of the ‘admirable giving up’ 
involved in kenoticism, the kenoticist can maintain that she’s wholly in line 
with Chalcedonian orthodoxy, and that Christ remains truly divine. Moreover, 
if humanity is ‘taken on’ by a divine being without any sort of kenotic ‘giving 
up’, then it could be argued that this act is a sham, lacking any real sacrifice and 
collapsing into quasi-kenoticism. It would be like donning a fancy dress 
costume: we’ve not truly lost anything of who we are, just as God would still 
really be omnipotent and omniscient beneath His human disguise.  
Nevertheless, it’s been retorted (and anticipated) by some that this re-
shaping of the divine attributes is too much of an ‘ad hoc’, ‘cooked up’ (Evans 
2002: 260), or even ‘desperate’ (Senor 1991: 361) move to be considered 
credible. Senor says that ‘[the kenotic theorist] alters the account by adding a 
caveat clause that is specific to the problem she is thereby trying to solve. But 
this comes perilously close to being a paradigm of an ad hoc emendation’ 
(2011: 105). Moreover, in response to my argument above that we’ve enriched 
our understanding of the divine nature by using the incarnation to shape our 
account, Senor rejoins that ‘learning something about divinity from the 
incarnation is fully appropriate, but one might have hope that what we learn 
would be more general or maybe even deeper than the simple addition of a 
caveat clause on the traditional attribute’ (ibid.: 106). The thought here appears 
to be that, by adding the phrase ‘unless freely and temporarily choosing to be 
otherwise’ to what we initially thought to be essential divine attributes, we’re 
qualifying the divine attributes only because it’s convenient for us.  
Therefore, it appears that we’ve learned nothing new about the divine 
attributes, and that our reasoning is faulty. Hick is particularly sceptical of this 
qualifying of attributes. He says that it:  
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…illustrates again the fact that it is always possible to save a particular 
element within a larger theological complex by making appropriate 
adjustments at some other point; but that such manoeuvres are liable 
to result in more loss than gain. One difficulty has been resolved, but 
only by creating a new and equally formidable problem elsewhere (2005: 
75). 
 
Hick adds that an attempt to provide an overall metaphysics of kenosis is ‘as 
theologically unattractive as it is philosophically ingenious’ (ibid.). 
 Peter Forrest agrees that qualifying the divine attributes in this way 
seems ad hoc, and thus weakens the kenotic account ‘unless some further 
rationale is provided’ (2000: 130, my italics). However, he maintains that we can 
say more on the matter. He subscribes to the Anselmian view of God being 
‘that than which nothing greater can be conceived’ (ibid.), meaning that we 
should progress to new conceptions of God if we conceive of something 
greater than previously. He says that the kenotic view is just this: a progression 
from the ‘omni’ God of the philosophers to ‘the kenotic God who out of love 
abandons absolute power, while retaining sufficient power to warrant total 
trust’ (ibid.: 131). The kenoticist can therefore maintain that there’s nothing ‘ad 
hoc’ about qualifying the divine attributes as above, because we’re doing so in 
line with conceiving of this greater God who, due to His love for the human 
race, sacrifices His divine prerogatives in order to know our condition, and for 
the purpose of our salvation. Moreover, there’s the added impact that in this 
project I’m specifically allowing the principle of the incarnation to shape my 
conception of God, meaning that the reconceptualization of divine attributes is 
obviously not an ad hoc amendment, since it’s in keeping with my overall 
method.   
 I’m wholly in agreement with Forrest’s argument: it certainly seems to 
me to postulate a more benevolent (and so, greater) God than one who sees 
that humankind has sinned, but doesn’t so humble Himself. This is endorsed 
by Brown, who says that:  
 
There are two ways of helping others. We may help them from the 
secure platform of a superior position…but we may help them also by 
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the method of sympathy, and this means a real entrance into the 
conditions of another’s consciousness (1985: 246).  
Brown provides Gore’s analogy of a teacher accommodating herself to the 
child’s mind in order to impart knowledge in the best possible way. It could 
thus be argued that the greatest possible way for God to help humankind was 
for Him to become incarnate, and kenotically so, since this provided Him with 
the most empathy for our (limited) human condition.  
We’ve seen Forrest maintain that the kenotically incarnate Son retains 
‘sufficient power to warrant total trust’. The issue now is what power the Son 
can retain if He ‘voluntarily and temporarily’ gives up His omnipotence. 
Swinburne is sceptical of whether any praiseworthy sense of power can be had 
by the Son if He’s kenotically incarnate. He says that if the Son emptied 
Himself of omnipotence then ‘there can (metaphysically) be a universe without 
there being a God in control at that time’ (1994: 232), which suggests that 
there are no convincing reasons ‘for supposing that there is a God at all since 
his control would not be needed to explain [the universe’s] existence’ (ibid.). 
Morris is sceptical for similar reasons, but in relation to the Son’s emptying of 
omniscience. He says that on a kenotic understanding of the incarnation ‘it…fails 
to be true that any divine person is logically or metaphysically immune to states 
of excessive ignorance concerning important truths about the world’ (1986: 
100-1). It could therefore be argued that, contra Forrest, this kenotic 
conception of the Son wouldn’t be one that would ‘warrant total trust’, due to 
His lack of important knowledge and lack of ability to sustain the universe in 
existence.  
This is particularly forceful when we imagine the Son as a vulnerable 
baby, or even an unborn baby as in the passage at the start of this section: it 
seems that He’d be completely powerless and lacking in knowledge sufficient 
for guiding us. Moreover, relinquishing control of the universe seems to be a 
reckless move from God the Son on this reading, because it seems 
irresponsible to cease control of one’s creation and leave it without a guardian.  
A solution to this problem requires adopting a Social Trinitarian view, 
whereby the three persons of the Trinity are like a ‘family’ of persons in that 
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they’re sufficiently distinct so as to carry out different roles.28 Although, on 
Social Trinitarianism, each member of the Trinity is God, they exemplify 
different types of the divine substance, which means that they can potentially 
bear different properties.29 On Social Trinitarianism, it can thus be argued that 
it doesn’t matter that The Son (temporarily) lacks sufficient power and 
knowledge to sustain the universe, because the remaining members of the 
Trinity shoulder this burden between them. Evans says ‘I see no reason why, if 
the second person of the Trinity became incarnate and divested Himself of 
omnipotence and omniscience…the sustaining work of this person in creation 
could not be carried on by the other persons’ (2002: 259). This is because of 
the Social Trinitarian assumption that ‘the Godhead as a unity would…possess 
such properties as omnipotence and omniscience, but this does not necessarily 
imply that the individual persons of the Godhead must all possess these 
properties at any given time’ (ibid.:258, my italics).  
I’d therefore argue that the incarnation is a far from reckless move on 
the part of the Son, because He can rest assured that the Father and Holy 
Spirit remain in control of the universe. It could even be added that once the 
Son is incarnate, ‘it is no longer a live option for either the Father or the Holy 
Spirit to become incarnate in this way’ (Feenstra 2006: 153), so we can be sure 
that the universe is always in the control of a divine person.30 I think that this 
account emphasises the love and trust between the persons of the Trinity, and 
their combined love for humankind due to their communal sacrifice for the 
purpose of redemption. I also venture that we’ve now answered the worry 
about the Son lacking sufficient omnipotence to be praiseworthy, and to be in 
control of the universe. With regards to the worry about Christ’s omniscience, 
this can be addressed in a similar way: by attributing this all-important 
knowledge to the Father and Holy Spirit. Hebblethwaite claims that we don’t 
                                                             
28 As explained in this thesis’s introduction, a further exploration of the metaphysics of the 
Trinity isn’t something that I’ve space for here, but it should be noted that my argument 
does hinge upon the assumption of a Social Trinitarian view. A recent independent 
argument for Social Trinitarianism can be found in Swinburne (forthcoming). Swinburne 
isn’t a kenoticist, however: I’ve outlined His divided mind account above. I venture that all 
orthodox kenoticists must be Social Trinitarians, but not all Social Trinitarians are 
kenoticists.  
29 By contrast, on Latin Trinitarianism, each member of the Trinity is token identical with 
God, which doesn’t allow for the members to possess distinct properties.    
30 Presumably, we could add that something similar is the case for divine responses. For 
instance, when the Son is kenotically incarnate, it is the other members of the Trinity who 
hear, and respond to, our prayers.  
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need to worry about Jesus lacking knowledge because ‘the Blessed Trinity was 
perfectly well aware of what was being done, experienced and suffered’ (1987: 
68). 
In spite of this, Joseph Jedwab retorts that if the Son empties Himself 
of omnipotence and so leaves the sustaining of the universe to the other 
members of the Trinity, He’ll no longer be the most perfect being that He 
could be. Jedwab argues that we can imagine a better being; one who does 
sustain the universe in existence. He says: 
 
If two agents are qualitatively the same, except that one sustains the 
world and the other doesn’t,…then, in that respect, the first is better 
than the second. So if the Son doesn’t sustain the world, it seems we 
can imagine a better agent, one who is just like the Son except that it 
also sustains the world (2011: 182.).  
 
Jedwab therefore seems to have Anselmian scruples about a being that gives 
up its omnipotence and so its ability to sustain the world. This would be in 
conflict with my earlier argument that a kenotic account of God postulates a 
‘greater’ deity than the traditional ‘omni’ God.  
However, Jedwab doesn’t make clear what criteria of perfection are in 
play when he uses the term ‘better’, as though we could unproblematically rank 
conceptions of God in terms of their ‘betterness’. In fact, my thought here is 
that, contra Jedwab, there’s in fact something even more perfect and great about 
the Son if He decides to sacrifice the divine prerogatives that are His 
omnipotence and omniscience. Such a God would be maximally loving, 
whereas comparably a God who didn’t make such a sacrifice wouldn’t, I 
submit, be ‘omni’ benevolent.  By these standards, then, a kenotically incarnate 
God is (contra Jedwab) ‘better’ than one who declines this selfless act and 
continues to sustain the world. This supererogatory kenotic act is carried out 
for the purpose of Atonement, and is a huge sacrifice on the part of the Son. I 
think that if we have two agents, both omnipotent and omniscient, both un-
obliged to surrender these attributes, there’s something more loving and 
praiseworthy about the one who chooses to humble herself by sacrificing them 
for the good of others. Furthermore, I think that becoming kenotically incarnate 
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is what the most perfect, self-sacrificing being would do, because the more He 
became like His creation, the more chance there would be that Atonement 
would be achieved – which makes it more perfect that the Son truly loses the 
divine attributes as a sacrifice for humankind.  
Evans makes related arguments when he says that ‘it is not at all self-
evident that a being who is incapable of self-limitation is superior to a being 
who is capable of such limitation. In fact, my intuitions are just the reverse on 
this issue’ (2002: 257-8). Similarly, in a later piece he says that the kenotic 
account deepens the extent to which God can know our condition. He writes 
that: 
He has made himself vulnerable to all the common ills of humanity, 
and has no hidden divine powers to be called forth in a pinch…an 
assurance of love towards us as sufferers is far more powerful if it 
comes from one who has shown a willingness to share fully in our 
sufferings (2006: 203).  
 
This links with my argument that a self-emptying Son who truly lives as one of 
us is far more perfect and praiseworthy than one who merely observes our 
suffering without taking action.  
I’ve argued that the kenotic view can account for the person of Christ 
being fully human and remaining fully divine, without resorting to ‘ad hoc’ 
moves, because the Son is an even greater being by voluntarily divesting 
Himself of His omnipotence and omniscience. This humbling sacrifice 
demonstrates the depth of His love for humanity. Furthermore, the worry that 
this move is reckless, or that during Christ’s earthly life there was no being 
sustaining the universe, can be answered by appealing to the Father and the 
Spirit’s roles. Throughout the discussion thus far I’ve only been discussing the 
Son’s omnipotence and omniscience. However, there are of course other traits 
ascribed to Him, several of which appear to cause a problem for kenoticism, 
given that they appear logically incompatible with properties that we might 
think are required to make one human. I’ll devote the following section to a 
discussion of these. 
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(2.2) ‘UNGIVEUPABLE’ ATTRIBUTES 
It could be argued that in order to become fully human, the Son must 
also divest Himself of other attributes such as having no beginning in time, and 
existing of necessity. Davis refers to properties such as these as ‘ungiveupable’ 
(2006: 119), because of the impossibility of divesting oneself of the property of 
‘not having been created’, or ‘having no beginning in time’. Futhermore, there 
seems to be a logical contradiction involved in losing the property of ‘existing 
of necessity’. It therefore seems that these ungiveupable properties can’t be 
changed retrospectively. We can’t, for instance, postulate that the Son was 
‘necessary unless freely and temporarily choosing to be otherwise’ without 
contradiction. This thought can be strengthened through a useful example 
from Senor, which highlights the difference between ‘giveupable’ and 
ungiveupable properties. He says ‘suppose you are a married professor of 
philosophy who lives in New York City. Get divorced, quit your job, and move 
to Texas and you’ll have changed some of your rather important properties’ 
(2007b: 560). Senor compares these attributes to omnipotence and 
omniscience: it’s possible that the Son give these up just as a professor can give 
up her job and move to a different state. However, Senor then notes that there 
are other properties which we can’t change, because to give these up would 
entail a contradiction. He calls these the ‘stable’ (ibid.) properties, and gives the 
example of ‘being born in the twentieth century’. Similarly, for the Son, He 
can’t divest Himself of ‘not having been created’, because this is something 
that can’t be retrospectively changed.  
The solution that’s readily suggested with these eternally true, 
‘ungiveupable’ properties is reduplication, as I discussed in relation to 
compositionalist strategies above. Both Davis and Evans agree on this solution 
for the properties of ‘having no beginning’ and ‘being uncreated’. Davis says 
that we can say (for instance) that ‘Christ-as-divine was uncreated’ and ‘Christ-
as-human was created’ (2011: 131). The issue, of course, is what exactly the 
kenoticist means by this reduplication. Compositionalists (as we’ve seen) say 
that it’s qua part (of the composite) that incoherence is avoided, which leads to 
the complications of deciding which (if any) property the person simpliciter 
possesses.  
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Kenoticists, however, could say that it’s qua phase sortal that incoherence 
is avoided. For example, just as Theresa May has the power qua Prime Minister 
to dissolve Parliament, she doesn’t have this power qua school girl (when we 
consider an earlier phase of her life). Similarly, the Son qua unincarnate has no 
beginning in time, whereas qua incarnate phase he does have a beginning in time, 
because He becomes man. We have the same person all the while, but 
incoherence is avoided because we’re only ascribing the (would be) 
contradictory properties to the Son at different times, in virtue of these phases. 
This option isn’t available to temporalist compositionalists, who maintain that 
Christ incarnate was both omnipotent and limited in power at any one time of 
the incarnation, such that the attributes belong simultaneously. This is perhaps 
partly why compositionalists attempt to insulate these into ‘parts’ of the 
composite. Reduplication of phase sortals is certainly not available to 
atemporalist compositionalists, who don’t have these different times of the 
Son’s life to work with at all.  
It might be objected, as Smith does, that ‘one and the same individual 
can’t have two beginnings in time; and no more can one single individual have 
a beginning in time and also have no such beginning in time’ (1977: 267). Smith 
would therefore argue that we can’t reduplicate phase sortals in this way and 
say that the same person both has and doesn’t have a beginning in time. 
However, I think that it might be possible for the same (backwardly everlasting) 
unincarnate Son to have a beginning of His incarnate life. Just as a caterpillar 
transforming into a butterfly can have two beginnings in time (qua butterfly 
phase and qua caterpillar phase) and still be the same creature, so the Son of 
God can be backwardly everlasting qua pre-incarnate phase, and have a 
beginning in time qua incarnate phase. It can’t be denied that a huge 
transformation takes place when the Son becomes incarnate, but I submit that 
the incarnation is simply a new phase (which begins at a specific moment in 
time) of the (backwardly everlasting) Son of God’s life.  
On a related note, Evans suggests a similarity between kenoticism and 
the other metaphysical models of the incarnation. He says ‘insofar as non-
kenotic theories make use of…a reduplicative strategy, there is at least some 
common ground between kenotic theories of the incarnation and other 
theories’ (2002: 253). However, it’s worth adding that kenoticists only need to 
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employ reduplication for these ‘ungiveupable’ properties: they don’t (contra 
two minds and atemporalist compositionalist accounts) need it for omniscience 
and omnipotence, because these attributes are freely and voluntarily sacrificed. 
 I therefore venture that this is a further strength of kenoticism: it 
doesn’t face the complications that reduplication brings to the extent that the 
other metaphysical theories do. Firstly, it doesn’t need to appeal to a 
problematic reduplication of parts, since many of the Son’s divine attributes are 
sacrificed and so not possessed at all. Instead, it can appeal to phase sortals, 
which is a less problematic form of reduplication because the conflicting 
properties of the Son are predicated of Him at different times. Secondly, 
kenoticism only needs to employ reduplication for the ‘ungiveupable’ properties: 
these being the only ones that generate incoherences.  
It’s also been suggested that the Son couldn’t divest Himself of His 
necessary existence. This is because when He’s incarnate He exists only 
contingently, and there’s the possibility that He cease to exist. This contingent 
existence is important because it shows that the Son has truly become a 
vulnerable human. However, if the Son’s existence becomes contingent, then it 
seems that He’d never have existed necessarily after all, since it will have always 
been possible that He no longer exist. Smith says that it’s ‘logically incoherent’ 
(1977: 265) to suppose that a necessary being can become contingent, because 
given this possibly of contingency, the being would have been contingent all 
along (ibid.). This is expanded upon by Davis, who says: 
 
Suppose it is essential to divine beings that they be necessary 
beings…and suppose it is an essential property of human beings that 
they be contingent beings…It seems to follow from this that God 
cannot become man and remain God, for no being can be both 
necessary and contingent (1983: 122). 
 
We can’t say that the Son exists necessarily qua unincarnate phase, and 
contingently qua incarnate phase, without generating a contradiction. However, 
Le Poidevin has suggested a way to resolve this problem. He proposes that we 
redefine de re necessary existence as ‘the ability of a being to sustain itself in 
existence’ (2013a: 222). This necessary existence is conditional, because it could 
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be given up when the Son divests Himself of His omnipotence. If He does so, 
He’ll no longer have the power to sustain Himself in existence, and His non-
existence will be a genuine possibility, just as it is for the rest of humanity. Le 
Poidevin says that ‘the sense in which Jesus’ non-existence is a possibility 
[during the Incarnation] is just that his will to live by itself no more rules out 
his ceasing to exist than does our will to live’ (ibid.: 224). The Son’s necessary 
existence is therefore time-sensitive on this account: ‘it is true [to say that the 
Son exists necessarily] prior to the Incarnation…but false [to say this] during 
the Son’s incarnate existence’ (ibid.: 222). This is because the Son’s necessary 
existence is conditional on His possessing the power to continue sustaining 
Himself in existence, which He chooses to divest Himself of when He 
becomes incarnate. If we construe the Son’s de re necessary existence as His 
‘ability to sustain Himself in existence’, therefore, then it seems that necessity 
isn’t so ‘ungiveupable’ after all. We can quite coherently say that, qua 
unincarnate phase, the Son possessed the ability to sustain Himself in existence. 
Likewise, we can say that qua incarnate phase, the Son lacked this ability.   
This can be supported by the thought that, because God is 
omnibenevolent, we can trust that He’ll not do anything reckless. Whilst it may 
be the case that He lacks the ability to sustain Himself in existence when He 
exists incarnate, He leaves the Father and Spirit in full control when He does 
so, because He cares deeply about His creation and wants to ensure that it 
always has a guardian. It could also be argued along these lines that God’s 
existence is still necessary (in the unqualified sense of the term) in virtue of the 
Father and Spirit, but not of the Son when considered in isolation.31  
Similarly, however, some thinkers question the incarnate Son’s 
immutability on the kenotic view, arguing that this ought by definition to be an 
‘ungiveupable’ property. However, on the kenotic view the Son undergoes 
genuine change. He first possesses the attributes of omnipotence and 
omniscience, and at a later time He no longer does, which seems to suggest 
that the kenotic account can’t get off the ground.32 Brown acknowledges that: 
 
                                                             
31 This would, I venture, require one to subscribe to a Social Trinitarian view, which I’ve 
already argued that the kenoticist must be committed to.  
32 Morris argues independently that immutability is incompatible with kenoticism (1986: 
96-7): in fact, it’s partly this that leads him to suggest the kenotic revision of the attributes 
omniscience and omnipotence.  
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There can be no question of attributing immutability to God on [the 
kenotic] model. God has become man, and this cannot be viewed 
otherwise than as a real change in God, since there is a change of 
substance that involves him in becoming a temporal being (1985: 
256).33  
 
Because of this intrinsic change in the Son, the burden of proof allegedly lies 
with the kenoticist to demonstrate ‘how such a radical revision of the 
traditional picture of the divine nature is able to distinguish between essential 
and contingent divine attributes, without undermining the immutability of God’ 
(Crisp 2007: 132).  
Immutability is closely linked to atemporality, because timeless beings 
are supposed to be steadfast and immune to the possibility of intrinsic change. 
Only temporality involves intrinsic change, which is why (as argued above) 
postulating God as temporal admits of the kenotic account, whereas an 
atemporal God doesn’t. 34  I therefore venture that we must weaken our 
conception of immutability if we’re subscribing to kenoticism, because we 
must allow for the Son’s properties to undergo such change. What does remain 
immutable, however, is His benevolent nature: there’s always, of necessity, no 
possibility that the Son can sin, and no real possibility that He can succumb to 
temptation. 35  To answer Crisp’s challenge, therefore, I argue that God’s 
immutable omnibenevolence is essential to His divinity, and He never loses this, 
nor is there any possibility that He do so. Brown sums up this response:  
 
                                                             
33 This implies that Brown understands the incarnation to involve a change from 
atemporality to temporality. I’ve argued in the previous chapter that this is an incoherent 
transition, since the atemporality wouldn’t have been genuine and the being must in fact 
have been temporal all along. Nevertheless, I think that Brown’s point still stands that a 
kenotically incarnate God can’t be immutable, due to the changes that this God undergoes 
in, for instance, divesting Himself of omnipotence and omniscience.  
34 If God is temporal, we’re already admitting that He can know (say) at one time that it’s 
now Tuesday, and at a different time know instead that it’s now Wednesday – or at least, we 
are if the A-theory of time is true. If the B-theory is true, we’re still admitting that a 
temporal God’s life is sequentially ordered.  
35 I suggested this argument above (section 1.4), but argued that if the two minds theorist 
adopts this line of thought, her model ends up collapsing into just one mind, due to the 
extent of control that the divine mind has over the human one. The kenoticist, however, 
can argue that the human Jesus just is omnibenevolent: there’s nothing controlling Him to 
ensure that He’s always perfectly moral.  
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More worrying is the contention that change is always for the worse or 
better and so, even if in God’s case it is always for the better, this 
would still impugn his divine perfection. But, provided his moral 
perfection is maintained, it is hard to see how this could constitute a 
serious challenge (1985: 257).  
 
Immutability in this weaker sense is therefore not undermined by 
kenoticism. Davis calls it ‘soft’ immutability, which he describes as ‘the 
doctrine that God is not fickle, capricious, mercurial, or moody; God’s holy 
and benevolent nature remains ever and eternally the same; God is faithful in 
keeping God’s promises; God’s aims and intentions for human beings do not 
change’ (2006: 137). Similarly, Marilyn McCord Adams emphasises that the 
Son’s retention and exercise of the moral attributes ‘during His earthly career is 
supposed to enable Him to be the true light of the world’ (2006: 87). This 
argument also lends support to the earlier one that Christ incarnate does remain 
truly divine, because He retains His perfect goodness, which no (mere) human 
possesses. Evans says that ‘what is retained will chiefly be the self-giving of 
love that is regarded as lying at the heart of divinity and which is exhibited 
precisely in God’s willingness to empty himself for the sake of his creatures’ 
(2002: 249). God’s love is exemplified when unincarnate through (amongst 
many other things) His decision to become incarnate and live as a mere human 
being, and culminates when He’s incarnate through His willingness to suffer 
on the cross, without wavering in His love of others. Both of these sacrifices, I 
think, demonstrate the immutability of divine love.  
Many will be dissatisfied with soft immutability, arguing that strict 
immutability (and so, atemporality) is essential to the divine nature. However, I 
think that this allegation begs the question against the temporalist (and so, the 
kenoticist). I hope that I’ve now argued a strong enough case for kenoticism 
that it won’t be dismissed out of hand because it involves a weakening of the 
concept of divine immutability, for kenoticism certainly has many independent 
strengths that deserve due consideration.  
I’ve outlined the kenotic account, explaining why it must go hand in 
hand with a temporal conception of God’s relation to time. I defended it 
against the allegation that a kenotically incarnate Christ can’t be truly divine, 
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arguing that a reconceptualization of the divine attributes to ensure Jesus’s 
divinity isn’t an ad hoc move, because it allows for maximal preservation of 
divine love. A kenotically incarnate God is one who, because of the extent of 
His deep, steadfast love for His creation, humbles Himself by taking on human 
form and sacrificing many divine prerogatives. He voluntarily chooses to 
sacrifice these in a supererogatory act, for the purpose of Atonement.  
It’s because of the power and extent of this sacrifice that I’m attracted 
to the kenotic view, and because of its emotive strength that I believe it 
deserves serious consideration, despite its requiring a weakening of the 
traditional conception of immutability, which at any rate I’ve suggested that all 
temporalists must endorse. Moreover, kenoticists need only employ 
reduplication for the properties of ‘having no beginning in time’, ‘being 
uncreated’, and ‘existing of (qualified) necessity’ – and they need only propose 
reduplication of phase sortals, not of parts. This is a strength of kenoticism 
because of the problems that the reduplication of parts approach gives rise to.  
In spite of these strengths, there remains one important problem that 
kenoticism faces, which is the Son’s glorification. If Christ regains omnipotence 
and omniscience when He’s glorified, we’re left wondering how it is that He 
can remain truly human. This will be discussed in Chapter 6. For the purposes 
of this chapter, however, I’ll conclude that kenoticists can deal sufficiently with 
the incoherence problem that threatens the incarnation, particularly in comparison 
with how their atemporalist compositionalist rivals can cope. A temporal God 
is therefore looking like the most plausible construal of divine eternity, in light 
of this.  
 
(3) CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined temporal solutions to the incoherence problem: 
the problem created by ascribing contradictory attributes to Christ incarnate. I 
firstly outlined the two minds model of the incarnation, and argued that we can 
interpret it under a compositionalist or a transformationalist umbrella. I argued 
that both interpretations are unable to avoid the incoherence problem in a 
manner that avoids heresy. I next considered a different transformationalist 
account: kenoticism. I argued that a kenotic model can account for the 
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incarnate Christ being truly divine (in spite of the extent of His sacrifice for 
humankind), truly human and one individual, without any of the threats of 
Nestorianism or Apollinarianism that come with the two minds view. 
Moreover, I demonstrated that the kenotic model, through its poetic picture of 
the Son ‘emptying’ Himself for the sake of all others in a supererogatory act of 
goodness, can best account for the humbling sacrifice that the Son underwent 
for humankind, and the extent to which He really did share our condition.  
I also demonstrated why the kenotic model can only go hand in hand 
with a temporal construal of God’s relation to time. It essentially involves 
(intrinsic) change in the Son, and this change has to take place at a time. This 
outcome, combined with the fact that atemporalist compositionalist models 
were unable to avoid the incoherence problem in an orthodox way, leaves a 
temporal God looking like the most appealing option. However, this is 
conditional on how the various models can account for the last hurdle of the 
Son’s glorification, which will be the subject of the next part of my thesis. 
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PART III) GLORIFICATION 
[He] ascended to heaven, where He sits at the Father’s right hand (Leith, 1963: 36). 
 
If the philosophical ground that examines the intersection of God’s 
relation to time and the incarnation is only just beginning to be covered, then 
that which considers God’s relation to time in specific light of the end result of 
Christ’s life on earth – His glorification – is almost entirely unexplored. The 
divine glorification (or exaltation) is an extremely important element of the 
incarnation because Christ’s ascension into Heaven as a being that is both 
divine and human is believed to have paved the way for the rest of humankind 
to achieve salvation. It’s therefore a foundation for other important ideas, 
notably ones that can be a great source of comfort for believers – such as the 
belief that we will meet our (saved) loved ones in heaven again after their 
deaths. Hill (2012) has recently pioneered a much needed voyage into this 
exciting area, which promises to provide interesting results for anybody 
considering the Christian God’s relation to time. Hill’s paper is therefore the 
main focal point for discussion in Chapters 5 and 6. In particular, I endorse, 
and rely heavily upon, his two requirements for the Son’s glorification, which I 
outline presently. However, I ultimately dispute Hill’s claim that atemporalist 
compositionalist models are the only ones that can accommodate the Son’s 
glorification. 1  I argue against the success of atemporalist compositionalist 
models in Chapter 5. What is more, in Chapter 6, I argue (again contra Hill) 
that temporalist models (specifically, kenotic models) are alone in being able to 
account for Hill’s two ‘glorification requirements’. 
 
 
                                                             
1 As a reminder, compositionalist models (introduced and discussed at length in Chapter 3, 
and discussed again in Chapter 4) are those whereby ‘Christ is a compound of qualitatively 
and numerically different constituents: a divine mind, a human body, and, on some 
models, a human mind as well’ (Marmodoro & Hill 2010: 469). Other authors refer to the 
third part of the composite as the Son’s human ‘soul’, and I use the terms ‘soul’ and ‘mind’ 
interchangeably.  
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CHAPTER 5 
DIVINE ATEMPORALITY AND 
THE EXALTATION 
(1) EXALTATION EXPLAINED 
Hill has two criteria for divine glorification, which I’ll be privileging in 
this part of the thesis. He dubs them the ‘exaltation’ and ‘perpetual humanity’ 
requirements, respectively. According to the former: 
 
[Exaltation Requirement]: After his death, Jesus both was raised from the 
dead and subsequently ascended into heaven. After these events, he is 
exalted—i.e., he enjoys the full divine life and properties, including 
omniscience and omnipotence (Hill, 2012: 3).  
 
That is, the exalted Son must be both omniscient and omnipotent, regardless of 
whether or not He possessed these divine properties when He lived on earth. I 
follow Hill in arguing that, if the Son did lack these properties on Earth, it 
doesn’t matter at which precise point He regains them: be it ‘his resurrection, 
his ascension, or some other point’ (ibid) – all that matters is that He does 
possess them once He’s exalted.2 This requirement is what makes the Son’s 
glorification different to that of mere humans: the glorified Son is omniscient 
and omnipotent, whereas when mere humans are glorified, they don’t possess 
these attributes. Henceforth, I’ll refer to the glorification of mere humans as 
salvation.  When I refer to the Son’s glorification, I mean His exaltation, which 
encompasses the added possession of omniscience and omnipotence. 
Glorification, therefore, will be the umbrella term for both the Son’s exaltation, 
and the salvation of us (limited) humans.  
 
 According to the perpetual humanity requirement:  
                                                             
2 Not least because to require a precise point at which the Son comes to enjoy full 
omnipotence and omniscience could potentially be to beg the question against divine 
timelessness, according to which God’s life isn’t sequenced.  
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[Perpetual Humanity Requirement]: After his exaltation, Jesus remains fully 
human (ibid.: 4).  
 
Hill proceeds to argue for the importance of both of these requirements to 
orthodox Christianity, although he doesn’t mean for his argument to be 
conclusive – he simply aims to show that there’s a great deal of favourable 
support for them. His central research question, which the bulk of his paper 
tackles, then becomes: ‘Assuming that the exaltation and perpetual humanity 
requirements are serious constraints upon Christology, what consequences 
follow for the metaphysics of the incarnation?’ (ibid., my italics).  
 In providing support for the exaltation requirement, Hill draws upon 
the fact that it’s largely supported by the Christian tradition – ‘since the bulk of 
Christian tradition argues that [The Son] never ceased to be omnipotent and 
omniscient even in his earthly career’ (ibid.: 4). By this, Hill means that it’s only 
kenoticists who argue that the Son ever lacked these divine properties, so by 
default those who aren’t kenoticists will assume that of course, the exalted Son 
possesses them. Hill acknowledges that many theologians, however, hold that 
during His earthly ministry Christ lacked the ‘full exercise’ of His omnipotence 
and omniscience (ibid.: 5). At any rate, Hill suggests that: ‘to whatever degree 
(if at all) one supposes that, in his earthly career, Christ gave up the divine 
properties, to that degree, one may ask whether he regained them upon his 
exaltation’ (ibid.).3  
 In considering the support for the perpetual humanity requirement, 
Hill admits that endorsement of it from the church councils is lacking (ibid.: 6), 
but says that it can be found in the works of important writers such as Gregory 
of Nazianzus, Augustine, Aquinas and Karl Barth (ibid.: 6-7).4 However, he 
also notes that the Son’s perpetual humanity has recently been questioned – 
citing Swinburne as an example of one such questioner (ibid.: 7). In spite of 
this, Hill proceeds to suggest some reasons why the Son’s perpetual humanity 
is required, such as that ‘if the Son remains human perpetually, that would 
demonstrate a much greater commitment to humanity than a mere temporary 
                                                             
3 This qualification will come to be important in Chapter 6. 
4 To name a few: Hill also cites the work of others.  
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union would’ (ibid.). He also cites some arguments in favour of this 
requirement from Forrest and Feenstra (ibid.), whose work will come to play 
an important role in this part of the thesis.  For instance, Feenstra discusses the 
fact that, according to Chalcedon, Christ ‘is’ (not ‘was’) fully human (1989: 
147). Furthermore, Forrest argues that denying the perpetual humanity 
requirement would mean that Jesus would be unable to fulfil His role as 
mediator between ‘the purely divine and the purely human’ (Forrest 2000: 134).  
Finally, Hill appeals to the importance of Christ’s perpetual humanity 
for humankind achieving salvation themselves. He says that ‘if God only became 
man for a while, and is no longer man, then this surely casts doubt into man’s 
hope of becoming God’ (2012: 8). 5  A further source of support for the 
perpetual humanity requirement has been offered since Hill’s paper was 
published, and comes from Mullins. He says that orthodoxy ‘denies that the 
Son ceased to be incarnate at the ascension. Even though no ecumenical 
council makes a ruling on this issue, the continual incarnation of the Son is 
affirmed by a majority of early Church fathers’ (2016: 174).6 
 Hill later builds upon his two requirements by specifying a more 
precise formulation of them: 
 
[Exaltation Requirement*]: It is true now that Christ has, and exercises, all 
the divine attributes, including omnipotence and omniscience (2012: 9). 
 
[Perpetual Humanity Requirement*]: It is true now that the Son is fully 
human as well as fully divine (ibid.).7  
 
                                                             
5 Incidentally, this assertion that we humans hope to ‘become’ God is a rather strange way 
of putting things. Rather, it seems more accurate to say that humankind hopes to achieve 
salvation. This links to my endorsement of the thought that we ordinary humans don’t, 
unlike the Son, become omniscient and omnipotent when we’re saved, as well as my 
distinction between exaltation and salvation, all of which was outlined at the start of this 
chapter. 
6 Mullins seems to be referring specifically to the continued embodiment of the Son, because 
He also says: ‘no embodiment, no incarnation. Incarnation means taking on flesh’ (Mullins 
2016: 192). This would still presumably be an exemplification of the Son’s perpetual 
humanity, though, whether or not we consider this ‘flesh’ to be a necessary or sufficient 
guarantee of that humanity.  
7 The use of asterisks here is my addition to this version of Hill’s requirements, for ease of 
distinction between the different formulations.  
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This indexical usage (and the ways in which temporalists and atemporalists can 
interpret it) will be important in the discussion that follows. Furthermore, these 
latter understandings of the exaltation and perpetual humanity requirements 
seem particularly significant because of the importance to millions of believers 
of the thought that Christ is ‘now’ in Heaven.8 If this weren’t the case, it would 
detract from the permanence of the resurrection, and thus from the belief that 
the rest of humanity, too, can achieve glorification for themselves. In 
considering the compatibility of atemporality and temporality with the Son’s 
glorification, I’ll follow Hill in assuming that these two requirements must be 
met by any account of the divine glorification worth its salt. Hill claims that 
although they may not be formally required by Christian orthodoxy, the 
requirements ‘are nevertheless claims that few orthodox Christians will wish to 
deny’ (2012: 9). My thesis has included the Son’s glorification (exaltation) as an 
important element of the incarnation itself, and thus I’m privileging Hill’s two 
requirements as a necessary benchmark that any credible account of the 
incarnation must be able to accommodate.  
 Hill considers the thought that for many, a ‘figurative’ understanding of 
the two glorification requirements might be preferable, because we shouldn’t 
take such claims literally (ibid.: 9). Unfortunately, Hill doesn’t specify how he 
understands the distinction between ‘literal’ and ‘figurative’. Nevertheless, I 
take it that any ‘figurative’ understanding of Hill’s requirements is undesirable 
for my purposes. The account of the incarnation that I’m seeking is a 
metaphysical one, so I’ll assess atemporalism and temporalism only for their 
ability to provide such an interpretation of Hill’s glorification requirements.9 
I’m interested, for example, in preserving the present truth that the Son is fully 
human in reality. This thesis is, after all, one that privileges a coherent realist 
metaphysics of the incarnation above all else, and I’ll therefore not be satisfied 
with any remotely ‘figurative’ understanding of Hill’s requirements.   
Hill claims that ‘those unwilling to accept the consequences [that he 
argues follow from the two requirements] may consider the arguments in this 
                                                             
8 This is the case whether we interpret this as meaning that Christ is ‘now’, at this time, in 
Heaven, or else that it’s timelessly true ‘now’ (and, indeed, at all times) that Christ is in 
Heaven. This distinction will come to be important as this chapter unfolds.  
9 I remain open to a non-literal interpretation of statements about the Son’s physicality – 
for example, regarding the claim in this chapter’s epigraph that the Son is ‘sitting’ at the 
right hand of the Father.  
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paper to be good reasons not to take the two requirements seriously’ (ibid. 4). 
It’s here that I diverge from Hill, because I take issue with what Hill claims 
these ‘consequences’ to be: in this chapter, I dispute Hill’s claim that if God is 
timeless, we can satisfactorily accommodate the two requirements only by 
adopting a compositionalist model of the incarnation.  
In section 2, I remind the reader of the state of play so far for the 
atemporalist, based on discussion in the previous two parts of the thesis. That 
is, we begin these chapters with the atemporalist position looking significantly 
weaker than its temporalist counterpart. Nevertheless, it’s important to give the 
atemporalist position fair consideration in this part of the thesis. I also explain 
why I’m considering only atemporalist compositionalism in this chapter. In 
section 3, I explain why atemporalist compositionalism can accommodate only 
Hill’s second formulation of the glorification requirements. I agree with Hill 
that the atemporalist has no problem with accommodating the exaltation 
requirement as understood in this second way. I next consider the perpetual 
humanity requirement as formulated in this way. I suggest the way that 
atemporalists can best understand the claim that it’s ‘true now’ that the Son is 
fully human, which is that it’s timelessly true that the Son is fully human, as well 
as fully divine. In section 4, I proceed to criticise this way of reading the claim. 
I conclude that, based on this and on my arguments in the previous part of the 
thesis, the atemporalist position is unable to account for an orthodox 
metaphysics of the incarnation.  
 
(2) ATEMPORALISM: THE STORY SO FAR 
The atemporalist position has been considered in the previous two 
parts of this thesis.  In the first part, I examined whether atemporalism and 
temporalism are able to account for the Son ‘becoming’ incarnate. 
Temporalism, I argued, is able to do so, by being able to respond to the 
worries faced by kind-essentialism. I considered three ways in which the 
atemporalist might be able to understand the Son timelessly ‘becoming’ 
incarnate. I argued that only one of these is provisionally viable: the Son 
becomes incarnate by undergoing an extrinsic change, in virtue of His human 
body (and soul) becoming related to Him. Such a change doesn’t require the 
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Son to be subject to the passage of time, I suggested, because He undergoes 
such change in virtue of something else undergoing intrinsic change. I argued 
that, in order for the Son to undergo extrinsic change, we must adhere to a 
particular model of the incarnation: compositionalism. According to 
compositionalism, the incarnate Son is composed of various parts, and it’s this 
parthood that (allegedly) enables the divine, timeless part of the composite to 
remain unchanged when the Son becomes incarnate. An intrinsic change takes 
place in reality itself, when the human parts of the composite come to exist, it 
was argued. 
In the second part of my thesis, I argued that atemporalism fails to 
overcome the incoherence problem. I specifically examined atemporal 
compositionalism, due to it being the only provisionally successful way to 
model a timeless God becoming incarnate. However, I argued that atemporal 
compositionalism fails to provide a sufficient account of how it is that the Son 
can be fully divine, fully human, and one single person. What is more, I argued 
that the temporalist position (by appealing specifically to kenoticism) is able to 
overcome the incoherence problem.  
We therefore enter this examination of the Son’s glorification with the 
temporalist position looking by far the strongest. However, in order to be as 
charitable as possible to the atemporalist, I’ll now examine how she might 
account for the Son’s glorification, focusing specifically on Hill’s glorification 
requirements. I’ll consider only atemporal compositionalism. I argued in 
Chapter 3 that any would-be atemporalist who claims that the Son somehow 
transformed into a human upon becoming incarnate isn’t in fact an 
atemporalist, because this is an intrinsic change, which requires one to be 
subject to the passage of time. This rules out atemporalist transformationalist 
models – the family of models of the incarnation that rival compositionalist 
ones. Similarly, two minds accounts on the one hand can’t accommodate 
atemporalism because they require the divine mind to change intrinsically when 
the Son becomes incarnate (understood in this way, they’re a species of 
transformationalist models). On the other hand, I argued in Chapter 4 that two 
minds accounts collapse into compositionalist models (because they allege that 
the two minds are parts of Christ). Furthermore, in line with Hill I think that 
regarding the former two minds models, to the extent that they suppose the 
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Son must bear the same relation to His body that we bear to our bodies 
(whatever this relation may be), they can’t allow for atemporality. This is 
because they require that the divine mind be capable of discursive thought. 
Such chains of reasoning, says Hill, would require the Son to be temporal 
(2012: 25). 
Compositionalist models therefore appear to be the only option on the 
table for atemporalists. What is more, they’re not in great shape: I argued that 
said models are unable to avoid the incoherence problem posed by the demands 
of incarnational orthodoxy. Nevertheless, I don’t want the temporal order in 
which I’m examining these elements of the incarnation to unfairly affect my 
analysis of a timeless God. I’ll therefore examine whether atemporalist 
compositionalism can account for Hill’s two glorification requirements. I’ll 
argue, contra Hill, that it can’t do so. Ipso facto, I conclude that divine 
atemporalism as a whole can’t account for the Son’s glorification.  
 
(3) INTERPRETING THE GLORIFICATION 
REQUIREMENTS 
As a reminder, Hill’s first formulation of the two glorification 
requirements is as follows: 
 
 [Exaltation Requirement]: After his death, Jesus both was raised from the 
dead and subsequently ascended into heaven. After these events, he is 
exalted—i.e., he enjoys the full divine life and properties, including 
omniscience and omnipotence (Hill, 2012: 3).  
 
[Perpetual Humanity Requirement]: After his exaltation, Jesus remains fully 
human (ibid.: 4).  
 
I think it’s uncontroversial that the atemporalist is unable to endorse the 
glorification requirements when formulated in this way, for they contain 
unacceptably temporal language. For instance, the exaltation requirement itself 
talks about the Son ‘subsequently’ ascending into heaven, and His being 
exalted ‘after’ He was raised from the dead. Furthermore, the perpetual 
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humanity requirement claims that the Son is fully human ‘after’ His exaltation. 
I’ll therefore consider these formulations of the requirements no further. 
Of course, this isn’t to say that we can’t interpret these requirements in 
a manner that’s more friendly to atemporalism. Hill provides us with the 
following versions of the two requirements, which I also outlined above:  
 
[Exaltation Requirement*]: It is true now that Christ has and exercises, all 
the divine attributes, including omnipotence and omniscience (2012: 9). 
 
[Perpetual Humanity Requirement*]: It is true now that the Son is fully 
human as well as fully divine (ibid.).  
 
These statements can be argued to be more compatible with divine 
timelessness, for reasons that I’ll explain presently. In fact, I venture that Hill 
introduces these versions of the requirements specifically so as not to rule out 
atemporalism from the get-go.10 In his discussion of atemporalism and the 
Son’s glorification, Hill seems only to be considering this latter formulation of 
the two requirements. In a footnote, he says that ‘for a being that exists only 
outside time and not within time, it might be true at time t that it bears certain 
properties, but it would not be true that it bears these properties at time t’ 
(ibid.: 25). The reason for this, presumably, is that an atemporal being can’t 
bear any properties ‘at’ any time, because an atemporal being can’t exist ‘at’ any 
time. Hill’s first formulation of the requirements seems to suggest that the Son 
does bear properties at a time (for instance, He is exalted [at the time] after His 
death), so I’ll therefore focus only on his second versions of the requirements.  
Hill claims that the atemporalist has ‘clearly no problem’ (ibid.: 26) with 
meeting the exaltation requirement, which I’m understanding as the exaltation 
requirement*. He says:  
 
On atemporalism, the Son does not change, because atemporal things 
cannot change. If at any point in time it is true that the Son enjoys the 
divine properties such as omnipotence and omniscience, then that is 
                                                             
10 Of course, Hill proceeds to argue that the atemporalist position is the most compatible 
with the exaltation, so it’s particularly important that he provides us with a way for the 
atemporalist to understand the glorification requirements.  
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true at every point in time, including during Jesus’ earthly career and 
afterwards (ibid.: 26-7). 
 
In other words, because the Son never relinquishes omnipotence and 
omniscience, there’s no problem with His possessing these attributes in His 
exalted state. It’s only kenoticism, after all, which claims that the Son 
relinquishes these divine prerogatives when He becomes incarnate. Hill is 
clearly speaking in terms of the exaltation requirement* here: it’s ‘true now’ – 
and, indeed, at every moment – that the Son exercises omniscience and 
omnipotence. This doesn’t, according to Hill, require that the Son is 
omniscient and omnipotent at any moment in time: it’s a timeless truth that the 
Son is omniscient and omnipotent. This seems all well and good in the case of 
these divine attributes, and I’m happy to grant that the atemporalist can meet 
the exaltation requirement*.  However, the situation is by no means 
straightforward when we consider the Son’s humanity, in the form of the 
perpetual humanity requirement*. I’ll explain this in the subsequent section.  
 
(4) THE TIMELESS TRUTH OF THE SON’S HUMANITY? 
I’ll now argue that atemporalists can’t account for the perpetual 
humanity requirement, even under what I’ve suggested is Hill’s ‘atemporalist 
friendly’ version of it. Once more, according to this requirement:  
 
[Perpetual Humanity Requirement*]: It is true now that the Son is fully 
human as well as fully divine. 
  
I think that the atemporalist must interpret this requirement as meaning that 
it’s timelessly true that the Son is fully human, as well as fully divine. At any time, 
it’s true to say that ‘the Son of God is incarnate’. Therefore, it’s also true ‘now’, 
or at the time simultaneous with this utterance, that the Son is fully human, 
because it’s true at all times. Importantly, this doesn’t mean that the Son 
Himself need exist at any of these times. This would, after all, mean that the 
Son is temporal, because to exist at any time is to be temporal. It’s helpful to 
think about numbers, by way of comparison. Numbers, it seems, exist 
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timelessly, and yet at every moment of time, it’s true that they exist: they 
themselves just don’t exist at any of these moments in question. If, and only if, 
the atemporalist has the resources to account for the timeless truth of the 
Son’s humanity, then it seems that she’s met the Perpetual Humanity 
requirement*, which in turn I’ve argued is needed for her to satisfactorily 
account for the exaltation. Hill seems to have the timeless truth of the Son’s 
humanity in mind when He says: 
 
If the Son is human in virtue of existing in a certain relation to Jesus’s 
body and soul, then because, on atemporalism, the Son exists outside 
time, it is true at all times that he (timelessly) exists in that relation to 
them. It is no more true during Jesus’s lifetime than it is at any other 
time, including the period afterwards or even today (ibid.: 27). 
 
Hill isn’t alone is taking this stance. Leftow, for instance, comments that ‘if 
God is timeless and incarnate, then He just is timelessly incarnate: the whole of 
His timeless life is spent so’ (2002: 295). Furthermore, Stump and Kretzmann 
remark that ‘the divine nature of the second person of the Trinity…cannot 
become temporal; nor could the second person at some time acquire a human nature He 
does not eternally have’ (1981: 453, my italics).11 
I’ll now argue that in spite of support for this claim, it isn’t a desirable 
result for an account of the incarnation. I argued in Chapter 1 that the only 
way to (provisionally) understand a timeless Son becoming incarnate is through 
His undergoing extrinsic change. Presumably, this has to mean that the Son is 
timelessly incarnate, for He himself undergoes no intrinsic change whatsoever 
when His human body and soul join with Him. It must therefore be a timeless 
truth that the Son is incarnate. Now, in virtue of what is this timeless truth true? 
It can’t be that the Son timelessly possesses the abstract property of humanity. 
Thanks to Leftow, we can see that it’s the Son’s concrete possession of ‘a full 
natural endowment of a human being, that is, a human body and (if such there 
be) soul ‘carrying’ a human mind and will’ (2002: 278) that makes Him human. 
It’s because of this that the Son possesses the abstract property of being 
                                                             
11 ‘Eternally’ is to be read here as ‘timelessly’.  
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human – that is, a concrete human nature is more fundamental than possessing 
the abstract property of humanity.12 Leftow comments that:  
 
One does not usually interact directly with properties, ‘assuming’ or 
‘exemplifying’ them. Concrete things act, and in virtue of their 
activities, they come to exemplify properties. Abstract‐nature 
incarnation can take place only by concrete‐nature incarnation. In this 
sense, the concrete nature view of the incarnation has to be basic (ibid.: 
279).  
 
Perhaps, then, the most obvious way that we might account for the timeless 
truth of the Son’s humanity (and hence, account for the Perpetual Humanity 
requirement*), is thanks to the Son’s timeless relation to His human body and 
soul. This certainly seems to be what Hill has in mind in the above passage. 
However, it can’t be that His body and soul themselves exist timelessly. After all, 
the Son’s human body and soul come into existence at a particular time. 
Leftow himself would agree with this. He says that ‘the Son ‘gets to’ [His 
human body and soul] before [they] are or constitute persons [because] Christ 
assumes [His human body and soul] as a zygote, at the moment of conception’ 
(2002: 281). Presumably, Leftow means that the human body and soul of the 
composite Christ don’t exist prior to their formation of a divine composite 
with the Son of God. This seems particularly important to Leftow, lest the Son 
appear to be a sort of ‘body snatcher’. He says that the Son didn’t ‘merely 
[team] up with an already existing person…nor did the Son ‘take over’ the 
body of an independently existing animal: incarnation is not possession’ (ibid.: 
278). The Son’s human body and soul therefore come into existence at a time, 
and exist at successive moments of time. They can’t exist timelessly in such a 
way that they’re able to be what guarantees the Son’s timeless humanity. 
 Alternatively, then, perhaps the Son is timelessly related to His human 
body and soul even though these human part(s) of the divine composite are 
themselves temporal. The timeless truth of the Son’s humanity could then be 
made true by the coming into existence of His human body and soul, and their 
                                                             
12 This distinction between the possession of an ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ human nature is 
originally discussed by Plantinga (1999) but is built upon here by Leftow. I examined this 
distinction in Chapter 2.  
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formation of a composite with the timeless Son as a part. This certainly seems 
to be Leftow’s preferred approach. He says that the Son remains human when 
exalted because although B may have died, GS is still timelessly related to S. 
Because of this relation, He says that ‘GS remains human or else is as close to 
human as any of us is…when the like occurs to us (2011a: 314). Presumably, 
this is all timelessly true of GS (that He’ll join with B+S, and that later B will 
die), lest GS be temporal. Leftow also provides us with an analogy to illustrate 
how the Son can be timelessly human, in spite of (from our temporal 
perspective) the human parts of the composite Christ not existing until He is 
born as the human Jesus. Leftow asserts that a single brick is always part of a 
wall, even before the rest of the bricks are added, thanks to the builder’s intent 
to produce a wall: 
 
I suggest similarly that the Son is part of a human composite as soon as 
the Son exists, even if the rest of the composite does not yet exist –for 
the rest of the composite is surely coming, and the builder’s intent 
makes the Son so. If the Son is part of a human composite, the Son is 
human (2002: 297).  
 
Importantly, according to this analogy, a single brick is only part of a wall. 
Leftow says ‘the brick is not a wall by itself, but it is part of a wall by itself’ 
(ibid.: 296). Therefore, the best we can say on this analogy is that the Son is 
timelessly part of a human composite. Leftow thinks it can follow from this 
that the Son is human: ‘if the Son is part of a human composite, the Son is 
human’ (ibid.: 297). Admittedly, being part of such a composite is what makes 
the Son human, according to compositionalism.13 But what of the Son being 
timelessly part of a human composite? Leftow’s analogy doesn’t get us all the 
way to asserting that ‘it is timelessly true (and hence, ‘true now’) that the Son is 
fully human’, in line with the perpetual humanity requirement*. In order to 
strengthen this, perhaps more needs to be made of the fact that the rest of the 
bricks, or the human parts of the composite, have come. It’s here that we begin 
to see a disanalogy. Moreover, it’s a disanalogy that makes us aware of the 
                                                             
13 Nevertheless, I argued against the success of atemporal compositionalism at length in 
Chapter 3. I’ll therefore not rehearse again the worries associated with God the Son being 
a mere ‘part’ of the human Jesus, as opposed to being identical with Him. 
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temporal notions that Leftow’s example relies upon. Firstly, in the case of 
bricks, they are a necessary part of (brick) walls. All brick walls begin with a 
single brick. In the case of God the Son, however, He’s not a necessary part of 
a human, because none of us have the Son as a part. However, it’s largely the 
fact that many walls begin with a single brick that permits the intuition that a 
single brick can be part of a wall. No humans besides (allegedly) Jesus Christ 
are formed by human parts joining with the divine Son of God, however. 
Perhaps the similarity between the examples relies less on the 
importance of the parts to their wholes, and more on the respective parts 
coming to form a whole.14 However, this seems to make the Son’s humanity 
unacceptably reliant on the temporal event of His human body and soul 
joining with Him, to the extent that we might worry that He can’t be 
‘timelessly’ incarnate. At the very least, it seems difficult to make sense of 
Leftow’s analogy without some sort of notion of temporality. We require the 
builder to intend to add more bricks to the single brick at a later moment, in 
order to be happy that the single brick is in fact part of a wall. Similarly, Leftow 
talks in the above passage about the Son being incarnate despite the fact that 
His human body and soul do ‘not yet’ exist – suggesting that His being 
incarnate relies on an event in time: the coming into existence of His human 
body and soul. If we can’t introduce this notion of a ‘later’ time, we can’t 
understand what it means for the Son to be incarnate. If we’re to be able to 
say, with Leftow, that in (say) 5 BC the Son was human ‘because S+B was to 
exist and he was to join with it’ (ibid.), it must be that somebody asserting in 5 
BC ‘(it’s true now that) God the Son is fully human’ was telling the truth. Now, 
what makes this true? Leftow would say (from the perspective of 5 BC) the 
future fact that the Son is joined by B+S (he says ‘God the Son could have been 
human [at any time before the birth of Christ] due to His relations to a future 
event’ (ibid.: 296)). However, it seems that in order to argue for an atemporal 
Son, Leftow is relying on temporal stages in the composite Christ’s life, which 
seems at best to exhibit a great tension, and at worst to be flatly incoherent. 
After all, even if these temporal stages don’t exist in the life of the Son 
                                                             
14 After all, the incarnation is a unique event, so we surely don’t want to endorse a view 
whereby the Son is a part of other humans besides Jesus.  
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Himself, but rather in the life of the human ‘parts’ of the divine composite 
Christ, then Leftow still has rather a lot to explain.  
In fact, Leftow states in a footnote in the paper in question that ‘God’s 
incarnate life is some sort of non-temporal part of His life’ (ibid: 282). Perhaps 
he’d remind us of this at this juncture, asserting that, because God’s incarnate 
life is timelessly a part of His life, he’s glad to depart from the wall analogy at this 
point. The brick can’t form a wall until the other bricks come along (after a 
specific period of time), but the Son is timelessly human because of it being 
timelessly true that His life includes the incarnation ‘stage’. I consider this 
response to be troubling, because it requires that God’s incarnate life be at 
once a timeless part of a life (the overall timeless life of God the Son), and also a 
temporal part (in fact, a temporal whole) of a life (the life of the man Jesus). This 
seems extremely peculiar, and is just one reason why I think that the timeless 
truth of the Son’s humanity is a problematic thought.  
 Nevertheless, one could argue that the timeless truth of the Son’s 
humanity is itself made true by His thinking certain thoughts and feeling 
certain sensations as a result of being incarnate, that He wouldn’t have felt had 
He not been incarnate. This is certainly something that Leftow endorses (ibid: 
299). It could be supported by the account of extrinsic change that’s currently 
on the table: the Son timelessly thinks these human thoughts and feels these 
human sensations, and doesn’t change intrinsically in doing so. Although the 
Son being incarnate is made true by the (temporal) event of the human parts of 
the composite joining with Him, this doesn’t require any temporal stages in His 
own, timeless life, the response might go. If this were the case, then we could 
grant that the Son is timelessly incarnate as a human, and hence we could grant 
the perpetual humanity requirement*. 
After all, I argued in Chapter 1 that this account of extrinsic change 
was a provisionally viable way to explain how the Son could ‘become’ incarnate 
without undergoing intrinsic change. However, we’re now considering this 
account as a means of explaining the timeless truth of the Son’s humanity. It’s 
here that I think that problems with the extrinsic change account start to 
emerge. Leftow says of these thoughts and sensations that the Son experienced 
as a result of being incarnate: ‘if God is timelessly incarnate, He has always had 
these, timelessly, even before [the human parts of the composite] appeared’ 
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(ibid.). For instance, presumably the human Jesus had many thoughts centred 
around His having a body. I agree with Leftow here, but I think that this 
causes problems for the atemporalist. That is, if the Son undergoes no intrinsic 
change whatsoever as a result of becoming incarnate, then all thoughts He has 
as a result of His humanity must indeed be thought timelessly. This argument 
seems merely to shift a bump in the atemporalist’s rug, however, as we’ll now 
see.  
 There are many worries to be had about the thought that the Son 
timelessly thinks these ‘human’ thoughts and timelessly feels these ‘human’ 
sensations. This becomes apparent when we imagine the sorts of sensations that 
are attributed to the incarnate Son. Holland argues that if the Son is eternally 
incarnate, then it must also be held that He’s eternally united with B+S. The 
alternative option, after all, is that He becomes united with these at a particular 
time – which is, of course, unacceptable.15 Holland remarks that ‘since Christ’s 
embodiment caused him to experience many things such as thirst and hunger, 
it would be difficult, then, to…avoid the unwieldy conclusion:…[that] God the 
Son is eternally impassible and God the Son is eternally experiencing thirst and 
hunger’ (2012: 120).16 I think that this is a highly problematic outcome, because 
it suggests that the Son, the alleged saviour of humankind, is eternally 
suffering.  
I also think that the direction of explanation entertained here in fact 
runs backwards. It seems more natural to say that the Son timelessly 
experiences human thoughts and feelings as a result of being timelessly 
incarnate, rather than (as suggested above) that He’s timelessly incarnate as a 
result of His timelessly experiencing human thoughts and feelings. However, I’m 
now at a loss as to what does make true the Son’s timeless incarnation, for I’ve 
already considered the former grounding of the Son’s timeless humanity, and 
argued that He can’t be timelessly incarnate in virtue of the relation He bears 
                                                             
15 Unless, as Leftow might say, B+S become united to the Son at a particular time, but the 
Son Himself is timeless. Even if this is the case, the Son would still have to timelessly be 
related B+S, and timelessly think any thoughts and feel any sensations that are due to His 
possession of a human body and soul (for example, hunger). Otherwise, if He came to 
have such thoughts at a particular time, this would represent an intrinsic change in His life, 
which would mean that He couldn’t be timeless.  
16 Holland is using ‘eternal’ here to designate timelessness, whereas in this thesis I use 
‘eternal’ as open to contest between the temporal and atemporal accounts of God – that 
is, the nature of God’s ‘eternity’ is the very question up for debate here.  
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to His human body and soul. I argued against the timeless existence of the 
human parts of the divine composite. I also argued against the coherence of 
the Son’s timeless relation to the temporal parts of the divine composite, when I 
criticised Leftow’s brick wall analogy.    
In spite of all this, the atemporalist might make the more general 
response that, because we’re temporal creatures, we simply can’t understand 
the picture of a timelessly incarnate God. Our lives are ubiquitously affected by 
sequence, to the extent that any analogies we draw, or arguments we make 
about divine timelessness will all be limited. This thought brings with it 
problems of its own, however.  
Even granting that it’s timelessly true that the Son is fully human (the 
present reading of the perpetual humanity requirement*), an altogether 
different problem is brought to the surface, which threatens the atemporalist 
position as a whole. It has to do with what believers are unable to think and say 
about God. To many, it’s undoubtedly a great source of comfort and 
reassurance that when they pray to God, He’s listening at that very time, and 
that when He intervenes to answer a prayer, He does so after the prayer has 
been prayed. Similarly, it’s important to many believers that the Son is now, at 
this time, in Heaven, lest we detract from the permanence of the Resurrection. 
This isn’t something that the atemporalist can allow, because a timeless God 
can’t ‘now’ be anywhere. Hill himself acknowledges this. He says that: 
 
[The atemporal view] does not leave any room for saying, for example, 
that Christ is currently seated at the right hand of the Father, as is 
stated in Ephesians 1:20….He cannot do that if his body exists only 
between 4 BCE and 30 CE. Similarly, the glorified Christ does not 
really have a glorified body, as Revelation 1:12–16 suggests, and one 
cannot hope to see Christ’s face in the new Jerusalem, as Revelation 
22:4 promises (2012: 28).17 
 
Atemporalists seem to have no option but to take statements such as these 
non-literally, and Hill agrees. Holland, too, says that ‘even though the creeds 
                                                             
17 Hill is assuming that these dates given are those of the Son’s life on earth. Henceforth, 
I’ll join him in assuming this. 
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and certain passages of Scripture speak of a sequence in the incarnation, the 
atemporalist must either read these statements as purely analogical and 
symbolic or reject them as outright untrue’ (2012: 124). However, I explained 
above that I’m interested only in assessing atemporalism for its ability to 
provide a metaphysical explanation of the glorification requirements. The 
atemporalist isn’t, I submit, able to assert that at this time the Son literally 
exists in Heaven in a fully glorified state, and that if we were to pray to Him, 
He’d hear our prayer at the time of praying it.18 This isn’t to say, of course, that 
we can’t rephrase these commitments in language amenable to the 
atemporalist, as we’ve seen Hill do with his glorification requirements. There is, 
however, a much wider set of everyday beliefs and commitments related to the 
glorification requirements that must also be reinterpreted in the language of the 
atemporalist – such as the belief that the Son is ‘now’ in heaven, or ‘now’ 
listening to my prayer. For example, the atemporalist would need to say that 
it’s ‘timelessly true’ (and hence, true now) that the Son is listening to my 
prayer.19 However, we’ve now come full circle back to the problems caused by 
postulating that it’s timelessly true that the Son is fully human – problems 
which, I’ve argued, look incredibly difficult for atemporalists to overcome. 
 
(5) CONCLUSION 
The literature on the metaphysics of the incarnation is almost entirely 
populated by discussions relating to the incoherence problem. The exaltation, 
and in particular the temporal metaphysics of the exaltation, is an element of 
the incarnation that’s almost completely unexplored – with the notable 
                                                             
18 This is the case whether one is an A-theorist or a B-theorist. For A-theorists, a timeless 
Son can’t exist in Heaven at the moment that’s objectively present, because only temporal 
beings can exist in such a way. Similarly, for B-theorists, a timeless Son can’t exist in 
Heaven at the time simultaneous with this utterance (or at a time simultaneous with any 
utterance), because only temporal beings can exist in such a relation of simultaneity. To 
exist in B-theoretic time is, after all, to still be temporal. I’ll discuss the bearing that the 
debate over whether or not time flows has on the debate over God’s relation to time in 
more detail in Chapter 8.  
19 I don’t have the scope to give these general arguments against the atemporalist position 
thorough treatment here. For arguments in favour of the importance of God hearing our 
prayers at the moment they’re prayed, see Lucas (1989: 217) and Everitt (2004: 270). For 
the more general argument that God ought to be able to respond to us at particular times, 
see Pike (1970: 128). See DeWeese (2004: 12) for the argument that a timeless God isn’t 
able to redeem us.  
 183 
 
exception of Hill, whose recent paper has provided the basis for discussion 
here. In this chapter, I outlined the importance of the Son’s exaltation, 
together with Hill’s two (divine) glorification requirements, which he 
formulates in two different ways. I argued that the first formulation uses 
unacceptably temporal language to detail both requirements, and so the 
atemporalist can consider only the second formulation of the same. According 
to this, ‘it is true now’ that the Son is fully human, and exercises omnipotence 
and omniscience, which the atemporalist must understand as it being 
‘timelessly true’ that the Son is fully human, omnipotent and omniscient. I 
conceded that atemporalists have no problem with accounting for the timeless 
truth of the Son’s omnipotence and omniscience, but I argued that the timeless 
truth of His humanity looks very difficult to uphold. This led me to discuss a 
related worry that can be employed against atemporalism as a whole – namely, 
that a God who exists at no times at all is difficult to think of as a reassuring 
presence.  
I therefore conclude that divine timelessness isn’t compatible with an 
orthodox metaphysics of the incarnation. Although it can potentially account 
for the Son ‘becoming’ incarnate (by appealing to extrinsic change to the divine 
part of a composite), atemporalism is unable to avoid the incoherence 
problem, and can’t accommodate the exaltation to boot. In the next chapter, 
I’ll examine divine temporalism in relation to the Son’s glorification, arguing 
that (unlike atemporalism) it can accommodate Hill’s glorification requirements, 
and thus that it can accommodate the exaltation.  
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CHAPTER 6 
DIVINE TEMPORALITY AND 
THE EXALTATION 
In this chapter, I argue that divine temporalists can accommodate both 
of Hill’s glorification requirements. These requirements (the ‘perpetual 
humanity’ and ‘exaltation’ requirements) were outlined in detail in the previous 
chapter. As with Chapter 4, I consider two forms of temporalist models of the 
incarnation: ‘two minds’ models and kenotic models. I firstly argue (briefly, 
given that in Chapter 4 they were already found to be lacking in other 
respects), that the two minds theorist can’t satisfy both of Hill’s requirements 
at once in a way that avoids heresy. I then turn to kenoticism, where I outline 
the alleged problem that kenoticists face in accommodating Hill’s perpetual 
humanity requirement. I argue that this problem is avoidable, and thus that 
kenoticists can comfortably account for the exaltation as a whole.  
 
(1) TWO MINDS AND EXALTATION 
 In Chapter 4, I introduced in detail the two minds account of the 
incarnation, due to Morris (1986, 1989) and Swinburne (1994).1 By way of a 
brief recap, this is the model whereby the Son becomes incarnate by voluntarily 
adding a limited, fallible human mind to His omniscient divine mind. The 
                                                             
1 In fact, Swinburne’s ‘divided mind’ account is slightly different to Morris’s two minds 
model, because on the former account one single mind is divided between a ‘human’ and a 
‘divine’ stream of consciousness. In Chapter 4, I discussed some potential differences 
between these two models, such as that Morris’s model alone can be consistent with a 
timeless God, because the incarnate Son has two distinct minds, which allows for the 
divine one to remain timeless and changeless. With Swinburne’s model, however, I 
suggested that the divine mind must undergo change in splitting to include a human 
stream of consciousness, which suggests that this model can only be consistent with a 
temporal God. In spite of this, for the purposes of this chapter the models are, for all 
intents and purposes, the same. As with the bulk of discussion in Chapter 4, I’ll therefore 
proceed to examine the ‘two minds model’, but I intend for all treatment of it to be 
likewise applicable to the divided mind account.  
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divine mind, being omniscient, is wholly aware of the existence of the human 
mind, and has access to its contents. The human mind, however, is unaware of 
the existence of the divine mind, and has very limited access to it – only when 
such access is permitted by the divine mind. We’ve seen that this model has 
been offered as a response to the incoherence problem: the incarnate Son is 
one person, but is wholly divine thanks to His divine mind, and wholly human 
thanks to His human mind. However, in Chapter 4, I argued that the two 
minds model can’t in fact avoid the incoherence problem, because to the extent 
that the minds are indeed separate causal centres, we unacceptably have two 
persons present in the incarnate Christ. On the other hand, if there’s only really 
one centre of causal powers, then the incarnate Son fails to be human, because 
He lacks a human will of His own: with the divine mind making all of His 
decisions.  
I’ll now argue that the two minds model of the incarnation fares no 
better in meeting Hill’s two exaltation requirements. When we consider the 
exaltation requirement, we most naturally imagine two minds theorists claiming 
that they can uphold it thanks to the incarnate Son’s divine mind, which is 
omnipotent and omniscient. After all, this omnipotence and omniscience is 
always attributed to the Son by two minds theorists, even during His earthly 
life. There therefore seems to be no reason why He shouldn’t continue to be 
omniscient and omnipotent in His glorified state. Likewise, regarding the 
perpetual humanity requirement, we can assume that the likes of Morris and 
Swinburne would appeal to the Son’s human mind: claiming that it’s in virtue of 
this that the incarnate Son is fully human.2 All appears well and good, then. 
Moreover, unlike atemporalists, temporalists (and so, two minds theorists) can 
straightforwardly say that it’s ‘now’ the case that the Son is fully human, and in 
full possession of omnipotence and omniscience, because God exists at every 
moment of time, and (whereas He was incarnate on earth), He’s now, at this 
very moment, incarnate in Heaven.  
However, I don’t think that matters are as straightforward for the two 
minds theorist as they first seem. This is due to problems that are almost 
                                                             
2 Interestingly, Morris often refers to the Son’s human mind as His ‘earthly’ mind (1989: 
121), which suggests that he doesn’t think this mind continues to exist when the Son is 
exalted and no longer living on earth. However, I’ll give Morris the benefit of the doubt 
here, because he may simply be saying that the Son’s human mind resembles our (earthly) 
minds.  
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identical to the ones that I argued were detrimental to the account in relation 
to the incoherence problem. They emerge when we start to consider whether 
the one single person that is the exalted Son is omniscient and omnipotent, 
and whether that very same person is – and can be – human. In fact, if we 
assume that the two minds model works in exactly the same way as it’s alleged 
to work whilst the Son is incarnate on earth, then we find all of the problems 
from Chapter 4 resurfacing. I argued that the problem facing two minds 
theorists takes the form of a dilemma (either the two minds are genuinely 
distinct, meaning that there are two persons in Christ and we’re guilty of 
Nestorian heresy, or the minds aren’t genuinely distinct, meaning that the 
incarnate Son’s humanity is threatened and we’re guilty of Apollinarian heresy). 
Regarding the exaltation, it seems that the two minds theorist might 
have an escape route available that was not possible in light of the incoherence 
problem. This is to argue that the second horn of the above dilemma can be 
blunted. That is, the two minds are no longer genuinely distinct, because the 
Son has been glorified, but the Son’s humanity isn’t threatened, for a reason 
which I’ll shortly suggest. Whilst it was important that the two minds be 
separate streams of consciousness during the incarnate Son’s earthly life in 
order that the Son take on true human form and live as we do, once He’s been 
glorified the minds can (perhaps even as part of this glorification process) 
become more unified. This may be supported by Brown, in his discussion of 
what he calls ‘two-nature Christology’, which is certainly consistent with a two 
minds account3. Brown says:  
Complete integration [of the divine and human natures] is only delayed, 
not permanently impossible, and there is a clear rationale for the delay, 
so that the human mind can exercise normally its faculty for the 
                                                             
3 Brown uses ‘two-nature Christology’ to encompass all models of the incarnation which 
allow for i) Christ to be a single person, ii) Christ to possess a fully human and a fully 
divine nature, and (importantly), iii) these two natures to be simultaneously present in the 
person of Christ (1985: 228). Two minds theorists would therefore claim that they can 
meet these criteria, in virtue of the divine and human minds (and so, natures) being 
simultaneously present in the person of Christ. Interestingly, Brown thinks that kenotic 
models can’t meet the third of these criteria: He thinks that according to kenoticism the 
two natures (divine and human) are successively present in the person of Christ (ibid.: 232), 
because the divine nature is given up when the Son becomes human. My argument in 
Chapter 4 was that divinity and humanity are in fact simultaneously present in Christ on 
kenoticism, thanks to a particular modification of the divine attributes. I’d therefore allege 
that kenoticism is also a type of two-nature Christology. 
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experiential acquisition of knowledge. At the last stage in Heaven the 
objection to infused knowledge experientially acquired on earth will 
justify us in continuing to speak of the presence of a human mind 
(1985: 260). 
 
The two minds theorist could therefore argue along these lines that the Son 
possesses two distinct minds whilst He’s incarnate in order that His human 
mind experience the world as we humans do. However, once He’s exalted His 
minds will unite. 
However, it remains for the two minds theorist to provide more detail 
regarding exactly how united these two minds of the exalted Son are to be. 
We’re owed this further explanation not least in order to be able to tell whether 
this interpretation of the two minds model can account for the exaltation and 
perpetual humanity requirements. After all, it’s one thing to say that the Son’s 
divine and human minds become united when He’s exalted, but quite another 
to demonstrate how this single mind is now able to be omniscient, 
omnipotent, and fully human. In particular, we might legitimately question 
whether or not the human mind becomes aware of its divinity when it’s 
exalted. Recall that, according to the two minds theorist’s alleged solution to 
the incoherence problem, the human mind is (for the most part) ignorant of its 
divinity throughout the Son’s earthly life, and it’s only permitted limited (and 
even then, unknowing), access to the divine mind when the divine mind 
permits this. 
On the one hand, two minds theorists could claim that the human 
mind (due to being exalted) does become aware of its union with the divine 
mind, and comes to possess omnipotence and omniscience. However, this 
seems to compromise the humanity of Christ. At the very least, the two minds 
theorist would need to have more of a story about exactly how, if the Son is 
exalted, and in possession of omniscience and omnipotence, He can count as 
fully human. If His human mind has become so closely united with the divine 
mind that He’s wholly aware of His omniscience and omnipotence, we need to 
hear some more about what specifically makes that human mind human, if 
we’re to satisfactorily meet the perpetual humanity requirement. One option 
might be to appeal to the Son’s possession of experiential knowledge from His 
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time on earth – the knowledge of ‘what it’s like’ to be (a particular) human, and 
to (for instance) lack knowledge of certain things. 4  This was suggested by 
Brown in the previous citation, and is certainly a route that the two minds 
theorist could explore. I’ll also discuss (and endorse) this line of argument in 
relation to kenoticism in section 3. 
However, it strikes me that to whatever extent the two minds theorist 
appeals to the Son’s exalted divine and human minds being united, even 
granting that they have a story about how the Son can remain human, we’ve 
now departed from a two minds model of the incarnation anyway. Rather, 
we’re instead looking at a picture of a ‘united’ exalted mind of Christ, which 
seems to be almost the very antithesis of the two minds view. The two minds 
theorist might respond that this is exactly how they intend to model the 
incarnation: the Son possesses a divine and a human mind whilst living on 
earth only: but these minds unite into one when He becomes glorified, in such a 
way that the Son retains both their divine and their human aspects. This is all 
well and good, but it’s an account of the exaltation which is by no means 
unique to the two minds model. For instance, as mentioned, I’ll shortly outline 
how the kenoticist can appeal to it. I would therefore consider this ‘united 
mind’ account of the exaltation to be an unacceptably hollow triumph for the 
two minds theorist. At the very least, even granting that this account is equally 
available to the two minds theorist and to the kenoticist, I argued in Chapter 4 
that there are other reasons for us to prefer the latter account to the former.  
Alternatively, then, the two minds theorist could propose that when 
the Son is exalted, His human mind remains limited in knowledge, and thus 
ignorant of its exalted, divine state. Hill worries that to take this stance would 
be to fail to meet the exaltation requirement, because ‘the Son does not enjoy 
his divine properties in the requisite way’ (ibid.: 17), since His human mind 
remains limited in knowledge. This is also problematic because we evidently 
want the human Jesus to know that He’s been glorified (as we’d similarly desire 
for ourselves), rather than His human mind existing, as Hill suggests, ‘in some 
kind of solipsistic world of its own’ (ibid.). Moreover, this latter account keeps 
                                                             
4 I’ll also consider an argument similar to this one in Chapter 8, when I examine what 
tenseless theorists of time might say about a temporal God remaining human once He’s 
exalted.  
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the two minds isolated such that the charge of Nestorianism returns: after all, 
two people in Christ is just as heretical in Heaven as it is on earth.  
A final option available to the two minds theorist could be to claim 
that the Son remains human once exalted because of the particular relation that 
He bears to His human body. However, Hill warns of the problems that arise if 
one goes down the road of appealing to glorified embodiment in the physical, 
spatial sense that we typically understand it. For example, in endorsing the 
continued existence of the Son’s human body, one must be able to point to 
where that body exists at this very moment. Hill says:  
 
To be orthodox, the model requires us to suppose that Jesus’s body 
continues to exist after the exaltation until the end of time; that at any 
given time, including right now, the statement ‘Jesus’s human body 
exists somewhere today’ is true (2012: 15). 
 
This is, after all, in line with the perpetual humanity requirement*, which 
specifies that it must be ‘true now’ that the Son is ‘fully human’, in addition to 
being fully divine. That is, if one claims that the Son’s physical embodiment 
makes Him human, then it must be ‘true now’ that He’s embodied. Hill 
outlines three potential options for where the Son’s body might be at this very 
moment, and suggests problems that face each of them. Option one is that His 
body is somewhere in our spatiotemporal universe, such as here on the Earth 
or on another planet. The highly problematic upshot of this, however, would 
be that we could in principle travel to the Son’s body (ibid.: 12). This leaves 
open the bizarre possibility of us getting closer or further away from the Son 
of God, simply by moving around through our daily routines.  
The second option is that Christ’s body exists now, but in a sort of 
parallel space, one which it’s impossible to travel to. The problem here is that 
this parallel space would have to share our time in order for it to be true that 
Christ’s body exists there now, and for Him to be temporal in the sense that He 
shares our time series. This generates problems for our standard conception of 
the intimate connection between space and time, because we’re left imagining 
‘a distinct space that nevertheless shares our time’ (ibid.: 13). Whether or not 
one thinks that the idea of a parallel space that happens to share the same time 
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as ours is conceivable, Hill’s second worry regarding this option has greater 
force. This is that it’s hard to see how the Son’s body, once existing in our 
space, could be identical to another body in the parallel space. It couldn’t move 
to the new location since there is no space between our space and the parallel 
space (ibid.). This leaves us imagining Jesus’ body disappearing in our space, 
and reappearing again in the other space. Hill asks ‘how would this scenario 
differ from one in which Jesus’ body is annihilated and a duplicate created in a 
parallel space?’ (ibid.).  
 The third option Hill proposes is that Jesus’ body might be in 
hyperspace (ibid.). He draws the comparison to the two-dimensional shapes in 
the novel Flatland (Abbott, 1952) being unable to conceive of a third 
dimension above them, and says that similarly there could be at least one other 
spatial dimension that we can’t perceive. The Son’s body would therefore be 
‘above’ us, but not in any sense of ‘above’ with which we’re familiar. Unlike 
with the last theory, hyperspace would be a part of our universe, and thus we 
don’t have the problem of the Son’s body disappearing and reappearing in 
order to reach its new location, nor the resulting problems of the body’s 
identity. Rather, it would be possible for the body to follow a ‘continuous path’ 
(ibid.: 14)  to its new location in hyperspace. This option, however, can be 
subjected to similar criticisms as the first one – it would, in theory, be possible 
for us to travel to this extra spatial dimension, meaning that this theory is just a 
‘more exotic version’ (ibid.) of the first theory in which the Son’s body exists 
somewhere in the universe as we know it. Furthermore, Hill adds that it would 
be a (perhaps unacceptably) large claim to argue that Christians are required to 
believe in hyperspace in order to understand the metaphysics of the 
incarnation (ibid.), and for this reason it seems that an alternative option would 
be preferable.5  
 One such option could be to claim that the exalted Son possesses a 
non-physical, glorified body. 6  This would dispel all problems with the above 
candidates for the physical location of the Son’s body. However, to the extent 
                                                             
5 Assuming, of course, that Christians are ‘required’ to have an account of the metaphysics 
of the incarnation in the first place. This seems incredibly demanding, and therefore I 
think it best not to endorse this particular line of argument suggested by Hill.  
6 Exactly what such a body would be like is mysterious. I’ll discuss this a little more in 
section 3.2, explaining that I don’t want to place argumentative weight on any particular 
idea of a glorified body.  
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that the two minds theorist wishes to appeal to the Son’s glorified body as a 
guarantee of His humanity, she seems to be whittling away at the core of her 
theory. The Son is human qua human mind, on the traditional two minds 
model, so it seems strange to shift this emphasis onto a body after the Son is 
exalted. Indeed, it seems that we’d be departing from a central claim of the two 
minds model if we took this approach.  
 On top of all this, I argued in Chapter 4 that the two minds account 
faces insurmountable problems in attempting to avoid the incoherence 
problem. I therefore submit that Morris and Swinburne’s model is a 
problematic way to model the Son’s glorification. Fortunately for temporalists, 
however, there’s another account available, which I also favoured in Chapter 4. 
I’ll now argue that kenoticism has the means to account for the glorification 
requirements.  
 
(2) KENOTICISM: THE CHALLENGE FROM 
GLORIFICATION 
 It appears that kenoticism has no problem in meeting the exaltation 
requirement. After all, when He’s glorified, the Son regains the attributes of 
omniscience and omnipotence that He voluntarily gave up when He became 
human, and continues to possess these for evermore. The problem arises when 
we consider whether kenoticism can accommodate the perpetual humanity 
requirement. In virtue of what, it might legitimately be asked, is the exalted Son 
human, according to kenoticism? This problem is particularly pertinent for 
those who maintain that a necessary condition of the Son’s becoming human is 
His very divestiture of omnipotence and omniscience.7  
That is, in the same way that in Chapter 4 the main challenge to 
kenoticism was being able to account for the Son’s divinity whilst He was 
lacking omnipotence and omniscience on earth, the challenge that faces 
kenoticism here is being able to account for His humanity once He’s regained 
                                                             
7 We’ll shortly see that this assumption has been challenged.  
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these two attributes.8 For this reason, Davis says that the exaltation appears to 
exhibit ‘a kind of necessary reverse ‘emptying’ in kenosis, where the glorified 
Logos, on returning to heaven, emptied itself of humanity’ (2006: 136). This 
emptying of humanity would be a most undesirable result, and would 
undoubtedly ensure that kenoticists are unable to meet the perpetual humanity 
requirement. Feenstra articulates the problem for the kenoticist as follows: 
 
If the second person of the Trinity needed to become non-omniscient 
in order to become truly human and if his taking up his omniscience 
once again implies that he is no longer truly human, then it seems to 
follow that the exalted Son of God who is sitting at the right hand of 
the Father, and who is presumably omniscient, is no longer truly 
human (1989: 146). 
 
If the Son’s omniscience was incompatible with His humanity during His 
earthly life, then this suggests that, once omniscience is restored to Him, He 
can’t satisfy the perpetual humanity requirement. I agree with Crisp that this 
poses a ‘serious problem’ (2007: 133) for kenoticism. Evans views the problem 
that kenoticism faces with regards to meeting the perpetual humanity 
requirement as one horn of a larger dilemma, which he poses as follows: 
 
Either the glorified Christ reassumes [omniscience and omnipotence] 
or he does not. If he does not, then the kenotic theory has an 
inadequate account of the glorified Christ, and the loss of omnipotence 
and omniscience is no longer merely a temporary divestiture but a 
permanent loss. If the glorified Christ does reassume these properties, 
however, then it appears that there is no reason why an incarnate God 
cannot be omnipotent and omniscient…If a glorified, bodily Christ 
who is fully human can be omniscient and omnipotent, then one 
cannot claim that a being must divest himself of these properties to 
become human (2002: 264). 
 
                                                             
8 However, I argued in Chapter 4 that kenoticists are in fact able to adequately respond to 
the challenge that the Son can’t be divine when He’s given up omniscience and 
omnipotence.  
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We can see here that the alternative horn (to the one that I already outlined) of 
Evans’s dilemma is that the Son doesn’t in fact regain His omniscience and 
omnipotence when He’s exalted. I consider this option to be so problematic 
for the kenoticist that it’s a non-starter, not least because it can’t accommodate 
the exaltation requirement. On top of this, the ‘permanent loss’ of these divine 
attributes seems to go far beyond a loving sacrifice for the sake of humankind, 
into a genuine loss of divinity on the part of the Son.9 I also think that it 
detracts from His worshipfulness. Crisp comments that it’s ‘one thing to argue 
that the Word may relinquish certain properties for a period of time. It is quite 
another to claim that the Word relinquishes those properties and will never 
take them up again from that moment onwards’ (2007: 133-4). I certainly agree 
with this, and will therefore return only to considering the horn of the dilemma 
on which the exalted Son does regain omnipotence and omniscience. 
Evans’s worry with this latter horn assumes that it is possible for an 
omniscient, omnipotent being to be fully human, and then questions why, if 
this is the case, the Son must nevertheless divest Himself of these divine 
properties in order to become human. In other words, assuming that the 
exalted Son can be omniscient and omnipotent as well as being human, we 
might as well also assume that there’s no incompatibility between these 
attributes during the Son’s earthly life. If this is the case, however, then it could 
be argued that we should just do away with kenoticism altogether. After all, 
this alleged incompatibility between ‘divine’ and ‘human’ attributes seems to be 
a large part of the motivation for kenoticism in the first place. Along these 
same lines, Crisp says that ‘some reason would need to be given to explain why 
it is that the pre-resurrection Christ may not possess omnipotence or 
omniscience, whereas the post-resurrection Christ (with a glorified body) may 
do so’ (2007: 136).  
Crisp, like Evans, is worried that if we grant omnipotence and 
omniscience, and humanity to the exalted Son without any contradiction 
arising, we then need a good reason as to why we can’t grant the very same to 
the Son during His life on earth. Forrest voices the same worry when he asks: 
                                                             
9 My ‘loss of divinity’ accusation here is consistent with my definition of essential divine 
attributes from Chapter 4. One example of such an attribute essentially possessed by a 
divine being was ‘omniscient-unless-freely-and-temporarily-choosing-to-be-otherwise’ 
(Morris 1986: 99, my italics). That is, any being that permanently divests itself of 
omniscience wouldn’t count as divine.  
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‘why should we abandon the classical account of the earthly life of Jesus if we 
are to assume just that account of his exalted life?’ (2000: 134). Unless we have 
a good reason for explaining why we have an incompatibility between divine 
and human attributes in the case of the earthly Son, but not in the case of the 
exalted Son, then this certainly seems to look like an ad hoc amendment to 
kenoticism. Furthermore, if we lack such a reason, it seems that much of the 
appeal of kenoticism is lost. 
It’s been argued that the problem for the kenoticist in light of 
glorification gets off the ground due to this very assumption: that the Son must, 
of necessity, give up His omniscience and omnipotence in order to become 
human in the first place. The assumption relies on the thought that the Son’s 
omniscience and omnipotence are incompatible with His humanity, a thought 
which I first introduced at the end of Chapter 2, and endorsed in Chapter 4. 
Feenstra makes this explicit when he calls it a ‘premise’ of kenotic Christology 
that ‘Christ’s possession of omniscience during His life is incompatible with his 
being truly human’ (1989: 144). It seems (again) to be this assumption that 
leads Crisp to suggest that, if the Son is to remain human when He’s exalted, 
then ‘when at the incarnation the Word relinquished certain divine attributes, 
including omniscience, he relinquished them for ever’ (2007: 135). To take this 
latter stance would also incidentally be to become impaled on the first horn of 
Evans’s aforementioned dilemma.  
In the sections that follow, I’ll respond to the challenge that the 
perpetual humanity requirement poses for kenoticism. What is more, my 
solution won’t require the kenoticist to give up the natural assumption of 
kenoticism (or, as Feenstra calls it, the ‘premise’), that omniscience and 
omnipotence are incompatible with humanity. In arguing that kenoticism can 
accommodate the perpetual humanity requirement, I’ll also respond to Hill’s 
claim that temporalist models of the incarnation don’t readily have the 
resources to account for the Son’s glorification. I’ll consider three different 
ways in which the kenoticist might claim to accommodate the perpetual 
humanity requirement. The first of these responses rejects the aforementioned 
assumption that the possession of omniscience and omnipotence is 
incompatible with humanity. The second one accepts the assumption only for 
the Son’s ‘becoming’ incarnate, but rejects it for His incarnate exaltation. The 
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third response accepts the assumption – and it’s this last response that I’ll 
argue provides kenoticists with the means by which to account for the Son’s 
glorification.  
 
(3) KENOTICISM EXALTED 
(3.1) OPTION 1 
The first way that kenoticists might attempt to accommodate the 
perpetual humanity requirement relies upon a distinction between the Son’s act 
of kenosis, on the one hand, and His incarnation, on the other. According to 
this account, kenosis is simply the particular way that the Son chose to become 
incarnate: when He made the decision to live as a human, He didn’t necessarily 
have to do this kenotically. Feenstra is the notable proponent of this view, and 
it seems that his account develops from holding fixed that the exalted Son can 
in fact be both human and omniscient and omnipotent, and then considering 
what story the kenoticist can tell about this. Feenstra says that ‘since the 
exaltation shows that Christ can be both truly human and omniscient, the 
incarnation need not involve his emptying himself of attributes such as 
omniscience’ (1989: 148). Feenstra adds that ‘the incarnation and the kenosis 
are conceptually, and to some extent temporally, distinct’ (ibid.). This 
qualification that the incarnation and kenosis are temporally distinct is offered 
because (allegedly) kenosis, the way the Son chose to become incarnate, lasts 
only for His earthly life, whereas the Son’s incarnation additionally continues 
throughout His exalted life. Similarly, Davis suggests that ‘the kenosis is indeed 
distinct from the incarnation, with the kenosis lasting only for the some thirty 
years of Jesus’ lifetime, and the incarnation lasting from the moment of Jesus’ 
conception to eternity’ (2006: 114).  
This response would accommodate the perpetual humanity 
requirement because the Son can remain human when He’s glorified, even 
though the separate act of kenosis is over. Furthermore, kenoticists can also 
uphold the statement that it’s true ‘now’ that the Son is fully human as well as 
fully divine (the perpetual humanity requirement*). This is because, as Davis 
says, the statement that ‘“[the] second person of the Trinity is God incarnate” 
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is after (say) 4 BC always true’, (2006: 114) – and so, is true now – ‘while the 
statement “the second person of the Trinity is kenotically incarnate” was only 
true from about 4 BC until about AD 29’ (ibid., my italics). In other words, it’s 
not true now, as I type this sentence, that the Son is kenotically incarnate, 
although He’s still incarnate. One might be tempted to object that, because the 
exalted Son remains incarnate, He must continue to be embodied, which in 
turn gives way to the various worries regarding the location of the exalted 
Son’s body that I outlined in section 1. It could be responded that after He’s 
exalted the Son instead possesses a glorified, non-physical body, to which we 
needn’t attribute a spatial location. I ruled this response out for the two minds 
theorist, because it’s central to her account that the Son is human qua human 
mind – not qua (glorified) body. There’s nothing to stop kenoticists from 
appealing to this response, however.  
It’s important to note that this first option for the kenoticist flatly 
denies the assumption that a being’s omniscience and omnipotence are 
incompatible with its being human. The Son wasn’t required to give up His 
omnipotence and omniscience to become human, but rather He desired to do 
so to redeem humankind. An advantage of taking this stance is that it makes 
the Son’s ‘humiliating’ kenotic sacrifice even more humbling and loving. Not 
only did He choose to take on human form, but the Son chose to do so in a 
way that was extremely limiting to Him, even though this property divestment 
wasn’t required for incarnation. It could be argued that this choice not only to 
become incarnate, but to become incarnate in this maximally selfless and 
benevolent manner, responds to the worry I outlined earlier, whereby if there’s 
indeed no contradiction between being omniscient and omnipotent and being 
human, we may as well dispense with kenoticism altogether. To this worry, the 
kenoticist could respond that God, the most loving being imaginable, chose to 
become incarnate via kenosis because He wanted to truly share in our 
condition and live amongst us.  
They could add that this choice makes God all the more praiseworthy, 
to a level that other models of the incarnation (where the earthly Son 
comfortably enjoys His omniscience and omnipotence) wouldn’t be able to 
attain. Feenstra comments on kenosis being freely chosen by the Son as His 
means of becoming incarnate: ‘in order to share our lot or condition during his 
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life on earth…He joins us in these [earthly] experiences, not simply because he 
is incarnate but by virtue of his kenotic self-emptying for the purpose of 
sharing our condition’ (1989: 148-9).   
Similarly, Evans agrees with this. He says that:  
God can be and could have become incarnate without emptying 
himself. Christ chose to become incarnate in a kenotic manner in order 
to fully share in our human lot or condition while on earth. On this 
view, God’s self-emptying is not necessary for incarnation (2002: 265).  
Once this glorification has taken place, it could thus be maintained that 
although – because the Son is once again omnipotent and omniscient – kenosis 
ceases, His incarnation continues, and in virtue of this He’s human for 
evermore.  
  However, in spite of all of these suggestions, I don’t wish to endorse 
this option as a means of accounting for the compatibility of kenosis and Hill’s 
two requirements. In Chapter 4, I argued that an omniscient, omnipotent God 
on the one hand, and a limited human, on the other, were fundamentally 
incompatible. I stand by this view here, not least because of the extent to which I 
think it aligns with common sense to assert that a single (limited) human being 
can’t also be unlimited in power and knowledge. After all, it was this that led to 
my criticism and rejection of the two minds account, and it was what shaped 
much of my endorsement of kenoticism – because the latter account doesn’t 
attribute all of these attributes to the Son during His earthly life. Of course, 
kenoticism as I defended it does allow that the earthly Son is both divine and 
human at once (on pain of unorthodoxy), but I argued both that divinity in this 
case needn’t require omnipotence or omniscience (simpliciter), and that the lack 
of these latter attributes is in fact required as a partial guarantee of  the Son’s 
humanity.  
To argue (as Feenstra suggests) that the Son could have become 
incarnate in other ways besides kenosis would be contradicting the thought 
that a single being can’t at once be omniscient, omnipotent, and a human. 
Moreover, I think that this thought aligns with our intuitions – when we think 
about the spatial finitude of humans as we know them, it seems very difficult 
to imagine, for example, how a human brain could store the infinite amount of 
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knowledge that’s presumably a feature of omniscience. Humans as we know 
them are also embodied, as was the earthly Son, and we presume that there are 
also limits to the powers of these bodies. They must, plausibly, obey physical 
laws such that they’re (for instance) unable to travel faster than light. This 
limitation seems to be inconsistent with omnipotence. It therefore seems that 
it’s at least a common sense intuition to suppose that omniscience and 
omnipotence are incompatible with humanity. 
However, it might be responded that the argument that the Son didn’t 
have to become incarnate via kenoticism doesn’t problematically attribute 
omniscience, omnipotence and humanity to the Son at once, because it qualifies 
omniscience and omnipotence in such a way that they’re compatible with 
humanity. This suggestion is due to Davis. Given that on kenoticism there’s a 
time in which the Son isn’t omniscient and omnipotent, Davis suggests that 
there’s no problem with these ‘modified’ divine attributes being compatible 
with the Son’s humanity. He says that the Son is ‘not now, as we might say, 
omnipotent and omniscient simpliciter. And I think those properties – being 
omnipotent and omniscient but not omnipotent and omniscient simpliciter –
are indeed logically compatible with full humanity’ (2011: 129). Davis’s idea is 
that because the kenoticist already accepts some modification of the divine 
attributes (that they’re divested for a time) as part and parcel of her account, 
then she’s already acknowledged that the Son isn’t omniscient and omnipotent 
simpliciter. This is moreover consistent with my argument in Chapter 4 that the 
essential properties of divinity aren’t in fact omniscience and omnipotence 
simpliciter, but rather ‘omniscient[-and-omnipotent]-unless-freely-and-
temporarily-choosing-to-be-otherwise’ (Morris 1986: 99). Davis then suggests 
that these ‘reconsidered’ divine attributes are indeed compatible with humanity. 
The kenoticist could therefore build upon the suggestion that the incarnation 
doesn’t of necessity require kenosis by claiming that the Son’s (modified) 
omniscience and omnipotence aren’t incompatible with His humanity.  
My response here is that the way that omniscience and omnipotence 
are qualified by Morris (the qualification that I endorsed) isn’t the sort of 
qualification that will help to ease an incompatibility with humanity. I’m 
following Morris in specifying that omniscience and omnipotence are qualified 
in that they don’t have to be possessed by a divine being at all times: they can be 
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relinquished for a period if that divine being freely chooses to do so. 
Importantly, I’m not compromising the maximal amount of power and 
knowledge that an omniscient and omnipotent being has when it’s in possession 
of these attributes. This modification of the divine attributes therefore helps in 
the case of the earthly Son, because it enables Him to relinquish omniscience 
and omnipotence, and yet to still be divine (alongside being human). However, 
this modification fails to avoid the incompatibility that arises for the exalted 
Son between on the one hand, omniscience and omnipotence, and on the 
other, humanity. When the Son is exalted, He regains His omniscience and 
omnipotence, in the fullest sense possible, for these attributes are not to be 
diminished in any sense when a divine being is in possession of them. I 
suggested, however, that these attributes in their full senses are incompatible 
with being a limited human. For this reason, I contend that omniscience and 
omnipotence, when possessed, are incompatible with humanity, and this is 
therefore also the case for a being that possesses the former two attributes in 
the ‘unless-freely-and-temporarily-choosing-to-be-otherwise’ sense that I 
endorse. I’ll therefore explore alternative ways that the kenoticist might be able 
to meet Hill’s two glorification requirements.   
 
(3.2) OPTION 2 
There’s a second way for the kenoticist to respond to Crisp’s worry 
that we must be able to explain why omniscience and omnipotence aren’t 
incompatible with humanity when the Son is exalted, but they are incompatible 
when He’s living on earth. It retains an important insight from the previous 
response, which is the distinction between the Son’s act of kenosis, on the one 
hand, and His incarnation, on the other. The idea, suggested by Feenstra, is 
that kenosis is necessary for the Son to become human, but not for Him to be 
human. Feenstra says that: 
 
Christ needed to empty himself of omniscience in order…to become 
truly human, but Christ can, once he is incarnate, regain this attribute 
without ceasing to possess true humanity. With this, the kenotic theory 
appears to have at least some reply to the criticism that it cannot 
accommodate an exalted Christ who is both omniscient and truly 
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human. This response depends, however, upon a premise that many 
might challenge: becoming incarnate, but not being incarnate, is 
incompatible with the possession of attributes such as omniscience 
(1989: 147).  
 
This account, like the previous one, assumes that kenosis is distinct from the 
incarnation: kenosis may have been required as the Son’s means of becoming 
incarnate, but once this has happened it’s no longer needed to ensure that He 
remains incarnate. It’s also important to note that this account accepts the 
assumption that omniscience and omnipotence are incompatible with 
humanity when the Son becomes incarnate, but then rejects it for the rest of the 
incarnation, including glorification. To be clear, there are two possible readings 
of the phrase ‘kenosis is necessary for the Son to be incarnate now’. It could 
mean (i) kenosis must necessarily continue to obtain in order for the Son to be 
incarnate now, or (ii) kenosis must necessarily have initially obtained in order for 
the Son to be incarnate now. The former interpretation is what Feenstra 
denies. Rather, he accepts the latter: kenosis is necessary for becoming, and not 
being, incarnate. In other words, kenosis is indeed a necessary precondition for 
being incarnate, but it’s not required in order for the incarnation to then 
continue – which is no problem for Feenstra’s claim, because of course this is 
exactly what he suggests: kenosis is necessary to ‘become’, but not to ‘be’ 
incarnate. This could also be illustrated with an analogy of becoming a father. 
For someone to become a father, it’s necessary that they cease to be celibate, 
but then they could be celibate again and yet continue to be a father. Similarly, 
it could be argued that to become incarnate, kenosis is necessary, but – 
following this – kenosis can be relinquished and the incarnation can 
nevertheless continue.   
 One way to respond here could be to insist on the disanalogy between 
becoming a father and becoming human, such that one can’t make the above 
comparison. It might be, for example, that whilst fatherhood is a status that 
can’t be lost once it has obtained, humanity can be relinquished if certain 
conditions fail to obtain. In Chapter 2, after all, I argued that the Son is 
‘accidentally’ (not essentially) a member of the natural kind ‘human person’. 
Furthermore, if humanity can’t be relinquished once it’s been taken on, then 
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there would be no need for me to argue a case for the Son’s perpetual 
humanity when He’s exalted – His humanity would instead be a given.  
Moreover, I think a better way to respond to Feenstra’s suggestion that 
kenosis is necessary for becoming, but not for being, incarnate, is to examine 
the very motivations for this claim. Unlike with the first suggestion that 
kenosis isn’t required for incarnation, here there’s at least a reason for stating 
that the exalted Son can be omniscient, omnipotent and human, whereas this 
can’t be the case during His earthly life. This reason is that the initial act of the 
Son’s ‘becoming’ incarnate requires, of necessity, that He lack omniscience and 
omnipotence, whereas the state of ‘being’ incarnate doesn’t require this. 
However, what’s the reason for this speculation? It might be argued that it 
appears an ad hoc amendment to kenoticism. Feenstra himself, after all, 
suspects that it might be accused of being a ‘futile and contrived attempt’ 
(ibid.: 147) to rescue kenoticism. Evans also shares this worry. He says that ‘if 
it is possible to be embodied and have these qualities, it is hard to see why it 
would not be possible to become embodied with these qualities’ (2002: 264-5).  
 Evans has suggested a response to this worry, and it involves appealing 
to the (limited) human body that the Son takes on when He becomes 
incarnate. He says: 
 
It seems plausible that if the Son decided to live as a bodily human 
being, living his mental life as other humans do through the physical 
processes that occur in the brain and central nervous system, then he 
would be deciding to accept limitations (2006: 201).  
 
This certainly gives credence to the idea that kenosis is required for this act of 
taking on a limited human body, for it indeed seems difficult to imagine how 
an ordinary body can be both omniscient and omnipotent, as I also suggested 
earlier.10 In contrast, Evans says that when the Son is exalted (and yet, still 
incarnate), His body is glorified, in such a way that it ‘differs dramatically from 
our ordinary human bodies’ (ibid.: 201). In light of this, Evans speculates that 
‘Christ’s incarnation in an ordinary human body may have required a kenosis, 
                                                             
10 I also outlined this worry in Chapter 2. 
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but the kind of body he possesses in his glorified state may be compatible with 
the reassumption of all the traditional theistic properties’ (ibid.: 201-2).11  
 If this route is to be taken, one might reasonably demand to know 
more about the nature of a glorified body. If such a body is non-spatial, then 
calling it a glorified body seems to be something of an oxymoron. If it is alleged 
to be spatial, however, all of the worries regarding the present location of this 
body (worries I outlined in section 1) resurface. Furthermore, one might not 
want to part with a glorified body (whether or not it’s spatial) because of the 
importance of bodily resurrection to glorification. I don’t want to place any 
argumentative weight on this notion of the Son’s glorified body, but I do want 
to note that kenoticists have the option of appealing to it. They would, 
however, need to tell us more about what this body is like.  
Even granting Evans that the Son’s glorified human body (if indeed He 
possesses one) doesn’t conflict with His being omniscient and omnipotent, the 
Son nevertheless possesses His limited body for a significant amount of time 
after He’s ‘become’ incarnate – for His entire earthly life, no less. He’s not 
‘becoming’ incarnate throughout this time, but rather ‘being’ incarnate: living 
as a human being. If there’s an incompatibility between the Son’s possession of 
a limited body and His divine properties when He becomes incarnate, 
therefore, then I see no reason why this incompatibility wouldn’t remain for as 
long as the Son continues to possess this body. What is more, to argue that the 
Son can be omniscient, omnipotent and human without any contradiction once 
He has ‘become’ incarnate is also once again to deny my assumption in 
Chapter 4 that a single being cannot be omniscient, omnipotent and at the same 
time genuinely human. For these reasons combined, I don’t think that 
appealing to the necessity of kenosis for ‘becoming’, but not for ‘being’ 
incarnate is a viable way to make sense of the Son’s perpetual humanity when 
He’s exalted.  
 
 
 
                                                             
11 Incidentally, this links with my account of ‘glorified’ humanity which I’ll discuss in the 
subsequent section, although I won’t argue that this glorified body is necessary for 
exaltation.  
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(3.3) OPTION 3 
 Fortunately, I think there’s a final way that the kenoticist can 
accommodate Hill’s two glorification requirements. Consistently with my 
arguments in Chapter 4, this line of argument also accepts the assumption that 
omniscience and omnipotence are of necessity incompatible with humanity. 
This was the assumption that we earlier saw dubbed a ‘premise’ of kenotic 
Christology by Feenstra, which further emphasises its presumed importance to 
kenoticism. Again, it’s worth noting that this ‘premise’ doesn’t mean that 
divinity is incompatible with humanity, which would be unorthodox. Rather, it 
means only that omniscience and omnipotence simpliciter aren’t necessary for 
being divine.  I think the kenoticist could claim that the glorified Son is in full 
possession of omnipotence and omniscience, and remains human, thanks to a 
particular qualification of what we mean by ‘human’.  
The perpetual humanity requirement can be met, I submit, by 
maintaining that the Son is still human because He was human – during His 
earthly life. In an earlier paper to the one that’s formed a springboard for this 
chapter, Hill suggests that the kenoticist might employ just such an argument 
to account for the Son’s divinity while He’s on earth. He suggests that the 
kenoticist could: 
 
…accept that the incarnate Christ does lack essential divine properties, 
but still counts as divine in a secondary sort of sense because he was 
divine—rather as former US presidents are still addressed as ‘Mr 
President’ despite no longer having the powers of office (2011: 18).  
 
This response could likewise be applied as a guarantee of the Son’s humanity 
when He’s exalted. It could be made more sophisticated by appealing to the 
phase sortals of the Son’s life. Crisp hints at something like this when he says 
that there might be certain divine attributes that are ‘phase-essential’ (2007: 
138) to the Son’s life: ‘that is, essential to certain phases of the life of the Word, 
rather as a tadpole may have certain essential properties that a frog does not’ 
(ibid.). The kenoticist might therefore argue that the Son’s human properties 
(such as lacking knowledge and power), are ‘phase essential’ to Him: they’re 
only required during the part of His life in which He lives as a human on earth, 
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where He experienced human limitations and temptations as a result of this 
lack of knowledge. The kenoticist could also argue that during this part of His 
life the Son experiences (increased) empathy for the human race, which will 
remain with Him when He’s glorified. If the Son hadn’t become incarnate as a 
human, He’d never have come to possess such a deep level of empathy for the 
human race.  
Importantly, this added knowledge that comes from empathy doesn’t 
have to mean that the Son wasn’t omniscient prior to the incarnation. Rather, 
one can argue that when unincarnate He knew all of the propositional knowledge 
that was to be known, and merely added to His experiential knowledge in the 
incarnation – namely, the knowledge of ‘what it’s like’ to be human. We can 
compare this with Mary the colour scientist coming to leave her black and 
white room, as she does in Frank Jackson’s famous thought experiment (1982: 
127-36). Even though in her room Mary knows all the propositional facts 
about seeing colour, upon leaving it she learns what it’s like to experience 
colour.  
In fact, it might not even be that the Son gains experiential knowledge at 
all in becoming incarnate. Linda Zagzebski, in discussing Mary the colour 
scientist, says: 
I do not assume that when Mary leaves her black-and-white room and 
begins to see in colour, she comes to know something she did not 
know previously. Although what it is like to see in colour differs from 
what it is like to see in black and white, the difference may not be a 
difference in what one knows. It might not even be an epistemic 
difference. Nonetheless, Mary’s mental state after she leaves the room 
differs from her state before she leaves the room. Everyone agrees 
about that (2008: 233).  
 
In line with Zagzebski, we can argue that the Son’s mental state differs when 
He experiences what it’s like to be human, and as such develops (increased) 
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empathy for the human race. We could then argue that this guarantees His 
humanity when He’s exalted.12  
Kenoticists could thus appeal to these phase sortals, and claim that the 
perpetual humanity requirement is met when the Son is exalted, because of the 
empathy, and perhaps added experiential knowledge, that His earthly life 
provided Him with. Christ retains this experience of what it’s like to be human 
when He’s exalted, and it’s therefore thanks to this prior phase of His life that 
He remains ‘experientially’ human when He’s glorified. This could be further 
supported by Brown, who suggests that the exalted Son’s human nature is 
retained as a result of His ‘remembered experience’ (1985: 234) of being 
incarnate on earth. This argument is similar to a response that I suggested for 
the two minds theorist in light of the Son’s glorification, which is also due to 
Brown – although I criticised it there for failing to preserve anything like ‘two 
minds’ in Christ.  
I think that this final option for the kenoticist is promising. To expand, 
it could be argued that we can be human in either a ‘glorified’ or an ‘earthly’ 
sense. We’re born earthly humans, with limited bodies, susceptible to hunger 
and temptation. If we achieve salvation, though, we become glorified humans. 
In the case of the Son, who is divine as well as human, this means that He’s 
omniscient and omnipotent when He’s a glorified human. As for the rest of us, 
we perhaps possess more (although not unlimited) knowledge and power when 
glorified, and our glorified bodies (if we possess such things) needn’t be 
spatially located, unlike our earthly bodies. 13  An important qualification to 
make here is that a necessary condition of being a glorified human is having been 
an earthly human – and so, possessing memories of what it’s like to live as a 
limited human on earth.14 On this account, therefore, the relevant phase sortals 
                                                             
12 In Chapter 3, I considered this as a way for atemporalists to claim that the Son’s relation 
to B+S is different to His relation with every other human. I argued that they’re unable to 
make such an argument because it requires the Son’s life to be temporal.  
13 I say ‘if’ we possess glorified bodies because I’ve mentioned that I want to remain 
neutral regarding whether the possession of a glorified body is necessary for glorification. 
If the kenoticist wishes to appeal to the Son’s glorified body, she owes us an account of 
what such a body is like.  
14 This distinction between earthly and glorified humanity meshes well with the separate 
distinction (due to Morris) that I made in Chapters 2 and 4, between being ‘merely’ and 
‘fully’ human. It could be argued that we mere humans can be either glorified or earthly 
humans. The Son, being fully divine as well as fully human, can be either a glorified or an 
earthly human, but if He’s the former He can also be omniscient and omnipotent, thanks 
to His divinity.  
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of the Son’s life would be ‘earthly human’ and ‘glorified human’ – with, for 
instance, limited knowledge and power being phase essential to the former 
sortals, but not the latter.15  
As aforementioned, this solution also endorses the assumption that the 
possession of omnipotence and omniscience are incompatible with being 
human – it simply qualifies ‘being human’ in the case of this incompatibility as 
meaning ‘being ontologically human’, which is indeed flatly incompatible with 
being omniscient and omnipotent. At least, if this incompatibility didn’t exist, 
there’d be no need for this argument at all, because the exalted Son could be 
ontologically human at the times that He’s glorified. This is to be expected, 
given my endorsement of the ‘incoherence problem’ that arises when 
omnipotence and omniscience, alongside (ontological) humanity, are attributed 
to the same being at the same time. This proposed solution maintains instead 
that the exalted Son is omnipotent, omniscient, and experientially human: human 
in virtue of His memories and experiences of living as an earthly human. It 
maintains that there’s no incompatibility in this case.  
It could be responded here that it’s not enough that the Son has this 
‘experiential’ humanity when He’s exalted, for we want Him to be genuinely, 
ontologically human when glorified. That is, we don’t want Him to merely count 
as human because He once was human, or can remember the experience of 
being human. In a similar vein, Feenstra responds directly to Brown’s 
suggestion that the exalted Son is human thanks to His memories. He says that 
Brown’s theory ‘seems to be an alternative to, rather than an interpretation of, 
the Chalcedonian two-natures doctrine’, (1989: 145) and that it ‘leaves no room 
for the continuing humanity of the exalted Christ’ (ibid., my italics). An 
important constraint on my account of the incarnation is of course that it 
remains within the confines of orthodoxy, and it could be argued that this 
‘experiential’ account of the exalted Son’s humanity seems to be stretching 
orthodoxy dangerously close to breaking point. Furthermore, it seems that if 
the exalted Son isn’t ontologically human, then believers wouldn’t be 
                                                             
15 Incidentally, it’s important to know that ‘divine’ isn’t a phase sortal, because divinity is 
something that’s possessed essentially: it can’t be taken on and it can’t be given up. This is 
in line with my discussion in Chapter 2, around the idea that the Son is essentially a 
member of the (super)natural kind ‘divine person’ – or, at least, that He essentially possess 
His individual divine essence. 
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warranted to believe of themselves and their loved ones that they’ll one day be 
glorified. 
I’d respond to this latter objection by highlighting the important 
difference between our glorification and the Son’s glorification. We mere 
humans, unlike the Son, don’t become omnipotent and omniscient when we’re 
glorified. Granting this, it seems that we can hope for glorification as 
(ontological) humans, because we (unlike the Son) don’t possess omniscience 
and omnipotence, so there’s no incompatibility present in the notion of our 
being raised in glory. Of course, it remains the case that we wouldn’t be able to 
achieve salvation at all (even if there exists no contradiction between our 
humanity and the way in which we’re glorified) unless the Son Himself has 
been glorified, but I’m suggesting that the Son is glorified as an experiential 
human, which allows that He can also be omnipotent and omniscient. The 
Son’s glorification then paves the way for our glorification as ontological 
humans. Granted, once we’re glorified we may perhaps be more knowledgeable 
and powerful than we were on earth, but we’re certainly not omniscient or 
omnipotent like the exalted Son, so there’s no threat of a contradiction 
between our knowledge and power, on the one hand, and our humanity, on the 
other. 
In response to the more general objection that I’ve attributed to the 
Son an unacceptably weak sense of humanity, I want to firstly re-stress that in 
order to be experientially human, it’s necessary that one have been ontologically 
human. This makes experiential humanity far less cheap to achieve. 
Furthermore, I venture that we wouldn’t want all of Christ’s ontological 
human attributes (such as His falsely believing that it’s possible for Him to sin, 
and His being limited in power such that He’s incapable of responding to our 
prayers) to remain when He’s exalted. Rather, I think that we desire a perfect 
sense of humanity for the exalted Son: one in which (though He recalls exactly 
what it’s like to be human and be limited) He’s nonetheless back in possession 
of omniscience and omnipotence.  
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(4) CONCLUSION 
 This chapter has examined how temporalists might account for Hill’s 
two constraints upon an acceptable account of the exaltation. I considered two 
kinds of temporalist models, arguing firstly that two minds models can’t 
accommodate the Son’s glorification. I next considered kenoticism, which 
appears at first to be incompatible with glorification, because of its alleged 
failure to meet Hill’s perpetual humanity requirement. I argued that this alleged 
incompatibility arises because of an assumption that kenoticists are committed 
to: the impossibility of an omnipotent and omniscient being that’s also human. 
I outlined two kenotic arguments that either fully, or partially, reject this 
assumption. The gist of these was that kenoticists can maintain that (for either 
part of, or all of, His incarnation), the Son didn’t need to be kenotically incarnate 
in order to be incarnate. However, I argued against these two accounts. 
Instead, I defended the view that the exalted Son is in full possession of 
omniscience and omnipotence, and is experientially human thanks to His 
memories of what it’s like to live on earth as a limited human.  In defending 
kenoticism, I argued against Hill’s contention that ‘no temporalist model of the 
incarnation can easily meet [the exaltation and perpetual humanity 
requirements]’ (2012: 22).16  
To sum up the state of play so far, then: Part one concluded that divine 
temporalism and atemporalism were able to (at least provisionally) account for 
the Son becoming incarnate. However, kenoticism (and, in virtue of this, 
divine temporalism), was championed in Parts two and three. I therefore 
conclude that prioritising an orthodox account of the incarnation of the Son of 
God strongly suggests that God Himself is temporal.  This is without a doubt a 
significant result for those interested in whether and how a Christian God 
relates to time. I’ll now deepen this finding by considering debates about the 
metaphysics of time itself. After all, it’s all very well to say that God exists 
inside of time, but how are we to understand time’s nature? Furthermore, what 
                                                             
16 One might object that my response to Hill is still one whereby temporalism doesn’t 
‘easily’ meet the exaltation and perpetual humanity requirements. It’s evident that Hill is 
confident that things are far more difficult for the temporalist than I’ve argued here, 
however. He says that temporalist models ‘struggle’ (2012: 3) to accommodate the 
glorification requirements, discussing different variants of temporalist models in turn, and 
dismissing each. I’m confident that my argument here makes things far easier, and far less 
of a struggle, than Hill would allege for temporalists.  
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is it to exist ‘inside’ of time? These considerations will be the subject of the 
final part of the thesis, which will in turn provide us with deeper insights into 
the exact nature of God’s temporality. 
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PART IV) REFLECTIONS 
FROM THE METAPHYSICS 
OF TIME 
 Having now examined three important elements of the incarnation and 
how they shape our view of God’s relation to time, the final part of this thesis 
takes a step back, examining debates about the nature of time itself.  
Incarnational considerations have revealed that God is best understood as 
temporal, but the picture of God’s temporality can look quite different 
depending upon the metaphysics of time that we’re working with.  
In Chapter 7 I outline the substantivalism vs. relationism debate. I consider 
(and endorse) the thought that in the history of the debate over God’s relation 
to time, substantivalist assumptions have been all too readily in play. I instead 
examine a potential relationist picture of the incarnation due to Le Poidevin, 
which allegedly allows for us to uphold at once two senses of God’s 
atemporality and one of His temporality. I argue that these senses of 
atemporality are riddled with problems. However, I venture that Le Poidevin’s 
sense of a temporal God is one that’s uniquely available to relationists. This 
result provides independent support for my argument thus far: the temporal 
God that has emerged victorious in the first 3 parts of my thesis is one that can 
be understood whether time is substantival or relational. 
 In Chapter 8, I consider the tensed vs. tenseless debate about the nature 
of time. I argue that in the history of the debate about divine eternity, a 
timeless God has almost exclusively been assumed to exist outside of tenseless 
time, and a temporal God to exist inside of tensed time. I consider how we 
might shake up these traditional pairings, firstly by examining Leftow’s 
suggestion that a timeless God can exist outside of presentist time. I argue that 
this picture is incoherent, and I also argue – for good measure – that a timeless 
God additionally can’t exist outside of Growing Block time or Moving 
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Spotlight time. I next consider the alternative way of revising the traditional 
pairings: a temporal God existing within tenseless time. I argue that this is a 
coherent picture, and that it has independent benefits to boot. It therefore 
ought to be taken seriously in the future debate. This chapter therefore 
strengthens my argument that a temporal God is the best way to understand 
divine eternity in light of incarnational commitments. That is, if God is 
atemporal, we’re forced into time being tenseless on pain of incoherence, 
whereas if God is temporal, we’re free to adhere to either a tensed or a tenseless 
view of time.  
Henceforth, although I’ll continue with a Christian God firmly in mind 
in order to shed important light on the foregoing discussion, I venture that 
these chapters have wider ramifications. As well as considering how my 
previous arguments might look depending upon one’s metaphysics of time, a 
broader conversation is also being had here, regarding how the metaphysics of 
time affects our idea of God’s eternity – where, I think, ‘God’ can potentially be 
understood as a God of theism in general. 
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CHAPTER 7 
A RELATIONIST ‘TERTIUM 
QUID?’ 
 Hitherto, my exploration of the (a)temporal metaphysics of the 
incarnation has rested on certain assumptions about the nature of time itself. 
I’ve been contrasting two popular, conflicting and well-rehearsed views 
regarding God’s relation to time: divine temporality and divine atemporality. 
These indeed appear exhaustive, for one might wonder how else God can exist 
if not ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ of time. Mullins certainly agrees that there are no 
other (a)temporal modes of existence on offer:  
 
Trying to find a third way is like hunting for snipe and haggis: it is a 
futile hunt because it is nothing more than a trick perpetrated on the 
uninformed. When it comes to whether God is temporal or atemporal, 
there is simply no third way. The two positions are logically 
contradictory…there are no other options (2016: xvi).[1] 
 
Contra Mullins, I’ll argue that divine atemporality and divine temporality don’t, 
in fact, present an exhaustive dichotomy, because they rest on substantivalist 
assumptions about the nature of time. This chapter looks again at the 
ontological status of time, examining how going relationist can shed new light 
onto this ancient debate.  
Section 1 illustrates substantivalism and its commitments, before 
explaining where and how it’s been assumed in previous debates over God’s 
relation to time. I then elucidate the opposing view: temporal relationism. 
Section 2 argues that abandoning our substantivalist assumptions in favour of 
                                                             
1 Snipe are wading birds that are notoriously difficult to hunt due to their excellent 
camouflage and erratic flying style. ‘Going on a snipe hunt’ is therefore a phrase used to 
describe attempting a near impossible task. Hunting haggis would, of course, be an even 
more futile pursuit.  
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relationism gives us a very different picture of God’s relation to time: one 
which has hitherto received little consideration. In fact, Le Poidevin is, to my 
knowledge, the only author to have explicitly attempted to flesh out the 
relationist position in any substantial way, and he does so specifically with the 
incarnation in mind. He postulates three different ways in which God relates to 
time – two of which are forms of atemporality, and one of which is a form of 
temporality. I explain that because Le Poidevin’s relationism is ‘radically 
reductionist’ (I call his position ‘RR-relationism’), all of these positions are 
allegedly attributable to the very same being at once. Explicating Le Poidevin’s 
account in section 3, I suggest that his single commitment to God’s 
temporality is novel and coherent. Nevertheless, Le Poidevin’s three 
commitments, when held together, are incoherent. This is due to the problems 
with each of his two commitments to divine atemporality. I argue that one of 
these commitments is heavily dependent on the other for its credibility (section 
4), and that the commitment being relied upon is itself internally problematic 
(section 5). Furthermore, I present an argument that Le Poidevin’s latter two 
aspects of divine atemporality are in fact at odds with each other in worrying 
ways (section 6). In section 7, I consider briefly how we might now make sense 
of an RR-relationist, kenotic incarnation, arguing that there’s nothing stopping 
temporalists from claiming that the Son of God became incarnate ‘in’ RR-
relationist time. This is due to the coherence of Le Poidevin’s novel 
commitment to divine temporality. I reflect again upon this commitment, 
explaining that it reinforces my main argument in this thesis. That is, this foray 
into the relationist and substantivalist debates generates a further reason why (a 
sense of) divine temporality ought to be preferred over divine atemporality.  
This is because divine temporality alone is compatible with RR-relationism and 
substantivalism.  
 
(1) SUBSTANTIVALIST SUPPOSITIONS 
 According to temporal substantivalism, time is like a container in which 
everything else occurs or exists. 2  Time, then, is an entity which exists 
                                                             
2 Given considerations arising from the Special and General theories of relativity, it’s 
become more common to speak of space and time as unified into a single entity: 
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independently of the events that occupy it: it would exist whether or not any 
events occurred at any of its instants. Furthermore, no event can exist without 
being simultaneous with some instant(s) of time. These commitments are at 
odds with relationism, which denies that time exists independently of its 
contents. Time, for the relationist, is: ‘nothing over and above temporal 
relations among events and things located in it….if there were no objects and 
events, there would be no time, for time is not a thing…but rather a system of 
relations among events and things’ (Benovsky 2010: 491-2). 
 We therefore have two opposing views about the ontological status of 
time. Depending upon whether we frame the question of God’s relation to 
time in relationist or substantivalist terms, the issue appears quite different. For 
the substantivalist, it’s something like: What’s God’s relation to time, where time is 
something that exists independently of the events and entities that occupy it? For the 
relationist, it’s more like: What’s God’s relation to time, where time is nothing over and 
above the system of particular relations between events and entities? Making explicit these 
understandings helps us to see that a substantivalist and a relationist pondering 
God’s relation to time are in fact considering quite different issues. However, it 
appears that throughout the course of the debate over God’s relation to time, 
substantivalism has all too often been assumed, and yet there have been no 
explicit substantivalist cards on the table. 
 One way in which substantivalism has been assumed is by framing the 
question of God’s relation to time as a matter of whether He exists ‘inside’ or 
‘outside’ of it. For instance, Pike (1970:10) references Anselm commenting that 
a timeless God can’t exist ‘now,’ because that being would be ‘contained’ by time 
(1958: 83). Swinburne discusses a timeless God in a similar way: ‘to say that 
God is eternal is to say that he is timeless, that he exists outside the ‘stream’ of 
time. His actions are timeless, although they have their effects in time’ (1977: 
216). Leftow has been a prominent figure in the preceding chapters, so it’s only 
fitting to include a similar comment from him. In discussing what 
atemporalists (such as himself) mean when they talk of God ‘existing’, Leftow 
                                                                                                                                                           
‘spacetime.’ I’ll continue to consider the debate in terms of substantivalism versus 
relationism about time alone, but the debate is still intelligible when we consider it 
applying to a unified relativistic spacetime. I defer to Sklar (1974: 163-4) and Hoefer 
(1998: 452-466) here. Le Poidevin also uses the term ‘spacetime’ as one that’s neutral 
between relativistic and non-relativistic theories – suggesting that he, too, considers the 
substantivalist vs. relationist debate to be intelligible in light of relativistic considerations 
(2017: 212). 
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says: ‘when I say truly that God exists, I, here (in time), say truly that God 
exists (over there, outside time)’ (2002: 275). Definitions of a temporal God are 
similar: Wolterstorff talks about God being ‘fundamentally in time’ (1982:95). 
Gregory E. Ganssle, too, says that a temporal God ‘exists at all times and 
through all times…he is in time’ (2002: 13).  
In the above quotations, I’ve italicised the particular words and phrases 
that imply a substantivalist conception of time. Speaking of God as existing 
either ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ time lends itself to a conception of time as a sort of 
‘container’ that we can be either within or without. Furthermore, speaking of 
existing ‘at’ a time suggests that time is an entity in itself, comprising 
independently existing points at which we can either exist or not exist.  
Now, the relationist might insist that she finds nothing disagreeable 
about the nature of time in the above statements. After all, she could just as 
well say that God exists ‘outside’ time, but would simply insist that this means 
He isn’t a part of our structure of events and entities which themselves constitute 
a temporal structure. Similarly, to say that a timeless God doesn’t exist ‘at’ any 
time is, for the relationist, to say that neither He, nor any event in His life, is 
simultaneous with any other event or entity. What’s being denied by the 
relationist is that the debate hinges on whether or not God exists inside or 
outside time, where time is something that exists independently of events and entities. 
The relationist could therefore insist that, so long as we do indeed deny that 
time exists independently of events and entities, then any of the above 
quotations can be endorsed.  
 This is all well and good for the relationist, although arguably a 
substantivalist reading of these statements is still the more direct and 
straightforward one. Furthermore, once we move past initial definitions and 
consider arguments in favour of either God’s temporality or atemporality, we 
can see that many of these indeed rely for their force on substantivalist 
assumptions about the nature of time.  
The first of these comes from Augustine: famously one of the first 
thinkers to ponder God’s relation to time. In response to the potential 
question of what God did before creating the universe, Augustine says: ‘How 
could innumerable ages pass over, which thyself hadst not made; thou being 
the author and creator of all ages? Or what times should these have been, 
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which were not made by thee?’ (1912: 235). Augustine is arguing that it’s 
nonsensical to question what God was doing before creation, because there 
can’t have been these times before creation unless God created them. Time 
seems to be an entity in itself, which God creates in its own right. This suggests 
that time exists independently of created events (albeit dependently on God). 
Again, it could be maintained that there’s nothing objectionable for the 
relationist in this passage. It could be in virtue of creating the universe and 
things in it that God created time – time simply being a construction from the 
relations between these created things. However, a substantivalist reading of 
the above is certainly more natural – for Augustine says that God made ‘times’ 
and ‘all ages’ – with there being nothing to qualify this as an indirect creation in 
virtue of His creation of other things such as entities and events.  
 A further way in which substantivalism has been assumed in the 
foregoing debate is when it’s argued that a temporal God would face a threat 
to His omnipotence due to somehow being ‘bound’ or ‘constrained’ by time. 
Zimmerman notes how substantivalist assumptions affect the debate over 
God’s omnipotence: ‘one frequently voiced objection to the thesis that God is 
in time is that it makes the deity subordinate to a created thing, namely, time 
itself…such worries would have considerable force for a theist committed to 
substantivalism about times’ (2002: 85). 
It also seems that Leftow is employing these substantival assumptions 
when discussing problems with divine temporality. He argues that alternate 
time series are possible, and that a temporal God can’t create such a series.3 He 
says ‘hence if God is temporal, possibly there is a contingent entity He cannot 
create…accordingly, if God is temporal, He is not omnipotent’ (1991: 273). 
This seems to place the ontological priority in a direction that favours the 
substantivalist: time is an ‘entity’ that can exist independently of its contents. 
Sturch, too, suggests that for God to be temporal is for Him to be in some 
sense constrained by time, as though time were an independently-existing 
entity. Sturch says that, because God is a being upon whom the whole universe 
                                                             
3 For a time series to be genuinely alternate, or ‘discrete’ from ours, Leftow requires that 
no moments in it are simultaneous with (or earlier than or later than) any points of our 
time series. (1991: 21-22). The reason why Leftow argues that a temporal God can’t create 
an alternate time series is that it would be impossible for a being to participate in multiple 
(and genuinely discrete) time series. He says that ‘I cannot conceive of one mind having 
two nonsimultaneous experiences neither of which is earlier than the other’ (1991: 30). 
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depends for its existence, God ‘is surely most unlikely to be Himself time-
bound’ (1991: 257).  
I’ve suggested that many authors have been assuming substantivalism 
in their arguments and in their framing of the debate – or, at the very least, that 
a substantivalist interpretation of these arguments is the more straightforward 
reading of these. I’ll now show that even presenting the debate over God’s 
relation to time as being between divine temporality and divine atemporality, 
with no other options, is itself to be operating with substantivalist assumptions 
in play. I’ll argue that, if time is relational, new pictures of God’s possible 
relation to time emerge.  
 
(2) RELATIONIST REVELATIONS 
Numerous authors (including Mullins above) present the debate over 
God’s relation to time as a debate between two, and only two, positions – 
temporality and atemporality.4 Leftow argues that our relation to time is one 
we possess necessarily. He says ‘in no possible world can a timeless thing 
become temporal or a temporal thing become timeless’ (1991: 43). According 
to Leftow, there’s a gulf between the two positions so vast that timeless beings 
(necessarily) can’t cease to be so: ‘temporal and timeless beings will have to 
have properties so radically different as to make transworld identification of 
such beings implausible. The greater these differences, then, the more plausible 
it is that whatever is timeless is necessarily so’ (ibid.: 44).  
With relationism, however, the picture is allegedly different, and 
positing a hybrid view doesn’t so obviously entail a contradiction. 
Unfortunately, however, relationist forays into God’s relation to time are 
extremely thin on the ground. William Lane Craig has briefly suggested that 
temporal relationism can help us to make sense of God being timeless until 
creation, at which point He enters into time. He says that, given relationism, 
‘God would exist timelessly and independently prior to creation; at creation, 
which he has willed from eternity to appear temporally, time begins, and God 
                                                             
4 See also, for instance, Swinburne (1977: 211), Helm (1994: 2), DeWeese (2004: 2-3), 
Everitt (2004: 270-1) and Hill (2012: 10), who all speak of just two candidates: temporality 
and atemporality.   
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subjects himself to time by being related to changing things’ (1978: 502). Craig 
isn’t himself a relationist (2001: 143-96), which is perhaps why he simply hints 
at how the relationist picture might look, without fleshing it out beyond the 
latter suggestion. This has left the position susceptible to attack – for instance, 
from Helm, who takes issue with a timeless God entering time: ‘there can be 
no temporal ‘and then’ for a timelessly eternal God’ (2014). This aligns with my 
argument in Chapter 1 that God can’t change intrinsically in order to become 
human, because this requires Him to be one way at one time, and a different 
way at a later time.  Moreover, if a timeless being exists at any moment of time 
– even just one – then the being won’t be timeless after all.  
It’s not obvious that Helm’s argument threatens Craig’s relationist 
position if the latter is properly understood: on a relationist account, for God 
to become temporal is simply for Him to come to be related to events. This 
doesn’t seem to necessarily require that there’s any sequence in God’s life, 
because it might be that (for example) God changes extrinsically when events 
come to be related to Him.5 Perhaps if Craig were to be clearer about what 
work relationism is doing here, he wouldn’t have invited criticisms such as 
Helm’s.   
Holland also seems to be alluding to relationism as a way to understand 
God’s relation to time, but without directly naming the theory. He says: 
 
It does not…make sense to think of a material object being ‘contained’ 
within time as if time were a material vessel of some kind. When one 
makes reference to a year, it is not the case that the earth, while moving 
around the sun, is contained within the year; rather, the physical event 
in question marks out the year (ibid.: 168).  
 
Holland is evidently denying that time exists independently of events, and yet 
doesn’t once mention relationism. On the other hand we have Craig, claiming 
that temporal relationism can explain the link between God, time, and creation 
– yet failing to flesh out his relationist account. Le Poidevin has therefore given 
us what’s long overdue: the first explicit and substantial attempt to examine 
                                                             
5 After all, I allowed in Chapter 1, section 3 that if God changes merely extrinsically when 
B+S comes to be related to Him, he needn’t be temporal. I don’t see why this case is any 
different.  
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and model God’s relation to time by using temporal relationism. The 
subsequent section provides an overview of his argument.  
 
(3) LE POIDEVIN’S RELATIONISM 
 On temporal relationism, all assertions such as ‘two minutes have 
elapsed’ and ‘the film starts in half an hour’ aren’t stating anything about time 
as an independently existing entity. Rather, these remarks ascribe temporal 
features to events, and the relations between them. Le Poidevin (2017) outlines 
a more specific form of relationism: ‘radically reductionist’ relationism 
(hereafter, RR-relationism). He argues that it presents us with an alternative 
account of God’s relation to time – one that’s neither strictly ‘atemporalist’ nor 
strictly ‘temporalist’. According to RR-relationism, ‘not only spatial points and 
temporal moments, but also spatial and temporal relations’ (ibid.: 213) are 
reduced to something more fundamental. In the case of time, temporal 
relations are reduced to causal ones, so ‘time, on this view, is simply the causal 
structure of events/states of affairs’ (ibid.) and ‘the arrow of time just is the 
arrow of causation’ (ibid: 214).6 RR-relationism therefore goes a step further 
than standard relationism: it agrees that time is nothing over and above the 
temporal relations between events, and it asserts that all temporal relations 
between events can be reduced to causal ones. Of course, a successful reduction 
of the direction of time to the direction of causation isn’t an un-contested 
issue.7 Nevertheless, for the purposes of this argument I’ll grant its coherence, 
because I want to examine whether, given a RR-relationism, we can make sense 
of God’s relation to time.  
  Le Poidevin outlines three distinct commitments to God’s relation to 
time: one to divine temporality, and two to divine atemporality. These can 
allegedly be upheld together, such that RR-relationism generates a ‘sense in 
which God is both outside time and within it’ (ibid: 219). Le Poidevin’s three 
commitments may be outlined as follows: 
 
                                                             
6 Mellor (1991 & 1998) is a famous proponent of an influential argument in favour of the 
reduction of the arrow of time to the arrow of causation.  
7 See, for example, Mackie (1980), and Harrington (2015, Chapter 7).   
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 Derivative Divine Temporality (DDT): God is temporal in that He participates 
in events that either i) we, too, participate in, or ii) are causally connected with events 
that we participate in. It’s the causal connections between events that we participate in 
that constitutes our time series.   
 Non-Derivative Divine Atemporality (NDA): God is a continuant, and 
continuants are timeless when considered in themselves.  
 Derivative Divine Atemporality (DDA): Part of God’s mental life can form a 
causal series which is causally (and so, temporally) isolated from the causal sequence that 
constitutes our time. In this sense God is derivatively timeless.  
 
DDT is the idea that, for objects without temporal parts (‘continuants’), 
their temporality is only derivative – they’re temporal in virtue of participating in 
events and states of affairs (‘occurrents’) which themselves exist at times in virtue 
of being part of a causal structure.8 Recall that this causal structure of states of 
affairs and events, according to the RR-relationist, is what constitutes time 
itself.9 God is therefore temporal in the derivative sense that He participates in 
various events, which are themselves temporal in virtue of their causal 
structure (ibid.). The causally-connected events that constitute our time series 
are the ones that we participate in, and God, by participating in them too, is like 
us derivatively temporal (DDT).10  
However, when we consider a continuant in itself, it’s not temporal, 
because it doesn’t (in contrast with occurrents) consist of a collection of 
temporal parts. In other words, it ‘does not exhibit an internal causal structure’ 
                                                             
8 It’s helpful to construe this in terms of the endurance versus perdurance debate. Le 
Poidevin doesn’t specifically mention endurantism or perdurantism, but it’s clear that 
continuants endure (are wholly present at each moment that they exist), as opposed to 
occurrents, which perdure (have distinct temporal parts at different moments of their 
existence).   
9Le Poidevin is evidently assuming that, if they persist, states of affairs are occurrents – 
they persist through time by perduring, and continuants such as God participate in them. I’ll 
therefore assume this along with him. Taking, for instance, the state of affairs of ‘the vase 
being red’, it has a temporal part located at the different moments of time that it obtains. 
We say that ‘the vase being red’ has causally connected temporal parts: ‘red at t1,’ ‘red at 
t2,’ ‘red at t3,’ and so on. If states of affairs were to be continuants, then ‘the vase being 
red’ would be numerically the same state of affairs at each moment that it obtains. Le 
Poidevin can’t be advocating this latter view, for then he’d be suggesting that continuants 
(God) can participate in other continuants (states of affairs). Hereafter, I’ll use the terms 
‘event’ and ‘state of affairs’ interchangeably, meaning simply the causally connected 
occurrents that time, according to RR-relationism, can be reduced to. 
10 Or at least, we participate in some of the causally-connected events that constitute our 
time series. Some events in our causal series aren’t participated in by anybody – for 
instance, a volcanic eruption millions of years ago. 
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(ibid: 216). This is Le Poidevin’s commitment to NDA: considered in and of 
Himself, God is atemporal. Likewise, we ordinary humans (who are also alleged 
to be continuants) are timeless when considered only in ourselves. Le Poidevin 
endorses this when he says that, in postulating God as timeless when 
considered in Himself, it might seem that ‘we have removed the all-important 
difference between God and ordinary continuants such as ourselves’ (ibid.: 
220). The thought that this account of God’s timelessness is one in which we, 
too, can count as timeless, might seem problematic to readers. I’ll return to it 
in section 4. 
Le Poidevin argues that there’s nevertheless an important difference 
between our relation to time, and God’s relation to time, which can be found 
in DDA: an additional sense of God’s atemporality. God can participate in His 
own (causally isolated) time series, where a time series is again understood as a 
causal network of events. God therefore participates in an isolated time series 
simply in virtue of some events in His life being in a causal network that’s not 
causally connected with the causal network of events that we participate in. Le 
Poidevin suggests a phase of God’s mental life as a candidate for this causally 
isolated time series. In this sense too, then, God is atemporal. Le Poidevin 
stresses that this, too, is a derivative sense of atemporality – presumably 
because God is timeless in virtue of participating in a causally isolated series of 
events. He says that ‘in a purely derivative sense, God is not in our time either, 
insofar as he participates in events which are not in our time’ (ibid.:220).We, on 
the other hand, don’t stand in a temporal relation to several distinct time series 
(ibid.) – presumably because no aspect of our lives is causally isolated from the 
single time series which we all participate in.  
Le Poidevin’s account becomes even more relevant to this thesis when 
we see that he applies his three commitments (combined with RR-relationism) 
to the incarnation. What’s more, he suggests that these commitments help one 
to endorse kenoticism. Le Poidevin suggests that, in addition to giving up 
omnipotence and omniscience upon becoming incarnate, the Son also gives up 
DDA – His divine prerogative to engage in a distinct causal series of His own. 
He ‘is then wholly within time in a way in which He was not before’ (ibid.: 
222), which contributes to His being fully human. I’ll return to this again.  
 222 
 
Returning to the three claims, the prevalent notions of ‘participation’ in 
events and ‘derivative’ (a)temporality seem to be intimately connected. 
However, Le Poidevin doesn’t suggest any examples of what this ‘participation’ 
in the events of our time amounts to, besides the incarnation. The claim made 
by NDA is that when we consider continuants in themselves, they’re timeless. 
Le Poidevin says that ‘an object by itself does not exhibit an internal causal 
structure: only the states of affairs of which it is part do so’ (ibid.: 216). This 
suggests that when continuants participate in events, this act of participation 
doesn’t betray internal causal sequence of any sort within the entity: the causal 
sequence is only to be found in the events. Le Poidevin notes that this is 
simply the three-dimensionsalist view of persistence: an object has no temporal 
parts, and so is wholly present at each moment that it exists. In relationist 
terms, ‘an object exists at different times only in a derivative sense, by being 
part of states of affairs which, in virtue of exhibiting a causal structure, exist at 
different times’ (ibid.). Le Poidevin’s understanding of participation thus relies 
heavily upon the reduction of time to causation. He also relies on his construal 
of participation to permit his sense of ‘derivative’ temporality: continuants in 
themselves are timeless, but they participate in different events which are 
themselves temporal in virtue of the causal connections between the same. 
Furthermore, Le Poidevin needs his non-causally structured understanding of 
participation in order to uphold NDA. If he were to permit continuants to 
participate in events in the sense that they themselves exhibit a causal structure, 
then he’d no longer be able to maintain that continuants, in themselves, are 
timeless.  
Let’s tease NDA out a little more. It might appear initially 
objectionable on the grounds that something can be temporal in spite of not 
being composed of temporal parts, and continuants seem like just the right 
candidates for this. After all, they ‘continue’ – they are ‘selfsame and identical 
without qualification at the different times at which they exist’ (Simons 2000: 420, 
my italics). This would be problematic for upholding NDA, because it requires 
something to be straightforwardly timeless when considered in itself – not that 
it exist at many different times. 
RR-relationists might respond that this is only problematic for 
substantivalists, because then a continuant must be said to be ‘contained by’ 
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each of the moments at which it exists. With RR-relationism, however, time is 
reducible to the causal nexus of events. In other words, for the RR-relationist, 
there’s nothing more to time than the causal connections between these states 
of affairs, whereas for the substantivalist, God would’ve had to create time in 
addition to creating its contents. It could therefore be argued that only on RR-
relationism can we consider a continuant ‘in and of itself,’ independently of the 
causally structured events that constitute time. When we do so, we find that 
continuants don’t exhibit a causal structure. Granted, we could also allow that 
there are continuants that persist through substantivalist time by enduring, but in 
this case their existence in time wouldn’t be derivative. The important 
difference between the substantivalist and RR-relationist positions is that for 
the latter alone, time reduces to causation. It’s this that enables the RR-
relationist the luxury of claiming that continuants exist at a time derivatively. 
With substantivalism, however, God can’t exist at a time ‘derivatively’ – He 
either exists at a moment, or He doesn’t. Le Poidevin suggests that on 
substantivalism ‘it makes dubious sense’ to consider objects existing 
independently of spacetime, because then they would lack extension (2017.: 
213). He also adds that, on substantivalism, there’s an ‘asymmetric dependence 
of ordinary objects on spacetime. Spacetime could exist without ordinary 
objects, but not vice versa’ (ibid.:215). The thought here is that, on 
substantivalism, we can’t exist without doing so at at least one moment of time, 
and thus if we’re temporal, we’re temporal in a direct, non-derivative, sense. 
It therefore seems more difficult for substantivalists to consider a 
continuant ‘only in itself,’ because for the substantivalist it’s difficult to 
consider a continuant independently of time. However, for the RR-relationist 
we only exist at times indirectly, or derivatively: in virtue of participating in 
causally connected events. Le Poidevin argues that ‘if temporality is derivative, 
it is not so integral to an object, but a matter of how the states of affairs in 
which it participates are ordered’ (ibid.: 219). It therefore appears that the RR-
relationist has, at the very least, less of a problem than the substantivalist when 
it comes to the possibility of contemplating a continuant ‘only in itself.’ I’ll 
therefore grant that this ‘derivative’ temporal existence (DDT) is something 
that’s only available to the RR-relationist. It’s the element that makes this latter 
position distinct from each of the (substantivalism-assuming) accounts of strict 
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temporality and strict atemporality. Consequentially, it also means that 
substantivalists can’t (unlike RR-relationists) uphold NDA of a temporal being, 
because that being would be temporal considered only in itself. This is an 
interesting result, that wouldn’t have been revealed had we not considered 
what the picture of God’s relation to relationist time might be like.  
Le Poidevin’s position has much to recommend it. It’s original and 
neat and, if successful, presents a genuine tertium quid in the classic debate 
between divine temporality and divine atemporality. It certainly does great 
service to the debate over God’s relation to time, by illuminating the possibility 
that substantival assumptions may have restricted the foregoing debate. 
However, I’ll now suggest some potential problems facing it. Having 
contended that DDT is a genuinely unique position that’s unavailable to the 
substantivalist, I’ll nevertheless argue that NDA and DDA aren’t coherent 
positions. This is because any credible understanding of NDA relies heavily on 
DDA, and DDA is itself subject to internal tension. Moreover, I’ll argue that 
NDA and DDA are in fact in conflict in worrying ways. I contend that, 
because of these problems, Le Poidevin’s account can’t be appealed to to 
explain God’s relation to time. DDT, which illustrates God’s temporality if RR-
relationism is true, is the only one of Le Poidevin’s three positions that can be 
upheld. This provides independent support for my arguments above that we 
should be divine temporalists.  I also suggest that there’s room for DDT to be 
further developed.   
 
(4) PROBLEMS WITH NON-DERIVATIVE DIVINE 
ATEMPORALITY (NDA) 
My first worry with NDA is that it’s not really a sense of timelessness 
at all. In fact, it’s a relation which we, too, satisfy, according to Le Poidevin. 
NDA says that one is timeless simply by being a continuant. For many 
proponents of classical divine timelessness, at least a part of its attraction is 
that it gives God a status superior to, and distinguished from, our own: He’s 
removed from the temporal order, whereas our experience is limited to the 
here and now. NDA would thus be unattractive to many theists. However, Le 
Poidevin is also committed to DDA, which He says is a sense of timelessness 
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that is unique to God. I’ll therefore grant for the time being that NDA escapes 
this ‘thinness’ allegation, because it can be bolstered by DDA.  
Another worry with NDA is that, in conceiving of God as a 
continuant, one risks positing a God who ceases to exist whenever He’s not 
participating in any events. Peter Simons thinks we ought to deny that a 
continuant exists at any time it’s not involved with any occurrent. Asking 
whether ‘the spectre of continuants popping into and out of existence 
according as they are involved or not in occurrents’ (2000: 424-5) might be 
raised, Simons deems this not to be a serious worry for ‘the world as we know 
it,’ (ibid.: 425) stating that it’s ‘a tremendously active place, where everything or 
practically everything is changing all the time, if only in some dull and 
repetitive but continuous oscillatory way (ibid.). Granting that Simons’s relaxed 
attitude to continuants popping in and out of existence is acceptable for 
ordinary continuants, it’s nevertheless a pertinent worry in the case of God, 
our necessarily existing creator.  
RR-relationists could respond to the worry that God flits in and out of 
existence by appealing to Le Poidevin’s other argument for divine atemporality 
(DDA). It could be argued that God is, all the while, participating in His own 
(causally isolated) time series, due to part of His mental life being causally 
isolated from the events of our time series. God doesn’t, therefore, go out of 
existence when not participating in events of our time, to the extent that the 
processes of His mental life form their own time series. 
On Le Poidevin’s kenotic account of the incarnation, however, the Son 
sacrifices DDA in order to become wholly engaged with the events of our time. 
That is, He gives up the prerogative to participate in a causally isolated time 
series. During the incarnation, therefore, the Son is only timeless in the sense 
that He’s a continuant – and continuants are timeless when considered in 
themselves (NDA). In spite of this, I maintain that there’s no danger of God 
popping in and out of existence whilst He’s incarnate, because during the 
incarnation He’s of course continually participating in the events of our time. 
Whenever God isn’t participating in an event of our time, therefore, we can 
hold that He still exists in virtue of His participation in His own isolated time 
series. Conversely, at the times when He has sacrificed the prerogative to 
participate in this separate time series, we no longer face the worry of God 
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‘popping in and out of existence’. This is because at these times God is 
incarnate, and is all the while participating in the events of our time series.  
Additionally, Le Poidevin could appeal to a Social Trinitarian 
conception of God to support the view that God doesn’t ‘pop out of existence’ 
whilst He’s incarnate. Le Poidevin could argue that the Father and the Holy 
Spirit, the other members of the Trinity, don’t relinquish DDA. This is because 
they’re separate persons, capable of entering into different relations, because 
they’re different types (as opposed to tokens) of the very same substance.11 The 
Father and Spirit are always participating in a causal series which is isolated 
from our own. In virtue of this, they’re always participating in events that form 
a temporal structure, and so God doesn’t oscillate in and out of existence.  
It appears, therefore, that DDA – the claim that God is derivatively 
timeless in virtue of part of His mental life being causally isolated from the 
events of our lives – has saved the day for NDA in the face of the worries 
above. It can be employed to argue that God doesn’t flicker in and out of 
existence depending on whether or not He’s participating in the events of our 
lives, because He’s all the while participating in a causal series of His own. 
When God has sacrificed this ability to participate in a causally isolated series, 
the initial worry of God popping in and of existence no longer applies. This is 
because God is now incarnate, and is continually participating in the events of 
our lives, with no mysterious breaks. Additionally, this could also be because 
the Father and Holy Spirit still possess DDA. It was also argued that DDA can 
save the day in response to the worry that NDA is far too thin of an account of 
divine timelessness. However, DDA can only be brought to the rescue in these 
instances if it can stand up to independent scrutiny. I’ll now make the case that 
DDA is subject to internal metaphysical tension.  
 
(5) PROBLEMS WITH DERIVATIVE DIVINE 
ATEMPORALITY (DDA) 
According to DDA, God is timeless in virtue of part of His mental life 
being causally isolated from the events of our time series. However, this notion 
                                                             
11 I relied on a Social Trinitarian account in Chapter 4 when I was arguing in favour of 
kenoticism, so it’s only fair to offer it up here as an option for Le Poidevin.   
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of an isolated ‘time series’ is suspect. It seems to introduce sequence into the 
life of the allegedly timeless being – regardless both of whether this sequence is 
connected with ours, and of whether the sequence exists independently of the 
events that constitute it. This ‘isolated’ part of God’s mental life is alleged to 
form a causal series, but a temporal sequence is nothing over and above this, on 
RR-relationism.  Perhaps Le Poidevin would be happy with this – indeed, he 
acknowledges that his account posits ‘timelessness of a much less radical kind 
than is represented by one tradition in Christian thought’ (2017: 221).  
More worryingly, though, if this is what it means to be atemporal, then 
there’s no reason why substantivalists can’t also help themselves to this 
account, and say that God is timeless due to existing in a time series that’s 
isolated from ours. Put differently, there’s nothing about this ‘isolated time 
series’ atemporality that means it is available exclusively to the RR-relationist. 
This makes the RR-relationist position appear less unique after all. Admittedly, 
substantivalists might face greater worries regarding God’s dependence on the 
isolated time series. The RR-relationist could maintain that the isolated time 
series supervenes on God’s mental life, so it’s God that is more fundamental 
than time, and time in no way constrains God. For substantivalists, however, 
time is something that can exist independently of its contents. It could 
therefore be argued that to the extent that substantivalists posit God existing in 
a time series of His own, they owe us an account of how it’s also possible that 
God exist independently of time. Otherwise, substantivalists will have 
produced a version of DDA whereby time is something more fundamental 
than God – an unattractive picture for the theist.  
However, the RR-relationist isn’t herself immediately home and dry 
with respect to God’s independence from time. Le Poidevin says that ‘if God 
necessarily has a mental life, and if that mental life has a causal structure, then 
(given the causal theory of time order) it seems that, after all, God has no 
choice over whether or not time exists’ (ibid.: 220). The thought here is that 
God’s creation of time ought to be wholly free and voluntary, and the 
existence of a time series ought to be contingent. However, because time is 
nothing over and above causal relations, all God need have is a causally-
structured mental life and He’s inadvertently created time. Le Poidevin 
responds to this by maintaining that God is still the source of this time series, so 
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the existence of this time series isn’t independent of Him (ibid.). It thus 
appears that the RR-relationist can tell the better story regarding God’s 
independence from time.  
Another worry for the RR-relationist has to do with the implications of 
part of God’s mental life being causally disconnected from the events of our 
time. This detachment suggests that God isn’t fully engaged with creation. To 
the extent that this is true, it’s at odds with the traditional picture of an 
omnibenevolent God who is wholly concerned about His creatures, and wholly 
focused on and knowledgeable about their actions. 
A potential way to dispel this objection could be to consider DDA 
further, and question exactly what the contents of God’s isolated mental life 
are.12 Could He, perhaps, be contemplating the vast extent of His knowledge? 
It’s hard to imagine how He can do this without being engaged with the events 
of our lives, and the information that He knows about these events. Perhaps 
He’s reflecting on how much love He has to give? Again, this seems to require 
God to think about the creatures that He loves. Furthermore, a likely 
explanation for how God possesses this knowledge of us and our activities is 
via a causal connection between us and Him.13 These gestures at the contents 
of God’s thoughts, though crude, suggest the difficulty of imagining what God 
can think about that would be truly causally isolated from the events of our 
lives. Though good news for those worried that God is disengaged from 
creation in light of DDA, this is at the expense of chipping away at the core of 
DDA, which states that a part of God’s mental life is genuinely causally isolated.  
It could be responded that God knows and loves us in a non-causal 
sense – so the above thoughts could indeed be aspects of His causally isolated 
mental life. Of course, the burden of proof is now on the RR-relationist to tell 
                                                             
12 It could be argued that assigning God a mental life comprised of distinct stages is 
problematic in the first place, because it’s at odds with the doctrine of divine simplicity. 
However, I won’t treat this as a serious problem with Le Poidevin’s account, given that in 
the next chapter I’ll argue that all temporalist accounts must ride somewhat roughshod 
over this doctrine.  
13 This is further supported by the causal theory of reference, whereby ‘speakers succeed 
in referring to something by means of its name because underlying their uses of the name 
are links in a causal chain stretching back to the dubbing of the particular name’ (Reimer 
& Michaelson 2016). The idea here would be that God can’t contemplate me, Emily, 
without there being an appropriately linked causal chain tracing back to when I was 
named. Arguments in favour of the causal theory of reference, assuming that it can also 
apply to God, therefore support my suggestion that when God thinks of us it has to be in 
such a way that renders Him causally connected to us. 
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us more about the events of God’s mental life, and how part of it can be 
causally isolated from the events of our lives. The divine mental life must be 
sufficiently engaged with creation for God to not come across as neglectful 
and uncaring, but there can be no causal connections between it and our time 
series.  
This task of explaining how there can be no causal connection between 
part of God’s mental life and our time series becomes more difficult once we 
consider the possibility that God is at no point causally disconnected from the 
events of our time series, because He created our time series in virtue of creating 
the initial state of affairs of the universe. He’ll therefore always be the ‘first 
mover,’ the initial cause to which all events and states of affairs can be 
retraced.14 This, after all, is a major reason why people praise God, giving 
thanks for His being the creator of all things. This pervasive causal connection 
between God and creation is problematic for DDA, according to which part of 
God is ‘isolated from our causal network’.  
Perhaps Le Poidevin’s response would be to reiterate that he’s only 
postulated a part, or phase, of God’s mental life being causally isolated from 
creation. This is, after all, what DDA states. It’s only God’s other part(s), the 
response would go, that are causally engaged: creating and sustaining the 
universe, and participating in our time series. This doesn’t seem an acceptable 
response to guarantee atemporality here, however. Firstly, I’m sceptical of 
causally cordoning off ‘part’ of God’s life. For one thing, Le Poidevin doesn’t 
provide a suggestion of how we’re to understand the way that God’s mental 
life is composed of at least one part. Even granting that we can make sense of 
a distinguished ‘part,’ or ‘phase’ (ibid.) of God’s life, this allegedly isolated part 
must surely be mentally accessible by the part of God that participates in our 
time series. Otherwise, we risk fracturing God’s unity.  
                                                             
14 The problem facing DDA here would be even greater if we were ‘continuous 
creationists’. Continuous creationists hold that God doesn’t merely cause the universe to 
exist through His initial act of creation: He also (causally) re-creates it anew at each 
moment of time. This therefore gives us an even stronger reason to suppose that God is 
at no point causally disconnected from the events of our time series. For a continuous 
creationist account, see Quinn (1983). For an examination of this view (and others in the 
vicinity), see Vander Laan (2006). It’s thanks to Adams (2016) that I encountered 
continuous creationism, as well as her really helpful criticism of it, and her proposed 
alternative account. 
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In fact, insofar as the RR-relationist account appeals to the separation 
of these ‘parts’ of God, it risks paralleling the contentious ‘two minds’ and 
‘divided mind’ accounts of the incarnation due to Morris and Swinburne.15 I 
discussed, and dismissed, these accounts in Chapters 4 and 6, under the heads 
of the incoherence problem and the Son’s glorification. By ascribing different 
properties (such as being causally connected to our time series, and not causally 
connected to our time series) to different ‘parts’ of God’s mental life, it 
becomes difficult for us to know which (if any) properties transfer to God as a 
whole. I venture that Le Poidevin would consider this similarity between his 
and the two minds account to be unwelcome, because he’s argued against these 
accounts elsewhere.16 
I’ll now return to the worry that God is, in virtue of creating the 
universe, causally connected to creation in such a way that DDA cannot be 
upheld. It might be responded that God creates the universe in a way that’s 
different altogether from the way in which ordinary causes bring about their 
effects. By way of illustration, Le Poidevin suggests the analogy of an author 
creating a novel. George Orwell determined the events of Nineteen Eighty Four, 
and the causal relations between these. However, ‘his so determining those 
events is not part of the novel, and do not stand in the same relation to those 
events as, say, the sinister forces of the Ministry of Truth’ (2017:219). By 
analogy, God’s act of creation would be different from the typical causal 
relations that take place within the world, and so wouldn’t thereby count as an 
event in time, given that time is simply the network of causal connections 
between events. This analogy isn’t one that Le Poidevin himself endorses. In 
fact, earlier on in this very same paper he says that ‘to say that God is the creator 
of x is naturally understood as implying x’s causal dependence on God’ (ibid.: 
211). He later adds that ‘the fact that the causal relations in the novel are not 
real, but purely fictional, may strain the analogy to breaking point’ (ibid.: 219-
20).  
                                                             
15 Even if Le Poidevin’s account doesn’t collapse into a two minds account, it at least 
seems susceptible to many of the problems that face the two minds account – at least, 
when the latter is construed along compositionalist lines. 
16 See his (2009b), where he questions whether the divided mind account of the 
incarnation provides us with a satisfactory account of Christ's unity. Furthermore, in his 
(2011), he disputes the claim that on the two minds account the property ‘constitutive of 
goodness’ is something that we ascribe only to the divine mind. Rather, he argues that this 
is a property that ought to be ascribed to a person as a whole (2011: 215).   
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Nevertheless, it does seem that this analogy to an author creating a 
novel could be employed to respond to the allegation that God is at no point 
causally disconnected from our time series. In fact, I think that this appeal to 
‘non causal’ creation needs to be employed, to avoid the conflict between DDT 
and DDA. Of course, in taking up this line of argument, one would need to 
spell out exactly what the relation is between God and His creation, if not an 
ordinary causal one. This is a species of my criticism above, where I charged 
the RR-relationist with needing to say more about what the relation is between 
God’s ‘isolated’ mental life and our time series, if this relation is indeed non-
causal. In doing so, a sense of God as a genuine creator and sustainer needs to 
be maintained, in line with the traditional theistic picture.  
 I’ve outlined the problems facing both DDA and NDA, demonstrating 
how NDA relies for its credibility on DDA, and then drawing out the 
problems that DDA faces. I now argue that there are also ways in which Le 
Poidevin’s two commitments to God’s atemporality are in conflict with each 
other.   
 
(6) NDA AND DDA IN CONFLICT 
If God is indeed atemporal when considered in Himself (NDA), this is 
in conflict with the RR-relationist’s other aspect of atemporality – the 
suggestion that part of God’s mental life forms a causally isolated time series 
(DDA). NDA and DDA are two jointly-held facets of atemporality in Le 
Poidevin’s argument. However, it seems contradictory to suggest of the same 
being both that it’s timeless when considered only in itself, and that it 
participates in its own time series which is causally isolated from all else. I 
presume that considering a being ‘only in itself’ is to take into account only its 
internal relations, and to discount all external connections, or relations to other 
things. For this being to then be deemed timeless in itself would be (according 
to RR-relationists) for there to be no causal connections between any of its 
internal ‘parts,’ if it does indeed possess parts. Of course, Le Poidevin himself 
endorses the notion of a ‘part’ of God, by suggesting that ‘part’ of His life is 
causally isolated from all else (see section 5). Equally, however, for a being to 
participate in a causally isolated time series is (for RR-relationists) presumably 
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to suppose that the being’s life has internal parts that are causally – and so, 
temporally connected. 
 Put differently, when Le Poidevin says in line with NDA that 
‘considered only in itself, a continuant is not temporal’ (ibid.: 219), given the 
reduction of time to causation, he must mean: ‘considered only in itself, a 
continuant possesses no internal causal sequence.’ However, according to Le 
Poidevin, God is both timeless when considered in Himself, and (in line with 
DDA) He has a mental life that (independently of any causal relation to 
anything else) forms a causal (and so, temporal) sequence. These two 
commitments appear straightforwardly contradictory.  
This consequence is particularly remarkable when we remind ourselves 
of how utterly meagre NDA is, compared to classical definitions of divine 
timelessness. As I noted in section 4, one simply needs to be a continuant to 
satisfy NDA! It’s a sense of timelessness which we, too, satisfy – and I 
mentioned that Le Poidevin is happy to acknowledge this. I explained that Le 
Poidevin certainly needs DDA, His other commitment to divine timelessness, 
in order to provide us with a sense in which God alone is atemporal. However, 
as sparse as NDA is, it still conflicts with DDA due to the RR-relationist 
reduction of time to causation.  
In response, the RR-relationist might maintain that NDA and DDA 
are by no means peculiar to the case of God. In fact, all continuants are 
timeless when considered in themselves, and yet also participate in events that 
form a causal (and so, temporal) series. When explaining that God is timeless 
when considered only in Himself, Le Poidevin says: ‘we have removed the all-
important difference between God and ordinary continuants such as ourselves’ 
(ibid.: 220), suggesting that he also attributes ‘atemporality when considered in 
ourselves’ to us. Yet we, too, participate in events that form a causal structure. 
One could maintain that these two aspects of atemporality are no more in 
conflict than are the claims that ordinary continuants are timeless in themselves 
and have lives that form a causal (and so, temporal) structure. Why, then, ought 
matters to be worse for God simply because He participates in an additional 
time series? Mere participation in one time series, the argument would go, is 
sufficient to generate a tension with a being’s timelessness when considered 
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only in itself. In other words, there would be a potential conflict not only 
between NDA and DDA, but also between NDA and DDT.  
However, I would respond that there is a conflict between NDA and 
DDA, but not between NDA and DDT. Let’s take these alleged conflicts in 
reverse order. Typically, continuants (such as persons) aren’t thought of as 
‘timeless when considered in themselves.’ Rather, they persist through time in a 
particular way: they endure. Although they don’t have temporal parts, they are, 
on this account, wholly present at each moment of time at which they exist. 
The thought that continuants are ‘timeless when considered only in 
themselves’ is unique to Le Poidevin’s account, and it doesn’t at first glance 
marry well with the idea that continuants also endure through time. However, 
we’ve now come full circle back to the debate in section 3. There, I granted the 
RR-relationist that we can make sense of a continuant being atemporal when 
considered only in itself. This is because only on RR-relationism can we 
consider an object independently of time, since time is reducible to causation. 
In fact, to make proper sense of NDA, we seem to rely on DDT. That is, we 
can only uphold the idea that a continuant is timeless when considered in itself 
once we allow that time is reducible to causal connections between events, and 
that continuants are only ever temporal derivatively.17  
Now, with NDA and DDA, the situation is altogether different, and I 
maintain that these two commitments are in conflict with each other. This is 
because DDA requires God’s life (or at least part of it), to be something that’s 
causally isolated from all else – and to be causally structured. Le Poidevin doesn’t 
think this claim can be made of ordinary humans. Moreover, this causal 
structure is all that there is to time, on RR-relationism. Part of God’s (causally 
isolated) mental life therefore forms a time series, and it’s very difficult to 
uphold this in conjunction with the claim that God is timeless when considered 
only in Himself. I therefore contend that NDA and DDA are in conflict in a 
                                                             
17 Is there, then, a sense in which NDA is derivative after all, because God is only timeless 
in Himself in virtue of being a (derivatively temporal) continuant, and hence not Himself 
exhibiting a causal structure? I’d suggest that on the most charitable reading of Le 
Poidevin’s argument the direction of explanation runs the other way: God doesn’t, when 
considered in Himself, exhibit a causal structure. As a result, if God is temporal, He’s only 
derivatively so, in virtue of participating in causally-connected events. Importantly, this 
wouldn’t make DDT dependent on NDA: it’s just that if God happens to be temporal, He’s 
only derivatively so, because He’s a continuant participating in our causal series.   
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way that NDA and DDT aren’t, and that simultaneously upholding these 
former commitments to God’s atemporality looks unfeasible.  
One might respond that, because we’re attributing temporality and 
timelessness to different things, NDA and DDA aren’t in conflict: the being 
that is God is timeless in Himself, whereas His life is causally (and so, 
temporally) structured. However, I think that there’s something suspect about 
drawing such a sharp distinction between God, on the one hand, and God’s 
life, on the other. Put differently, if time is reducible to causation, and a being’s 
life is composed of causally-connected events, there’s still a problem with 
saying that the being is, when considered only in itself, timeless. This is 
particularly pertinent because the sequenced events we’re considering here are 
the events of God’s mental life. They are, according to Le Poidevin, mental 
events which are causally disconnected from any events in any other causal series, 
and yet they form a causal series of their own. If considering a being ‘only in 
itself’ means disregarding the events of its mental life which are causally isolated 
from all else, I think we’re stripping down too much of our sense of that being 
and its essence. However, Le Poidevin must disregard God’s causally-sequenced 
mental life when considering God ‘only in Himself’, otherwise he can’t allow 
for NDA. This is because for Le Poidevin there’s nothing more to a temporal 
sequence than a causal sequence, and thus if a phase of God’s mental life is 
causally-sequenced it’s at odds with God being timeless ‘only in Himself’.  
 
(7) A RELATIONIST KENOTICISM 
I’ve argued that Le Poidevin’s two ‘atemporal’ features of God can’t, in 
fact, be upheld if RR-relationism is true. We’ve seen that Le Poidevin extends 
his argument to the incarnation, arguing that when the Son becomes 
kenotically incarnate, He sacrifices DDA in addition to sacrificing other divine 
prerogatives such as omniscience and omnipotence. In light of my argument 
that DDA is subject to many problems (both internally and in light of its 
incompatibility with NDA), I therefore submit that DDA can’t be sacrificed by 
the Son when He becomes incarnate, because it can’t be possessed by Him at 
all. The Son (if temporal, as the first three parts of this thesis concluded) can 
nevertheless continue to possess DDT when He becomes incarnate, and can 
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also still become kenotically incarnate in the traditional way outlined and 
endorsed in Chapters 4 and 6. In fact, the result of this chapter lends 
independent support to divine temporalism, because a temporal God can exist 
‘inside’ of substantivalist or RR-relationist time. In comparison, it looks as 
though our construal of divine atemporality is problematic if RR-relationism is 
true.  
 
(8) CONCLUSION 
I’ve argued that substantivalism has been all too readily assumed in the 
history of the debate over God’s relation to time. I considered again the 
ontological status of time: examining a relationist stance instead. I examined Le 
Poidevin’s RR-relationist account of God’s relation to time, but argued that 
only one of its three main commitments is coherent. I argued that DDA, one 
of Le Poidevin’s commitments to atemporality, is riddled with problems, which 
is particularly problematic given the extent to which NDA (his other 
commitment to atemporality) depends on it. I then argued that these two 
commitments are in conflict with each other. I conceded, however, that there’s 
no incompatibility between DDT and NDA.  
We therefore have only DDT remaining: the commitment to God 
being derivatively temporal in virtue of His participation in the events and 
states of affairs of our lives. Divine temporalists can also be RR-relationists, 
and make sense of a kenotic incarnation, albeit not in the unique way that Le 
Poidevin has in mind. Overall, then, when we consider God and RR-relationist 
time, it’s only a sense of divine temporality that can be salvaged. That a temporal 
God alone is consistent (thanks to DDT) with RR-relationism lends 
independent support to my argument in Parts 1-3 that upholding an orthodox 
metaphysics of the incarnation can lead us only to a temporal God. I’ll now 
turn to an alternative debate in the metaphysics of time: the debate between 
tensed and tenseless theories of time. I’ll argue that this debate also 
recommends indirectly in favour of a temporal God, because (unlike 
atemporalism) temporalism is consistent with both tensed and tenseless time. 
This latter combination of a temporal God and tenseless time is hitherto 
unexplored. 
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CHAPTER 8 
TENSEDVS. TENSELESS TIME 
Theologians and philosophers of religion can advance the nature of divine 
eternity only by tackling the difficult and multifaceted problem of the tensed 
versus tenseless theory of time (Craig 1998: 248). 
 
The debate between the tensed and tenseless theories (or, in McTaggart’s 
terms, the A-series and the B-series (1908: 458)) of time is hotly contested, 
spanning philosophical, scientific, and – more recently – psychological debate. 
It’s the debate over whether or not time in reality flows: whether there’s an 
ontologically-privileged present that’s continually changing, or whether all 
moments of time are equally real. Tenseless theorists maintain the latter 
position; tensed theorists the former. A thesis which aims to examine the 
metaphysics of God’s relation to time mustn’t neglect mention of this debate 
about the nature of time itself, which is arguably the central debate in the 
philosophy of time. Whether God (if God exists) is temporal or timeless is 
bound up in interesting ways with these theories of time, but ways which 
haven’t been sufficiently recognised and elucidated in the foregoing debate. 
This chapter illuminates these assumptions that couple God’s relation to time 
with the metaphysics of time, as well as revealing new directions for this 
debate. 
In section 1, I introduce the tensed and tenseless theories of time in 
more detail, and explain how they’ve been traditionally taken (indeed, more 
often than not, assumed) to fit better with a temporal and timeless God, 
respectively. These traditional pairings haven’t been made without exception, 
however: in section 2, I discuss how Leftow has challenged them by arguing 
for the compatibility of a timeless God and tensed time. More specifically, he 
argues that God can be timeless even though presentism is true (2009: 297-
319). I criticise this picture on grounds of incoherence. In order to give the 
combination of a timeless God and tensed time a fair shot, I next consider the 
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potential coherence of combining a timeless God with the other main 
dynamical views of time: the Growing Block Theory and the Moving Spotlight 
Theory, in turn.1 I argue that with both, we face similar problems to the ones 
we faced with presentism. I therefore conclude that a God existing ‘outside’ of 
tensed time is an incoherent view, whichever dynamical conception of time 
we’re working with. Atemporalists therefore have only tenseless time to work 
with. In section 3, I examine the alternative way of ‘shaking up’ the traditional 
pairings: I consider the compatibility of a temporal God and tenseless time, which 
is hitherto completely unexplored. I argue that this is a coherent construal of 
God’s relation to time, and one that enjoys several benefits besides. I sketch 
the preliminaries of the account in section 3.1. In section 3.2, I speculate about 
how a temporal God might become (kenotically) incarnate in tenseless time, 
since I’ve argued that this is the only successful model of divine eternity in light 
of incarnational considerations. Finally, in section 3.3 I consider, and respond 
to, the main objections that could be lodged against the account of a temporal 
God existing within tenseless time. I conclude in section 4 that the picture of a 
temporal God existing within tenseless time ought to remain firmly on the 
table in future discussions over God’s relation to time. Temporalists, unlike 
atemporalists, therefore have the luxury of pairing their account with either 
tensed or tenseless time. 
 
(1) OLD ASSUMPTIONS: TENSED VS. TENSELESS TIME 
According to the tensed, or ‘A-theory’ of time, the present moment is 
privileged above all other moments of time: marking out the moment that is, 
objectively, ‘now.’ At any time, therefore, we couldn’t provide a complete 
description of reality without specifying this privileged moment (Cameron 
2015: 2). Furthermore, time in reality flows, such that the moment that is the 
‘present’ moment changes.2  
                                                             
1 Henceforth, I’ll use the terms ‘dynamical’ and ‘tensed’ interchangeably.  
2 Interestingly, general intuitions seem to be divided regarding whether we feel that time 
flows towards us, from the future into the present, as though its events are somehow borne 
towards us on a stream, or whether we feel that we, the contents of time, move forwards 
through it, from the present into the future. We’d be like ‘sailors on the ocean of time’ 
(Skow 2015: 178) on this latter account. See Skow (2015: 178-187) for an interesting 
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There are different versions of tensed theories of time, and it’s from 
now on that they part ways. Presentists add to the above that the present 
moment is the only moment of time that exists: no other moments are a part of 
reality, so the present moment is ontologically privileged. This moment will 
soon pass out of existence, as a new present moment comes to exist.3 Growing 
Block theorists additionally admit the existence of the past into their ontology, 
so that the present and past are all that there is to reality. Reality can therefore 
be imagined as a ‘block’ that expands with the flow of time, so that at each 
instant a new aspect is added to reality. The present moment is still privileged, 
because it is always the ‘leading edge’ of the block – the edge which the block 
grows from. With each moment of time, a present moment becomes past, and 
a new present moment comes into existence at the leading edge of the block – 
meaning that the block grows. At any given moment in time, after the leading 
edge of the block there’s simply non-existence. We refer to this ‘non-existence’ 
as the ‘future,’ but it picks out nothing in reality, because the future doesn’t 
exist.4 A final tensed view of time, admitting still more into its ontology, is the 
Moving Spotlight Theory (MST). According to MST, all moments of time (past, 
present and future) exist, and are equally real. However, the instant of time 
that’s the present instant changes absolutely. The theory gets its name from C.D. 
Broad, who describes a row of houses with a police officer’s torch illuminating 
each house in turn. Broad says that this is how we might imagine presentness: 
like a light that successively illuminates each instant of time in turn (Broad 
1923: 59). Importantly, on this analogy the houses are all equally real, and exist 
even when they’re not being illuminated – just as on MST all moments of time 
are equally real, and exist even when they’re not present.5 
Tensed views of time have traditionally been taken to sit better with an 
understanding of God as temporal.6 This seems to stem primarily from a desire 
                                                                                                                                                           
discussion of these opposed intuitions. See also Harrington (2015: 128), where he 
distinguishes between the ‘time moving’ and the ‘ego-moving’ metaphors. 
3 Presentism is probably the most popular of the tensed views of time. For a defence, see 
(e.g.) Bigelow (1996) and Bourne (2006).  
4 For defences of the Growing Block theory, see Broad (1923) and Tooley (1997).  
5 It seems safe to say that MST is the least popular of the three models of tensed time. 
Skow (2015) has recently defended it over its tensed rivals, only to opt for a tenseless 
theory of time as the ultimate victor. See Cameron (2015) for the only substantial defence 
of MST that I know of.  
6 See, for example, Swinburne (1994), Wolterstorff (2001a), Zimmerman (2002: 75). More 
recently, Mullins (2016) opts for the combination of presentism and a temporal God. 
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to preserve divine omniscience. The central idea here is that, because on tensed 
views of time there’s an objective fact of the matter about which moment is 
‘now,’ and this fact changes, God’s knowledge must also change in order to 
encompass this continual modification of reality. However, this ‘moment to 
moment’ change in knowledge is something that isn’t possible for a timeless, 
immutable God. Nicholas Wolterstorff comments specifically on a timeless 
God’s lack of knowledge of time’s flow when he says: ‘Surely the non-
occurrence followed by the occurrence followed by the non-occurrence of  
[sequential] knowings constitutes a change on God’s time-strand’ (1982: 116). 
Delmas Lewis frames the problem from a slightly different angle: a timeless 
God’s lack of knowledge of the moment that’s objectively ‘now’:  
 
There is an important ontological feature- [existing in the present] - 
which we know I possess and which my birth and death don’t and, 
moreover, which talk of  locations on a linear continuum neither 
reflects nor captures. An eternal entity ex hypothesi is unaware of  this 
feature (1984: 79).  
 
For instance, assuming a tensed theory of time, a timeless God wouldn’t be 
able to know that I’m ‘now’ typing about His lack of knowledge. Arthur Prior 
similarly suggests that an atemporal God is unable to know (at the time) that 
the final exams in 1960 in Manchester are over ‘now’: he says this information 
can’t be known by a timeless God or any timeless being, ‘because it just isn’t 
true timelessly’ (2003: 42). This is because for a timeless God there is no 
privileged ‘now’, just a sequence of ordered events, each as real as any other. 
Having said this, there’s an important and interesting caveat to note. 
These arguments that marry tensed time with a temporal God seem only to 
work when we start with tensed time. Put differently, we begin with the 
assumption that there’s a privileged present in reality, that changes with the 
objective passage of time. We then reason that if there’s a God, He ought to be 
temporal in order to preserve His omniscience.7 That is, those arguing for 
                                                             
7 For example, Swinburne (1994) and Wolterstorff (2001a) take such approaches. 
Swinburne begins with arguing for tensed time (ibid.: 72-95), and then argues that an 
atemporalist construal of God is incoherent (ibid.: 95). Similarly, Wolterstorff explains 
why he’s a tensed theorist of time (2001a: 195-6), and then argues that, among other 
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God’s temporality seem to be assuming the tensed theory of time in putting 
forward their case for the former. Importantly, this inference is at odds with 
my overall approach in this thesis, which has been to begin with indispensable 
commitments about God (namely, that He became incarnate), and use them to 
reflect upon His relation to time – and, in this final Part of this thesis, on the 
nature of time itself. This explanatory priority will also be important to bear in 
mind in section 3, where I’ll argue that the reverse commitment doesn’t 
necessarily hold. That is, I’ll claim that if we start out with the notion of a 
temporal God, and then consider the nature of time, we’re not forced to adhere 
to a tensed theory of time.8 I’ll now elucidate the tenseless view of time in 
more detail, together with the reasons why it’s typically been argued for 
alongside an atemporal God. 
Opposed to tensed views of time is the tenseless, or ‘B-theory’ 
account9. Tenseless theorists maintain, contra presentists and growing block 
theorists, that all moments of time have the same ontological status: existence. 
That is, there are no ontologically-privileged moments of time. Contra all 
tensed theories of time, tenseless theorists also argue that there’s no privileged 
property of ‘presentness’.10 They deny that time changes, or flows, maintaining 
that our experience as of being in the present is merely an illusion. Instead, 
times are ordered in ‘earlier than,’ ‘later than,’ and ‘simultaneous with’ relations. 
Tenseless theories are often referred to as ‘four-dimensionalist,’ because time is 
simply like another spatial dimension. All moments of time exist in reality, and, 
just as my home town is no less real because I’m currently (spatially) far away 
from it, so too the times of my childhood are no less real because they’re 
(temporally) far away from my temporal location as I type this (Sider 2001: 11).  
                                                                                                                                                           
things, a timeless God would lack important knowledge of what’s occurring now (ibid.: 
202, 206).  
8 This runs contrary to the view of Paul Helm (2014), who argues that divine temporalism 
as a whole is committed to time being dynamic. 
9 The tenseless theory of time is sometimes referred to as ‘eternalism’, because all 
moments of time are eternally a part of reality. However, I mentioned at the start of this 
thesis that there are different ways in which we can understand what it means to be 
‘eternal’. Something can be timelessly eternal, and it can also be temporally eternal. 
Moreover, what it means to call God eternal is exactly what’s up for debate in this thesis. To 
avoid confusion, I’ll therefore steer clear of referring to the tenseless theory of time as 
‘eternalism’.  
10 This ‘property’ of presentness is mysterious for Moving Spotlight theorists, which is one 
of the reasons for MST’s particular lack of popularity when compared with its tensed 
rivals. Presentists can argue that the present is ontologically privileged, whilst Growing 
Blockers can argue that the present is privileged as the block’s leading edge. 
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It’s a timeless God that’s traditionally been thought to pair the best with 
a tenseless theory of time, and the motivation for this seems again to primarily 
be the preservation of God’s omniscience. A timeless God’s perspective is of 
all moments of time as equally real, so (the thought goes) this is how time 
should really be. Our perspective might be of time as appearing to flow, but this 
is an illusion. God, from outside of time, sees reality as it really is: an ordering 
of equally real events into ‘earlier than’, ‘later than’, and ‘simultaneous with’ 
relations.  
The arguments in this vicinity seem to begin with the thought that God 
is timeless, and then infer that time must be tenseless, in order to preserve 
God’s omniscience.11 This isn’t to say that the direction of explanation couldn’t 
go the opposite way, however: one can imagine being a tenseless theorist who 
considers that God, if He exists, ought to be timeless, in order to know reality.  
Having now outlined the main features of the tensed and tenseless 
theories, and explained how each has been taken to fit more naturally with a 
particular construal of God’s relation to time, I’ll proceed to introduce and 
analyse some ways in which these traditional pairings have been, and could be, 
shaken up. I begin with Leftow, who denies that a timeless God must lead us 
to affirm that time is tenseless. Rather, he argues that an atemporal God can 
coherently be believed in in conjunction with a tensed theory of time – more 
specifically, presentism.  
 
(2) TIMELESS GOD AND TENSED TIME? 
 As we well know from the foregoing discussion, Leftow is a strict and 
unwavering atemporalist. Interestingly, however, he also makes it clear that he 
doesn’t feel this commits him to a particular theory of time. In Time and Eternity 
(1991), he argues that, in spite of his steadfast commitment to divine 
timelessness, he wants to be neutral regarding whether time itself is tensed or 
tenseless (1991: 231). Remaining true to his word, Leftow has recently (2009) 
provided us with an argument that a timeless God can exist outside of presentist 
                                                             
11 See Helm (1988: 44-7), Craig (1998:221-50), Rogers (2000: 59), and DeWeese (2004: 
179-184) for examples of such accounts. Rogers also says that Anselm reasoned along 
these lines: ‘Anselm takes it that the tenseless view of time follows from the divine 
perfection of [timeless] eternity, and so we know that time is tenseless’ (2007: 5).  
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time. He’s responding to Katherin Rogers (2007), who maintains that, for 
Anselm, the tenseless view of time follows from his commitment to God’s 
timeless eternity (ibid.: 5). Leftow seeks to rebut this claim: he wants to 
convince us that Anselm is actually a presentist about time, and that if God is 
timeless, it doesn’t have to follow that time is tenseless.  
 
(2.1) TIMELESS GOD AND PRESENTISM? 
 Leftow argues that a timeless God views all instants of presentist time 
by seeing each instant as it is at that stage – when no other moments of time 
exist. He says: 
 
Presentist time might appear to God in snaps of an ordered array of 
instant-thick blocks. At time’s beginning, let’s say, He sees just an 
instant of time. For every instant thereafter, He sees a distinct, later 
instant-thick block. Time as a whole appears to Him in many such 
experiences, so ordered as to represent the order of instants…God 
sees presentist time t, and sees no other time existing as of t. He sees 
t+1 in the same way. He sees each as it is when it is special, and as 
special then (2009: 309). 
 
Leftow stresses that this is crucially different from how a timeless God would 
view tenseless time. If time were tenseless, then all ‘snaps’ would look the same 
to God – because at each moment, all of time exists in the same way. Above, 
Leftow is claiming that each snap will only ever feature a single instant of time: 
the instant that’s present at that time. Every snap will therefore be of a 
different moment, to encompass time’s flow, but only of one moment, to 
encompass the commitment that only the present exists. I’m of the opinion 
that Leftow’s position is an excellent example of somebody attempting to have 
their cake and eat it. He’s suggesting that God can be timeless and unchanging, 
and that He can receive a sequence of snapshots of a dynamical universe. The 
snapshots of presentist time must be received in such a sequence, of course, to 
reflect how time is in reality. At any one moment, only one moment exists, and 
all else has either ceased to exist, or is yet to come. I fail to see how a timeless 
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God, whose life has no sequence, can be kept up-to-date with this objective 
passage.  
 Leftow anticipates such worries. He elucidates his position by drawing 
an analogy to our looking at the night sky, where (in one and the same 
moment) we see stars as they were at different times. He says ‘it would not be 
absurd to say that we see into many times at once’ (ibid.: 310). He adds that the 
stars (which existed at different times), all contribute to our experience, but 
from this it follows neither that they exist all at once, nor that presentism must 
be false – and yet, we nevertheless observe them all at once. Likewise, this 
leads Leftow to argue that ‘if it is compatible with presentism that many times 
be seen at once, it is compatible with presentism that all be seen at once’ (ibid.: 
310-11). Leftow is aware that the analogy isn’t exact: he says that (contra our 
perceiving stars), times don’t affect God’s cognitive state by sending signals to 
Him across space. Rather, if time is presentist and God’s life is timeless (and so 
temporally partless), Leftow says that  God is able to ‘record’ all of the instants 
of presentist time in one and the same simple and unchanging bit of His life. 
He says: 
 
I type one keystroke; this is recorded in one bit of the divine life. I type 
the next – and it is recorded in the same simple bit. It is not recorded 
later in the divine life; the divine life does not have earlier and later 
parts (ibid.: 311).   
 
Leftow argues that it’s now true that, timelessly, the later parts of presentist 
time are recorded in the divine life. He says that this has to be the case, or else 
God’s life would have earlier and later parts, meaning that He wouldn’t be 
immutable (ibid.).  
 I fail to see how Leftow’s account can be rendered coherent. He’s 
arguing that all of presentist time is timelessly recorded in God’s atemporal life. 
An upshot of this is that, as far as we temporal beings are concerned, the 
future doesn’t exist, but nevertheless future events are ‘already’ (from our 
standpoint), known about by God. This is because God timelessly knows 
about every moment of time. However, if we’re to take this option, it seems that 
we don’t have presentism after all. Rather, it appears that time only seems to us 
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to flow objectively, but in reality it’s tenseless, and all moments of it are equally 
real. This is because God’s perspective (given His omniscience) ought to be of 
ultimate reality: if He sees all of time ‘at once,’ then this is how time actually is. 
If presentism is true and God is omniscient, therefore, then He ought, at any 
moment, to perceive only that moment as present, and see nothing else as 
being part of reality. Presentism is a theory about what reality is really, 
objectively like: only the present exists, simpliciter. If presentism is true and we 
want to preserve God’s omniscience, therefore, we simply can’t countenance 
that all of time is timelessly ‘recorded’ with Him.  
Leftow’s argument perhaps stems from his background view (which he 
claims to base upon Anselm) that there are two equally real modes of 
existence: temporal and atemporal (he calls the latter ‘eternal’).12 In Time and 
Eternity, Leftow argues that events can be both present and actual in timeless 
eternity, and also sequenced in time (1991: 234-5). He says that the conditional 
‘if an event occurs in eternity, then it occurs simpliciter’ is false. Rather, 
according to Leftow: 
 
It can be true at a time t that an event dated at t+1 has not yet occurred 
in time, and yet also correct at t to say that that very event exists in 
eternity. That all events occur at once in eternity, I submit, does not 
entail that they all occur at once in time (ibid.: 231-2).  
 
Leftow’s contention is that we ought to take God’s timeless mode of existence 
as an additional mode of existence that’s distinct from our temporal one. He’d 
therefore maintain that all temporal events also exist in eternity, because ‘events 
are present and actual all at once in eternity, but present and actual in sequence 
in other reference frames’ (ibid.: 235). According to this view, there’s more to 
reality than the way things appear to God from the eternal perspective. There’s 
also a temporal perspective, and these two perspectives reflect two genuinely 
different modes of existence: atemporal and temporal.  
Rogers is wary of Leftow’s claim that everything really exists in these 
two different ways. She says that it leads to contradictory claims about, for 
                                                             
12 This account also alludes to, and engages considerably with that of Stump & Kretzmann 
(1981), whose influential account postulates temporal and eternal reference frames. 
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example, my future actions. For instance, from my temporal perspective, I 
haven’t yet bought a puppy in 2019 (and I don’t know whether I will), but in 
eternity, I (tenselessly) buy a puppy in 2019. Given the reality of both modes of 
existence, it becomes true to say that I exist in the present and haven’t yet 
decided to buy a puppy, and true to say that I exist in eternity where I 
(tenselessly) buy the puppy in 2019 (2009: 326).  
I agree with Rogers, and would add that the picture Leftow paints is 
flatly incoherent.  On Leftow’s account, from the timeless mode of existence 
all events are equally real, whereas from the temporal mode of existence, only 
the present moment exists. This isn’t presentism, however – as I’ve explained, 
presentism is a theory about what reality as a whole is like: it says that all that 
exists simpliciter is the present. I therefore conclude that Leftow doesn’t succeed 
in arguing for the coherence of God existing outside of presentist time. At 
best, what he’s defended here is the compatibility of a timeless God and a sort 
of pseudo-presentism, where the present is all that exists from one perspective. At 
worst, he’s simply defended a tenseless view of time, because of God’s 
perspective (which is of ultimate reality) perceiving all events as equally real. In 
order to give the combination of a timeless God and tensed time a fair shot, I’ll 
now examine the Growing Block theory. I’ll argue that it doesn’t fare any 
better than presentism does when paired with a timeless God. 
 
(2.2) TIMELESS GOD AND GROWING BLOCK? 
Leftow sets the scene for his argument that a timeless God and 
presentism are compatible by first imagining how Growing Block time might 
look to a timeless God. He suggests that, for every stage of the block’s growth, 
a timeless God would be able to ‘see’ it as it is at that stage (2009: 307-8). From 
God’s timeless perspective, He will have, at once, multiple experiences which are 
‘images’ of the block at all of its various stages of growth (ibid.: 308). 
Collectively, these ‘images’ will be of the whole of time. Leftow draws an 
analogy with looking at once upon different images of a child taken on 
successive birthdays. He says ‘though no individual photo of the child captures 
any process of growth, collectively, the photos present the process by 
presenting some stages in it’ (ibid.).  
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 For similar reasons to the previous section, I think that Growing Block 
theory isn’t compatible with a timeless God. Given the assumption that God is 
atemporal, He’d have to timelessly perceive these different stages, so the 
question becomes whether it’s coherent to suppose that change can be 
perceived without being undergone by the perceiver. We’ve seen that Leftow 
attempts to persuade us that this is plausible through his example of somebody 
instantaneously seeing into many times when looking up into the night sky. The 
thought is that it’s not much harder to imagine God timelessly seeing many 
different times. However, when we look at the stars, we see them all as if they 
were present. Importantly, if we are to preserve God’s omniscience, He’d have 
to see each moment of time when it’s present (at the block’s leading edge), and 
when no other times are present – and this, I contend, isn’t a feat that can be 
accomplished timelessly. At each moment, new events that hadn’t previously 
existed become a part of reality, and moments that were once present recede 
into the past. It simply can’t be that all moments of time are somehow 
timelessly ‘recorded’ in God’s atemporal standpoint ‘as if’ they’re present, like a 
complete series of photographs of reality, because then God still lacks 
knowledge of a fundamental feature of reality: which moment is objectively 
now.  
 A well-known objection to Growing Block theory is that nobody can 
actually know which moment is objectively ‘now’.13 The idea is that, because 
the present and the past exist, then everybody at every moment (past and 
present) will be thinking that the time at which they exist is the privileged 
present. They can’t all be right, because at any time only one moment is 
privileged as the present. Moreover, it’s been argued that growing blockers 
don’t have a (forthcoming) response to this. They can’t argue (as presentists 
would) that we know that the current moment is objectively ‘now’ because it’s 
the only moment that exists. They equally can’t argue (as tenseless theorists 
would) that ‘now’ means the moment at which I utter that sentence (Braddon 
Mitchell 2004: 199-200). To summarise, we can’t be sure that what seems to us 
to be the objective present isn’t actually a moment in the past of the objective 
present, because the past is just as real as the present, and we have ‘no 
independent access’ (Braddon-Mitchell 2004: 200) to where the leading edge of 
                                                             
13 See Braddon-Mitchell (2004: 199-203) & Bourne (2006: 22) for articulations of this.  
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the block is. It’s thought that growing block theorists can’t respond that the 
past exists in a ‘less real’ way from the present, because this would chip away at 
the core of the theory, which after all says that present and past exist simpliciter.   
Granting that we humans mightn’t be able to know that it’s truly ‘now’ 
now if reality is indeed a growing block, this is unacceptable for an omniscient 
God, because such a being can’t be subject to these epistemological limitations. 
I therefore venture that God’s knowledge must change objectively, in order to 
be continually aware of time’s passage, and to be continually updated with the 
moment that’s at the block’s leading edge. Leftow suggests that a timeless God 
views a complete series of ‘snapshots’, featuring the block at every stage of its 
growth when it was at that stage. However, we’re then not working with a 
genuine Growing Block theory of time after all, because the Growing Block 
theory must preserve the thesis that all that exists simpliciter is the past and 
present. If, from God’s perspective, all moments of time can be perceived 
equally (including those of the would-be future), then we’re instead working 
with a tenseless theory of time, given that God’s perspective ought to be of 
ultimate reality.  
 Having argued that the growing block theory is susceptible to many of 
the same problems as presentism when paired with a timeless God, we’ve just 
one dynamical theory of time remaining. I’ll argue that, although more 
promising than its A-theory rivals at being compatible with an atemporal God, 
MST nevertheless emerges as unsuccessful. 
 
(2.3) TIMELESS GOD AND MST? 
 MST, although arguably the least popular tensed theory of time, has 
perhaps the best chance of success at upholding divine atemporality. This is 
due to all moments of time existing as a part of ultimate reality. God’s 
knowledge doesn’t have to change to encompass new forms of reality, as – say 
– a once-present moment ceases to exist, or a new moment becomes present. 
Bearing this thought in mind, we can see that Garrett DeWeese is mistaken 
when he employs the premise that, on tensed time, ‘the future does not exist at 
all, in any sense’ (2004: 182), for his conclusion that a timeless God entails 
tenseless time. MST, a tensed theory, denies the claim that the future doesn’t 
exist. Rather, it claims that all moments of time exist. One moment, the 
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present, is privileged (though not ontologically), and the future is every 
moment that succeeds it.  
 In spite of this, I still think that MST is incompatible with a timeless 
God. At each moment of time, there remains a moment which is privileged as 
the present – and this moment changes objectively. Using this theory’s 
eponymous metaphor, this is the moment illuminated by the spotlight. This, I 
submit, isn’t something that can be known by a timeless God. He may indeed 
be able to see all moments of time as equally real, as they are on MST, but the 
element that makes this theory dynamic is that the present moment changes. If 
we allow that God knows that first one moment is privileged, and then 
another, we’ve again introduced sequence into His life, and we’ve failed to 
uphold divine timelessness. Alternatively, if we respond that, from God’s 
perspective, He sees ‘at once’ all of the images of reality at every time (so that 
presumably every moment is illuminated by the spotlight), then we’ve two 
unacceptable options to choose from. Either, because God’s perspective is 
privileged, not only is every moment of time equally real (as MST can accept), 
but also every moment is privileged in the same way – and hence, in effect, no 
moment is privileged. We therefore have tenseless time.14 On the other hand, if 
we allow that there are two equal perspectives: one in which the present 
moment changes, and the other in which it doesn’t, we’ve strayed unacceptably 
far from the classical picture of MST whereby reality as a whole features an 
objectively moving spotlight.  
 This section has examined the compatibility of a timeless God with 
tensed time. I outlined Leftow’s argument that a timeless God can exist outside 
of presentist time, and argued that it either mis-represents presentism, or else it 
fails to uphold the idea that God is truly timeless. By attempting to marry 
together these two theories, Leftow is, I argued, trying to have his cake and eat 
it, because as we’ve seen there’s a great tension between them. To give tensed 
time a fair shot at being linked with a timeless God, I also considered the 
compatibility of a timeless God with Growing Block theory and MST, 
respectively. I argued that these combinations also fail. If we claim (as Leftow 
                                                             
14 Admittedly, this might be a ‘second level’ of tenseless time, because all moments of time 
are illuminated by the spotlight, but this would be tenseless time nonetheless – because no 
moment would be privileged by the spotlight. Another spotlight would need to be 
introduced to fill this role, and restore tense to MST.  
 249 
 
does) that time is tensed, and God is timelessly aware of all of these moments 
of dynamical time, then we lose what’s so important to the metaphysics of 
these theories of time: they’re theories about reality, simpliciter. It simply won’t 
do for there to be different modes of existence. At best, this would mean that 
we’ve some kind of ‘pseudo’ version of these tensed theories of time, and at 
worst (for A-theorists, at least), it means that (privileging God’s perspective as 
being of ultimate reality) time is tenseless after all.  
In fact, based on the foregoing discussion, I’d argue that there’s an 
inconsistent triad between divine timelessness, omniscience, and tensed time 
(see Fig. 1). If God knows about all of tensed time at each moment, then He’s 
not timeless. If He timelessly knows about all events ‘at once,’ then time isn’t 
tensed. If, however, He timelessly exists outside of tensed time, then we can’t 
uphold divine omniscience. This – in addition to my arguments against 
atemporalism in Parts 1-3 – is independently disappointing for the atemporalist 
in the sense that they’re forced to be tenseless theorists. This might be all well 
and good to most atemporalists, but I’ll now argue that temporalists at least 
have the freedom to choose between the tensed and tenseless theories of time. 
I’ll consider the alternative manner of shaking up the traditional ways of 
pairing divine eternity with one’s theory of time; I’ll examine the compatibility 
of a temporal God and tenseless time. I’ll argue that it is a coherent way to model 
God’s relation to time, and that it even boasts independent benefits. I’ll also 
briefly speculate about the picture of a kenotically incarnate God within 
tenseless time.  
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(3) NEW DIRECTIONS: TEMPORAL GOD AND 
TENSELESS TIME 
An initial noteworthy preliminary is that being a temporalist (regardless 
of whether time is considered tensed or tenseless) needn’t commit one to a 
particular stance on time’s finitude (or lack of it).15 Divine ‘everlastingness’ 
appears to suggest that time must itself be without a beginning (and end), in 
order to preserve the notion that God Himself is without a beginning (and end). 
One could, however, maintain that God is temporally everlasting because, at 
every moment of time (whether time be finite or infinite), God exists. In taking 
this stance, one can remain non-committal about the everlastingness of time 
itself.  
Furthermore, temporalists needn’t worry about their position imposing 
by definition some restriction upon God’s sovereignty because of His being 
somehow ‘contained within’ time. As was discussed in the previous chapter, 
they could adopt (some version of) a relationist account of God’s relation to 
time, and maintain that time is nothing over and above a system of relations 
between events and entities. Alternatively, temporalists could be 
substantivalists and argue that, although points of time exist independently of 
the events that exist at them, they don’t exist independently of God, who 
creates all points of time and sustains them in existence. I therefore maintain 
that the temporalist is on equal footing with the atemporalist regarding ability 
to preserve divine sovereignty.  
 
                                                             
15 Being committed to finite time could lead the temporalist to a dilemma between, on the 
one hand,  God Himself being finite (unacceptable on classical theism), and on the other 
hand God existing in some alternative state before the beginning of time, which would 
require further elaboration. It verges on Craig’s ‘hybrid’ account discussed in Chapter 7 
and, as was mentioned there, this isn’t without problems of its own. Alternatively, if the 
temporalist were to claim that time is infinite, then a different dilemma seems to face 
them. They could claim either that the universe is nevertheless finite and created, or that the 
universe, too, exists infinitely into the past. The latter horn seems to unacceptably detract 
from God’s status as creator, although there’s some scope to argue that God is still 
logically (or metaphysically) prior to creation, and is thus sufficiently independent from it 
to remain its creator. The former horn, however, on which God is presumably infinite, 
leads the temporalist headlong into worries about what God was doing before He created 
the universe, and why He didn’t create sooner. I don’t think that these dilemmas are 
unavoidable, however. I simply wanted to note that temporalists of all stripes aren’t forced 
to opt for one particular horn.  
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(3.1) FEATURES OF THE ACCOUNT 
We’re now ready to elucidate the features of this account whereby a 
temporal God persists through tenseless time – or four-dimensional spacetime, 
for that matter.16 The most common account of persistence through tenseless 
time is perdurance: the view that we persist by having distinct temporal parts 
throughout our existence (Lewis 1986a: 202). The opposing account is 
endurance, where something persists by being ‘wholly present’ at each time that 
it exists (ibid.), such that it doesn’t have temporal parts: only spatial parts. 
David Lewis invites us to imagine perdurance through time as similar to the 
way that a road winds its way through space: ‘part of it is here and part of it is 
there…none of it is wholly present at two different places’ (ibid.).  
I venture that the same is the case for God, on this account. He is 
made up of temporal parts, or ‘time-slices’, and at every moment of time there 
exists a distinct divine temporal part, and no distinct part is present at two 
different places. However, God still exists as a whole, unified being, because 
time itself exists as a whole, with all of its parts being equally real. In turn, all of 
God’s temporal parts are equally real, with none existing in a ‘privileged’ sense, 
because time is tenseless. God’s persistence can therefore be represented by a 
‘time’ worm that has a part at every moment of time. He therefore exists in a 
more robust sense than all other creatures because He perdures through the 
whole of time: there’s no moment at which a temporal part of Him isn’t located.  
Furthermore, God’s temporal parts are unified by the causal continuity 
between them. According to Lewis, ‘[a perduring thing] stays more or less the 
same because of the way its later temporal parts depend causally for their 
existence and character on the ones just before’ (1986b: xiii). It could therefore 
be argued that God is a unified being because of the causal connections that 
connect His later temporal parts with His earlier ones. For example, God’s 
earlier temporal part in which He witnesses a world in which humans are in a 
fallen state and sin abounds, is causally connected with His later temporal part 
in which He decides to become incarnate as a response to human sin.  
                                                             
16 Henceforth, I’ll talk about ‘time’ instead of spacetime, given that God’s relation to time 
is the subject of this thesis. As in the previous chapter, however, I think that the debate is 
certainly intelligible when considered in terms of spacetime as a whole, particularly due to 
the strong compatibility of tenseless time and relativity theory. 
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I know of no other account of this sort, although Mullins considers 
(before dismissing) something similar for Christ’s human nature (2016: 186). He 
imagines a model in which the Son’s human nature perdures through space-
time, in conjunction with a timeless God. His motivation for doing so has to 
do with the Son’s ‘becoming’ incarnate: Mullins is looking for a way in which 
the atemporalist can avoid claiming that the Son ‘began’ to be incarnate. We 
saw back in Chapter 1 that this isn’t an easy business for the atemporalist – and 
Mullins himself thinks that divine timelessness should be abandoned. Mullins 
suggests that, if Christ’s human nature perdures through spacetime, then there 
will be no moment at which the Son ‘began’ to be related to it. However, he 
then objects to this view, claiming that it fails (contrary to orthodoxy) to 
preserve the numerical identity of the Son and Jesus Christ – because part of 
Christ is composed of temporal parts, but this isn’t the case for the Son (ibid.). 
My account differs from that of Mullins, and (I think) avoids this problem. I’m 
supposing that the Son as a person is composed of temporal parts – not merely 
that His incarnate human nature is so composed. On my account, a unity of 
temporal parts, which includes the temporal parts of the life of Christ, 
composes one single person. If somebody were to argue that these parts don’t 
compose one single person who remains the same person through time, then 
they’d be begging the question against perdurantism. This fallacy also runs 
counter to the approach of my thesis, which has so far (using the incarnation 
as a lens) favoured an understanding of God as temporal. If He’s indeed 
temporal, He must persist in one way or another, and we can’t rule out a major 
account of persistence simply by denying the very conclusion that it offers.     
I think that, in addition to being a coherent account of God’s relation 
to time that ought to be taken seriously, this account also enjoys independent 
benefits. Firstly, it aligns with modern physics regarding time’s tenseless nature. 
The special and general theories of relativity (STR & GTR), developed by 
Einstein, are at the forefront of our current ‘best science.’ Both state that we 
need a union between ‘points of space’ and ‘instants of time’, into a spacetime, 
and that, unlike with Newtonian physics, there’s no such thing as ‘absolute’ 
distance or simultaneity. Rather, on STR time is a relative quantity, which 
depends upon the reference frame from which it’s measured (Harrington 2015: 
151). For our purposes, the important thing to note is that STR and GTR 
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strongly suggest that sets of events can’t be ‘absolutely present to’ one another 
in the way that the tensed theory of time requires (Harrington 2015: 85). That 
is, whether or not two events are ‘simultaneously present’ (such as my writing 
this chapter and Cyril Ramaphosa being sworn in as President of South Africa) 
isn’t something that we can judge absolutely, because simultaneity is relative. 
According to tensed theories of time, however, the present moment is a 
feature of reality that’s objectively privileged, and doesn’t depend on observers 
and reference frames. Furthermore, the tenseless theory of time sits better with 
the unification of space and time into a spacetime universe. Of course, there 
have been attempts to rescue tensed theories of time from the clutches of STR 
and GTR17, but it’s nevertheless widely recognised that the tenseless theory of 
time has a significant advantage over the tensed theory here.  
This being said, my project is one which prioritises the metaphysics of 
the incarnation over all else, so I’ll not place too much weight on this ‘physics 
first’ victory. Indeed, I think that temporalists can still help themselves to the 
‘classic’ version of their account whereby God exists within tensed time. It’s 
nevertheless good to note that this alternative temporalist account, as well as 
(I’ll argue) preserving a consistent and orthodox metaphysics of the 
incarnation, is also one that marries well with modern physics. 
Having sketched how the picture of a temporal God existing within 
tenseless time might look, I’ll now suggest ways in which I think it can handle 
the three aspects of the incarnation that I prioritised in this thesis: i) the Son’s 
becoming incarnate, ii) avoiding the incoherence problem, and iii) the Son’s 
glorification. I’ll deal with each of these in turn.  
 
(3.2) TEMPORAL GOD, TENSELESS TIME, AND KENOTICISM 
In Chapter 2, I argued that temporalists can overcome the problem 
posed by kind-essentialism, and can consistently explain how a divine being 
becomes human. I think that my account, being temporalist, can likewise avoid 
kind-essentialist worries in the ways I suggested. I venture that this account 
only differs from general temporalist accounts in that it spells out in more 
detail how the Son persists through time. The Son ‘becomes incarnate’ in the 
                                                             
17 See Zimmerman (2008) for a defence of presentism in this regard. See also Skow (2015) 
chapters 8-9 for an argument that a modified version of MST is compatible with relativity.  
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traditional kenotic way if time is tenseless: He freely gives up His omniscience 
and omnipotence, and takes on a human body. I would explain the intrinsic 
change that the Son goes through by appealing to His temporal parts. The Son 
has an earlier temporal part in which He’s omnipotent and omniscient, and 
considers making a huge sacrifice and taking on human form. He also has a 
later temporal part (causally related to the earlier one), in which He has 
divested Himself of omnipotence and omniscience, and in which He has a 
human body.  
In the paper that formed much of the basis for discussion in Chapter 7, 
Le Poidevin worries about assigning different persistence conditions to God, 
on the one hand, and humans, on the other. More specifically, he considers 
combining a picture of God as an enduring being, with humans as perduring 
beings, where time is tenseless.18 Le Poidevin’s worry is generated by 
considering the Son becoming incarnate, and whether or not He’d remain a 
continuant (an enduring being) when He becomes human. Le Poidevin asks: 
 
Does he remain a continuant? Then he does not truly enter into our 
(four-dimensionalist) condition. Does he cease to be a continuant, and 
become instead simply a process with different temporal parts? Then it 
is not truly the Son who becomes incarnate, but rather a process 
somehow continuous with the Son’s pre-incarnate life. The Son 
himself goes out of existence at that point. No: incarnational doctrine 
does not sit happily with different approaches to divine and human 
persistence (2017: 222).  
 
Le Poidevin is worried that, if the incarnate Son continues to endure, and 
humans persist by perduring, then He’ll not have become ‘truly human’.19 
Accounting for the Son’s continual humanity whilst He’s incarnate on earth 
and in heaven is a hugely important part of the incarnation, so I’m in 
agreement that it won’t do to opt for an account which gives us a very limited 
sense of the Son’s humanity. On the other hand, Le Poidevin argues that if the 
                                                             
18 Le Poidevin, recall, doesn’t use the terms ‘perdurance’ and ‘endurance’ in his discussion, 
but rather talks about persisting things as ‘occurrents’ and ‘continuants’, respectively.  
19 We saw in the previous chapter that it’s part of Le Poidevin’s argument that humans in 
fact endure. Here, he’s simply entertaining the thought of combining an enduring God 
with perduring humans.  
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Son does cease to be an enduring being when He becomes incarnate, then He, 
the Son, doesn’t truly enter into our condition – instead, some ‘process 
continuous with the Son’s pre-incarnate life’ becomes incarnate, and the Son 
ceases to exist. Presumably, this thought hinges on the (plausible) premise that 
one and the same being can’t change its manner of persistence and continue to 
exist. However, if the Son has always been a perduring being (as I’m suggesting 
here), then we avoid Le Poidevin’s worry, because in both his pre-incarnate 
and incarnate states, the Son perdures through tenseless time.20 I therefore 
maintain that my account has the resources to explain the Son ‘becoming 
incarnate’.  
 In Chapter 4 I argued that kenoticism (which, in its most credible form, 
entails temporalism of some sort), is the best way to avoid the incoherence 
problem that’s so readily plagued metaphysical accounts of the incarnation. I 
therefore think it’s an advantage of the account proposed here that it 
incorporates this understanding of the incarnation. The kenotically incarnate 
Son doesn’t possess omnipotence or omniscience at any of His incarnate ‘time-
slices’, because at these points He’s freely given up these attributes. It’s this 
that makes Him ‘fully human’. 
 In line with orthodoxy, though, the Son remains ‘fully divine’ whilst 
He’s incarnate, and the tenseless theorist can maintain this is for three reasons. 
Firstly, the Son is causally connected with the (equally real) earlier temporal 
parts of His life, in which He does possess omnipotence and omniscience.21 
Secondly, His omnibenevolence is retained. I argued in Chapter 4 that God’s 
unwavering omnibenevolence is essential to His divinity, and is a necessary 
attribute that there’s no possibility of Him giving up. In fact, it’s the very 
essence of and motivation for His kenotic sacrifice, and it’s retained when He 
becomes human. Thirdly, the incarnate Son is ‘fully divine’ thanks to the 
                                                             
20 Le Poidevin’s own solution to his worry, discussed in Chapter 7, was to argue that God 
and humans are both enduring beings – or ‘occurrents’, so the Son doesn’t need to change 
His mode of persistence in order to become incarnate.  
21 Likewise, He’s connected with the equally real later temporal parts of His life, where 
He’s regained omniscience and omnipotence. Perhaps this isn’t such a strong guarantee of 
divinity, however, because of the asymmetry of causal connections meaning that the Son is 
only able to regain these divine attributes as a result of His sacrifice made when He lacked 
them. 
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traditional kenotic modification of ‘essential’ divine properties.22 I therefore 
maintain that temporalists who adhere to tenseless time can explain the Son 
‘becoming’ incarnate and avoid the incoherence problem, and do so using a 
kenotic account. In fact, I think that the only difference between this 
discussion and that in Chapters 2 and 4 is that here I’ve simply spelled out in 
more detail how the Son would persist if time is tenseless.  
I’ll now argue that this account can also fulfil the requirements of the 
Son’s glorification, which is the third and final aspect of the incarnation that 
this thesis privileges. According to the kenoticist, the Son is able to become 
‘fully human’ because of His (voluntary) divestiture of the attributes 
omniscience and omnipotence. I noted earlier that the kenoticist’s claim to be 
able to satisfy the full humanity of the Son in this way is equally what makes 
things problematic when we consider the exaltation. The kenoticist must be 
able to provide an account of how it is that the exalted Son, in spite of regaining 
His omniscience and omnipotence, remains ‘fully human’. This requirement is 
a highly important aspect of the doctrine of the incarnation: the glorified Son 
retains His human nature to signify that we’re also capable of such 
glorification.  
In Chapter 6, I argued that temporalists are able to circumvent these 
worries, because they can appeal to the Son’s experiential humanity when He’s 
exalted. He regains full possession of omnipotence and omniscience, as well as 
total recall of ‘what it’s like’ to be the human Jesus. I stressed that in order to 
be experientially human, it’s necessary that one have been ontologically human. I 
then argued that no conflict is generated between omniscience and 
omnipotence, on the one hand, and experiential humanity, on the other.  
 If we venture away from ‘classical’ accounts of divine temporality 
whereby time is tensed, and instead consider the combination of a temporal 
God and tenseless time, I think that we can still make sense of the exaltation. 
This is in a similar way to that suggested in Chapter 6. In particular, this is 
thanks to some important aspects of tenseless time, which I’ll now spell out.   
 My suggestion is that tenseless theorists appeal specifically to the 
temporal parts of the Son’s existence in which He’s human, as a means of 
                                                             
22 I refer readers back to discussion in Chapter 4, where I discussed the traditional kenotic 
strategy that the requisite divine property isn’t, for instance, ‘being omniscient’ simpliciter, 
but rather ‘being omniscient unless freely and temporarily choosing to be otherwise’. 
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accounting for His experiential humanity when He’s exalted. These temporal 
parts are equally as real as all other temporal parts of the Son, and they’re 
causally related to the parts of His existence in which He regains His 
omnipotence and omniscience. If time is tenseless, the moments (or temporal 
parts) where the Son has given up His omniscience and omnipotence are just as 
real as the moments (or temporal parts) in which He has these divine 
properties. It therefore seems that the tenseless theorist can account for a 
robust sense in which the exalted Son is ‘experientially human’: she can refer to 
causally-connected, earlier time-slices in which He’s sacrificed His omniscience 
and omnipotence, and say that He’s human in virtue of these earlier time-slices, 
which are just as much a part of reality as the later ones.  
  I argued in Chapter 6 that (among other things) the exalted Son can 
remain human thanks to His perfect ‘recall’ of ‘what it’s like’ to be human. I 
think that the tenseless theorist of time has the potential to strengthen her 
argument even more here, using this strategy. That is, she can appeal to the 
time-slices of Christ’s life in which He (tenselessly) lacks omniscience and 
omnipotence, and experiences human limitations and temptations. She can 
argue that this experience of being human, and the Son’s resulting perfect 
empathy for the human race remains with Him in heaven, because of His 
causal relation to these earlier time-slices.23 In fact, the tenseless theorist can 
claim that the Son does something more robust than ‘recall’ what it’s like to be 
human, and ‘retain’ such knowledge. Rather, being omniscient, He’s always 
aware of these moments as an objective part of reality. He’s aware of these 
earlier time-slices, and (being omniscient) knows that they’re no less a part of 
reality than the time simultaneous with His recollection of them. The tenseless 
theorist can argue that this is sufficient for the Son’s ‘perpetual humanity’ at all 
of His exaltation time-slices. As such, tenseless theorists can claim that it’s true 
                                                             
23 Importantly, this added knowledge that comes from being human, and empathising with 
humans, doesn’t have to mean that Christ wasn’t omniscient prior to the incarnation. 
Rather, one can argue that when unincarnate He knew all of the propositional knowledge 
that was to be known, and merely added to His experiential knowledge in the incarnation – 
namely, the knowledge of what it’s like to be a human. However, I would argue that the 
Son would fail to be omniscient if, upon being glorified, He were to forget this experiential 
knowledge that He possess at His incarnate time-slices. This is because to forget 
something (whether or not it’s propositional knowledge) does seem to prevent 
omniscience.  
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‘now’ (at the time simultaneous with this utterance) that the Son is fully 
human, and this is thanks to the existence of His earlier time-slices in which 
He lacks omniscience and omnipotence. Having sketched how temporalists 
might account for the Son’s incarnation within tenseless time, I’ll now consider 
and respond to what I think are the most troubling objections.   
 
(3.3) STAVING OFF OBJECTIONS  
There are no doubt many possible objections to this very specific 
account of God’s relation to time, and I’ll now outline those I consider to be 
the most troubling. Firstly, many hackles might be raised at the thought of 
God having temporal parts. The strongest underlying reason for this is, I think, 
because this flouts the doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS). According to 
traditional definitions of DDS, God has no parts (whether these are spatial, 
temporal, or other), and He’s identical to His attributes. However, DDS has 
recently been objected to on a number of grounds, most notably that if God is 
supposed to be identical to each of His divine attributes, then it follows that 
He’s a divine attribute (and that all of His attributes are identical to each other) 
(Adams & Robson, manuscript). Moreover, I think it’s quite clear that the 
framing of my thesis is open to the charge of flouting DDS anyway, because 
from the outset I’ve been open to the possibility of the incarnation revealing 
that God has temporal parts, if such an account can uphold incarnational 
orthodoxy.  
Furthermore, I think that any account of divine temporality (whether 
time is tenseless or tensed) will flout DDS. A temporal God existing within 
tensed time would have a life that changes objectively with the flow of time, 
which is far from simple. Moreover, temporalists who think (or assume) that 
time is tensed still have to pick the way in which God persists through time: 
either perdurance or endurance. Here, I’ve simply spelled out in more detail 
how God would persist.  
Relatedly, an account which ascribes temporal parts to God seems far 
less worrying than one that ascribes spatial parts to Him, because on a latter 
account it seems (worryingly) that we can get (geographically) closer to God by 
travelling in a particular direction. In light of this, the idea of a God comprised 
of temporal parts seems far less worrying. What is more, although this account 
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postulates a unified ‘spacetime’, it doesn’t require God to be a ‘spacetime’ 
worm: only a time worm. This could, in fact, be another way (besides 
everlastingness) in which God’s existence differs from our own), and grounds 
God’s superiority.  
Granted that I’m permitted to flout the traditional DDS, then, a related 
and more forceful worry is that I’ve proposed an account so radically 
‘unsimple’ that it threatens the doctrine of the Trinity. I’ve argued that the Son 
is a ‘time worm’: that He’s comprised of unified, causally-connected ‘time-
slices’. Presumably, then, the other members of the Trinity must also persist in 
the same way. The Father and Spirit can’t be the very same time worm as the 
Son, for His time-slices involve Him doing things that they simply don’t do. 
For example, the time-slice of the Son in which He’s getting baptised cannot, 
surely, be a time-slice in the life of the Father or Spirit. It seems that the Father 
and Spirit must themselves be separate time worms, if they too are temporal.24  
It might be objected, therefore, that I’ve separated the ‘substance’ of 
the persons of the Trinity so far that I’m committing to some form of 
Tritheism: in other words, that I’m (unacceptably) postulating three separate 
Gods, rather than three persons who are the same God. My response here 
would be to maintain that my account fits under a ‘Social Trinitarian’ umbrella. 
The Social theory of the Trinity was discussed in Chapter 4, and was in fact 
relied upon to defend a kenotic incarnation, so it’s quite consistent that it be 
employed again here. To recap, this is the view that the three persons of the 
Trinity are united into one God by the loving relationship that exists between 
them, but are three persons because of the different loving relations that they 
bear to one another (Swinburne forthcoming: 8). I’d therefore claim that part 
of the reason why these different relations are distinct is because they’re borne 
by separate time worms. Moreover, persons are unified time-worms, on this 
account, so I’m not exaggerating the accepted understanding that the Trinity 
comprises of three persons: I’m simply suggesting a means of cashing this out. 
Having outlined (and responded to) worries that stem from theological 
concerns, I’ll now consider some that are more purely metaphysical in nature. 
One such objection is that tenseless time poses a problem for human freedom 
                                                             
24 I explained in the introduction that I’ll not take a stance on whether all three members 
of the Trinity must have the same relation to time, although I gave reasons for my general 
speculation that they must.  
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in that God knows how I act in (what’s to me) my future. God’s knowledge 
allegedly makes it impossible for me to act otherwise, when the time comes. I 
respond that this is only a problem insofar as the B-series in general poses a 
problem for human freedom – nothing more problematic is added if we 
suppose that God knows the tenseless fact that, say, I buy a puppy in 2019. 
Rather, the existence of the fact itself is where the problem (allegedly) lies. The 
traditional response from the tenseless theorist here is, briefly, that although 
the future exists as a part of reality, this doesn’t entail the necessity of my 
actions, and so doesn’t constrain them.25 The B-theorist can still maintain that 
our actions at an earlier time causally (in some sense) affect our actions at a 
later time.  
A different objection has to do with the possibility of our being able to 
claim (given tenseless time) that it’s true at times earlier than the incarnation that 
the Son was fully human. An opponent might argue that, given the Son’s 
omniscience and the equal existence of all times, just as the Son is fully human 
at times later than the incarnation thanks to His knowledge of His human 
time-slices, so He should also be fully human at times earlier than the 
incarnation, for the very same reason. This clearly seems to be a 
counterintuitive result, though: we surely don’t want our account of the 
incarnation to commit us to the view that, before a temporal God became 
human, He was human already. This seems to make very little sense, especially 
for a transformationalist account such as kenoticism that maintains that the 
Son became human by being transformed into a human at a particular time.  
By way of response, I’d appeal to the asymmetry of causation making it 
the case that we can’t make the same claims about a person’s relation to their 
later time-slices as we can about their relation to their earlier time-slices. 
Although all moments of time are equally real, it’s nevertheless consistent with 
the tenseless theory of time that there are important (asymmetric) causal 
relations between the earlier and later time-slices of a person, such that earlier 
time-slices can cause later time-slices, but not vice versa. At any rate, it’s part of 
Lewis’s account of perdurance that persons are unified by causal connections 
between their earlier and later temporal parts, as I outlined above. I therefore 
argue that, because of the asymmetry of causal connections between temporal 
                                                             
25 See, for instance, Diekemper (2007) & Le Poidevin (2013b). 
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parts, we can’t say that the Son is human before the incarnation by appealing to 
the later time-slices in which He’s human. Instead, the Son’s not being human 
is amongst the causal conditions for His ‘becoming’ human (in a form of 
genuine sacrifice) at a later time. I therefore venture that one can only say ‘it’s 
true now that the Son is fully human’ at times simultaneous with and later than the 
incarnation. At all of these times, one can justify one’s argument by appealing 
to the time-slices in which the Son is incarnate, but (because of the asymmetry 
of causal relations) they can’t do the same at times earlier than the incarnation.  
A final objection is that, when claiming that the exalted Son is 
experientially human, I placed a substantial amount of weight on the existence 
of earlier time-slices of His life in which He’s human. It might be argued that 
this reliance is simply too tenuous. After all, one might say, it’s then true now 
(at the time simultaneous with this utterance) that ‘Emily is on a bike ride’, 
largely due to the fact that an earlier time-slice of me was doing just this. In 
response, I suggest that the reason why the exalted Son can count as human, 
and why the thesis-writing Emily can’t count as on a bike ride, is thanks to the 
other aspect of my account: the Son’s perfect knowledge of what it’s like to be 
human. Admittedly, I can remember what my bike ride was like, and recall 
various sensations from it, but my memory of it is imperfect due to the way 
that I experience time. God, however, being omniscient, knows (at the times 
simultaneous with His exaltation time-slices) perfectly what it’s like to be human, 
and to lack knowledge and power. In fact, it could be argued that God knows 
about these time-slices as clearly as we know about (what appears to be) the 
present moment, and that our memories of (what appear to be) past moments 
are mere copies of this perfect and infallible divine knowledge of all times. I 
therefore suggest that it’s this difference in divine and human knowledge that 
drives a wedge between the Son’s perpetual humanity, on the one hand, and 
my (alleged) perpetual bike ride, on the other. 
 
(4) CONCLUSION 
 The debate between the tensed and tenseless theories of time is 
arguably the apogee of discussion in the philosophy of time. We’ve seen here 
that it has a clear bearing on the issue of God’s relation to time. I’ve examined 
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the effects of challenging the traditional assumptions that a timeless God exists 
outside of tenseless time, and a temporal God within tensed time. I firstly 
considered how things might look if God is timeless and time tensed, 
provoked by Leftow’s argument that God can exist outside of presentist time. I 
concluded that, if we want a timeless God to be omniscient, we can’t uphold 
any dynamical theory of time. Sharpening this point, I suggested that there’s an 
inconsistent triad between divine omniscience, divine timelessness, and (all 
accounts of) tensed time. Atemporalists (as well as being unable to account for 
the doctrine of the incarnation) have only one option regarding the passage of 
time: they must be tenseless theorists. I next outlined a new account on which 
God is temporal, and time tenseless. I argued that this is a coherent account, 
which boasts independent benefits besides. Moreover, I argued that this 
account is able to accommodate the Son becoming kenotically incarnate. 
Divine temporalists can therefore choose between being tensed or tenseless 
theorists of time, I submit, which is a luxury that divine atemporalists can’t 
afford.  
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CONCLUDING REMARKS  
All praise to Thee, eternal God 
Who, clothed in garb of flesh and blood, 
Dost take a manger for Thy throne, 
While worlds on worlds are Thine alone. 
Hallelujah! (Luther 1993) 
 
The nature of God’s eternity has long beguiled Philosophers and 
Theologians. It’s a particularly complex and multi-layered question because of 
how deeply it’s interwoven with other commitments that are themselves up for 
debate, such as the nature of time itself, the way we understand various divine 
attributes, and – importantly for this thesis – the specific religion that we’re 
working with. I’ve been considering a Christian God, using Christianity’s 
central and sacrosanct commitment to the Son of God becoming incarnate as a 
lens for examining the nature of God’s eternity.  
I’ve privileged three important elements of the incarnation, and 
devoted the first three parts of my thesis to each of them in turn. Part one 
considered the Son ‘becoming’ incarnate. Chapter 1 argued that atemporalists 
have at their disposal only one provisionally viable way to make sense of such a 
transition. They can’t argue that the Son changes intrinsically when He becomes 
incarnate, because such a change requires one to be subject to the passage of 
time. Neither can atemporalists help themselves to Leftow’s account of modal 
variation as a means for understanding the Son becoming incarnate, I argued. 
This is because, whether we’re genuine modal realists or ersatz modal realists, 
unpacking Leftow’s claim leads to us being unable to achieve his desired modal 
variation. This leaves only one option, I argued: the Son ‘becomes’ incarnate 
because of an extrinsic change. Atemporalists can adopt a compositionalist 
account of the incarnation, whereby Christ is composed of a divine ‘part’ as 
well as two human ‘parts’: a body and soul. They can argue that the Son 
became incarnate when His human body and soul came into existence and 
joined with Him, thus causing Him to change extrinsically as a result.  
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Chapter 2 considered whether and how temporalists can account for 
the Son becoming incarnate. I outlined the worries that temporalists face in 
light of the various commitments related to kind-essentialism. Most notably, 
these were the worries that a divine being can’t ‘take on’ humanity, because this 
is to become a member of a natural kind – which according to kind-essentialism 
is impossible.  Related to this is another commitment that to belong to a 
particular natural kind requires one to possess – of necessity – a particular set 
of properties. This commitment also poses a problem for a temporal God 
becoming incarnate because of the alleged conflict between ‘divine’ and 
‘human’ properties. I outlined several responses to these kind-essentialist 
worries, most notably from Sharpe and Morris. Morris re-considers the 
properties that are necessarily required for being human, and also draws a 
distinction between being ‘merely’ human (like us) and ‘fully’ human (like the 
Son). Sharpe outlines a revised version of kind-essentialist commitments, such 
that the Son can consistently be both divine and human. This requires him to 
distinguish between being ‘dominantly’ and ‘accidentally’ a member of a 
particular kind. I argued that, by braiding together the insights of these 
arguments, the atemporalist is able to overcome kind-essentialist reservations. 
As a case study, I applied my arguments to Merricks’s physicalist 
understanding of the incarnation. Of course, I noted that temporalists are 
equally free to simply deny kind-essentialism, but I wanted to argue that even 
given kind-essentialist worries, the temporalist has the resources to be home and 
dry.  
In Part two, I turned to the second non-negotiable aspect of the 
incarnation: that the incarnate Son was fully divine, fully human and yet one 
single person. Arguments that Christ can’t be all of these things are grouped 
under the head of the ‘incoherence problem’. Chapter 3 considered whether 
atemporalists have the resources to respond to this. I argued that they have just 
one model available – compositionalism – and that it doesn’t give them the 
resources to avoid incoherence. I examined the atemporalist strategy of 
ascribing the conflicting properties of divinity and humanity (such as being 
omnipotent and limited in power) to different parts of the composite Christ, so 
that incoherence is avoided. However, I argued that on the one hand this 
strategy can’t avoid inflating the composite Christ into two persons, so we have 
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Nestorian heresy. On the other hand, attempts to avoid this unwelcome result 
lead atemporalists headlong into the heresy of Apollinarianism – an equally 
unacceptable result.  
I turned back to temporalism in Chapter 4, and argued that it can fare 
much better at avoiding the incoherence problem. This is no thanks to two 
minds models, however – as I argued at the start of this chapter. I claimed that 
these models, when understood as compositionalist, face similar worries to 
atemporal compositionalism. Understood in an alternative, transformationalist, 
sense in which one mind comes to ‘contain’, or ‘include’ the other, I argued 
that we end up either ascribing false beliefs to the divine mind, or else 
impinging upon the freedom of the human mind. It’s an alternative 
transformationalist model, kenoticism, that I argued is able to come to the 
rescue for temporalists and successfully avoid the incoherence problem. I 
responded to objections that a kenotically incarnate God can’t be truly divine, 
and also that a kenotically incarnate God can’t be immutable. I concluded this 
part of the thesis by alleging that temporalism alone is able to avoid the 
incoherence problem.  
Part three considered the final element of the incarnation that I’m 
privileging: the Son’s glorification. I outlined Hill’s two requirements that any 
satisfactory account of the glorification must be able to meet: that the exalted 
Son is in full possession of omnipotence and omniscience, and that the exalted 
Son is fully human. Hill names these the ‘exaltation’ and ‘perpetual humanity’ 
requirements, respectively. In Chapter 5, I argued that whilst atemporalists 
have no problem in accommodating the exaltation requirement, they’re unable 
to account for the claim that the exalted Son remains ‘fully human’. The only 
way that they’re able to explain this, I argued, is by appealing to the timeless truth 
of the Son’s humanity. However, I then argued that atemporalists are unable to 
provide a satisfactory explanation of what makes this truth true. This 
incidentally bled into a more general criticism alleged against atemporalism as a 
whole: that a God who exists timelessly  is difficult to think of as any kind of 
reassuring and responsive presence.  
In Chapter 6, I argued that temporalists are able to account for the 
Son’s glorification, thanks only to kenoticism. I argued that the two minds 
theory is unable to help us here, due to running into almost identical worries to 
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those it faced in light of the incoherence problem. I considered several 
responses from the two minds theorist, arguing that they either lead to heresy, 
or else are responses that are by no means unique to the two minds account. I 
next outlined a worry for kenoticists in the shape of their being unable to 
accommodate the claim that the exalted Son is ‘fully human’. I considered 
three different ways in which the kenoticist might respond to this worry. The 
first of these two responses had in common that (for either all or part of His 
incarnation) the Son didn’t need to be kenotically incarnate in order to be 
incarnate. I argued against both of these, because they’re in tension with the 
common-sense essence of kenoticism: that possessing omniscience and 
omnipotence are incompatible with being human. The third and final response 
that I considered retained this important element of kenoticism, but qualified 
what we mean by ‘human’. That is, I argued that the glorified Son is 
experientially (but not ontologically) human, and this generates no conflict with 
His possession of omnipotence and omniscience. I therefore concluded this 
part of the thesis by asserting that kenoticists (and so, temporalists) alone are 
able to make sense of the Son’s glorification.  
Having prioritised these three aspects of the incarnation, and argued 
that they strongly suggest in favour of a God who exists inside of time, I then 
took a step back from this claim. That is, Part four examined how debates in 
the metaphysics of time can affect our understanding of divine eternity. I 
argued that such debates are the most illuminating and supportive of a temporal 
God, which independently supports my conclusion of Parts 1-3. Chapter 7 
considered what it can mean to say that God exists ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ of time 
by examining the debate between substantivalists and relationists about time. I 
firstly argued that substantivalism has been all too readily assumed in the 
foregoing debate over God’s relation to time. I next examined Le Poidevin’s 
RR-relationist account of God’s relation to time. This attributes (at once) two 
senses of atemporality, and one sense of temporality, to God. I argued that 
both of these senses of divine atemporality face many problems, as well as 
being in conflict with one another. However, I argued that Le Poidevin’s sense 
of God existing ‘within’ RR-relationist time is coherent. When we argue that, in 
light of the incarnation, God ought to be ‘temporal’, we’re therefore free to 
understand time as either substantival or relational.  
 267 
 
Finally, I turned in Chapter 8 to consider the debate between tensed 
and tenseless theories of time, demonstrating that this has a bearing on what 
we mean when we talk about God’s relation to time. I outlined the traditional 
pairings that have been assumed in the foregoing debate: a timeless God with 
tenseless time, and a temporal God with tensed time. I considered how we 
might challenge these pairings – firstly by considering Leftow’s argument that a 
timeless God can exist outside of presentist time. I argued that this account is 
incoherent, as is the picture of a timeless God existing outside of any form of 
tensed time. Atemporalists therefore only have tenseless time to work with. I 
next considered the untraditional and unexplored pairing of a temporal God 
and tenseless time, which I argued is coherent. I sketched how God could 
persist through time on this account, and suggested that this account can also 
accommodate the Son becoming kenotically incarnate. I concluded that 
temporalists are, unlike their atemporalist rivals, free to choose between time 
being tensed or tenseless. This flexibility can only be an added benefit for 
divine temporalism. 
I began this thesis with the following central research question: 
 
Assuming an orthodox understanding of the doctrine of the incarnation, what does this tell us 
about God’s relation to time? 
 
The answer, to summarise, is that God can’t be atemporal, because a timeless 
God isn’t compatible with important (and orthodox) aspects of the 
incarnation. Rather, God (if He exists) is temporal, and He became incarnate 
kenotically. We’re free to make what we will of the nature of time itself, 
however – although I demonstrated that the picture of a temporal God can 
look quite different depending on our metaphysics of time. I therefore 
conclude that, by privileging an orthodox metaphysics of the incarnation, I 
have ‘found time’ for the Christian God. 
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